Across the DMZ

South Korean Tactical Doctrine

by Charles T. Kamps, Jr.


Most ROK operations are based on pure infantry tactics for the basic reason that there so few armored /mechanized assets available for attachment within the division. Similarly, most operations center around "key terrain" rather than the enemy. The ROK Army will consider high ground as key terrain in preference to cities.

ROK Airborne troopers hit the drop zone

The primary ROK offensive operation is the coordinated attack. The South Koreans do not consider a "hasty attack" as viable, and instead rely on meticulous planning. A division on the offense will normally attack with two regiments, leaving the third regiment in reserve. The reserve regiment often provides a company to conduct pre- attack infiltration of the enemy position or of dominating terrain.

Assault troops will move as far forward as possible in trucks before deploying to close with the enemy. The attack is delivered with "jungshin" (fighting spirit) - that is, with ferocity and vigor. A successful attack will be followed by a pursuit, which may be conducted by the attacking division itself, or by a "following" division of the same corps - apparently similar to a "second echelon" in Soviet terminology. In the pursuit, the objective becomes the destruction of the enemy unit rather than seizure of more terrain. Advancing forces will seldom bypass isolated enemy units, preferring to destroy them.

When not already in contact with the enemy, an ROK division will conduct a "movement to contact" advance, in which regimental combat teams (RCTs) will be organized. Two of these are each based on an infantry regiment, a tank company, a direct support 105mm artillery battalion, and an engineer company. Truck transportation companies are attached to the regiments. The division's third regiment and other units would travel at some distance behind the leading RCTs. The "reconnaissance in force" is similar to the movement to contact, with the exception that each RCT will operate with a reinforced battalion task force out ahead for reconnaissance.

South Korean tactics are adaptable to special circumstances. Night attacks are hardly considered special in the ROK Army however, because about seventy percent of its training takes place at night. During darkness the ROKs will generally not use artificial illumination, and will try to operate without artillery support if possible. Cold weather operations are common, and all ROK soldiers receive intensive training for them. During winter there would be fewer night operations, greater use of rail transport, and wider use of terrain (including lakes, stream beds, and paddy areas) unless icy conditions proved too dangerous for armored vehicles.

The ROK Army does not neglect operations in mountainous areas. Like the NKPA, the ROKs will tend to use animal transport and laborers for resupply, and mortars for fire support. Division-size attacks against fortified positions are reinforced by one or more tank, artillery, and engineer battalions.

The South Koreans recognize two major types of defense, "area" and "mobile". The area defense is terrain-oriented ' with emphasis on defending avenues of approach which would give the enemy access to the key terrain in the defended sector. The object is to retain control of the key, dominating, terrain.

The division will normally defend the "main defense area" with two regiments, while manning a general outpost line ahead of this area with the third regiment. Again, little task organizing is done and most units fight without attachments. The regiment on outpost fights a delaying action and then passes through the main defense area and forms a reserve which may be used to reinforce one of the defending regiments or counterattack an enemy penetration.

The mobile defense can realistically be carried out only by the ROK's mechanized and armored forces. These units have a much more flexible organization, and cross-attachment of units is commonplace. The mobile defense is oriented on the enemy instead of on terrain. The object is, quite literally, "annihilation" of enemy units. In the mobile defense, the general outpost line may be sparsely held by economy-of- force units, and the reserve may actually include the bulk of the formation. It is the mission of the reserve to counterattack with shock and firepower to destroy the attacking enemy. ROK doctrinal literature allows for an infantry division to conduct a "mobile defense" with its reserve regiment and tank battalion, but this would be extremely difficult to execute.

Defense in special circumstances may cause modifications to basic doctrine. In mountains, an area/positional defense is used with emphasis on early detection of enemy approach, concentration of artillery and mortar fire, and a quick counterattack. Mountain defense is based on occupying the forward slope and not the peak.

A "broad- front" defense is used when a division must cover more than its standard frontage. It is based on a basic anti-tank defense, with dispersion of troops and long-range engagement of enemy armor. A "defense-to-the-end" is a circumstance requiring the defending unit to hold a piece of ground with no option for withdrawal. The object is to be strong enough to repel any enemy attack, and if that is impossible, to die in place trying.

ROK airborne units are rather few in number, and generally dependent of US Air Force airlift assets for deployment. Airmobile operations are within ROK capabilities, using helicopters from the lst Aviation Brigade or attached to corps, as divisions have no organic lift capability. A typical airmobile operation would employ a battalion task force using: one infantry battalion (with three companies assaulting and one in reserve), a recon company and an engineer platoon from division, a 106mm antitank platoon and a 4.2" mortar platoon from regiment, and a tactical air control party. Airmobile operations are purely offensive in nature, and are always assigned terrain objectives.

The North Korean unconventional warfare threat to the ROK strategic rear area is to be countered by the Homeland Reserve Forces. These include localized units from provincial divisions down to village platoons, which employ a combination of pacification and strike operations within their tactical areas of responsibility. At the fighting front, each infantry regiment has a fourth battalion which is specifically tasked with rear area security.

Across the DMZ The Next War in Korea

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