By Ian Croxall
The seeds of resistance were sprouting. It didn’t happen immediately, long enough to lure the French into a false sense of security. It took time for disparate warring tribes to coalesce into an organized force to resist a common foe. The tribes had their own differences and language barriers to cross. Eventually plans were discussed, differences put aside and a resistance grew from the Tafilalt to rid Dar El Islam (the house of Islam) of the roumi infidel. The Repulse from Metarfa The murmurs of discontent spread eastwards. At Timimoun, the new Arab Bureau Officer, Falconnetti was made aware that agitation was fermenting at Metarfa. On August 28th 1900, he set out for Metarfa with a detachment of Spahis. Unable to dislodge the Kasarians from the walled village, he sent to Timimoun for reinforcements. Captain Pein and his Goumiers showed up ready for action. The resisters left the Kasar and engaged the French in a series of skirmishes in the dunes around the town. Falconnetti called for more reinforcements from Timimoun and was joined by 60 Tirailleurs and an 80-mm mountain gun. The French prepared for the attack on the Kasarians who were still occupying the dunes. The prayers of the defenders that could be overheard disconcerted Pein’s Goumiers. It no doubt crossed their minds that they were fighting with the roumi against fellow Muslims. The ineffectiveness of the gun whose lethality was drastically reduced by the absorbing effect the sand had on the exploding shell and the line of site problems created by the dunes and the goumiers’ lack of resolve was blamed for the French’s inability to dislodge the Kasarians. After three days of skirmishing, the Kasarians still held out in the dunes. Pein had just wanted to seize the undefended Kasar, but Falconnetti wisely overruled this as pointless. The French gave up and returned to Timimoun after losing an officer and several men. Over the next several months, small skirmishes from raiders in the Tafilalt resulted in more losses and prompted Falconnetti to request urgent reinforcements from the north. Counter Attack at Timimoun At Timimoun, February 1901, Major René Reibell and his complement of 160 men occupied the garrison. It was comprised of French troops of the Infanterie Légère d’Afrique (les joyeux,), Tirraileurs, machinegun sections, non-combatant, clerks, sappers, nurses and Arab Bureau staff etc. Captain Claude Quisard, second in command and 11 other officers were left in Timimoun while its overall commander General Servière took a large column, including all the artillery out on patrol as a show of force to the residents of the Tuat to the south. Timimoun was a ram shackle village at the main oasis in the Gourara. Many of the tightly packed buildings had been knocked down to facilitate communication between the two main casbahs. The principal casbah was a mud walled fortress with 3-meter walls and a square crenellated tower at each corner. This had been designated the troops’ quarters, but was in fact too small to house them all and many of the outer buildings had also been commandeered. The other, smaller, virtualy ruined casbah had become the ammunition dump. The south wall in the main casbah was crumbled down at one section there were a number of barley sacks stacked up inside of the breach. The immediate area beyond the breach was an animal holding pen with a watch station for the Goum guards who occupied a mud brick building there. On February 17th, the Arab Bureau officers went out with all the remaining Spahis and Goumiers to patrol Oulad, the next oasis to the north. Major Reibell was now without any scouts, but no trouble was expected here. On the 16th, out with the main expedition under General Servière was a patrol commanded by Captain Pein. His Goumiers brought a native back from reconnaissance patrol who told Pein that a large Moroccan harka of Berber warriors was massing at Tabelbala at the base of the Hammada de Guir. Pein was about 150 km south of Timimoun, and as Tabelbala was some 400 km from Timimoun he didn’t see this as an immediate threat. He sent a regular dispatch back to Timimoun which arrived back in Timimoun a week later on the 23rd. The only problem with this, was that by the time Pein heard of the harka at Tabelbala on the 16th, it was in fact at Charouine just 40 km southwest of Timimoun (oh the joys of communication). On the morning of the 18th, the harka of 1,500 Berbers was creeping up on the casbah in the dark. A group of thirty of the toughest Berbers, self titled the Thirty Thieves, stole through the animal park on the south wall and managed to hide themselves amongst the stacked barley sacks just inside the breach. As the mullah began the morning prayers, the main body of Moroccans opened up on the mud casbah. The French burst out of their billets in the pre dawn blackness and ran confused for a few minutes, bumping in to each other, clutching their boots trousers and lebels trying to figure out what was happening. The Thirty thieves added to the panic as French tried to locate their foe. Outside the walls of the casbah, taking fewer casualties, two platoons of Tirraileurs formed up on the east wall. Inside, the French got their act together and spent the next hour picking off the Thirty Thieves until all were dead. The French and Tirraileurs pushed back the main body of Moroccans who fell back on the oasis about 1500 meters south of the casbah. The Tirraileurs outflanked the retreating Moroccans and two groups were cut off. One of the groups holed up in a building by the oasis and was attacked by the Tirraileurs who were beaten back when they began to take casualties, two of whom were their officers. The second group of thirteen took refuge in the guards’ hut in the center of what was the animal park about 50 meters from the south wall. The French poured fire on the building from the casbah for some time. The hut provided too much cover from rifle fire and Reibell called on Sergeant Vialis, commander of the garrison’s sapper detachment. From the south wall, Vialis stood, with a cigarette in his mouth, and lit his first stick of dynamite. Tossing the stick all the way up to the building, the French waited. The building disappeared in a huge ball of dust and smoke and was completely obliterated by the huge explosion. A cheer went up from the French defenders, but as the dust settled, a furious fire came back at them from the rubble of the building. Vialis hurled a second stick, all the way into the rubble, and again a huge ball of smoke and dust erupted from the ruin. Again it was answered by a belligerent crackle of gunfire from the ruins. Eight sticks of dynamite were thrown into the rubble, each time to be answered by return fire from the stubborn Moroccans. Major Reibell called a halt to the bombing after 8 sticks had been thrown. His secondary plan was to send in the Bat d’Af. The Joyeux, as they were known, were as dependable as the Legion in a close fight, but lacked their romantic reputation. The assault group consisted of 10 men and a sergeant. The Tirraileurs lined the wall of the casbah while the assault group assembled behind a low barricade that formed the edge of the animal pound and fixed their bayonets. The plan was to have Vialis toss in one more stick and the Bat d’Af would charge home and finish the day. No doubt, the assault group was nervous, or perhaps they just misunderstood the plan, but before Vialis had time to light his cigarette, the group rose up from their cover and charged screaming across the 50 meters of open ground. The Moroccans managed to drop the sergeant and one other before the charge closed home but the French finished off all the regaining Moroccan defenders with their bayonets without further loss. The final toll was 153 Moroccan dead. French counted 9 dead and 21 wounded most from within the casbah. Among the dead, in the courtyard was Captain Quisard. In his diary was found the complaint that after a 10 years in Africa, he had still not fired a shot in anger. C’est la vie. Pursuit into the Desert Hearing of the attack at Timimoun, Serviere sent Pein and his goumiers in pursuit. Heading northwest towards the Wad Saoura, Pein’s men entered the southeast end of the oasis of Charouine. Charouine was surrounded on three sides by an escarpment. Pein sent up lookouts that saw the harka pouring out of the oasis and heading to towards him. Pein retreated back to Serviere who was trying to catch up but was hampered by his slow moving supply train. He eventually abandoned the baggage and forced marched to Charouine. Serviere did not press his advantage and spent 3 days positioning his Tirailleurs and guns on the edge of the plateau overlooking the oasis on three sides. The harka did not wait and beat a hasty retreat out of the oasis into the dunes to the Northwest and headed for the Saoura. Defeat in the Dunes Pein and his Goum supported by Tirailleurs set off in pursuit. They eventually caught up with a large portion of the Harka holed up in a depression in the dunes. The harka leaving the depression again retreated up into the dunes. Pein’s Goums pursued, but as they charged up the sand hill the Moroccans appeared at the crest all around them and fired into them. The Goums retreated back into the depression and sough cover behind what little clumps of brush were available. For two hours they held off, hoping for relief from Serviere that never came. They were eventually driven back into the oasis with 25 men and 2 officers dead, with another 41 wounded. To add to this a significant number of his Goums and the Tirailleurs had deserted. More Resistance in the Desert Part I
Invasion of Tidikelt The Resistance Ferments Problems of Supply Overview of the Inhabitants of SE Morocco Military and Political System of Dawi Mani' and Ait Atta Kasar Inhabitants Native Firepower in the Desert French Forces in North Africa Back to Table of Contents -- Courier #80 To Courier List of Issues To MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 2000 by The Courier Publishing Company. This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com |