Weaknesses in French Armored Tactical Theory

As a theory, French armored tactical doctrine was basically sound. Relying on good organization, plenty of ammunition, and time to prepare, it was a doctrine that was capable of winning battles. Unlike the German doctrine, it did not rely on initiative, speed, or the indirect approach, and neither its equipment nor its troops were organized or trained to fight according those principles.

Nevertheless, when viewed even on its own terms the doctrine had significant weaknesses. The French had long recognized the potential of a breakthrough along a defensive front with tanks, and bolstered their Army with the formation of the DCR's in early 1940 to counterattack and restore the front. Yet because French advances were no faster than the pace of an infantry soldier, the enemy would usually have plenty of time to bring up reserves, thereby defeating the possibility of a breakthrough. This is exactly why no significant breakthroughs occurred on the Western Front in World War I. Under their present organization, the French would still find it very difficult to create a breakthrough in combat.

French tank tactics were also very weak in terms of fighting against tanks. Their formations were reminiscent of Macedonian phalanxes. Little regard was given to taking advantage of terrain to out-maneuver an opponent. They were to be protected by their own thick armor, as well as nearby supporting weapons. But against a skillful opponent gaps could inevitably be found and exploited.

The final flaw in the French armored tactical theory was in ground-air coordination. They simply did not have the type of close air support forces that the Germans had in their dive bombers and fighters. The French did not realize that close air support with modern aircraft had added a new dimension to warfare. They had yet to learn that no conventional army in the world, no matter how well trained and supplied, could survive - let alone win - while the enemy had control of the skies.

Shifting from an analysis of their theory to practice, one can see that even without help from the Germans, the French would have difficulty implementing their tank doctrine in battle.

Training Performance

French tank training was generally excellent. These troops trained hard, and they knew their tanks were better than what the Germans had. Many historians have observed that the DCR's had only been formed early in 1940 and that these divisions had only just begun their training. The tank battalions that comprised them, however, had been fully trained, and most of the troops of these divisions had already been associated in smaller regimental units.

So even in the three starting DCR's the training level could be said to be high. Morale in French tank units was generally regarded as excellent, as they considered themselves elite troops.

Yet the armored troops were only a part of the combined arms team, and most French troops were not of the same caliber. Throughout most of the infantry, troops were poorly trained and disciplined. The soldiers often had little respect for their officers, many of whom were too old and low in fighting spirit. French infantry soldiers were at especially low physical standards from the long winter constructing defenses, and had conducted very little training.

Ammunition and Equipment Supply

French military theory stressed munitions to carry the troops through battle. But at the start of the Campaign the French were terribly short on artillery rounds, the foundation from which their operations depended. In addition, while French antitank doctrine stressed the value of mines, incredibly they had hardly any in the inventory. The French were short antitank guns as well.

Furthermore, the French Army was seriously short of transport, even as thousands of civilian trucks were commandeered for military use. It should also be noted that, although it soon became obvious that their units were short of antiaircraft guns and radios, French tactical doctrine did not regard these as vital to the degree that the Germans did. Nevertheless, the supply shortages alone were enough to place the entire French Army in a precarious position.

Air Force Coordination

Cooperation between the Armee de Terre (Army) and the Armee de l'Air (Air Force) was extremely low. In accordance with the prevailing theories of aerial warfare in Allied circles, the air commander viewed the primary tasks of the air force as protecting French cities and the strategic bombing of German cities, and was largely uninterested in support of ground troops. The disastrous initial attempts at ground support during the Campaign further eroded efforts at coordination.

French Tank Tactics In The Campaign

In appraising French military performance in May and June of 1940, it is crucial to distinguish between performance on a tactical and strategic level. The German breakthrough on the Meuse River created a situation in which the French First Army in Belgium was utterly defeated almost be fore it could fight. Cut off from resupply, their ability to coordinate attacks paralyzed, the best of France's army literally disintegrated. This was due to the strategic brilliance of the German plan, not a failure in French tactics.

Because the Campaign in France was such a smashing success for the Germans, it is very easy to overlook one fact - the French generally fought well. That soldiers often ran in the face of masses of German tanks was not a sign of their cowardice - it was a sign that any rational infantry soldier without antitank weapons support will run.

In fact, on May 29th, troops of the German 57th Infantry Division at the Abbeville bridgehead fled from the Char B's of the 4th DCR, because they knew the tanks could not be stopped with the weapons at hand. Where the French were able to fight, such as at the Abbeville bridgehead from May 25-30th and on the Weygand Line from June 5-10th, they put up a ferocious defense. Yet the central fact of the French Campaign of 1940 was that, in the face of the new German military doctrine, no country's troops could have done much better.

A brief look at some of the significant engagements of the major French armored units makes it clear that these units were most often simply unable to follow their own tactical doctrine:

Independent Battalions and Companies - On May 14th, the 7th Battalion de Chars de Combat (BCC) with its 39 FCM tanks was ordered to attack the 1st Panzer Division with no other supporting arms. It was overwhelmed by superior firepower from German artillery and obliterated. Under similar circumstances, the 67th BCC of D1 tanks was destroyed by the 1st Panzer Division at Suippes in late June.

Many of the FT-17 tanks, under the command of the infantry units they were attached to, were broken up and forced to act singly, not in accordance with doctrine. The 51st BCC with seven Char 2C's was moving south by rail on June 13th. Finding the rail cut by German dive bombers and hearing of German troops in the vicinity, the commander ordered the tanks destroyed.

1st DCR - Thousands of refugees on the roads forced the Division's tanks to move forward without its artillery or support units. Reaching the town of Flavions early on May 15th, the tanks ran out of fuel. The Division's tanks were then cut down by Stukas and artillery of Rommel's 7th Panzer Division while attempting to refuel. The French destroyed 30 to 40 panzers in the process, but without fuel many tanks had to be destroyed by their own crews as the Germans advanced. The Division had only 20 tanks left out of 158 by the end of the day.

2nd DCR - This Division was used in piecemeal attacks at the Orne-Sambre Canal defending bridges, and by May 20th it ceased to exist. However, the Division was reconstituted and used on June 4th against the German bridgehead at Abbeville south of the Somme River. Though it attacked with strong artillery and infantry support, the artillery had trouble locating targets. The Germans forced back the infantry, after which the tank group ran into an undetected minefield. Those that still made it through wreaked havoc on German lines, but were ultimately forced to call off the attack due to losses. No strategic gains were made.

3rd DCR - Though armed with 130 tanks, the Division was short of supporting equipment and transport. It was in a position to counterattack with two other tank divisions against the German troops crossing the Meuse on May 14th, but an order from XXI Corps commander General Flavigny dispersed the Division in defensive positions over a 20 kilometer front. Most of its tanks were destroyed over a four-day retreat from Dijon from June 13th to 16th by Stukas against which they had almost no defense.

4th DCR - Under Colonel De Gaulle (later promoted to Brigadier General), the Division attacked Guderian's XIXth Panzer Corps on May 17th with 88 tanks and a battalion of infantry. They hit German convoys near Moncornet, but were forced back by lack of infantry support which had gotten caught up in action in the town of Chivres, and the tanks were attacked by Stukas as it retreated.

Reinforced on May 18th, the Division attacked again on the 19th. Again it was attacked by 100 Stukas, and when German ground troops threatened its rear, the Division was forced to withdraw. Reinforced, on May 28th the Division attacked at the Abbeville bridgehead against the 57th Infantry Division, forcing the Germans back four kilometers. As it renewed the attack on May 29th, however, it was then faced with artillery and heavy flak guns, and lost 105 of 140 tanks.

1st DLM - Originally transported to Antwerp to support the Dutch, the Division was pounded by Stukas on May 11th with no friendly air support, then ordered back to Ninth Army in France on May 14th. The Division led a hastily organized counterattack with infantry southwards on May 17th and 8th against units of 5th and 7th Panzer divisions. The infantry could not keep up, however, and 1st DLM was finally crushed by the artillery and antitank guns of 5th Panzer Division near Le Quesnoy. All remaining equipment was lost during the Dunkirk evacuation.

2nd and 3rd DLM - These two divisions fought against 3rd and 4th Panzer divisions near Gembloux in Belgium on May 12th and 13th. They were rushed into Belgium on May 10th to perform their role as forward reconnaissance and screening until the French First Army arrived. This battle, then the largest tank vs. tank battle in history, was a virtual standoff with heavy losses on both sides - and a demonstration of what French armored troops could do when given the chance.

The French divisions, in accordance with their plan, were ordered back once the rest of the First Army arrived. However, the First Army commander ordered the dismemberment of these divisions to spread the tanks out among the infantry. In a few days, all remaining equipment was lost in the Dunkirk evacuation.

1st DLC - Its attacks against Rommel's 7th Panzer Division at Dinant on May 13th initially worried German troops, until Rommel personally took charge and they were beaten back. 2nd DLC and 5th DLC - These two divisions first met German troops in the Ardennes on May 10-11th. They fought 1st Panzer Division's troops as well as Stukas, and fell back along the Semois River.

Together they fought along with the British 1st Armored Division at the Abbeville bridgehead on May 26-27th against the German 2nd Motorized Infantry Division. The French provided artillery support, but had little idea of where the Germans were. On one wing of the attack German antitank positions were well dug-in, and the Allied tanks were smashed. On the other wing, Allied tanks made good progress but were forced to turn back when their own infantry troops halted to dig-in.

4th DLC - On May 15th, it attempted to fight off German panzer units in their bridgeheads across the Meuse, but was pounded by Stukas. Conflicting orders to nearby divisions meant that some stayed while others retreated, creating havoc in the defense and leaving the Division to be outmaneuvered and forced to surrender.

French Tank Tactics

Doctrine During the Inter-War Period
Tank Designs and Organization
Weaknesses in Armored Tactical Theory
Tactical Problems During the 1940 Campaign

Letter to Editor about Valverde