On May 10, 1940, both the Allies and the Germans had the military potential to win the campaign. That the Allies did so poorly in the first half of the campaign was due to poor leadership and planning, and, most important, their failure to appreciate and effectively use the mechanized forces available to them.

General Estienne was the first exponent of armour in France. He proved his theories by breaking the WWI trench lines with masses of tanks armed with machine guns and light cannon. The French armoured forces, coupled with British tanks and fresh American troops, finally ended the four-year deadlock that characterized the First World War. Opposition to mechanization by government and established military leaders prevented progress in Britain and France, although the number of believers in armour and motorization grew between the wars.

The tank was thought to be the answer to the slaughter of trench warfare, as it might possibly put mobility back into battle. But the cavalry and infantry generals viewed this as heresy and regarded the new weapon with suspicion.

Mechanization was not accepted as essential immediately after WWI. Britain did, however, field an Experimental Mechanized Force in 1927-28. Much knowledge on the application of armoured forces was gained, but the program was dropped due to financial limitations.

Role of Tanks

The conflict over the role of the tank in battle further slowed progress. The War Office in Britain developed the concept of two separate classes of tank for what were regarded as two different kinds of warfare -- infantry support and mobile operations for after a breech was made in the enemy lines. This devisiveness, coupled with an acute shortage of funds for military purposes, prevented the armour theories of men like Fuller, Hobart, and Liddell Hart from coming to fruition. As a result, Britain, rhe leader in armour theory, could only watch the application of its ideas in the 1940 campaign in France.

Ironically, all of the work done in Britain succeeded in helping Germany. Men like Guderian advocated the use of tanks in mass and adopted and modified theories expounded by British and French military writers. Most importantly they won the support of Adolf Hitler. Clandestine operations were authorized in Sweden, Russia, and even Germany to keep abreast of experiments in France and England.

The big step for the panzer forces was taken when Germany broke the provisions of the Versailles Treaty and began to rearm in 1932. The first organized unit of the fledgling German armoured force was the NSKK or National Socialist Motor Corps. Germany's production was overestimated greatly by the Allies. A fear of German potential actually far beyond reality prevented early action on the part of France or Britain to stop Germany in the mid- and latethirties. British production alone was greater than Germany's at this time. Not until the Wehrmacht's failure to crush the Russian army in 1941-42 did Germany think of total economic mobilization.

Operations with small units in the Spanish Civil War, the occupations of Czechoslovakia and Austria, and the Polish campaign gave the German armoured forces training and experience that would prove vital in the coming French campaign. The basic ideas of speed and flexibility stressed by Guderian, in conjunction with well-trained crews, were to upset Allied planning and paralyse French and British thinking during the battle across France.

German Concentration

The Germans concentrated their tanks into selfcontained units with supporting infantry, engineers, and artillery. These divisions were employed in concentrated motorized corps against selected points of the enemy's line. After making a small breech, the armoured vehicles would rush througn to the rear areas, destroying depots, artillery, and HQs; disrupting and isolating the forward combat units.

Only when a defense in a city or along a river was attacked did the weaknesses of tanks become apparent. It still took artillery and determined groups of assault infantry to dig the enemy out of strong defensive positions. Personal command was a factor that was vital to the success of German armoured operations. While many Allied commanders were trying to direct the movement of mechanized forces from far behind the lines, German tank leaders were at the head of the panzer columns making sure that the fast pace of the advance was maintained. Without this continual pressure on the Allies, time would be lost in which the enemy could form new lines and regroup their potentially powerful armoured counter-strike forces. Any delay, whether stop-order from the German High Command or small uncoordinated counterattacks by Allied tanks, could give the Allies time to avoid total defeat, or even turn the tide of battle.

The strung-out panzer columns vvere very vulnerable to Allied counter-action. German tanks were in general inferior to French and British vehicles. That the Germans pulled off such a great victory at so little cost led them to believe in the invincibility of their armoured forces, and resulted in mistakes that proved Germany's undoing by 1941-42.

Lack of foresight, slowness and rigidity of technique, and the piecemeal use and distribution of France's armoured forces lost a battle for France when all the figures were in her favor.

Experiments

Experiments were carried out by the French army in 1932 based on their existing cavalry divisions. These trials resulted in the light mechanized division, a unit equal to the panzer division on paper. Only three of these were created and even those were wasted in the classic cavalry screening actions in front of the Allied infantry. French cavalry doctrine was only modified to permit the creation of armoured divisions because of the tremendous success the Germans had had with tanks employed in mass in Poland.

The French too had individuals who foresaw the future of mechanized armies. As early as the mid twenties military writers such as General Camon and Colonel Allehaut had written at length about the need for motorization of French forces. In 1926 Camon predicted that the next war would be won within a month by the nation that had the advantage over its enemy with a motorized army. De Gaulle took up the idea of armoured forces with a more enthusiastic approach. He had help in the Chamber of Deputies in the person of Reynaud, but the government dismissed his theories of creating a 100,000 man professional armoured force as nothing more than the misguided ideas of the upper brackets of a military clique that would relish an offensive war.

De Gaulle's system was undemocratic as it opposed France's universal conscript army, and was regarded as an aggressive system that would lead to wasteful offensives like those of 1914. The professional army was looked upon as more of a threat to France than Nazi Germany.

Faith in the method of victory in 1918 and belief in the superior power of the defense over offense stagnated military thought and achievement between wars. This lack of progress was aided by severe economic and political crisis in France. When war was inevitably begun by the German invasion of Poland, France entered the conflict reluctantly. The attitude of the time has been refered to as the "Maginot Line Complex".

Originally the line of underground fortifications stretching along the Franco-German border was only meant to delay German invading forces long enough to permit mobilization of France's citizen soldiers -- a very long process. The Maginot Line was not supposed to be a "Great Wall", but eventually it came to be looked upon as the main block against Germany. Skepticism of the tank and airplane contributed to this attitude and retarded development of the forces that were to be the main weapons of the next war.

ORGANIZATION and EQUIPMENT

The main Armoured Fighting Vehicles [AFVs] used by the combatants in 1940 vvere of two types: tanks and armoured cars. Armoured Personnel Carriers [APCs] were just beginning to be used in quantity. In both areas the Allies had either comparable or superior quality equipment, as well as more vehicles than the Germans. In leadership and organization, however, the Germans enjoyed a great advantage.

Allied AFVs totaled 6300 for the campaign, of which nearly 800 were obsolete models. 2500 French and 650 British tanks opposed a similar number of German vehicles, but only 1400 French tanks were in divisional units. In spite of vast sums spent on the Maginot Line and production delays caused by the nationalization of her industry, France deployed enough tanks to defeat Germany in 1940.

The battalion was the basic tank unit in the French army. Of 68 tank battalions, only 32 were organized into armoured or cavalry divisions. 27 independent battalions were of little use against German medium tanks, having R-35, H-35, or FCM models with the low-velocity 37mm gun. Another 9 independent battalions split up among the various armies were of obsolete FT-17 and 2c WWI tanks.

French tanks in general were slow, with poor crew accomodation. All had one-man turrets. The latter factor was a severe handicap to operations as it placed too much work on the tank commander. He often acted as loader and gunner, as vvell as tactical leader for the tank or squadron. Even the char B with its crew of four (commander, driver - gunner, radioman, and loader) was manned inadequately for the tank's two guns; one 47mm in the turret and one 75mm in the hull.

French Cavalry Vehicles

French cavalry vehicles were either the Somua and Hotchkiss chars (tanks), or automitraillousos (armoured cars) of the Panhard and Renault types. The armoured cars were classified in 1931 as reconnaissance (AMR), decouverte or scout (AMD), and combat (AMC). The AMCs were actually Hotchkiss light tanks. The AMD Panhard 178, with its 25mm gun, was an excellent AFV which could easily engage German armoured units.

By 1936 only 40 new tanks had been produced in France. The main AFV strenght of the army was the WWI FT-17 tank. At the start of the war these obsolete chars formed ten battalions; although replacements reduced this number to eight battalions by May 10, 1940. Hovvever, production of the new tanks rapidly increased and by 1939, 2200 new tanks had come off the assembly lines. A total of 3500 tanks were completed by May 1940, of which 800 were medium or heavy types.

French infantry transports included Laffly armoured half-tracks carrying ten men each, and the new Chenillette (literally "small tracked vehicle") APCs. The Laffly formed the bulk of the transport of the dragons portes, the infantry componentsof the cavalry divisions. By May 1940, 387 Chenillettes had been constructed for the armoured divisions. Since these were fully-tracked vehicles they gave better crosscountry performance than trucks or half-tracks and actually put the French a step ahead in the armoured infantry concept. The weapons of these APCs were usually only those carried by the men being transported.

After the German victory, many French AFVs received a second life by being used as chassis for German self-propelled guns and as tank equipment for Germany's allies.

British AFV Design

Captain Carden was responsible for most of Britain's AFV design and development until his untimely death in 1935. The Germans were quick to incorporate his excellent ideas into their own armoured forces during the midthirties. His Mk Vl light tank cameinto service in 1938. The first examples of the cruiser and infantry tank models (A9 and All ) were also delivered to the army at this time.

The cruiser series (which was influenced by American Christie designs) evolved because of the need for medium tanks to penetrate into an enemy's rear areas. Improved versions of these tanks came in 1939, the first being the A10. It had no small MG turrets as did the A9, and had better armour protection. The A13 which followed was an excellent tank whose reliability was proven in the June retreat of the 1st Armoured Division.

In the move back to Cherbourg to embark for England, 400 miles were covered without the loss of a single tank to mechanical breakdowns. The cruiser tanks were armed with the 2-pounder (40mm) gun. A close support version had the 3.7" mortar.

Conventional ideas of infantry support led to the development of the infantry tank. Only sixteen A12 models of the 7th R.T.R., armed with the 2-pounder gun, were involved in the counter-attack at Arras on May 21. Dubbed "Matilda", it was much superior to the Mk I which was more of a mobile machine-gun post than a tank. On all British AFVs the Vickers wateocooled MGs were being replaced by 7.92 millimeter types (Besa) in 1940.

In the British tanks the commander, gunner, and loader-radioman were located in the turret. All were trained to take over the job of a disabled member. Only the driver, located in the front of the hull, could not be replaced as the cramped interior did not permit much movement.

The cruisers were employed in the 3rd Armoured Brigade of the 1st Armoured Division. The three Royal Tank Regiments of the Brigade were the only armoured units in the campaign to use cruiser tanks. The offcial establishment of the 1st Armoured Division, shown on page 17, was supposed to include 474 AFVs. 304 cruisers would have made up the major portion of this total, but in fact only 166 A9, A10, and A13 models took part in the campaign.

An armoured regiment (the equivalent of a French or German battalion) had 575 men in three squadrons of four troops. The cavalry regiments of the 1st Armoured Division followed the same organizational pattern, but had 58 light tanks in place of the cruisers.

Battalion

The battalion was the primary combat unit until 1942. In the 1st Army Tank Brigade, there were 50 Mk I infantry tanks in the 4th Bn. (R.T.R.), and 27 Mk I and 23 Mk II types in the 7th Bn. (R.T.R.). A battalion had 513 men armed with 9 LMG, 9 AT rifles, and 8 carriers. Light tanks vvere organized in the 1st and 2nd Reconnaissance Brigades and divisional cavalry regiments.

The losses in the 2nd Brigade on 18 May were so heavy that a composite regiment was formed; the Brigade did not function again until its return to Britain. The 1st FF Yeomanry from the 51st Infantry Division and the 1st ER Yeomanry were placed in the 1st Reconnaissance Brigade.

The other cavalry regiments available -- 4/7 Dragoon Guards of the 2nd Division, 13/18 Hus~ sars of the 1st Division, and 1st Lothians of the 48th Division -- were taken by the B.E.F. as GHQ troops from March to May. The cavalry regiment with its three squadrons comprised 28 light tanks and 44 carriers, with 480 men, 240 pistols, 296 rifles, 10 LMG, and 10 AT rifles. One other unit, the 12th Lancers (an armoured car regiment), was organized on the basis of three squadrons. Its 380 men had 38 armoured cars, each armed with a Bren 0.303'' LMG and a Boys 0.55" AT rifle.

Only a limited number of armoured cars took part in the battle for France. At the beginning of the war some old Lancaster armoured cars and the 1924 Rolls-Royce models were in service with the army. The latter types equipped R.A.F. units and the 11th Hussars, and were armed with Bren LMG, Boys AT rifles and 4" smoke dischargers. The only modern armoured car in service at the outbreak of the war was the Morris four wheeled model CS9/LAC with the 12th Lancers.

The long range reconnaissance vehicles were designated "Tank, Light (wheeled)", but were renamed simply "Armoured Car" in 1941. A new type came into existence in 1939 as "Car. Scout". These were used for liaison, and as armoured dispatch riders for tank regiments and squadron headquarters of the First Armoured Division. Scout cars also were organized in the motorcycle battalions as two platoons of 21 cars. The armoured car regiments emphasized speed and mobility. Their primary duty was to gather information, not fight the enemy.

The APC of the British Army was the Bren carrier. It carried heavy weapons and acted as a reconnaissance vehicle for infantry and reconnaissance units, was an armoured observation post for artillery, and a tractor for AT and LAA weapons. I ts crew, I i ke that of the German APCs, often fought from the vehicle and would not dismount. Bren carriers were issued to the infantry on a ratio of ten per battalion. They were called scout carriers in the 7 mechanized divisional armoured car regiments of the B.E.F. The Bren was cramped and uncomfortable and gave protection from only small arms fire.

German Panzers

Germany's 4600 AFVs were organized into ten panzer divisions with nearly 400 tanks and armoured cars apiece. Each division deployed one or two tank regiments and one reconnaissance battalion. The divisions' total of 35 panzer and 10 armoured car battalions was lower than the total number in Allied mechanized divisions, but the Germans had more vehicles per battalion. The six German motorized infantry divisions also contained armoured car units. Out of 3500 tanks and self-propelled guns available, only 2600 were frontline on May 10. The rest were kept as training or replacement vehicles.

Panzer Divisions 1, 2, 5 - 8, and 10 in Army Group A faced Belgium and Luxembourg. Panzer Divisions 3, 4, and 9 of Army Group B were to advance through southern Holland into Belgium. Army Group C opposite the Maginot Line, and the 16th Army of Army Group A, had no tanks whatsoever.

By 1939 the Germans had four main Panzer kampfwagen (PzKpfw) or armoured battle vehicle types in production, augmented by two models seized in Czechoslovakia when Germany annexed that country. All had been designed between 1934 and 1939 and most mechanical problems had been worked out These were the Panzer I and II light tanks which were nothing more than fully tracked armoured cars; the Czech light tanks models 35 and 38; and the medium Panzer III and IV.

The first three panzer divisions, formed in 1935, consisted of panzer models I and II. The former type was a Spanish Civil War veteran patterned after the British Vickers CardenLoyd light tanks.

The Pz I was armed with two 7.92mm machine guns and had only light armour protection. A munitions carrier version which had no turret or armament was also produced, as well as commanders' armoured vehicles with increased radio gear and only one MG.

The panzer II was a stop-gap measure started in 1934 when it appeared obvious that the heavier Pz III and IV models would not begin major production until 1939. It mounted a 20mm light gun and one MG and was the largest single type of tank used in the panzer regiments. A flame-thrower model of the Pz II was also employed in very small numbers in the 1940 campaign.

The Skoda 35t and 3St [t=Czechi vehicles were the best light tanks available for Fall Gelb. Most mounted the Czech 37mm A3 or A7 gun although some had the German 37mm L/45 or or L/40. There were also a few Czech armoured command vehicles armed only with an MG.

Main Battle Tank

The main battle tank of the panzer forces was supposed to be the Pz III with the 37mm gun, but production fell far short of expectations. Some were also produced as armoured command vehicles, with only an MG. The Pz IV, with its 75mm gun, was the best German tank. Its armour protection, like that of the British cruiser series, was inadequate.

All of the German tanks had good speed and excellent cross country performance. The large crews of the panzers enabled them to perform more complicated operations than their Allied counterparts. The mediums' crew of five [commander, gunner, loader, radio operator, and driver] was a well- coordinated team which could get three aimed shots off when an Allied tank could fire only once. In the four-man crew the loader doubled as radio-operator.

Enemy armour, mechanical breakdowns, and fueling time delayed or stopped the panzer columns. The latter problem stemmed from the fact that refueling was done with small, five-gallon containers ("Jerry" cans) and there was no bulk fuel source other than gas stations along the route of advance.

Most tank losses in the campaign resulted from mechanical breakdowns. The treads on tanks would become worn out after long advances on roads and across open country and needed replacing; engines had to have complete overhauls after the heavy strain of complicated maneuvers and high speeds of combat and prolonged advances.

At any time during the course of the campaign up to 30% of a panzer division's AFVs might be unavailable for combat because of mechanical problems. Experience gained in the occupations of Austria and Czechoslovakia, as well as the campaign in Poland, led to the development of an excellent tank recovery system. The Germans usually were able to field many damaged tanks when the Allies were forced to abandon and destroy theirs.

Combat Losses

Net combat losses from May 10 to June 1, after replacements had been added, totaled 529 tanks and armoured cars. The light panzer I and II models and the armoured cars made up over 70% of the write- offs. This was due to the fact that these fast vehicles were invariably in the van of the panzer columns and ran into the enemy first, took losses, and then called up fire support from the heavier AFVs.

Almost 50% of the German tank force was panzer I and II types, all but useless in tank vs. tank combat. This left only about 1200 vehicles to engage Allied tanks on a somewhat equal basis. Even then the superior armour on the main French and British tanks almost always gave the advantage to Allied forces, no matter how small the unit employed was. Usually, only close air support, the panzer divisions' heavy artillery, and anti-aircraft guns of the Luftwaffe field units made it possible for the Germans to defeat enemy armoured units.

German armoured cars and APCs vvere grouped under the classification of Sondorkraftfahrzoug (SdKfz) or special purpose vehicle. A new AFV type, the Sturmgoschutz (StuG) or assault gun, was tried out experimentally in the campaign. There were also self-propelled guns, an improvisation by the Germans involving the mounting of 47mm anti-tank and 150mm heavy infantry guns (slG 33) on panzer I chassis. These latter vehicles were instituted since armoured units often found themselves without close infantry or artillery support, because the soft skinned vehicles (trucks and tractors) of these units were too vulnerable to ground and air attack.

The first interim armoured cars appeared in 1932. 800 light four wheeled vehicles were available for the campaign, a few of which had increased armament of a 20mm gun. The 6- and 8-wheeled models, armed with the 20mm gun, made up 30% of the total number of armoured cars on May 10.

Mass production of half-track trucks to tow artillery and carry gun crews was begun in 1937. The armoured (gepanzert) model appeared in 1938. A few companies of the 6-man APCs were first used in Poland by 1st Panzer Division. Armoured half- tracks were armed with the 37mm anti-tank gun for platoon leaders, or two machine guns, besides the weapons of the troops being transported. The half- track prime movers were used also as platforms for light AA and AT guns.

Other German transport of trucks and passenger vehicles were a conglomeration as no standard types could be developed due to the limitations of German industry.

TANK AND ANTI-TANK GUNS

The tank and/or anti-tank gun is a direct-fire weapon; its flat trajectory fire is directed at targets that can be seen by the gunners. The longer the barrel of the gun, the greater speed or muzzle velocity is given to the shell fired, and the more likely it is to penetrate the armour skin of an AFV. However, a shell could be so large that muzzle velocity doesn't matter. A 105mm shell fired from regular artillery pieces could easily destroy or disable a tank, but the AT gun has a better chance of hitting a vehicle.

AT Projectiles

In the French campaign only two types of projectiles were available for AT use. Germany and France employed the armour piercing (AP) shell, Britain used the AP shot. The shot was solid and ricochetted inside the tank once it penetrated. The shell detonated after breaking through the armour, giving a greater lethal effect. However, the differences between the two were slight considering that most of the AT guns were of small calibre (37,40, and 47mm).

A shot or shell needn't penetrate a tank to effectively destroy it. An AFV could be disabled and immobilized by destroying its treads and driving gear. This took iron nerves on the gunners' part, as a tank would have to approach very close to insure a direct hit on these vulnerable areas.

The main German tank and AT gun was the 37mm. This and the low-velocity 75mm gun (a good infantry support weapon, especially against pillboxes) were unable to penetrate the frontal armour on most French and British AFVs. It took assistance from Stuka divebombers, heavy artillery, and the 88mm gun of the Flak Corps to effectively deal with Allied armoured forces. The latter was originally intended for anti-aircraft purposes only, but experience in Spain and Poland found the 88mm units were often forced into directfire engagements.

This led to many being fitted with armour shields before the 1940 onslaught in order to afford the gun crew some protection. The 88mm gun in France, as throughout the war, proved to be the Germans' most valuable AT weapon. It was the only gun that could penetrate the Matilda tank's frontal armour.

Other German AT guns included the very ineffective 7.92mm Pz B anti-tank rifle, assigned in sections of three guns, one AT section to each infantry company. The 20mm guns mounted on the Panzer I and II were derivatives of the 20mm anti- aircraft-tanks, having shorter barrel s and different rifIing. The Czech guns were somewhat better than the German tank guns, the best such weapon was the 47mm which was mounted on the Panzer I chassis as a self-propelled gun.

British AT

The British Army's main AT weapon was the 2- pounder (40mm) gun, although some Hotchkiss 25mm guns were alloted to the infantry. In 1938 the responsibility for AT defense was taken from the infantry and placed on the Royal Artillery. One regiment of such guns was assigned to every B.E.F. division. The 2pounder, and even the 25mm to a degree, could engage any German AFV up to half a mile and expect to destroy it with a direct hit.

Allied AT weapons in general were more than adequate to counter Germany's armoured forces. France's semi-automatic tank and antitank guns took a heavy toll of German AFVs, even Rommel nearly fell victim to a well placed French 47mm. Only the WWI veteran 37mm SA 18, used primarily on R-35 and H-35 tanks, had too low of a velocity to successfully engage the medium Panzer III and IV. German superiority in tactics made up for their severe disadvantage in the AT gun area; usually Allied AT units were overwhelmed by sheer numbers. The failure of the Allies to supply adequate supporting units for their AT guns led to their rapid elimination, rendering them merely block or delay units.

The AFV profiles and data are for the main typos of tanks, APCs, and armored cars that took part in the 1940 campaign. Weights are combat loaded. The maximum road speed is given; crosscountry performance was usually a little less than half of this figure. Range is given in road travel on internal consumption, cross-country travel being approximately two-thirds of this figure. In addition to the main armament of guns and machine guns on the vehicle, the crew sometimes carried hand weapons. Armor lists maximum thickness in millimeters front/side/rear. Crew is the number of specialists required to operate the AFV.

More 1940

1940: Campaign in France
1940: Campaign in France: Military Dictionary
1940: Campaign in France: TO&E: French
1940: Campaign in France: TO&E: British
1940: Campaign in France: TO&E: German
1940: Campaign in France: Tank Illustrations and Specs
1940: Campaign in France: Anti-Tank Gun Comparison
1940: Campaign in France: Order of Battle Numerical Charts

Related

1940: French Armored Forces