Tactical Problems During The Campaign

Aside from the strategic debacle, French armored units experienced several recurrent tactical problems during the Campaign which they were never able to overcome. These included the following:

1. Spreading Out Tank Divisions Among Infantry Units

As was noted above, infantry support was the primary mission of tanks, but by no means the only one. That the 2nd DCR's tanks were placed on a 20 kilometer line, or that the 2nd and 3rd DLM's tanks were distributed to units throughout the First Army, were not conducted under the orders of the division commanders, but by higher ranking non-armored officers who did not understand contemporary French tank doctrine.

General Rene Prioux protested vigorously that his two DLM's were needed according to the prearranged plan to lead a counterattack, but to no avail. Their disintegration as fighting units was a misapplication not only of the strategic plan but of French tank doctrine as well.

2. Hasty Attacks

The French were not trained for the hasty attack; they were masters of the deliberate attack. Yet due to the speed of the German advance, the French were consistently forced to attack before they were ready. This often led to only partial forces being committed to battle. In addition, it meant there was poor intelligence preparation of the battlefield, resulting, among other things, in artillery barrages being unable to locate antitank guns.

The French were continually forced to fight on the Germans' terms rather than their own terms, and they could not match the Germans at their own game.

3. The Overwhelming Power Of German Close Air Support

Insufficient regard has been paid to the role of the Luftwaffe in this Campaign, which was even more decisive than the panzers. The Germans established virtual air supremacy from the start of the Campaign, and its effect was truly paralyzing. This paralysis was not because the French were caught unprepared for it - though they were in fact utterly unprepared.

Rather, the paralysis was due to a central truth of modern combat that no conventional army can operate effectively under hostile skies in open terrain. It was not until later in the war that the Germans began to experience for themselves the paralysis created by enemy air power on ground operations.

4. Poor Coordination Between Tanks and Other Arms

In many instances it was very difficult for French infantry to keep up with advancing tanks. Once the tanks lost their infantry, they became increasingly vulnerable to artillery and antitank guns, with mounting losses that would eventually bring the advance to a halt. This was a problem common to all armies during the war, not just the French. Infantry were naturally far more vulnerable to artillery and small arms fire, and also became exhausted more easily. It took well trained troops to manage the coordination effectively. Given the poor state of infantry training and morale, the French failures are not surprising.

It has been suggested that the French never concentrated their tanks and troops enough to have a decisive influence on a battlefield. But this was clearly not the case at the Abbeville bridgehead, where the French may have outnumbered the Germans by as much as 4:1, and even more in tanks. Here, their inability to win a decisive victory came from an inability to coordinate with artillery, infantry, and aircraft to take out dug-in German positions.

5. Insufficient Battlefield Agility

On a tactical level, the central problem with the French army as a whole was in what modern US AirLand Battle doctrine refers to as "agility." They were simply unable to respond to situations on the battlefield as quickly as the Germans could. Often, in the time it took for the French to organize an attack, the Germans would be gone. Other times, the French were able to assemble an attack force in time. But the Germans had the ability, even where they were temporarily outgunned, to move their firepower quickly enough to contain and halt any French advances.

This lack of agility was particularly prominent during tank vs. tank engagements. As "neutralizers of territory," there was little room in the doctrine for tactical maneuver against German tanks. French tanks usually just stood out in the open, hoping their superior armor would protect them. This allowed German tanks to move to the flank or rear and inflict damage that could not be done from a distance.

French tanks had great trouble hitting the frequently moving German tanks, while the Germans could move behind cover to stop and fire at the stationary French tanks. In tank units without radios, there was little the tanks could do to concentrate their firepower and support each other when in trouble - signal flags were of little value in a smoke-covered battlefield. Even in tanks with radios, there were incidents where units had failed to bring an adequate supply of batteries, and the radios soon went dead.

There is no doubt that on a tactical level the Germans were clearly superior not only in the attack but in the defense. This was the payoff from their outstanding communications network, the training and high morale of their troops, and outstanding leadership on all levels.

Conclusions

The causes of the German victory in the Battle for France were many and varied. They had largely to do with new German tactical and strategic methods, a brilliant strategic plan, an overwhelmingly powerful air force, the lack of French military supplies, and the lack of a French strategic reserve to contain breakthroughs. Of the reasons why the French lost in 1940, the weaknesses of their tactical tank doctrine are far down on the list. French tank doctrine was not a good doctrine, but it was an adequate one. Yet because of the pace and unexpectedness of the German attack, the French armored troops had few opportunities to implement their own tank doctrine in combat.

As discredited as French tank tactics were by the catastrophic results of the Campaign, one might assume that no army would have continued to utilize them. Shortly after the Campaign the Soviet Red Army scrapped its version of French armored doctrine and attempted to embrace German methods. But in Britain, General Montgomery's tank operations were wholly a reinvention of French tank tactics. El Alamein in particular was a crowning achievement of French tank methods. After El Alamein, most battles of the British were conducted "French style:" extensive planning, huge artillery barrages, with tanks and infantry used in slow, deliberate attacks to destroy the enemy frontally rather than through deep strikes to the rear.

The United States never stopped using tanks as an essentially infantry support weapon, although some units such as the 2nd and 4th Armored divisions did fight in a more thrusting "German" style. Less than half of all US tanks were assigned to armored divisions, mirroring French Army policy of dispersing tanks. A battalion of tanks was assigned to every infantry division, just as the French had intended for their own troops.

Although Patton's forces used their tanks successfully in the breakthrough in Normandy, this type of bold use was the exception rather than the rule. The US never adopted the armored corps or formed an armored army, preferring instead to match single a armored division with two or more infantry divisions. Whether in the Mediterranean, Western Europe, or Asia, US tank troops generally plodded through to victory.

The excessive rigidity of French tanks methods as neutralizers of territory was dropped, but the Allies rarely displayed the flair for tactical maneuver that was the hallmark of the panzers. As a rule, Allied air power and artillery dominated the battlefield, and the infantry and tanks were left to mop up. On the Western Front, the proper application of French tank doctrine won the war against Germany.

Other Fronts

On other fronts, Japan's armored force continued to play an infantry support role, whether in the jungles of the Philippines or on the plains of China. On the Eastern Front, the Soviets initially found it extremely difficult to implement German tank doctrine because it required such a high degree of training, leadership, and communications to be effective. They often fell back on French methods. But the Red Army improved dramatically over the years, and by the summer of 1944 they were ready to conduct their own blitzkriegs.

Some historians have considered "French tank tactics" as a great oxymoron, like "military intelligence" or "Italian victory." Yet while French tank tactics were supposedly discredited from their disastrous campaign, those same tactics were used by most armies throughout the war!

Wargaming Battles From The Campaign

Battles of the French Campaign are very exciting for wargaming. Players are immediately faced with the unique problems that each side faced from these battles. The panzers really are nearly helpless against French tanks, until they bring up artillery, heavy antitank guns, or Stukas, or all three. If the French have infantry that are determined enough to fight, they can neutralize the guns.

Unfortunately, the Stukas really cramp the style of the French infantry, as they were among the world's first guinea pigs to the effects of modern air power. Meanwhile, the French tanks fire more slowly and less accurately than the Germans. Although German infantry were generally better than the French, this was by no means always the case, and the French colonial troops were especially good. What I find most interesting about this period is that each side has its own significant strengths and weaknesses. In the end, it comes down to leadership to see which side wins.

Bibliography

Kaufman, JE and HW, Hitler's Blitzkrieg Campaigns, Combined Books, Conshohocken, PA, 1993
Macksey, Kenneth, Tank vs. Tank, Salem House Publishers, Topsfield, Mass, 1988
Ministere de la Guerre, Manuel Du Grade D'Infanterie, Edition de 1934, Modificatif No. 1, translation provided by author
Ministere de la Guerre, L'Aide-Memoire de l'Officier de Reserve d'Infanterie, Edition de 1939, translated by US War Department
Ministere de la Guerre, Le Cours d'Artillerie, Edition de 1939, translated by US War Department
Mariot, Major, Le Division Legere Mecanique, 1936, translated by US War Department
National Archives, US War Department Military Intelligence Files, Attache Reports 1930-1941
Pallud, Jean, Blitzkrieg In The West, After The Battle, London, 1991

French Tank Tactics

Doctrine During the Inter-War Period
Tank Designs and Organization
Weaknesses in Armored Tactical Theory
Tactical Problems During the 1940 Campaign

Letter to Editor about Valverde