Resistance in the Desert
Part I

The Invasion of the Tidikelt

By Ian Croxall

The Battle of Ingotsen

The plan was for a military escort lead by Theodore Pein to guide a scientific expedition into the Tidikelt. The mission started out well with 90 cameleers, 15 horsemen and 40 goumiers. The expedition’s “scientific” intentions were under the auspices of a geologist, Flamand. A unit of Spahis shadowed the expedition under the command of captain Germain. It took them about a month to cross the Tademait plateau, which they camped at the base of, in the oasis of Foggaret ould Badjouda. Reconnaissance told them that the Tidikelt was rising up against them. Any notions that this was a scientific expedition can be dispelled by the fact that the French refused this opportunity to withdraw. The expedition approached Ingosten oasis. The kasarians (sedentary residents of the kasars) came out and stood off, chanting and riling themselves up for a fight.

The French faced them but refused to be drawn any closer. After a while several hundred more Arabs rose from the dunes on either side of the French’s intended path where they had been waiting in ambush.

With 1000 screaming and chanting Arabs awaiting their approach, Flamand lost his nerve and insisted on a withdrawal. Pein argued with him for sometime insisting that the Arabs were no match for his trained Goum. With his goumiers riding back and forth in agitation waiting for the order to attack, Pein was apparently on the point of backing down to Flamand when his Goumiers received some fire form the kasarians who were now only about 100 yards away, and the battle commenced. A red rocket was fired which signaled the reserve of Spahis to join them. The kasarians were pursued back through the un-walled town and amongst the oases. By mid morning the battle was over with at least 50 kasarians dead but family members carried off many bodies. Germain and his Spahis arrived later that day and although the battle with the Arabs was over, that between Pein and Flamand was raging.

Occupation of In Salah

Flamand still wanted to retreat but Pein was set to march on In Salah, the principal town (actually still a group of walled villages in 1900). Germain agreed to press on because he was out of forage for his horses and because Pein wrote him a letter absolving him of all responsibility should their further incursion into the Tidikelt have negative political repercussions. That this was a scientific mission would be hard for the French people and parliament to swallow, now that it had become openly aggressive and that its civilian leader wanted to withdraw.

Not wishing to suffer the same fate of Ingosten, the Bashaw of In Salah surrended without a fight, probably encouraged by the fact that Pein had also rounded up hostages on his way, which he intended to execute. Pein occupied the principal casbah (fortified building) and “fined” the town 10,000 francs (with which to pay his Goum).

Later that night Germain’s Spahis informed them of a large harka (war party) being assembled at In Rhar some 50 km west of In Salah. The feud brewing between Pein and Flamand intensified even further, but Pein had to restrain himself and deal with the impending attack.

The Battle of In Salah

Pein had spent several days strengthening the casbah of Badjouda, the center casbah of a string of five that ran north south all about 1000 - 1500 meters apart. The oases of date palms screened it from the advance of the harka from the west. As the harka approached it attempted to out flank the French position and veered around to its right to attack from the south. This large body of men, over 1000 strong was difficult to manipulate stealthily and by the time it had turned north towards the southern most casbah Pein’s lookouts had spotted the maneuver. He positioned the Spahis in the dunes and the goumiers in the casbah.

As the harka approached, now on foot, they were caught in the murderous crossfire, their only cover being the mounds of dirt around the ventilation shafts of the fuggaras (underground water galleries). Pein had kept some Spahis in reserve and at this critical moment for the harka, he ordered the Spahis to attack the harka’s baggage train. The harka broke and fled. The battle was won, inflicting at least 150 dead for the loss of 1 Spahis with two wounded. This was January 3rd 1900

Hearing all the gunfire from the central casbah, what little nerve Flamand had left was dwindling rapidly. He had sent dispatch riders with a series of letters to Major Baumgarten who arrived two weeks later with a company of Tirailleurs. The furious but relieved Flamand was able to leave the Tidikelt and return north.

Flamand got his side of the story in the gutter press at the expense of Pein. Later while on leave, Pein engaged Flamand in a duel, but after two shots and two misses each, they parted unsatisfied.

Baumgarten remained at In Salah, but the next excuse to further the colonial boundaries came in the form of a series of letters he sent directly to the war minister in France thereby by-passing his own chain of command through XIX corps. Baumgarten “needed” to move the 50-km west to In Rhar to provide forage for his camels, which was insufficient at In Salah.

The Assault on In Rhar

In late January, Baumgarten finally got his permission and advanced on In Rhar. In Rhar comprised two fortresses. The kasarians sent out a few skirmishes but refused any meaningful battle with the French, who, for lack of artillery, were forced to retreat back to In Salah.

The Prime Minister was then harassed by the army to send a relief column to “rescue” the isolated garrison at In Salah. Indications were that In Salah was under imminent danger of attack from the Bashaws of Timimoun and Timmi in the Tuat who were organizing a harka (war party) against the invaders. Viewing this desert nuisance as an irritant, insignificant compared to the problems he was up against at home (he had recently been informed of a planned coup d’etat by right wing army officers) he gave the go-ahead to sending a relief column into the desert.

This mentality was to typify the French Colonial experience throughout most of its territories. Ill advised missions of no importance to France advance into economically worthless territories and subsequently need rescuing. A small garrison is left behind. A resistance is raised against them. Relief columns and rescue missions are sent in. They leave, the resistance returns. The cycle continues.

This relief mission was under the command of Colonel Clement d’Eu. It comprised two companies of Tirailleurs Algeriens, one company Legere (Bat d’Afrique), half a squadron of Spahis, two 80-mm mountain guns, a section of sappers, 1500 camels, 200 cattle and 2,400 sheep. It crossed the Tademait in three squares with the animals within the squares, the Tirailleurs on the flanks. It started out on February 24th and by March 14th was in sight of In Salah.

Unsure of what defenses they were up against, Pein disguised as an Arab and with two of his goumiers stole into the casbahs of In Rhar. This was an extraordinarily brave move on the part of Pein and his goumiers, who could have been in little doubt as to the end that would have befallen them had they been discovered. They went unspotted taking note of defenses, armaments and positions. They were able to report back that that d’Eu faced 3000 poorly armed defenders. At 5:00 am on March 19th 1900 the attack began.

The casbahs had sent screens of skirmishes into the dunes to slow the advance of the French. Pein’s Goum and Germain’s Spahis fought these back. As the defenders were pushed back to the palm groves that screened the wall, the mountain guns were brought up to the crest of the dunes and began to fire over the trees on the walls of both casbahs.

This attack was weakened by a sandstorm that blew up reducing visibility to a mere 100 meters. D’Eu had the guns manhandled out of the dunes and pushed into the palm groves, now that Pein had cleared them. At point blank range the gun at the north casbah began to pour shells into the tough walls. The gun attacking the southern fortress was having problems due to its field of fire being obstructed by a mosque that remained heavily defended.

The northern fortress was pounded for more than an hour before D’Eu considered the breach large enough for an infantry assault. The Tirailleurs and Bat d’Af stormed the broken walls shortly after 10:00. Once inside the walls, the assaulters found themselves confronted by a series of terraces leading down form the breach. The sappers were brought up and blew holes in the floors one by one allowing in the infantry to take the casbah floor by floor from the top downwards. Back at the southern casbah the defenders were finally driven back from the mosque by about 11:30 after a very determined defense. A small breach had been made in the wall and the Tirailleurs were sent in to assault the opening. They were repulsed by the Kasarians and driven back to the mosque.

The artillery piece used at the northern casbah was dragged up through the breach there and assembled on the walls of that casbah overlooking the southern fortress. It pummeled away at he southern fortress for over an hour. This was enough and at 3:00 p.m. a man emerged identifying himself as the Bashaw of Timmi and asked for terms of surrender. The defense of In Rhar was the Tidikelt’s last gasp and the resistance collapsed.

D’Eu returned north one month later leaving a garrison at In Salah consisting of Tirailleurs and Bat d’Af with artillery support. In May, another column of a thousand men comprising Legionaires, Tirailleurs and Bat d’Af took Timimoun in the Gourara region without a fight. In the same month another force of 230 Spahis and Tirraileurs under the personal command of General Serviere marched unopposed throughout the Tuat. He reported to parliament that the Tuat, Gourara and Tidikelt were all pacified.

The first cycle was complete and ready to begin again.

More Resistance in the Desert Part I


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