The Spanish Civil War
The Guadalahara Offensive

Organization of the Italian Forces

by Pat Condray
photos by the author

The Italian formation of the insurgent engaged on the Guadalajara consisted of:

    Corps CIC General Mancini
    Corps Staff (apparently no corps troops)
    1st Division- Major General Bergonzoli
    2nd Division- Major General Nuvoloni*
    3rd Division- Major General Coppi.

    There is a slight doubt as to the existence of the 3rd division.
    *Coppi and Nuvolini are reversed in this document.

Italian CR32 fighter attacks Republican Truck Columns.

There were, as the Italian prisoners had stated on the 10th of March 1937 [12] , four divisions. There were also no few corps troops. The 2nd Blackshirt, Fiamme Nere, was assigned from Corps a brigade strength element, the Gruppo Francisci, which contained the 4th and 5th Blackshirt Regiments. Also, according to a TOE compiled by Jack Radey [8] there were four artillery gruppos, one of 75mm L27 guns (3 batteries of 4 guns), two of 100mmL17 howitzers (2 x 4 gun batteries) and one of 149mml12 howitzers (2 x 3 gun batteries.) Another body of artillery consisted of a gruppo of 75mm guns, two of 100mml17 howitzers, and one of 105mmL28 guns (2 X 3 gun batteries.) These were to participate in the opening barrage, but be reallocated to the 3rd Blackshirt Division afterwards for the exploitation. Also a part of this command were an AA gruppo with 2 batteries of 20mm L65 automatic AA guns, and 2 batteries of 75mm L40 AA guns. Littorio and at least the 2nd and 3rd Blackshirt Divisions seem to have had one 4-gun battery of excellent Breda 20mm automatic anti-aircraft guns.

Two tank companies of the diminutive L3 33/35 tankettes were also allocated to the 2nd Blackshirt Division for the breakthrough. There seem to have been four such companies with the equivalent of a strong company of flame-thrower versions. The 3rd and 4th companies, 10 tanks each, were detached to the 2nd Blackshirt Division for the breakthrough, and may have remained until that division was relieved on the Brihuega front by the 1st Blackshirt (Dio Lo Voule).

But by far the most interesting of the Corps troops was the so-called “Ragruppament Reparti Specializata. It consisted of two tank companies, the 1st and 2nd, a motorcycle company (Bersaglieri), Armored Car company (Lancia M1917 armored cars), an assault company with a dozen CV 33LF flame thrower tanks (Lanzalmas) and three platoons of engineer flame-throwers. This task force also included a battery of 4 x 20mm Breda AA guns and another of 4 x 47mmL32 AT guns (as far as I can tell these were the only specialized anti-tank guns in the C.T.V. at that point) and a Motorized Repair Unit. All elements were fully motorized.

Motorcycle (Bersaglieri) Company

There is some confusion about the motorcycle (Bersaglieri) company. An unsigned article in ABANDERADO Volume II/4 [13] reports a total of seven companies of motor cycle machine gunners (Motomitraglieri Bersaglieri) leaving Naples in January 1937 for Cadiz. Although that article reports “At Guadalajara in 1937 the main bulk of the Bersaglieri went into action with the Reparti Specializzatti the latter organization is always given as having one such company. But it was apparently of machine gunners. It was an 8mm weapon mounted on the handlebars but with a bipod for dismounted action. The weapon could be fired at the halt from the motorcycle. It is claimed that the Bersaglieri were originally attached to Littorio. Thus it might be reasoned that the MG Battalion was composed of several of the missing Bersaglieri companies. But this is not supported by either the prisoners from that battalion (who seem to have been quite talkative) or any other source. Thus I am inclined to consider the battalion a truck mounted MMG unit. It is so treated by Greg Novak in CPQ 8.

Although different sources give different artillery components, the range of numbers for the C.T.V. artillery are roughly from 134 to 176 guns over 65mm, with 68 of the latter, plus four AT guns and various AA guns. Even the low-end numbers are enormous by contemporary Spanish standards.

The great weakness of this massive force was in training, organization, and morale. The Blackshirts were not what anyone would consider fanatics, except, in their own estimation, the officers. Those who had actually volunteered were often family men averaging a decade older than the ideal 18-25 year old conscript. They were fairly well paid and fed. Many seem to have been under the impression that they were being sent to Ethiopia as occupation troops.

Even the regular army Littorio Motor Division, under the enthusiastic and relatively capable General Annibale (Electric Whiskers) Bergonzoli, had been formed as they arrived at Cadiz in February. According to Lieutenant Saqui Aquile:

“He arrived in Spain on February 6th...From there they went to Santa Maria Port and stayed there fifteen days...The division was organized in Spain...On board those who did not know how to handle their weapons were trained.”

Not what you would call long term professionals. And these were the regular Italian army troops. They were far and away better trained and organized than the Blackshirt “volunteers” which should have been enough to scare the daylights out of the C.T.V. command. On the other hand, it is probable that the special weapons elements, and in particular the mortars and artillery, were drawn from regular army units and had a basic familiarity with the tools of their trade. The motorcycle companies (mainly Bersaglieri), and armored units were also professionals.

This force, which probably numbered between 30,000 and 40,000 troops, was not entirely without Spanish Nationalist support. In fact, there was a Spanish force called the “Soria Division” assembled in the vicinity of Soria under General Moscardo (hero of the Alcazar) which numbered more than any pair of C.T.V. Divisions. It was very different in character. The Marzo Brigade contained an “Agrupacion Sotelo (commanded by a Major Sotelo) with a mounted reconnaissance platoon and four battalions, each probably of four rifle and a machinegun company, thus more men than a C.T.V. battalion. These were drawn from the America (II Btn), Bailen (VIII), Toledo (III) and La Victoria (VI) Regiments. They were supported by a tank company, an artillery grupo or battalion of horse drawn 75mm (French soixante-quinze) guns, an AA/AT battery of Italian 20mm L65 guns. In the Agrupacion Aldecoa (Major Aldecoa) there was a Carlist Requete battalion of large size, but which apparently had few if any automatic weapons. Another Agrupacion under Pita Daviega had 4 cavalry squadrons, a recon troop, and probably cavalry machinegun elements.

The Spanish force was thus very different in character from the C.T.V. It was afoot and on horseback. There were few tanks and trucks. It would walk or ride horses wherever it went. It was composed of pre-war soldiers or volunteers, many with months of combat experience. They tended to have few automatic weapons, and only seven artillery batteries, all but one of 75mm guns. This WWI technology force would obviously attack, and if necessary, defend in a very different style from that of the C.T.V. But its rank and file were on the other hand much better trained and motivated.

The Attack

The allied forces lined up with the Spanish on the right flank. Opposing them on a front of several miles was a single Republican Division, the 12th. Based on various sources, including a Soviet account published by Spanish Civil War veterans in 1940, This force was estimated by the Italians (per Jack Radey’s unpublished manuscript) at 6,000 to 7,000 men, but the Republican sources as many as 10,000 men. Jack attributes the difference to the fact that the Italians were counting front line units while the Republicans counted divisional reserves.

These numbers worked out to 5 Brigata Mixta of 11 front line and 3 reserve battalions, a cavalry squadron, a tank company, and 10 front line, 12 reserve guns. In theory all Popular Army “Brigata Mixta” would have 3-5 infantry battalions and a gruppo of 3 field batteries as well as cavalry or armored car scouts and miscellaneous brigade support elements. Throughout the Guadalajara campaign the fledgling “Brigata” might have the requisite number of usually under strength battalions. But they were more likely to have a battery (if that) than a “gruppo” of artillery.

The frontage was perhaps 15-20 miles. The ground sloping down from north to south in a series of plateau, sometimes bare, sometimes wooded with the Henares River on the Spanish Nationalist (right) flank the Tajuna River on the C.T.V. left. The 12th Division was a fairly strong formation as Spanish divisions went in those days. But with ten guns on the line, and perhaps 80 Italian guns in the opening barrage, it stood little chance. And since it was vaguely considering an offensive on a quiet front, it wasn’t heavily dug in. To put it in wargame terms, it wasn’t a balanced scenario. There was a ferocious barrage beginning at 7am. And in half an hour the reinforced 2nd Blackshirt (Fiamme Nere) advanced preceded by 20 tankettes. The front crumbled. Republican reserve formations were rushed to the front and the front line troops in some disorder fell back on reserve positions. Almadrones held overnight, but Hentenares east of the Carreterra Franzia (main highway) fell.

The 3rd Blackshirt (Penne Nere) allocated artillery and motor support was to pass through the Fiamme Nere the next day to exploit. The latter division moved forward mainly on foot with the Gruppo Francisci accompanying. The exploitation force (Penne Nere) was motorized from corps assets, and two full divisions, Dio lo Voule (1st Blackshirt) and the Littorio Motor Division were in reserve.

By morning there was an attempted ground counterattack. Four battalions supported by a claimed 20 tanks-probably FT 17s or armored cars of the company stationed behind Almadrones, attempted to pinch out the deepest point of the previous day’s penetration at Hentanares. This counterattack, which was probably in the path of the 5th Regiment (Francisci) and the 2nd Division, was quickly repulsed. Of the counter-attack, one Italian source (1) states “In various skirmishes the Republicans lost nine of the 22 tanks they employed. Both sides consumed enormous amounts of fuel because of the difficult terrain, and fuel supplies were often delayed because of congestion along the supply routes.” It is not clear what the tanks were. But that same source usually identifies anything with a gun that moves as a BT-5, so, again we are probably dealing with FT 17s or home made.

The Soria force likewise advanced, one battalion helping the Fiamme Nere take Almadrones on the morning of the 9th of March. The C.T.V. divided its attack after Almadrones with the 3rd Division following the main road (Caraterra Franzia). The 2nd Division with Gruppo Francisci moved mainly on foot. They carried Cogollor and Masegoso by the end of the day. There the 4th Regiment would hold the Tajuna crossing. The remaining elements followed a diagonal road (not on Willoughby’s Map) from a point about 3 km from the Caraterra along the Masegosa road which branches off towards Brihuega. Spanish elements plodded down the Soria-Jadreque-Miralrio-Padilla de Hita-Hita-Guadalajara road.

Padilla de Hita was secured by the 12th of March. The Spanish/C.T.V. boundary seems to have been the Badiel River flowing into the Henares west of Torre del Bulgo. Because the Badiel had steep banks, and probably from natural inclination, there was no direct cooperation between the Spanish and Italian Fascists after Almadrones on the 9th.

By the 10th the C.T.V. had seized Brihuega (where Marshall Vendome bagged Stanhope’s British rearguard in 1710) by a coup de main. Console (Colonel) Enrico Francisci woke his 5th Blackshirt Regiment early and took the town by surprise. The 3rd Penne Neri column was near Trijueque. Up to this point air activity had been limited to ineffectual bombing missions, and even less effectual attempts to intercept them. But something had been holding up the offensive. The motorized Italian spearheads had been advancing little more rapidly than the “beans and hay” advance of the Soria Division. The latter had gained about ten miles in two days, the former at most fifteen.

Obviously, even though there was no longer a continuous front, and the strong Republican (Russian) air arm had yet to so much as scout the invading force, the attack was bogging down. The thousands of trucks and dozens of fast tanks and armored cars were moving. But the rate of advance was not exceeding what good troops could easily maintain on foot, let alone horseback.

The Spanish Civil War The Guadalahara Offensive

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