The Sudan: Part II
1885-1899

Advance to Omdurman, 1897

by Lynn Bodin

Kitchener now took a break and sailed to England to plead his case for a total reconquest of the Sudan. Now was the time to avenge Gordon, destroy the Khalifa, rescue the Sudanese people from their tyrannical overlord, restore Egyptian rule to the headwaters of the Nile, and check the advances of the French. There were plenty of interested listeners in the government offices. The Sirdar returned to Cairo in December with permission to proceed and promises of British troops, if they were needed. Work began immediately on the plans for the advance up the Nile to Omdurman.

Supply was again to prove a major problem. Once more, Kitchener chose to build a railway to supply his army. He decided to abandon any plans to continue the line along the Nile beyond Dongola. instead, an entire new railway would be constructed from Wadi Halfa, straight across the Nubian Desert to Abu Hamed. On January 1st, 1897, construction began and by the middle of July the tracks were almost half-way to their goal.

The Khalifa, still angry over the loss of Dongola without a fight, had not been sitting idly by watching the Egyptian army advance. In May he had summoned the Emir Mahmud Ahmad and his 10,000 man Army of the West to Omdurman. Mahmud, itching for a fight, begged to be sent North to oppose the Sirdar. In June, the Khalifa consented and Mahmud marched towards Metemma. By the first of July, over 10,000 Mahdists were in Metemma with Mahmud and entrenching to oppose the Egyptians.

The railway was continuing to advance and Kitchener now needed to capture Abu Harried. A flying column of 3,600 men under MajorGeneral Hunter set out from Merowe on July 29 and arrived at Abu Harried on August 7. The 700-man Mahdist garrison refused to surrender, so Hunter stormed the town. The natives fought to the last, leaving over 250 dead before the town was secured. The gunboat flotilla was now hauled over the fourth cataract and, by the 29th of August, five gunboats had reached Abu Harried to help protect the future rail head.

Zaki Uthman, the Khalifa's commander at Berber, was fearful of an Egyptian attack following their capture of Abu Hamed. In early August, Mahmud tried to calm Zaki by writing him that reinforcements would be sent shortly from Metemma. By the 24th, Zaki was losing control of his troops. The promised reinforcements still had not arrived, so he evacuated Berber and fell back to Shendi, south of the river Atbara. General Hunter, on hearing rumors of Zaki's withdrawal, sent 40 irregular camelmen to investigate. The scouts reached Berber on the 31st and occupied the town, sending a message back to Hunter informing him of their actions.

Risk

Kitchener, caught off-guard by this sudden capture of a town he figured he'd have to fight for, was now forced to make a major tactical decision. Should he send a force to Berber, nearly 130 miles beyond his railhead supply base, or should he abandon the city? If Mahmud were to move swiftly and in force, the garrison would be easily cut-off and probably overcome. The Sirdar decided to take a risk, something he had never done until now, and try to hold Berber. He hoped that Mahmud would not see the Egyptian weakness and would not attack. The Mahdists did not oppose the Egyptian occupation of Berber with a brigade in September.

Uthman Digna, now between two Egyptian forces (at Berber and Suakin) abandoned his headquarters at Adarama and pulled south. The Berber-Suakin caravan route was reopened and supplies began moving into Berber from two directions. In mid-October, Kitchener's three largest (and newest) gunboats reached Berber and began scouting operations on the Nile against Mahmud at Metemma.

On the last day of October, the railway reached Abu Harried. The problems related to maintaining the garrison at Berber were now greatly simplified. The falling of the Nile in November threatened to trap Kitchener's gunboats north of the River Atbara. Not wishing to have to drag the boats over the shallows, the Sirdar decided to establish a base at the confluence of the Nile and the Atbara. This base soon grew into a major fortified camp, Fort Atbara.

On Christmas Day, 1897, the Italians (still hard-pressed by the Abyssinians) chose to turn over the garrison at Kassala to the Egyptians. In a year of campaigning, the Egyptians had extended their railroad over 200 miles, cleared 300 additional miles of the Nile of Mahdists, and re-occupied Abu Harried, Berber and Kassala--all of this had been accomplished with only the slightest resistance from the Khalifa and his troops. Kitchener, realizing that the inactivity of the Mahdist armies had to end soon, requested a Brigade of British troops as reinforcements on January 1, 1898.

Once again, the Sirdar's intuitions appeared to be right on target. In the middle of February, Mahmud and his army began to move north from Metemma. They crossed the Nile to Shendi and joined forces with Uthman Digna's army. The combined Mahdist army took a month to march 50 miles to Aliab. Mahmud's intentions, which exhibited little originality or advance planning, were for a direct frontal assault on the Anglo-Egyptian positions at Fort Atbara.

Uthman Digna, realizing from experience that 16,000 ansar with 10 guns would have no chance of success against the Sirdar's 14,000 men with 24 guns and 12 maxims (plus the gunboats) favored a different plan of operations. Uthman thought that the Mahdists would have more success if they outflanked Fort Atbara and raided Kitchener's supply lines north of Berber. As neither Mahmud nor Uthman could agree on a combined plan of operations, they turned to the Khalifa for a decision. Abdallahi sided with Uthman and Mahmud did not argue with the decision.

On March 18, the Mahdist forces made a right turn and marched across the desert between the Nile and the Atbara. They planned to cross the Atbara (currently almost dry) and continue north across the desert before turning back to the Nile, thereby bypassing Fort Atbara. Mahmud reached Nakhaila, on the Atbara, on the 20th. Here the ansar halted and constructed a fortified camp. The perimeter was ringed by a thorn bush zeriba, a low stockade of palm logs and three lines of trenches. Within the camp, intermingled with the natives' huts, were numerous small trenches and rifle pits.

Waiting

For two weeks the opposing armies sat in their respective forts, less than 20 miles apart, trying each others' patience. Supply problems for the Mahdists soon prevented the army from continuing northward, for they had run out of food. Too proud (or stubborn) to move, Mahmud sat and waited for Kitchener to act. The Sirdar's patience gave out in early April and, beginning on the 4th, four days of cautious advances (including a night march during the night of 7-8 April) brought the Anglo-Egyptian Army to a position overlooking Nakhaila. Kitchener's plan, despite his previous experience, lacked originality and was not much more tactically sound than Mahmud' s original idea for a frontal assault on Fort Atbara. Preceded by a heavy artillery bombardment, the three Egyptian and one British infantry brigades were to just force their way into the Mahdist camp.

After more than an hour of continuous artillery fire, with pipes, drums and bugles playing, the Anglo-Egyptian army attacked at 7:40 AM on April 8, 1898. As the troops neared the zeriba, Mahmud's men, for the most part unscathed by the earlier barrage, emerged from their trenches and met the Sirdar's troops with a blistering volume of rifle fire. Not expecting such resistance, the advance was momentarily checked before it recovered and burst into the Mahdist camp. For nearly an hour the Anglo-Egyptian troops worked their way in small groups rooting Mahmud's men from their trenches and rifle pits. Finally, the remnants of the Mahdists broke and fled south across the Atbara.

The battle was over, but the Anglo-Egyptian army had paid dearly for their victory. Over 550 men had been killed or wounded by the Mahdists. Mahmud's army was destroyed. Uthman Digna managed to keep control of about 4,000 men and made a reasonably organized retreat to Gedaref. Nearly 3,000 ansar were killed and hundreds captured, including Mahmud. The rest of the Mahdists were scattered into the desert and ceased to be an effective part of the Khalifa's army.

After the battle of Atbara, the Sirdar's army went into summer quarters at Fort Atbara. They sat peacefully for four months waiting for reinforcements and the rise of the Nile. The Khalifa, too, spent the summer gathering troops for the final confrontation. To some extent, Abdallahi still held the trump card, as he could choose where to oppose the advance of the Anglo-Egyptian army. The most obvious natural obstacle to Kitchener's advance was the Sabalucla gorge, 50 miles north of Omdurman. Here, the Nile narrowed as its waters dropped through the 6th Cataract. The gunboats would be most vulnerable to artillery fire from the shore along the gorge. The army would either have to march inland, bypassing the rocky terrain along the gorge (and losing support of the gunboats), or it would have to advance along a narrow front, hugging the banks of the gorge. In either case, the fighting strength of the Sirdar's army would be compromised. Consequently, Sabaluqa was chosen by the Khalifa as the front line of defense. Seven forts were built at or near the entrance to the gorge. Each had walls ten feet thick and could hold three artillery pieces and a section of riflemen.

During the first week of July, after the forts were completed and two batteries of artillery were in place, the Khalifa suddenly ordered the Sabaluda positions abandoned. Astonished, Abdallahi's generals and advisors were at a loss to figure out why their carefully planned defense of the gorge was so abruptly terminated. Several explanations have been presented for Abdallahi's decision. The most accepted reason is that the Khalifa feared that the Sabaluqa positions were too isolated to adequately supply with ammunition, food and reinforcements.

Remembering the sorry state of logistical support which Mahmud's army received at the Atbara, the Khalifa decided to fortify the area around his capital, Omdurman, and take his chances with one major battle against the Anglo-Egyptian army. The stage was set for the engagement which would decide the fate of the Mahdiyya.

In July, a fourth brigade of Egyptian troops and a second British brigade arrived at Fort Atbara, Kitchener's army now numbered almost 26,000 supported by 44 guns, 20 maxims and 10 gunboats armed with 36 guns and 24 machine guns. In the middle of August, the Sirdar's army began moving south. Slowly, and without opposition, the Anglo-Egyptian forces worked their way towards Omdurman and the Khalifa's army. On the 1st of September they camped around the village of Egaiga, just six and a half miles from the Mahdist capital. Cavalry scouts soon located the Khalifa's army, west of Omdurman and moving north towards the Kerrari hills, near Egaiga. Kitchener's army began to quickly strengthen its position. By mid- afternoon, the Mahdists halted and it became clear that they did not plan to attack at the prsent time.

More Sudan Part II

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