Despite Soviet efforts to keep the planned invasion under wraps until every aspect of the operation is in place, the members of the NATO Alliance will not be caught totally by surprise.

M-1 Abrams

Contemporary intelligence-gathering methods of the West are very sophisticated and such an operation will require activity almost impossible to conceal from these surveillance tools. The time available for preparation will be short, however, and the West will be forced to face a classic Soviet attack. The Soviet theory of warfare is to go on the attack and remain on the attack until either completely destroyed or the objective is achieved.

Aware that they do suffer to some extent in terms of weapons technology, the goal is to meet Western forces with matchup technology whenever possible, but to override any disadvantage with sheer numbers when necessary. Thus, while the rear attacks are being carried out, the Soviet bloc forces will launch a massive surface assault beneath a nearly impenetrable cover of fighter and assault aircraft on a wide front in Western Europe.

The opening moments of this assault will be an artillery barrage of such magnitude that such may not even be imaginable. NATO military planners fully expect that this barrage will be a front line attack as deep as 25 miles. In the past ten years, the Soviet Union and its allies have concentrated on developing a large arsenal of self-propelled guns directed by new command structures and with improved fire control. Besides conventional artillery "parks", Soviet forces have been given increased firepower at the regimental level. Being self-propelled, this added artillery has the same mobility as the front line mechanized forces. As an example of the sheer weight of numbers, the Soviets have some 8300 self-propelled guns of 150mm or larger. NATO can counter with about 3000.

The immensity of this artillery capability on the part of the Soviet Bloc forces is staggering enough, but its probable effectiveness causes NATO planners even greater concern. Presently, NATO Allies are arguing over the most effective form of defense against a Soviet invasion. The major problem is to determine where the line of defense will be drawn in Western Europe, particularly with regard to West Germany. As the expected critical arena for a Soviet invasion, West Germany will be the first target. Conventional military analysis would argue that the NATO Allies must establish an in-depth defense to counter the Soviet invasion. Unfortunately, to do so is to run the risk that the West may lose up to a third of West Germany to the invading forces before sufficient losses have been taken by the invaders to slow or halt their advance. This "sacrifice" of territory would mean that West Germany would yield over one third of its population and over half of its industrial capability, all of which are located within 150 miles of the East German border. To attempt a forward defense, however, is to place the majority of the available NATO forces in the path of an invading force so numerically superior as to cast serious doubt on the ability of the allied forces to counter. The opening artillery barrage, if a forward defense is adopted, will land squarely among the Western forces.

Following closely on the heels of, and in some cases during, the opening barrage will be the actual physical crossing of the line by Soviet ground forces. This attack will be that often envisioned by Western nations. A mobile, well armed, and prepared force of massive size will strike against the defenses of NATO. Estimates are many as to the numbers available to the Soviet Bloc. The most conservative states that these forces will have over 17,000 first line main battle tanks supported by infantry carried in armored personnel carriers. Where conservative estimates of Soviet armor focus almost entirely upon tanks of the upgraded T-62, T-72, and T-80 categories, other estimates include those vehicles not so capable and these swell the number upwards as high as 30-40,000 available tanks. In either case, NATO Allies have only 8,000 main battle tanks available and the support forces available are at an even greater numerical disadvantage.

Equipment Matchup

The matchup of equipment available in this early assault phase often brings a look of smugness to the faces of those believing in the technological superiority of the West. They admit to the numerical advantage, then speak almost lovingly of the superior armor, the increased firepower, the high grade ammunition, and the sophisticated training of the crews that are inherent characteristics of the West's main battle tanks.

In a simple tank battle scenario, these factors might be sufficient to insure an Allied victory. Despite efforts to upgrade their armor equipment, the Soviets still lag behind Western developments. Recent events, however, indicate that Soviet tanks are appearing with upgraded armor, including even older T-62 models, and that the Soviets have been able to produce the variant known as the T-80 in sufficient numbers to have it appear in many units. The T-72, considered by many to be merely an interim development, was produced in massive quantity, nearly 13,000 in all, and can effectively meet the majority of Allied tanks, except the M1A1, Leopard II and the Challenger. More importantly, care must be taken not to forget that weapons available to either side are vulnerable to destruction by virtually any of the equipment available under the right conditions. With the considerable numerical superiority of the Soviet Bloc, the kill-to-loss ratio for the allies will have to be phenomenal.

Almost conveniently forgotten by Western supporters is the real problem existent among allied forces. Whereas Soviet Bloc armored development has been standardized, with its equipment sharing common features, Western developments have been victimized by a failure of the major producers - United States, France, Great Britain, and West Germany - to agree to any form of standardization. Millions of valuable production dollars have been wasted on duplicated research, development, and production.

Support for the main armored assault will be provided by ground forces that also have an anti-tank capability. In this realm, the Allies will face a vast onslaught of armored personnel carriers, many of which carry anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) capable of destroying the majority of Allied armor. The Soviets have revolutionized the use of ATGMs by mounting them on all their personnel carriers, thus providing anti-tank capability to all front line units. One of these personnel carriers, the BMP-2, is considered by NATO analysts to be capable of knocking out even the most advanced NATO tank. Although presently only available to front line Soviet units, other units and Soviet allies are beginning to receive copies as supplies increase. Though not developing dedicated anti- tank groups, the motor rifle divisions so equipped are a formidable foe. Only the United States of the Western Allies has followed this example. Other allied nations have been held back in their adoption of this policy by severe financial constraints.

The initial assault by the Soviet Union will not be merely a wave of tanks and men flowing across the border. Providing cover for these forces will be a force of both fixed wing and rotor aircraft. Dedicated fighter aircraft will seek out the West's air forces, concentrating heavily on intercepting allied air superiority aircraft. Combining a radical increase in technological advancement with the advantage of superior numbers, these aircraft will attempt to gain a measure of control over the access to support so vitally needed by the Western ground forces. At the same time, ground support aircraft will strike at both assigned targets and targets of opportunity which pose a threat to the advance of the Soviet ground forces. To counter the projected use of attack helicopters and the utilization of Western armor, the Soviets will provide an effective and well coordinated helicopter force to aid their own ground forces.

As in certain areas relating to armor development, the NATO Alliance holds an advantage in the air. Aided by sophisticated computer fire control, target acquisition and command systems, the general superiority of allied military air forces is evident. To counter this technological advantage, the Soviets will be able to deploy almost 8,000 front line aircraft of which over 60% are interceptors, whereas the NATO alliance has a little over 3,000 aircraft available for all functions.

In reserve, the Soviet Bloc nations can make available a number estimated to be twice their original number again. Western capability for response has been hindered by the underestimation of the capabilities of the Soviet aircraft. For example, serious misjudgments of the capabilities of aircraft such as the Yak-38mm (Soviet Maritime Forces) and the Sukhoi-20 led many Western analysts to discount their effectiveness. Now studies indicate these aircraft, while not on a par with Western equipment, still represent a serious problem. Utilizing data and equipment obtained by whatever means, newly-appearing Soviet fighters are causing great consternation among allied military planners as well.

Today, front line units of the Soviet Bloc are being equipped with up-graded versions of older aircraft and the new production MiG-29s, MiG-31s, and Sukhoi27s. These aircraft are appearing with new systems very similar to those employed by the West, including sensor equipment developed from F-14 and F-15 equipment obtained bytheSoviets. and weaponry developed from acquired copies of NATO air-toair missiles. In addition, the Soviet Bloc nations are showing rapid strides in the development of AWACS deployment, with work progressing on the "Mainstay" as well as other aircraft.

For ground support and for defense of ground forces against Western ground attack aircraft, the Soviet Bloc will employ both air and ground equipment equal to or greater in capability than that available to the West. Dedicated assault aircraft will be backed by a large rotor force. Soviet military planners have assembled a large force of helicopters both for attacks on Western troops and for transporting Soviet troops and supplies. Recently the first appearance of the Mi-28 "Havoc" and the Kamov "Hokum" have been noted. Capable of functioning as either a ground support combat helicopter or, more importantly, as an air-to-air attack helicopter, these two Soviet developments have no counterpart in the West. Only the AH-64 and Italy's Mangusta approach the type of helicopter represented by the Havoc and Hokum. Expected to revolutionize helicopter warfare of the future, these two forms are ably supported by the vast number of transport and other attack helicopters of the Soviet Bloc. The Hind-24 has been significantly up-graded by the addition of equipment found necessary in the Afghanistan conflict and represents an even more formidable foe than it had previously.

A discussion of the Soviet Bloc equipment as contrasted to that available to the Western Alliance can continue with even a cursory analysis for many pages. Suffice it to say, the Soviet Union has the numerical capability to meet any Western force. Sufficient evidence exists to prove that the Soviets have the technology viable enough, though perhaps not comparable, to that available to NATO, so they can counter the advantage that may be held by the West. By doing such, the Soviet Bloc forces will be able to produce breakthroughs in the defensive wall of the NATO Alliance. Additionally, the pressures produced on the Western forces by the magnitude of the onslaught will be sufficient to deter significantly, if not completely, the employment of the Western battle doctrine.

Besides serving as the initial stages of a Soviet attempt to occupy Western Europe, the nature of the Soviet assault integrates another critical element of the Soviet military doctrine. Soviet theorists believe that warfare is, as noted earlier, resourceintensive. They argue that any conflict will be and must be fought with the men and materials available on day one of the confrontation. Because of the lethality of modern warfare, the Soviets expect that casualties may run as high as 15% in the opening days of the conflict. Some estimates by military analysts calculate the losses as high as a thousand tanks a day and several hundred fighters.

In the Arab-Israeli War, both sides lost almost half their tanks in three weeks of heavy fighting. In that conflict, attention must be drawn to the fact that many considered Israel to be in the same position as that of the NATO partners: superior in equipment, but almost overwhelmed by numbers. When note is made that the Arab countries did not have available to them the best of the Soviet equipment and that their training was inferior to that of the Soviets, the outcome of a conventional confrontation leans heavily in favor of the Soviet Bloc. The initial assault is designed to destroy or damage as much of NATO's capability as possible. In doing so, the Soviets restrict the men and equipment available to the West to respond to the assault.

More significantly perhaps, the initial Soviet assault will force the Western Alliance into making a very critical decision. How will they employ countermeasures to halt the Soviet advance when to do so will entail wholesale destruction of territory and production facilities in the West. Soviet military doctrine dictates that every effort be made to ensure that any defense of the Soviet Union and its Eastern European Allies takes place on Western territory. All indications are that West Germany and Denmark will, if taken by the Soviet Union, be either abandoned or will become wastelands as a result of any counterattack that might be undertaken by the West.

The loss of West Germany, even in part, will diminish greatly the war materials production capability of the NATO Alliance. Already severely hindered by decreases in military budgets, the loss of key production facilities will mean that NATO must rely on the long and easily interdicted supply lines to the United States and Canada where over 40% of the alliance's population and production facilities exist. Even taking into account possible resupply and reinforcement, the question would remain as to where the Allies would stage a counterattack from and what would they target.

More Soviet Conventional Combat Philosophy by Owen Stanley

Introduction
Soviet Military Thought
Laws of Military Conflict
Soviet Planning
Opening Assault
Conclusion