As should be evident, the underling premise of the initial Soviet actions in a conventional war confrontation is that the technological advantage of the West need not be met head on, but must be countered only to such a point that what remains is not a viable threat. By meeting the technologically superior forces with sufficient manpower and equipment combined with adequate technology, the forces of the Soviet Bloc can cripple the response of the NATO Alliance. Utilizing their ability to produce vast supplies of equipment and adopting a philosophy that nothing is ever obsolete, the Soviet Bloc has developed a means of forcing the allies to depend on a conflict that will eventually be fought between forces utilizing weaponry presently scoffed at as out of date and useless. James Webb, Secretary of the Navy for the United States, put it succinctly in a recent interview when he said:

"All of this sophisticated gear is tremendous stuff. But the troops shouldn't become dependent on it. A conflict will be a different ball game at first, with all this new technology. But after a few weeks, it will be the same as it has always been. A lot of this high-tech gear will be down for maintenance or jammed with sand or mud."

The dependence of the Allied Powers on high technology has resulted in much equipment being declared obsolete and either destroyed or placed in mothballs with little, if any, maintenance being done.

After the loss of the initial equipment, the question must be what materials will be available to the West. Figure 1 show a comparison between the technology levels and current equipment holdings of both the West and the Soviet Bloc. To produce new equipment or even to release old equipment will require raw materials and time. The building of many contemporary Western aircraft takes up to 15 months and over $42.5 million dollars a copy. By contrast the Soviets can build a MiG-l 9 in about 9 days, a ratio of 50 to 1.

Despite extensive stockpiling of materials, the United States still imports over 94% of its bauxite, 88% of its platinum, 90% of its chromium, 93% of its cobalt, and the list goes on. Even in areas where it once held sway, the United States is critically short of manufacturing facilities as in the case of steel and copper. Although this discussion has focused principally on Western Europe, the Soviets will force the conflict into the arena of moderate and low technology warfare. In this arena, the Soviet military theorists and planners are more than confident that they will be successful.

There are other factors existent in examining a scenario involving a Soviet invasion of NATO that can only be briefly touched on in this paper. The assumption is made that the NATO Alliance will act in concert with one another to counter any Soviet threat. Such an assumption is not based on a very firm foundation. Too much evidence exists to suggest that NATO is a very fragile military organization.

So, too, do some question the stability of the relationship between the Soviet Union and its allies, though the evidence here seems to suggest that the conditions are less volatile from a military point of view than those which exist in the West. Perhaps most important, the assumption is made that nuclear weapons will not be available. At this time, little can be argued about this point. If such are in evidence, the response of the West is a foregone conclusion. Despite protestations to the contrary, the Western nations will have to risk escalation to halt a Soviet conventional attack.

During 1983, NATO commanders met to participate in their annual command and staff exercises. The purpose of the exercise was to simulate a Soviet conventional attack into West Germany. In the simulation, the Soviet Bloc forces crossed the border on 3 March. Five days later, the remaining NATO commanders requested permission for the employment of nuclear weapons. On 9 March, NATO ordered the first strike with nuclear missiles. The conventional confrontation between NATO and the Soviet Bloc had lasted just six days...

More Soviet Conventional Combat Philosophy by Owen Stanley

Introduction
Soviet Military Thought
Laws of Military Conflict
Soviet Planning
Opening Assault
Conclusion