(reprinted from Savage and Soldier, Vol. X No. 4, Oct-Dec 1978) I was put in a reflective mood recently when going over some back issues of Savage and Soldier; specifically by issues VI/4 through VII/3 when a controversy raged within our pages over wargame rules and the nature of colonial wargaming. It was a controversy prematurely brought to an end, and unfortunately so, for the questions it raised have not been taken up again by this or any other journal. The controversy was ostensibly about a set of rules published in an earlier issue. Some New England wargamers had tried them out and were dissatisfied with them, and their complaints were forwarded to me by a man who was, among other things, a professional rule writer. His main complaint seemed to have been that the rules were poorly written, and his criticisms were aimed to help improve their clarity. While granting some of his claims, I was intrigued by what he presented as the main proof of the unworkability of our rules. in the game he referred to, the British player found himself forced (by our rules) to dismantle an unwieldy square and go after his opponent, maximizing his firepower by deploying in line. The native player, apparently unprepared for such a tactic, was mopped up without (so my critic informed me with great disgust) giving the British a chance to "bloody their bayonets." This was clearly no way to fight a colonial wargame! I was then, and I remain now, extremely pleased by this criticism, for it seems that our rules forced at least one player to fight a colonial wargame as most colonial battles were fought instead of the way he thought they should have been fought. But what perplexes me now, is that to fight the battle the right way caused such extreme dissatisfaction. This same paradox arose at this year's (1978) National Wargame Convention at Reading (U.K.) The competition regulations produced head-on collisions for all battles, including colonial competition. There were only three of us fighting colonial battles (so my coming in second can be seen as second from the top or bottom), and I think we all agreed, after the dust and shouting was over, that colonial wargames had to be set up differently from conventional (or convention?) wargames. Some recognizable objectives had to be introduced, even if negatively; i.e. to prevent the opponent from achieving something within a time limit. One of the players pointed out to me that in his wargame circle such a game would not likely be popular, as most wargamers wanted to fight to the finish rather than accept a tie, or a defeat when most of their army was still intact. I replied that that sort of wargamer would be unlikely to be interested in playing colonial wargames. But what sort of player does like playing colonial wargames, and what sort of wargames are colonial wargames? It is my firm conviction that no enjoyable colonial wargames can be played if it is a refight of Ulundi or Omdurman or any other battle of such massive firepower. It was the best strategy of the Imperial army to try to maneuver its enemy into such a battle,just as it was the best strategy of the native army to prevent such a battle from coming about. In wargames something else needs to be tried which can allow the native army to claim a strategic victory, even if its casualties are higher than the Imperial army. Strategic Victory? What is a strategic victory? Let us look at two battles of the Desert Column of the Sudan for an example. By all accounts the British won the battles of Abu Klea and Abu Kru (or Gubat). By all accounts the Mahdists thought they had lost them as they certainly hoped to annihilate the Camel Corps and their own losses caused the Mahdi great distress. But what was the ultimate effect of those two battles? First, the British lost enough men by rifle fire and melee to force them to revise their plans and delay their next move. The commanders of the column lost faith in the Heavy Camel Corps after Abu Klea and removed them from the front line of battle; thus reducing the amount of troops in front line fighting. The column did not have enough men or supplies after both battles to take Metemmah when it finally got to the river. It had lost most of the Naval Brigade, so it was unable to employ Gordon's steamers as soon as they hoped. In this condition the Desert Column was unable to do anything to avert or delay the fall of Khartoum, which was its sole objective. With "victories" like that in 1896-98, the Anglo- Egyptian Army would never have taken Omdurman. In a wargame reconstruction of the battle of Abu Klea, I would suggest that the natives would win if they depleted the Imperial force by a certain percentage before it was able to get off the board, while maintaining a certainof their own troops intact. This may not appeal to many commanders of Imperial troops, but if our rules are to reflect a certain accuracy in firepower and expense of troop types, should not our wargames reflect more closely the conditions of colonial warfare? Should we revise our ideas of wargame "victory", and should we set up our colonial wargames in a different way? The idea of introducing "strategic victories" to thewargame table is not new and indeed has been used in many board games. it does not seem to be a popular idea among wargamers using figures. If wargamers, as someone told me recently, like to fight to a clear finish, and that finish is indicated by seizing ground and killing the enemy, few wargamers having taken most or all of the important positions on a table and having inflicted more casualties on the opponent than they have received, will accept at the end of the game that they have been defeated. For campaign purposes they might admit to a Pyrrhic victory, but it is to them a victory none the less. As most wargamers fight in conventional periods where the opposing forces are more or less equal, this reluctance to turn victory into defeat is understandable for such a reversal is unnecessary. For those who fight in the colonial period where opposing armies must be balanced inequalities, the consideration of such a strange outcome is necessary. While not wanting to turn colonial wargames into a donkey racewhere the loser wins, we must consider the nature of colonial campaigns and battles in order to recreate the essence of colonial warfare in individual wargames. Colonial strategists frequently urged that the aim of the Imperial army in a colonial war was to inflict so heavy a defeat on their enemy as to make him acknowledge defeat and submit. This was done by forcing the enemy into battle where severe casualties could be inflicted. The seizing of villages, crops or herds was done primarily to bring the enemy to battle, but the most favored method was to establish oneself in a strong defensive position in the enemy's territory and provoke him to attack. Successful Campaign A successful campaign might consist of a series of battles where the Imperial troops used a defensive position (such as a square) aggressively, or at least provocatively, and which ended in one large battle such as Ulundi or Omdurman in which the enemy's army and his will to fight was completely and decisively destroyed. Many of the best known and best loved colonial campaigns followed or tried to follow this pattern. There are other less well known and less well loved campaigns where the imperial strategy was thwarted by the enemy refusing to conform to what was expected of him. In these campaigns the native forces either denied the Imperial troops a chance to engage in a decisive battle, or managed to force the imperial troops to stretch their own resources to the limit and thus be obliged to break off hostilities, at least temporarily. This was especially so of campaigns conducted on the frontier of an empire, or guerilla campaigns in parts of the empire that were too distant or undeveloped to defend properly, or where Imperial policy was one of maintaining a presence only, or of containing hostility to a manageable level until such time as the full resources of the empire could be turned on the problem. As wargamers, we are primarily concerned with the military aspects of colonial wars - of weapons, training, logistics and tactics. These are the elements that can most easily be transferred to the wargame table. Since most wargames are isolated battles and not part of a campaign, our objectives are restricted to those that can be used on the wargame table as well. In general we have not considered what motives and objectives of the different sides in a colonial campaign might have been, because we cannot see how such intangibles can be translated into military terms that can in turn be transferred to our miniature combats (I have played only one game where local political considerations were effectively incorporated into the battle, and that was a Northwest Frontier skirmish game of Ted Herbert's where both the British authorities and the bandit chief had to be careful not to antagonize the uncommitted tribesmen who were also on the board). Resources In the history of colonial campaigns, the resources of the Imperial troops were crucial in determining the length and outcome of the campaign. When, for a variety of reasons (political or logistic), the Imperial forces in the area were restricted by their resources in what they could accomplish, very often they were content to inflict what they called a "salutory lesson" and withdraw without accomplishing much of military value. The native state's ability to estimate the limit of the resources was also important. In many places resistance and even battlefield tactics were determined by underestimating such resources, while in other places surrender and submission in battle or at the end of the campaign came about by overestimating them. In the end it was the Imperial countries' ability to recover from reverses and engage in extended campaigns, or a series of campaigns, without greatly straining the country as a whole that brought them their colonial conquests. Native resources were much more limited; thus their ability to fight a war was limited, whatever their success in guerilla tactics or evading the enemy. In most campaigns, then, where the Imperial troops were trying to obtain a victory, the native armies were usually limited to two options: to prevent a victory, or at least to avoid a defeat. The longer they could do this, the more strained the Imperial resources would be, at least locally, and eventually the campaign would be called off (Bunyoro and Somaliland are good examples of this). This strategy led to a number of "chasse aux negres," as one Frenchman put it, of a most irritating and even demoralizing sort for the Eurpeans involved. In battles where the Imperial troops tried to force a decisive battle in order to inflict heavy casualties, and the natives succeeded by withdrawing in a fighting retreat without suffering many casualties, the natives have to be acknowledged as the winners, having achieved their objective by preventing the Imperial troops from achieving their objective. Such strategic constraints on the way the battles were fought led many of the imperial officers to underestimate the personal courage of their enemies and denigrate them as cowards. When von LettowVorbeck adopted in East Africa the tactics which the Herero and Nama had used against the Germans in South West Africa, hewas much praised for his ability. Yet he was doing, with the resources of a modern army, what less developed peoples and states had done in Africa over a half century of colonial wars. Translation The problem for wargamers is how to translate a war of survival into a wargame of survival, one that will involve combat as well as maneuver, where the outcome is determined by a clear objective, even if the objective is off the board. There are a number of scenarios possible, and as long as the set you use includes a balanced system of set-up points, most sets of colonial rules can easily be used. The simplest scenario of a strategic victory of the sort mentioned at the beginning of this article is the one in which an Imperial army starts at one end of the board and tries to get off at the other end within a reasonable time limit, and with a certain percentage of its force intact. It is, therefore, required to move and cannot afford to entrench itself in an impregnable position to repulse all attackers. The native force must reduce its enemy by a certain amount within the time limit. Depending on the size of the game and troops involved, the natives might have the added restriction of maintaining a certain percentage of their own force intact as well. It is forced to attack, but also to feint and to delay, to do what it can to slow down or stop, and reduce the opposing column. Once the time limit is up, or once the enemy is reduced by the required amount he can withdraw and the game is his. In a real game of survival the positions would be reversed, and the native force must avoid giving battle and get off the board with a certain percentage of troops, or perhaps with a herd or a group of civilians intact. It must try to cover its retreat, while the European force tries to find it and bring it to battle. In battles of this sort much depends on terrain and positioning of troops at the beginning of the game. The introduction of herds and civilians would especially be appropriate in South West Africa or Nez Perce Indian games. Another type of battle might consist of a series of small villages, oasis or watering holes which would be occupied by, or behind the lines of the native forces at the start of the battle. The objective of the Imperial troops would be to bring the natives to battle and reduce their overall force by a minimum percentage. The Imperial troops would gain nothing by the occupation of a village or oasis, but the natives would lose points if the enemy does occupy them. The total points of all the villages should equal the amount of points in men that are needed to give the Imperial troops victory. Thus the Imperial troops win if they force the natives to lose a certain number of points, one way or another. The Imperial troops must maneuver the natives into a fight within a certain time limit, and the natives must calculate the risks of avoiding a fight in one place, leaving a village to possible occupation by the enemy, and fighting, at least for a short while, in another. The Imperial troops must decide on their part whether to reduce its main force by garrisoning occupied villages to prevent reoccupation, or to leave the villages unprotected and risk the return of the native force. These are but two ways of fighting wargames of survival which do not involve effective destruction of the opposing force or complete occupation of the board to gain victory. They are best fought on large boards with small numbers of figures, but quite sizable games can be fought. They require care in setting up the terrain and adjusting the points and percentages involved. Limited observation for the imperial troops and hidden movement for the natives are essential. The time limit especially reflects the limited resources available to the local Imperial forces, for in campaigns time was usually on the natives' side, while in the broader course of the Imperial conquest it was not. These wargames of survival involve certain handicaps for the imperial forces which represent historical limitations. They are, I believe, closer to the spirit of most colonial campaigns that were fought near the end of the last century. They should appeal to all those who really are interested in thoses types of campaigns and the warfare they involved. They are one way of balancing in wargames the inequalities inherent in the opposing armies in colonial campaigns. More Campaign Ideas Colonial Wargame Campaign Ideas: Introduction Colonial Wargame Campaign Ideas: Wargames of Survival Colonial Wargame Campaign Ideas: Frontiers and Wargames Back to Table of Contents -- Courier Vol. V #3 To Courier List of Issues To MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 1984 by The Courier Publishing Company. This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com