US Forces

The United States has been committed to the defense of South Korea ever since 1950. US units have been stationed in the peninsula and surrounding regions since the end of the "police action" back in 1953, and Korea has been a site of several political-military confrontations in the past. US units along the DMZ conduct patrols under conditions approaching those maintained in wartime.

US Force deployments in Korea and the Pacific
Jumbo Map of US Deployments (slow: 161K)

The United States currently maintains one hybrid division in the Korean Peninsula, the 2nd Infantry. It consists of a mix of armor, mechanized, air-mobile, and aviation battalions as well as artillery and support units. The 2nd also has a brigade stationed in the United States, which would be deployed to Korea in event of war.

The US has other units earmarked for rapid deployment. These include the 3rd Marine Expeditionary Force (based on Okinawa), the 82nd Airborne Division (from Fort Bragg), and the 25th Light Infantry (in Hawaii). The US could also deploy the 101st Air Assault Division in an emergency.

One plan calls for the 101st to have its organic helicopter component fly from its home base at Fort Campbell, Kentucky, to Korea using in-air refueling and base-hopping via Alaska and Japan. Heavier contingency forces, such as the 24th Mechanized and 1st Armored Cavalry divisions, could also be deployed, as well as additional Marine units.

Air-Land Battle

US military doctrine is based on the AirLand Battle concept. Essentially, Air-Land Battle is an operational approach covering a scale of war between strategy and tactics. It involves achieving goals within a theater of operations in a specific campaign.

Air-Land Battle was the result of considerable debate within the military establishment in the 1970s and 1980s as the Army sought to develop a new approach to warfare. AirLand battle has several key tenets:

• Agility. The commander - and the troops - must be able to act faster than the enemy. They have to take advantage of opportunities as they present themselves.
• Initiative. The friendly commander must dictate the pace of the battle.
• Depth. The battle is fought in the entire area of operations, not just along the front line.
• Synchronization. Ground combat, aviation, logistics, and special operations elements must work together.

The concept was inspired by the great armored victories in World War II and in the Arab- Israeli Wars, where small mechanized forces supported by air power outmaneuvered larger, more ponderous enemy formations. Air-Land Battle combines maneuver and firepower for maximum effect. The idea is to hit the enemy from several unexpected directions, which magnifies the effect of the attack and minimizes friendly casualties. In practice, the doctrine relies heavily on leadership and initiative, especially for lower level formations. Commanders must be given general mission objectives and the flexibility to carry them out.

Air-Land Battle is fought in considerable depth, covering three distinct aspects:

• Close Battle, where the bulk of maneuver forces are in contact.
• Deep Battle, fought in the enemy's rear area using aviation, special operations forces, and long range artillery/missile fires. Targets include the enemy's command network, his logistical system, and reinforcements being moved to the font.
• Rear Battle, involving maintenance of lines of communications and logistical structure, plus rear area security against enemy infiltration or airborne attack.

Because of the increased depth of the battlefield, the commander must focus on the "Area of Influence" and the "Area of Interest." The first is the region in which a commander can immediately engage the enemy. The second is the surrounding zone where situations may develop that can potentially affect the battle. The commander keeps the Area of Interest under surveillance, through various intelligence and reconnaissance capabilities, and acts accordingly when interest changes to influence.

Much of Air-Land Battle involves "getting inside the enemy's action-reaction loop," which involves acting more quickly than the enemy can respond, thereby always placing the enemy one step behind friendly operations. Thus destruction of the enemy's command, control, communications, and intelligence systems (C3I) becomes imperative. If enemy commanders do not know what the situation is, and cannot get their battle plans down to the units in contact, then they have effectively lost control of the battle. Air-Land battle relies heavily on non-material aspects of warfare. C3I, training, and leadership are all key factors. Weaponry becomes the means to execute the overall plan.

Air-Land Battle is even more of a necessity in Korea, given the nature of the terrain and Communist forces. The use of helicopter mobility is vital in overcoming the massive communist ground forces. Through vertical envelopment, American airmobile forces can bypass Communist forces and attack them from the rear.

Korea should be an interesting test for airmobile warfare. During Vietnam, the US military made extensive use of helicopterborne forces, but it should be remembered that Communist air defenses in South Vietnam were not fully developed. Even then, the US suffered considerable attrition among its helicopters. The Gulf War saw the 101st Airborne make use of helicopters for a wide flanking movement across the Iraqi right flank.

Korea would be another matter because of the density of the Communist air defense system. On the other hand, airmobile forces could exploit Korea's open seaward flanks to come in behind the front. There is also the fact that US helicopters have been upgraded greatly, and now carry additional countermeasures and protection. US helicopter gunships armed with anti-tank missiles would also be useful in countering North Korean armor.

Another advantage that American forces have is their naval superiority. The US Navy has the 7th Fleet headquartered in Yokosuka, Japan, and the 3rd Fleet in San Diego. The Navy would certainly gain control of the seas surrounding Korea in the opening phase of the war. The long Korean coastline could then be exploited to launch amphibious invasions into the Communists' rear, although there are limitations caused by the scarcity of open coastline. Similarly, US carrier based air power could strike deep into the North Korean strategic rear echelons.

Redline: Korea Crossing the Big Red Line

Background and Politics
US Forces and the Air-Land Battle
War in the Air