The Sudan: Part II
1885-1899

The Invasion of Egypt, 1889

by Lynn Bodin

With the Abyssinian border reasonably secure, Abdallahi now turned his eyes northward. Since December of 1885 and their defeat at Ginnis, the Mahdists had been content to sit and watch the undeclared "no-man's land" which existed along the Egyptian frontier. In early 1889, the Emir Abd al-Rahman wad al-Najumi, with a force of 5,000 men and 8,000 camp followers stood ready at the last major Mahdist outpost, Saras. It's difficult to understand why the Khalifa decided on such a small force for his invasion of Egypt. The best explanation is that he believed the Egyptian army to be no better than Hick's rabble, despite nearly seven years of British supervised reorganization and training.

On the 1st of July, 1889, Najumi and his small army advanced into Egypt. The plan was to bypass many of the Egyptian garrisons by marching inland, away from the Nile. The ultimate objective was Bimban, 25 miles north of Aswan, where the appearance of the Mahdist force was to coincide with a massive popular rebellion. This objective may have been attainable by a well-organized, fastmoving mounted force, but Najumi's rabble with its camp followers doomed from the beginning. By the end of July, the Mahdists had not quite reached the village of Toski (more properly Tushki), not even half- way to their objective. Worse still, besides their pitifully slow pace, Najumi's force had shrunk to only about 3,300 fighting men and about 4,000 camp followers.

The invasion had not gone unnoticed. Major-General Grenfell, Sirdar of the Egyptian Army, had followed it closely and was concentrating a combined Egyptian and British army to meet and defeat the Mahdists. Without his entire force, Grenfell decided to oppose Najumi at Toski. All the Egyptian troops were available, but only the cavalry had arrived from the British brigade. On the morning of August 3, 1889, the battle commenced.

The Mahdists advanced against the Egyptian troops, who to their astonishment, did not turn and flee but instead served up murderous volleys of rifle fire. The battle quickly disintegrated and then it was over. Najumi was dead, as wereover 1200of his men. Almost4,000of the Khalifa's followers wereprisoners. Only about 800 escaped to tell of thebattle. Egyptian casualties were 25 killed and 140 wounded. The Mahdists, shocked and disheartened, abandoned Saras and withdrew all the way to Suarda, nearly 130 miles south of Wadi Haifa, the southernmost Egyptian garrison. For the first time, refugees in sizable numbers began arriving in Egypt. During the months immediately following Toski, nearly 20,000 former followers of the Khalifa streamed into Wadi Haifa. This was the beginning of the decline of the Mahdist state in the Sudan.

As if the set-back at Toski wasn't a severe enough blow to the Khalifa's administration, a natural disaster now struck the Mahdists. The years of absence frorn'the fields by the ansar finally took their toll on the crops.

In 1888, the rains failed. Normally, the natives could have salvaged enough grain to make it through 1889, but with most of the men gone to war, it did not happen this year. The famine of 1889 was severe, even in the capital city, Omdurman, cart-loads of dead left the city each day. When the rains did come, the prayers of thanks by the people were quickly overcome by a plague of locusts. Another year of suffering fell upon the Sudanese people.

Internal political problems troubled the Khalifa during 1891. The Ashraf, feeling that the previous two years of famine had weakened Abdallahi's grasp on the country, turned to Muhammad al-Sharif to lead the revolt. The Khalifa's intelligence system proved too competent, however, and the rebellion of November 1891, was over before it had hardly begun. The next year saw Abdallahi systematically exileing and killing all his possible enemies. The revolt of the Ashraf was crushed and the last serious political threat to the Khalifa was gone.

Another serious military blow was dealt to the Mahdists in 1891. Uthman Digna was again threatening Suakin. The Egyptian General Staff, through Sir Evelyn Baring in Cairo, was finally able to convince the Prime Minister, Lord Salisbury, that a punitive expedition was needed to eliminate the constant pressure which Uthman Digna was applying to Suakin. On February 7, 1891, Salisbury consented to the expedition. Almost immediately, a force of nearly 2,000 men (all Egyptian) left Suakin for Trinkitat and the ultimate goal of Tokar. The Egyptians had hoped for only moderate resistance. They were met, however, by Uthman's main army of almost 7,000 men. The Mahdists attacked swiftly and were soon threatening to completely surround the Egyptian firing lines.

Uthman expected a slaughter similar to Baker Pasha's defeat in 1883. He was more than surprised when the new English-trained Egyptian troops held firm and patiently fired volley after volley into the charging natives. The attacks soon disintegrated and Uthman's troops fled, leaving nearly 700 dead on the battlefield. Uthman's prestige among the local tribes was smashed. He was forced to withdraw to Adarama, 200 miles to the west. The new Egyptian army had again proven itself, even more so than it had at Toski.

More troubles in the east befell the Khalifa's empire. In November of 1893, the Italians defeated Ahmad wad Ali at Agordat. A few months later, in July 1894, the Italians under General Baratieri captured Kassala. The loss of Kassala, the largest town in the eastern Sudan, was a serious blow to the Khalifa. Though he made a major display of organizing and planning an expedition for Kassala's recapture, the venture was never undertaken.

In the south, Equatoria and the Bahr El Ghazal, which had never been fully occupied by the Mahdists (even after the Egyptian garrisons had been overcome and Emin Pasha "rescued" by Stanley) were now slowly slipping from the Khalifa's grasp. Both the French and the Belgians were making inroads into territory previously claimed by the Mahdists. Abdallahi, too fearful of a major Anglo- Egyptian invasion from the north, could not commit troops to the south. He was powerless to oppose the Belgian and French probes into his southern provinces.

More Sudan Part II

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