Redline: Korea 1995
Crossing the Big Red Line

War in the Air

by Joe Miranda



The War in the Air

The North Koreans remember the impact that US air power had during the First Korean War. They have gone to considerable lengths to build up their air defenses, creating a massive system of interceptors, anti-aircraft guns, SAMs, radars, and hardened sites. But as the Gulf War demonstrated, this type of system can be dismantled by a well organized aerial campaign. Consequently, United Nations forces would probably gain aerial superiority after the initial stage of any war.

While on paper the North Koreans maintain more aircraft than their ROK/US forces on the peninsula, these numbers are deceptive. The majority of Communist aircraft are obsolete or obsolescent types, such as the MiG- 17, MiG- 21, and the Chinese J-5/J-6.

Although these were capable of engaging US fighters on comparable terms during the Vietnam War, they would be outclassed by US F-14s, -15s, -16s, and -18s. Moreover, although the United States maintains about 100 aircraft on the Korean Peninsula itself, it has other air units within range in Japan or available for immediate reinforcement from aircraft carriers or bases in the Pacific.

Another factor to consider is training. Most North Korean pilots reportedly receive a minimal number of flying hours per year. Compare this with the extensive US training program, and it is clear that the North Koreans would be outclassed in the air. The United States also has the benefit of the experience of the 1990- 91 Persian Gulf War, in which its aerial operations were further refined.

The Persian Gulf War revealed a revotionary new role for American air power. The basic idea was simultaneously to attack man enemy targets, thereby overwhelming enemy defenses and overloading their ability to repair the damage. Technology proved to be important in executing this strategy Improved electronic warfare and guided munitions allowed a smaller number of aircraft to conduct more effective missions.

Beyond air power's physical effects is a psychological impact. Air power delivers much "information" in a short amount of time. Bombing has a political impact; it demonstrates to the enemy that he is helpless in the face of friendly power. But it can also backfire. Collateral damage can be exploited by enemy propagandists to make the friendly side look like they have been conducting atrocities.

On the operational level, an air campaign must take an integrated approach. The first enemy target must be his surveillance an command systems. Knocking out his radars electronic warfare planes, and command post will paralyze his air defense capabilities. As in ground warfare, intelligence is vital. If the friendly side knows where the enemy air force is but the reverse is not true, then the friend lyside can concentrate its assets to destroy the enemy's air power. Meanwhile, the enemy will be flying "blind."

Attacks against ground targets must hit centers of gravity. Strategic targets include electrical power grids, which can paralyze an entire society with a minimum of destruction and casualties. Support of ground forces occurs through interdiction and close air support. Attacks on enemy command control nexuses, bridges, natural chokepoints, and reserves isolate the battlefield. These work with the ground components of Air-Land battle to completely paralyze the enemy's ability to react to a changing situation.

The Future

There was a brief war scare over Korea in mid- 1994. DPRK nuclear capability dominated world news, along with the death of Kim Il Sung, until diplomatic deal-making calmed things down at least temporarily. Korea still remains one of the most heavily armed places on the globe. Whether or not another war breaks out, the peninsula will remain a high priority item on the agenda of the "New World Order" from some time to come.

Redline: Korea Crossing the Big Red Line


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