From their experiences in the Great War, the French military viewed tanks as having earned a place in their Army, but were by no means greatly impressed by their potential to transform the battlefield. Most commonly, they considered tanks as being highly vulnerable. They were vulnerable to getting stuck in difficult terrain, vulnerable to mechanical breakdown and refueling needs, vulnerable to mines, to artillery, to antitank guns, and of course to enemy tanks.

Accordingly, French tactical doctrine was based around this perception of the inherent weakness of tanks. Along with the rest of the Army, French tanks and tank doctrine did change and grow over the inter-war years, but they were changes at the margin rather than at the core. The basic principles of French armored warfare as they developed after the Great War were:

1. Tanks as support weapons for infantry

The "Manuel du Grade d'Infanterie," the basic manual for infantry NCO's, stated that "tanks are the immediate auxiliaries of the infantry." Similarly, in other manuals such as the "L'Aide-Memoire de l'Officier de Reserve d'Infanterie," the manual for reserve infantry officers, it was argued that "the neutralization of resistance opposing the infantry is the normal mission of the tanks." In French tank doctrine, tanks were clearly subordinated to infantry. It was the infantry, by engaging the mass of enemy forces, which would be expected carry the Army to victory.

The French envisioned two primary roles for tanks with Infantry: the "accompanying" role and the "supporting" role. In the accompanying role, tanks moved directly alongside the infantry and intermingled with their ranks. In the more flexible supporting role, tanks would protect the flanks, move forward to seize key terrain, or strike enemy rear areas.

For tanks in the accompanying role, one tank company was normally to be assigned per infantry battalion, while the ratio of tanks to infantry in the supporting role varied according to availability. Most tanks could perform either of these roles, but some were more suited to one than the other. Doctrine also prescribed that in performing either of these roles, "in general, the tank company is not split up," and that a tank platoon is "never" split up.

2. Combined Arms

The French had a deep appreciation for the principle of combined arms. This principle recognizes that each weapon system has its own strengths and weaknesses, and that in order to be truly effective on the battlefield, each weapons type must intimately support the others. They understood this principle far more than the British, who virtually rejected the idea of combined arms in favor of concentrating and employing single types of weapons together.

The French version of the all-arms battle group was the tactical "groupement," similar to the German "kampfgruppe" or American "task force," comprised of various elements within a division. In the attack tanks might lead the groupement, particularly when enemy artillery was not a concern. This would cause the enemy antitank guns to expose themselves, which would then in turn be targeted by the artillery. Infantry was more likely to lead at night, to gain a greater degree of surprise, or when enemy artillery was strong.

Though the French appreciated the value of combined arms, they understood it in a very different way from that of the Germans. For the French, combined arms was subordinated to the first principle above, which was that tanks and artillery were to support the infantry in their engagement against the enemy front line.

For the Germans, combined arms was subordinated to the principles of avoiding rather than engaging enemy strong points, and of paralyzing and surrounding the enemy through speed and shock.

Infantry

Infantry was regarded as the central instrument of battle. Once the artillery had prepared the battlefield, its task was to seize and hold ground. Nearly all tactical plans were based around the maximum pace of dismounted infantry, estimated at 50 meters per minute, and the standard pace of 25 meters per minute. All French advances on the battlefield would be set to the pace of the infantry.

A critical task for the infantry advancing with tanks was to take out enemy antitank guns. This was a task for which it was well suited, as antitank gunners would have minimal protection and minimal ability to fight back against small arms fire. The greatest danger for tanks, it was argued, would be for them to go beyond the support of infantry over a crest and suddenly be fired upon by enemy troops they never saw.

In fluid situations, motorized infantry were to be employed with the tanks. A motorized infantry company consisted of 18 half-tracks. Each "group de combat" or squad of 12 troops was divided into two groups of six troops per half-track. They could move quickly to seize key terrain, though as in other countries motorized infantry would normally be expected to fight dismounted.

Artillery

As in World War I, the French placed their reliance for winning battles on the artillery. The slogan "shells are cheaper and more abundant than men" was a popular one, and their vision of battle called for large expenditures of ammunition. Artillery was regarded as the true neutralizer of territory. It was intended that artillery would have to be able to deliver a "crushing blow" against enemy positions in order for the infantry to advance.

The French recognized that heavy artillery was limited in its support of tank attacks, as it would create large craters, making movement difficult and slow. Instead, medium field artillery would normally be employed. Rolling barrages were viewed as an ideal support method for infantry-tank advances. In addition, artillery was considered a solution to clearing antitank minefields, although it was untested in this role.

In French doctrine, the minimum needs of artillery for an advance by infantry and armor were as follows: one artillery battalion (12 guns) in direct support for every 300 meters of front, one artillery battalion in general support for every 600 meters of front, and one battalion of corps artillery for counterbattery fire for every 800 yards of front - or at least one corps artillery battery for each enemy battery. The actual needs would be based upon a thorough intelligence estimate of enemy strengths in the area.

In the defense, the minimum needs for artillery were one battalion in direct support per two kilometers of front, and one battalion in general support for every three to four kilometers of front.

Aircraft

The French understood the importance of air power as a support for ground troops, though in a limited way. Air reconnaissance would be the eyes and ears of the Army. Nine Potez Po-63 observer aircraft were assigned to each armored division. The pilots were NCO's from the Armee de l'Air and observer officers were assigned from the division. In addition, level bombers were to soften up targets as an adjunct to artillery.

After the German victory in Poland, consideration was being given to adding two dive bombing squadrons per division, though no action was taken. Thus, no close air support of fighters or fighter bombers to knock out specific targets on the battlefield was available. Antitank Tactics

French antitank theory stressed the use of mines to halt tank assaults. They also placed great confidence in their antitank guns. One gun was considered sufficient to cover 300 meters of front (!), although this could be shortened when necessary. The guns could also be grouped by platoons of four guns into strong points, and given a defined zone to protect.

In addition, antitank guns were to be used offensively, moving in bounds in support of infantry and tanks. They were to be well hidden and to use the advantages of surprise when possible. As the French were highly cognizant of the benefits of camouflage, antitank platoons were expected to dig in and were issued one camouflage net per gun.

3. Well Defined, Limited Sectors of Attack

According to French tactical theory, the great challenge in combat was the elimination of all enemy points of resistance in a sector of attack. Even a single enemy machine gun nest was regarded as being able to wreak untold havoc on friendly troops, as the French had experienced again and again in the previous war. Tanks could not hope to eliminate all points of resistance, however, due to their limited mobility, observation, and ammunition load. Only the infantry could accomplish this most essential of tasks. On an offensive front, every unit down to the smallest level would be assigned a "compartement" or zone for which it was responsible for clearing all resistance. The value of flank attacks against enemy positions was much appreciated, but most planning was for the head-on attack.

4. Highly Structured Battlefield Maneuver

French tank formations were intended to be highly structured, mutually supportive groups. Once engaged in battle, tanks were to stay in formation, fighting in the open, seeking to neutralize territory. They would be protected in their advance by infantry and artillery, as well as other armored tank units to their flanks and rear.

The French were great practitioners of the principle of fire and maneuver. This principle states that units moving forward should be simultaneously covered by stationary units to pin the enemy down and suppress or destroy enemy fire. Accordingly, one group of infantry and tanks were to move towards an objective in a bounding movement while other infantry and tanks supported the advance with fire. Naturally, in unopposed advances or when conducting reconnaissance work, bounds would not be necessary.

5. Deliberate Attack

The fully planned and organized attack was the French ideal. The "Aide-Memoire" even states that "A preparation is often preferable to an action by surprise; it has the advantage of weakening a generally strong and vigilant antitank defense and of concealing the placing of the attacker's means of position."

In addition, a US military attache file from April, 1939 stated categorically that "No French infantry or cavalry is ordered to cross the Line of Departure in an attack" without proper artillery support. All this would require planning, extensive amounts of ammunition, and time.

6. Tanks As Versatile Weapons For Multiple Roles

French military theoreticians appreciated that tanks were an all around weapon, the "Aide-Memoire" stating that "the use of tanks extends at present to all phases of battle." In addition to the accompanying and supporting roles, they could also play a cavalry role. This role included reconnaissance, screening, flank protection, and providing protective cover for breaking off attacks. Other roles for tanks were in counterattack, antitank defense along the line, and breakthrough behind enemy lines, as well as special tasks such as sieges. In short, it can be said that tanks were intended primarily for infantry support, but not exclusively for infantry support. Instead, tanks were a versatile and fully integrated battle weapon in the French Army's military plans.

French Tank Tactics

Doctrine During the Inter-War Period
Tank Designs and Organization
Weaknesses in Armored Tactical Theory
Tactical Problems During the 1940 Campaign

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