First, a basic discussion of Soviet thoughts about a confrontation with the Western powers must be presented. Fundamental to any examination of Soviet military posture is the recognition that they believe that a military confrontation is inevitable - and even right. William P. Baxter, in his work Soviet Airland Battle Tactics, makes the observation that Western analysts regard war "as the antithesis of politics resulting from a failure of the political process, as a temporary breakdown in the social order that interrupts the natural stability of the world." To think of war in any other way is abhorrent to even military personnel. Soviet military theorists reject this approach as both naive and nonsensical. Marxist- Leninist thought argues that war is a social phenomenon and a natural outcome of the struggle between classes. Lenin declared: "Peace is a temporary, unstable armistice be between two wars."

As Marxist-Leninist thought also contends that historical process is governed by immutable "scientific" laws, a confrontation between supporters of socialist thought and the enemies of such, i.e., the United States and is allies, can not help but occur. With the question of will confrontation occur answered, the problem becomes determining the nature of the conflict.

The underlying premise of Western military analysis is that the Soviets will attempt to develop an unstoppable first-strike capability. Analysts continually point 1) to statements by Soviet leaders, both political and military, that the Soviets can and will survive a nuclear war; 2) to the massive arsenal of strategic nuclear missiles held by the Soviet Union; and 3) to the apparent unwillingness of the Soviets to discuss strategic arms limitations as incontrovertible evidence that they are correct. Consequently, Western military and political leaders argue that a similar nuclear capability must be maintained by the West. By setting up conditions that ensure the annihilation of both combatants, Western theorists believe the Soviets will be held in check.

Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD)

The concept of mutually ensured destruction (MAD) is very important in examining contemporary Soviet military policy and in answering the question about the nature of the potential conflict between the Superpowers. Western analysts believe that no effective means can be found to counter the MAD argument. Two important factors are being ignored by the West, however. One, the focus of Western thought is upon the use of nuclear weapons as a strategic means to counter Soviet Bloc aggression. Two, the basic Soviet belief is that a nuclear war will come either as a result of a surprise attack by the West, or as the result of a conventional conflict escalating as the West finds itself losing. In the Soviets' minds little can be done to counter the possibility of a surprise attack by the United States. But they feel that by countering Western reliance on nuclear weapons in a conventional confrontation, they can give themselves the optimum probability of success in the war - a conventional weapons confrontation.

Despite thoughts to the contrary, Soviet military theorists are neither naive nor stupid. Not only do they recognize the dangers of a full-scale nuclear war, they are cognizant that many others are frightened by the possibility. As more reports are presented regarding the potential outcome of such a war, or even a nuclear accident, many allies of the United States have reacted harshly to both the deployment of weapons in their countries and the passage of military equipment through their territories. New Zealand, Japan, and Canada have openly declared their opposition. Frequent mass demonstrations have been held throughout the free world demanding the dismantlement and removal of weapons systems.

Most recently, the Soviets have responded to certain Western arms limitation overtures, surprising many and frightening quite a few in the nature of that response. On April 14, 1987, Soviet leader Mikhail S. Gorbachev offered to eliminate all medium and short-range nuclear weapons from the Soviet arsenal in Europe. In exchange, the United States and its allies would dismantle and remove the medium- range missiles of the type exemplified by the Pershing 11 class, agree not to replace them, and sign an accord forgoing the possibility of future short-range missile deployment. Greeted by skepticism by some, the general response has been favorable. With the exception of West Germany, the leaders of Western Europe have expressed increasing support for the proposal. The United States and its allies have suddenly found themselves on the horns of a dilemma.

Ronald Reagan and other Western leaders have long argued for some concrete discussions on limiting what they consider the most destabilizing weapons of any arsenal: nuclear weapons. The general public of nearly every nation has loudly supported some form of control. The problem is that any acceptance of the Soviet proposal for strict control and elimination of certain grades immediately negates the one critical facet of Western defense policy: the idea of a "trip wire" response to a Soviet attack with conventional weaponry. Retired Army General Edward Rowny is openly critical of the proposal, declaring that "the United States has unwittingly played into Gorbachev's hand."

NATO commander General Bernard W. Rogers agrees and has stated that the Western Alliance must have American ballistic nuclear weapons in Europe to counter and deter a ground attack by "superior Soviet conventional forces." West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl has expressed concern that the acceptance of the proposals would leave West Germany vulnerable to a Soviet conventional attack. The published response of the United States is that it has no intention of agreeing to anything that will leave Europe open to an attack by conventional means.

For the Soviet Bloc, the declaration that they are willing to discuss, and actively engage in, a policy of nuclear pullback is both politically and militarily viable. In either case, this shift in policy reflects a new direction in Soviet military philosophy. If it can limit the ability of the United States and its allies to respond to Soviet activity in a strictly strategic encounter, then it can engage in a conventional conflict with little fear of escalation into a MAD scenario. Deprived of its principal means of countering a Soviet attack, Western Allies will be force to adopt an approach more closely aligned with the desires of the Soviet Bloc. With the elimination of the "trip wire" threat of nuclear response to a conventional invasion, NATO must concentrate its efforts on fielding a force that is technologically superior, acting under a superior command structure. It would have to believe that this would be sufficient to halt any Soviet Bloc attack. Where once this position might have had great validity, present Soviet preparedness would seem to dictate otherwise.

The contention that the United States and its allies rely upon a "trip wire" policy is disputed by some analysts. They point to the fact that NATO adopted the "flexible response" in 1967. This new approach, they argue, moved NATO toward programs designed to counter any Soviet invasion without the need of nuclear weapons. The "flexible response" format states that the West would meet any invasion with conventional forces and only use nuclear weapons as a last resort.

Tricky semantics, but when examined closely, this is still the "trip wire" approach. Accept for a moment, however, that this policy is in effect. The reliance on technology and command becomes even more critical and probably unviable.

More Soviet Conventional Combat Philosophy by Owen Stanley

Introduction
Soviet Military Thought
Laws of Military Conflict
Soviet Planning
Opening Assault
Conclusion