The Situation

One of the world's hot spots is the Korean Peninsula. The Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea) and the Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea) have been in a state of uneasy peace since the end of the First Korean War in 1953. What is the potential for future conflict?

Military Geography

The Korean peninsula presents a unique military situation. The peninsula averages 150 kilometers across much of its width, which mandates a very narrow front line. The peninsula also contains some of the roughest terrain in the world. A spine of mountains runs long the eastern half of the peninsula, giving way to relatively flat land in the west.

This terrain makes flanking moves extremely difficult, at least by land. The terrain dictates several avenues of approach across the border, including the Munsan and Chorwon corridors, which lead directly to the South Korean capital of Seoul.

Korea is divided by a demilitarized zone (DMZ), the line which the opposing armies occupied when the cease-fire took effect in 1953. Both North and South Korea have fortified their own sides of the DMZ extensively. The North has entrenched thousands of guns along their side of the DMZ and would probably preface any assault with a massive barrage. The South has buried numerous demolitions that can trigger avalanches to create roadblocks along restricted mountain roads.

Communist Doctrine

Both sides have developed capabilities to overcome the natural and man-made geographical deadlock. The North Korean Peoples' Army (NKPA) emphasizes the offensive. It sees destruction of the enemy force as its primary goal, to be accomplished through integration of conventional and unconventional warfare.

The North Koreans use an operational approach similar to the old Soviet model, relying on armored and mechanized forces to blast their way through enemy defenses, push deep into enemy territory, and then turn to envelop the defenders' positions. Assault forces will be supported by the massive infiltration of special operations troops into the enemy rear.

Special forces account for about one fifth of all maneuver brigades in the North Korean army. By infiltrating via airborne, amphibious, and tunnel insertion, these forces can effectively outflank the ROK's DMZ defenses. Another advantage to the special operations strategy is that it forces the South Koreans and their allies to assign considerable numbers of troops to rear area security duties. In fact, both sides have trained and armed millions of their citizens for such security missions, leading to a general militarization of society.

There are important logistical considerations for the Communists. One is how well they could support an actual offensive. The North Korean arms industry could not provide the munitions, equipment, and replacement parts for a protracted war. Support could conceivably come from the Peoples' Republic of China. This support will depend upon the state of relations between China and the West.

The increased mechanization of the NKPA multiplies logistical requirements. Fuel and maintenance are both crucial to keeping mechanized forces operational. Both require long and vulnerable lines of communication. The fuel situation is also critical because it is not apparent that the North Koreans have sufficient fuel stocks to support sustained operations. Fuel stockpiles will probably be a primary target for US air power. Logistic constraints might prove to be the communists' Achilles heel. The very size of the North Korean army could bring about its own demise.

In the South

Seoul, the South Korean capital, is within 50 kilometers of the DMZ. This fact largely dictates ROK strategy. Communist capture of the Seoul area would mean loss of the Republic's political and commercial center, along with a quarter of the population. The ROK considers the loss of any territory as a serious defeat. Consequently, its strategy is based on retaining or recapturing geographical objectives rather than defeating the enemy army.

Unlike the United States Army, which emphasizes mobility, the ROK has a forward defense doctrine. Most South Korean regular army units are deployed up front along the DMZ. Although this places them in a position to counter a frontal assault, they could conceivably be trapped in place if the Communists achieve a breakthrough somewhere along the front.

The South Korean army is mainly an infantry force, which reflects the nature of the country's rugged terrain, where less sophisticated armored vehicles would be at a disadvantage. ROK infantry divisions have three infantry regiments, each with four battalions instead of the usual three.

The fourth battalion is intended for rear area security operations against infiltrating North Korean special forces. The infantry is motorized: troops would be taken to the battle site via truck, then deploy on foot.

The armed forces emphasize a high degree of training. They practice day, night, and allweather maneuvers extensively. The South Koreans have no desire to repeat the performance of 1950, where poorly trained ROK soldiers were unable to stop a surprise Communist invasion.

One advantage the South Koreans have is that since most of their equipment originated in the United States, logistics is somewhat simplified. They can use the American logistics system already in place to provide maintenance and supply.

The real question is how well the forward defense doctrine would work. Historical experience on the Russian Front during World War II shows that armies that attempt to hold at all costs tend to be enveloped and destroyed. Yet the political and economic importance of Seoul, and the fact that the Korean peninsula terminates in the south at the ocean, mean that the loss of forward positions would be a political and perhaps even a military disaster. There really may be nowhere to retreat and conduct a classic mobile defense.

War and Politics

There are some other important political considerations in a future Korean War. During the First Korean War there was considerable anti- communist sentiment in the North, and the US/ROK exploited this to recruit agents and guerrillas there. But the Communists have had almost 50 years to consolidate their position in the North. The majority of North Koreans appear to be loyal to the Communist regime, although the recent death of dictator Kim It Sung may lead to political instability and internal power struggles.

There is also the question of civil-military relations in the ROK. Military rule and the suppression of student disturbances have created internal divisions which the Communists could exploit in the case of war. This divisiveness reinforces the need for a for-ward defense. A strategic retreat might be construed by the populace as a sign that the ROK government is unable to protect the country, thereby leading to political collapse.

There are also questions of how the other powers in the region would react. Japanese national policy is to refuse to commit its ground combat forces outside the home islands, but in the event of a major threat this policy might change. On the other hand, Japan's role as an occupier of Korea until 1945 is still remembered, and a Japanese intervention would fuel anti-ROK propaganda.

The People's Republic of China (PRC) intervened in Korea in 1950, largely in response to the United Nations' counterattack deep into the DPRK and the potential threat to Manchuria. It is possible that as long as UN forces stay on their own side of the DMZ the Chinese can be kept out of the war. On the other hand, this would give the North the advantage of a guaranteed sanctuary.

The other major question mark is Russia. The collapse of the old Soviet Union now places Russia potentially in the UN camp, which would partially counterbalance PRC intervention in the peninsula.

Finally, there are the "little dragons" of East Asia. The Republic of China (Taiwan), Hong Kong, and Singapore all have experienced economic booms in recent decades. Would they sit back and allow the Republic of Korea to be overrun?

Redline: Korea 1995 Crossing the Big Red Line

Background and Politics
US Forces and the Air-Land Battle
War in the Air