Across the DMZ

North Korean Tactical Doctrine

by Charles T. Kamps, Jr.


In war, the NKPA could be expected to organize several "fronts" of three to four corps each. The corps, similar to a combined arms army, would control up to four infantry divisions (or tank and mechanized if appropriate), one or possibly two infantry brigades, a light infantry brigade, a corps artillery command (normally with three artillery regiments /brigades and an MRL regiment), an armored brigade or regiment, and corps engineer and air defense regiments.

A Soviet example of the AN-2 Colt

First line corps on the DMZ are reinforced with additional artillery and a combined arms brigade to help penetrate South Korean border defenses within the first few days of combat. The basic operational unit is the infantry division which is "lean and mean" and tailored for continuous operations. Its organic armor may be used piecemeal in support of infantry, while corps armor would hope to exploit breakthroughs.

The basic tactical unit is the infantry regiment which, similar to the Warsaw Pact armies, attacks in two echelons with an additional reserve of one company. The favored maneuver is the envelopment, followed by the setting up of road blocks in the enemy rear. This was highly successful in 1950 when ROK forces were unable to establish a continuous line. If enemy forces are spread thin, an envelopment is not necessary and a simple penetration is attempted.

For the real hammer and tongs work of an attack, the NKPA likes to have numerical superiority. It will attempt to mass 3 to 5 times more armor, 6 to 8 times more artillery, and 4 to 6 times more infantry than the defender. When attacking prepared defenses, it will increase these ratios even more. In any event, the NKPA counts on infiltration and special warfare units as force multipliers in the enemy rear. Even though tactical massing is employed, it will seldom look like the "human wave" attacks of the Korean War, which were necessary only because of the crude state of command/control measures available to the NKPA at that time. Radio is now the primary means of communication, but the North Koreans insist that all transmissions be encoded.

In summary form, the hallmarks of North Korean attack doctrine are:

    1) operational security and deception to mask the time and place of attack;
    2) use of rough terrain and bad weather to achieve surprise;
    3) extensive night operations to close with the enemy and nullify his air superiority;
    4) a combination of flank attacks and infiltration to get into the enemy's vulnerable rear area; and
    5) disruption of the enemy's superior communications through jamming and shelling his transmitters.

In defense, the NKPA also deploys in echelons. Defenses are sited in depth, with entrenchments and obstacles. The emphasis is on defeat of enemy armor, with decentralized employment of anti-tank weapons as far forward as possible, and the retention of an anti-tank reserve by higher headquarters. Counterattacks are expected to deal with enemy penetrations, but if they are unsuccessful, then the entire force resorts to delaying tactics until massed fires can be brought to bear. NKPA regimental and divisional commanders may be trained to be creative in the defense.

The North Koreans are great believers in artillery, and big mortars which substitute for artillery in mountainous terrain. They also are enthusiastic about multiple rocket launchers (MRLs), which are simple to move and maintain, and are unsurpassed for area suppression fire. Normally the highest level of using organization for artillery is the corps, with its corps artillery command.

Aside from its normal assets, the corps may be reinforced by army-level guns and those of other corps which are not on the front line. At the start of an offensive, artillery control is usually centralized at corps headquarters, and only decentrallized. as a successful attack turns into a pursuit. Each division has its own division artillery command which coordinates the fires of artillery, mortars, and MRLs of the division and its attached units.

In offensive operations the NKPA wants to mass 80 to 100 artillery pieces per kilometer of attack frontage for a main effort, and 40 to 60 pieces per kilometer for a secondary attack. MRLs and other artillery pieces are the prime means of projecting toxic chemicals for the North Koreans. They hold assortments of nerve, blood, blister and choking agents, including sarin, tabun, phosgene and a host of other nasty Soviet concoctions. Artillery also figures into the NKPA electronic warfare program. The North Koreans expect to destroy by fire, or disrupt through jamming, fully half of the enemy command/ control transmitters which they detect and can react to in a timely manner.

Unconventional warfare (UW) operations are prominent in North Korean plans to disrupt the ROK rear areas. Most UW forces are light infantry type units with few heavy supporting weapons. The exceptions are the combined arms brigades which are used for combination infiltration/ shock assaults, primarily to breach ROK border defenses. These units include light infantry as well as tanks, assault and self-propelled artillery. The remaining UW units are to be used to conduct raids, reconnaissance and large scale guerrilla operations; act as conventional or unconventional forces to support friendly attacks; conduct infiltration by land, air, or sea; and operate in mountain areas.

Infiltration operations are used to create confusion in the enemy rear by raiding headquarters, lines of communications, and high priority targets such as nuclear delivery systems. Infiltration units may also occupy enemy avenues of retreat. Light infantry brigades can conduct infiltration through rough terrain, streams, or mountains; during night or reduced visibility; and through gaps between enemy units. They may also be used to conduct tunnel infiltration under the DMZ.

North Korean tunnel operations were first discovered in 1974, and the ROKs have an active program to locate, identify, and destroy these tunnels. Over 20 have been positively or tentatively identified. Some of these tunnels are capable of passing small trucks or a flow of 8,000 troops per hour. Airborne brigades can be inserted behind enemy lines by parachute operations using North Korea's fleet of An-2 biplane transports, which are relatively hard to detect, or by airmobile insertion via helicopter. Seaborne infiltration will be used to place marine commandos on South Korea's coasts, and might even involve raids on ROK naval bases and ports.

The North Koreans have enough amphibious shipping available for their entire marine contingent, and also have swarms of fast attack craft which can be used to transport raiding detachments. NKPA reconnaissance brigades are used for strategic reconnaissance and raiding. They would try to identify and destroy nuclearcapable weapons systems, ascertain enemy plans and movements, monitor aircraft traffic at military bases, and generally collect information of military and political value.

Across the DMZ The Next War in Korea

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