Reprinted from NATO Review, Vol. XIX, Sep=Oct 1971, where it appeared under the title "Soviet Military Power -- The Development of the Soviet Air Force." It is part of a larger study of the Soviet military done by Prof. Ericson (Edinburgh Univ.) published by the Royal United Services Institute for Defense Studies, London, UK. It was written before close ties with the USSR, Sudan, and UAR were severed. Special thanks to Gerard van Rossum, Editor, NATO Review, for permitting us to reprint the article.

Though the Soviet Navy has captured far more than its fair share of headlines (thanks largely to the assiduousness of the capitalist press which promotes what is virtually an advertising campaign on behalf of the Soviet naval command), it might be more correct to say that the one genuine element of flexibility has been provided by the Soviet Air Force: we are mesmerised by the small flotillas but the growing air transport armadas largely escape our attention. The expansion of the naval forces has been prominent enough during the past decade, but there has also been continuous modernization of the formidable force of Soviet manned aircraft, a policy which will clearly continue throughout the 1970s.

The revolution in Soviet air-lift capability and the increased logistical and operational mobility of the Soviet Air Force may well prove to be the most significant factor after the build-up in strategic weapons, for Soviet air power provides both flexibility and mobility. The SAF is also "operational" in a fashion which is unique within the Soviet armed forces, for 150 Soviet-manned MiG-21J fighters -- ten squadrons -- fly in Egypt in conjunction with the air defence screen constructed against the Israeli Air Force: at an average of two pilots per plane this amounts to at least 300 Soviet pilots operating out of six Soviet-controlled airfields, Inchas, Gianaklis, Al-Mansoura, Beni Suef, Cairo West and Aswan. Further south Soviet Air Force pilots ferry in supplies in Antonov transports to the Sudan, where Soviet specialists maintain both fighter and helicopter forces.

With a manpower strength just under half a million and an inventory of 10,200 aircraft, Soviet air power is divided into five components: Long-Range Aviation (with nine divisions of three regiments -- three "air armies" -- equipped with intercontinental and medium- range bombers), Tactical Aviation (for ground support operations), Fighter Aviation/Air Defence Command (IAPVO: with over 30 regiments of fighter aircraft), Air Transport Command and Naval Aviation: the SAF disposes of 450-500 airfields (90 of which are in the northern regions), with at least 300 in European Russia.

The bulk of the air force front-line strength is made up of the 4,000 machines of tactical aviation with its ground-attack and fighter-interceptor aircraft, light bombers, helicopters, transports and reconnaissance aircraft: next in numbers comes Marshal Skripko's Air Transport component with 1,700 short and medium-range transports (augmented by a few longrange transports) and a helicopter fleet of some 1,500 machines (an inventory which would not be complete without including the "shadow" order of battle obtained from the aircraft of AEROFLOT, the Soviet national air line, whose aircraft could boost Air Transport command very substantially): the Navy Air Arm lost its fighter element to the Air Defence Command early in the 1960s but has since recovered to form a stronger force, with its land-based bomber force of Tu-16 BADGERs, Tu-22 BLINDERS, long-range maritime reconnaissance aircraft (Tu-20s), amphibious aircraft for short-range reconnaissance and 100 or so helicopters for ASW duties, supported by 200 fixed-wing aircraft for transport or other utility roles.

Long-range Aviation

Long-range Aviation under Agal'tsov is formally subordinated to the Air Force command, but it operates for all practical purposes as an independent arm: two 'air armies' are deployed in European Russia and one in the Soviet Far East. Over the past few years the numbers of intercontinental bombers have remained static -- some 90 -- 100 Mya-4 (201-M) 'BISON, bombers with a range of 2,600 nm and the Tu-20 'BEAR B' (approximately 100 machines) now used in the strategic reconnaissance and ECM role, though for strike operations the Tu-20 carries the near obsolete 'KANGAROO' stand-off missile: the Tu-16 (BADGER) strike-reconnaissance aircraft equipped with 'KIPPER, long-range stand-off missile remains in service, but 'BEARs,, 'BISONs, and 'BADGERs, are being replaced by the Tu-22 'BLINDER B, which is a long-range strike aircraft carrying the high-speed 'KITCHEN, missile -- the Tu-22 is supersonic with Mach 2.1 dash speed and a range in the order of 2,600 nm.

Two versions of the Tu-22 have been noted, with the missile-carrier transporting a stand-off bomb partially enclosed in the weapons bay and the reconnaissance version which has camera windows under the fuselage nose: there are still more than 500 Tu-16s in service and some 175 Tu-22s, so that the latter augments rather than replaces the BADGERs at the moment.

Tactical Aviation

Tactical Aviation, with its complement of ageing and obsolescent types, has recently undergone a face-lift, with the MiG-17 and MiG19 for interception and strike being replaced by the high performance MiG-21FL and MiG-21PF all-weather interceptors and strike aircraft, followed by the MiG-23 (E-266) interceptor-strike aircraft which is now reaching SAF units in Europe in some numbers. The MiG-23 entered SAF serviceinl967(thoughits existence was known in 1965) and may have been designed originally for a supersonic low-level strike role, though Soviet references have been to its high altitude all-weather interceptor role. (Tactical Aviation and Fighter Aviation/Air Defence Command use the same fighters, so there is no real incongruity in these two descriptions.)

The Sukhoi Su-9 all-weather single-seat interceptor remains in service, with radar homing air-to-air missiles (four to each aircraft) as armament: the Sukhoi Su-11, which appeared in 1967, is an all-weather interceptor (also assigned to IA/PVO) which is equipped with four missiles (two infra-red and two radar homing) and has a speed of Mach 2.5. The Su-11 (FLAGON-A) appears to be in squadron service with the SAF.

Among the several types of fighters and fighter- bombers displayed in 1967 was a Yakovlev experimental VTOL aircraft ('FREEHAND,), which took off vertically, performed its transition to level flight at about 200 feet and proceeded to make a highspeed fly-past, ending with a hovering turn and a vertical landing: such a machine could presage the development of a transonic close-support fighter (and possibly an aircraft for the naval air arm), but it would appear that for present purposes the SAF is more interested in variable geometry aircraft (Mikoyan's VG single-engined aircraft was also shown in 1967) and jet- assisted STOL, of which the MiG21 (FISHBED G) is an example. The new Air Force commander, Marshal Kutakhov, has also stressed that STOL training should be mandatory for all Soviet pilots.

Air Defence Command and Air Transport Command

Between them, Tactical Aviation and Air Defence Command organisation operate the bulk of Soviet combat aircraft: the ageing MiG-17s, MiG-19s, Yak-25s and I~2& of Tactical Aviation are being steadily replaced by newer types and in the Air Defence Command, which operates half the fighter strength of the SAF, the MiG-23 and Su-11 interceptors provide ultramodern all-weather aircraft. While this would account for 6 -- 7,000 combat aircraft, the next largest component is the Air Transport Command with some 1,700 machines (half of them made up of Antonov An-12 and Ilyushin 11 - 18 transports, the former a standard paratroop and freight aircraft with a range of 1,800 nm and the latter with a range of 2,000 nary).

The largest unit in service is the Antonov An-22 'ANTEUS', until the advent of the American C5-A the largest machine in the world: An-22s have a range of almost 6,000 nm and over 2,500 nm with the maximum payload of 176,0001b. The Soviet Ground Forces have about 600 helicopters at their disposal, the troop-carrier Mi-6 and Mi-8 and a heavy-lift helicopter in the Mi-10. To supplement the long and medium-range lift the Soviet command could call on AEROFLOT aircraft to furnish a transport fleet of some 300 planes, among them Tu-104s, TU-114s, Tu-124s and Tu-134s.

The invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 was a demonstration of Soviet combat-landing, though this operation was mounted within relatively easy reach of Soviet air bases. Air lift on an appreciable scale has been demonstrated several times in the Middle East, with the huge reinforcement lift in the immediate aftermath of the Six Days War, the air lifts to the Yemen in 1967 and 1968 and the present supply operations being run into the Sudan, not to mention what looks like an emergency airlift for special air defence equipment being rushed into Egypt (all this towards the end of March and early April 1971).

It seems reasonable to suppose, therefore, that the present air lift for 3-4 airborne divisions will be expanded, the helicopter force increased for Ground Forces operations and the "back-up fleet" of long- and medium-range civil transports similarly enlarged, with the Soviet Air Force concentrating on increasing its own tactical mobility and its logistical resources.

With a force of 5,000 high speed jet transports and helicopters at its disposal, the Soviet military command could countenance a number of revisions in some of its present ideas, most immediately on the Warsaw Pact area (which could be "leap-frogged" with air transport) or on holding the frontier areas with China (where much has already been done to improve the effectiveness of tactical aviation).

Naval Aviation

The future, or part of it, may also lie with a build-up of the Naval Air Arm, which has not as yet received any aircraft (save for the small force of amphibians) specifically designed for a "naval" role. The Tu-16 BADGER still occupies a place of prime importance in the Naval Air Arm, though the 300-strong force of Tu-16s is being partially replaced with Tu-22s. The connection between the Naval Air Arm and LongRange Aviation has been quite close, for it was from the LongRange Aviation component that the naval arm drew its Tu-16s and LRA still has some responsibility for providing longrange aircraft to back up the Soviet Navy. (It may be that one of the principal reasons for the Soviet Navy's "entry" into the Mediterranean in 1963-64 was that Long-Range Aviation could not do this job effectively, apart from augmenting reconnaissance facilities).

The attack role of Naval Air Arm aircraft, equipped with stand-off missiles, is directed against carrier forces and major surface units, while the long-range reconnaissance Tu-20s "track" carrier forces: the Mya-4 (201-M) is also available for radar reconnaissance. The Tu-16s and Tu-22s carry air-to-surface missiles for anti-shipping strikes: the earlier AS missiles with a 50-mile range had the disadvantage of forcing the Tu-16s lower and slower for launch, but i m proved missiles (such as "KITCHEN,,) require no such modification of height and speed from the launch aircraft.

The logical sequence of development in Soviet naval aviation would be substantial improvement in the performance of long-range maritime reconnaissance aircraft (both in range and endurance), advances in AS missiles for anti-shipping strikes, the introduction of an advanced long-range ASW aircraft and further improvements in both the amphibians and the helicopters which serve this arm. a "VTOL carrier" might appear as part of the "mobile sea platform" concept, but it is more likely that the Soviet command will settle for fighters with much increased payloads and range, an "outer-shore cover" which could be supplemented by equipment supplied to client states (in which there has been a significant change, for no longer does the Soviet Union deliver older and obsolete models but rather quite advanced combat aircraft).

If, as seems most likely, the most critical point of the naval "struggle" will centre on the battle for "access," at which points the Soviet Navy will of necessity commit most of its forces then this type of solution, implemented by "on-the-spot" air power and a highly mobile air force operated from the Soviet Union, would probably best serve Soviet interests. The "VTOL carrier" could be a complementary response and might be part of a continuing experimental programme which would meet an interim requirement, but the biggest punch of the naval "threat" may well lie with the Naval Air Arm in the coming decade.

Other Warsaw Pact Air Forces

In the Warsaw Pact area (where the Air Defence Command comes under centralised Soviet control and under the overall command of Marshal Batitskii) the Soviet Air Force provides the backbone of the available air power, with one tactical air army (the 24th) of 900 aircraft attached to the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany (GSFG).

The largest air force within the Warsaw Pact organization, other than the SAF itself, is the Polish (PLW) with 800 aircraft (6 squadrons of light bombers, 48 squadrons of fighters, 18 squadrons of ground-attack and reconnaissance aircraft), the combat aircraft being Soviet-supplied though Polish industry produces some trainers and small helicopters: recently the PLW was accorded independent status with its HQ at Poznan, having been previously under control of the Polish General Staff.

The Czechoslovak air force musters some 600 combat aircraft, half of them fighters, and produces the I-29 DELFIN trainer, the DDR also 600 aircraft, with Hungary, Bulgaria and Rumania bringing up the rear with smaller forces -- the Hungarian air force is merged with the army and is a close-support force (though it was re-equipped with MiG-21s after 1963).

Along with the Soviet Ground Forces, Warsaw Pact forces appear to be undergoing greater training in "vertical envelopment" operations using strong helicopter forces and the Polish armed forces include a sizable paratroop contingent: some of these specialist units and skills were demonstrated in the recent multinational exercise Brotherhood in Arms conducted by Warsaw Pact forces.

It would be a truism to say that the Soviet command has a firm grasp of the realities and potentialities of "air power" in precise terms, there has been no retraction of the idea of going for air superiority over the battlefield. The helicopter has been identified as a means of attaining great tactical flexibility, the increased air-lift available has encouraged some ambitious ideas for airborne operations, the role of the manned aircraft in the Soviet defence system has increased as has recognition of the need to deal with the manned bomber as a potential threat (together with the stand-off missile) and there has been no let-up in the modernisation of the SAF -- no less than 13 new types of Soviet fighter have appeared in the past ten years, and there are at least three direct-lift STOL fighters being tested.

Mikoyan's VG strike fighter (NATO code-name "FLOGGER,,) has been estimated to have a speed in excess of Mach 2, and all at a weight which is about one-third of the Amencan F-111A. Lift, strike and reconnaissance -- all these areas have received continuous Soviet attention and the "air component" permeates every section of Soviet military activity: the irony is that while there is much talk about where the Soviet Navy might "intervene," there is little or none of where the Soviet Air Force has "intervened" or been put on a form of combat test. Without the An-12 transports the invasion of Czechoslovakia would have been a much more messy affair: the Soviet Air Force is unlikely to forget nor to let others forget it.

More Soviet Air Force

Soviet Air Force
Soviet Air Force Organization
Soviet Aircraft and Specs (slow: 169K)
Soviet Air Force Missiles