112th US Cavalry
1944 Covering Force
in New Guinea

TO&E vs. Actual Unit Strengths

Dr. Edward Drea

Throughout history there are many accounts relating the results of battles. One of the issues always covered is the number of casualties. Until recently these numbers were rarely reliable and often could only be extrapolated from multiple sources. Even for battles during the American Civil War, which was well covered and documented, eye-witness descriptions must be weighed with care. We read of units that are described as charging into a storm of fire and being virtually destroyed, only to find out that their total losses were fewer than 20 men out of a company or even a regiment.

Since campaigns in World War II tended to be long, with units staying in the line for months at a time, the standard TO&Es rarely relate to the actual troops present for combat. Besides those casualties resulting from the enemy, disease and sickness remained major drains on a unit's combat strength. As just one example, consider the following information from Leavenworth Paper No. 9, Defending the Driniumor by Dr.Edward J. Drea, on unit strengths and casualties of some of the units involved in the fighting on New Guinea in 1944.

The 112th Cavalry Regiment had an authorized strength of 1,728 officers and men. After six months of action on New Britain, the 112th was down to 1,100 men. It had a two week rest before being sent to New Guinea. During that time, replacements and returning troops raised its strength to 1,458 men; that was 85% of its TO&E.

On 26 June, when the 112th embarked for Aitape, New Guinea, the combat troops (companies) averaged between 140 and 150 men, instead of the authorized 162. This amounted to between 86 and 93% of the authorized establishment. Upon arriving on the 28th of June, the men were immediately sent into the jungle to take up defensive positions along the Driniumor. Just getting into position was a physical hardship. From the beginning the officers had to worry about disease. During the course of the campaign, there was a total of 279 cases of typhus, which alone caused 16 deaths.

Fighting alongside the 112th was the 127th Infantry Regiment. On 29 June 1944 it had 117 officers and 2,861 men present, versus an authorized 152 officers and 3,100 men. Thus the 127th had 77% of its officers and 92% of its men available at the start of the battle.

During the course of the fighting from 10 July until 8 August, the 112th Cavalry lost 317 battle casualties. This amounted to 21% of their authorized strength and probably 27% of their actual strength at the start of the battle. Of these casualties, between 27 and 35 were from friendly fire. This equated to 9 or 10% of the losses. However, compared to New Georgia and Burma this was relatively low. During the Bougainville-New Georgia campaign 66 of the 393 casualties, or 15.7% of the dead, were from our own fire. In Burma the percentage was 16%.

For the Aitape campaign there were about 55,000 Allied troops present. Of these, 12 infantry battalions did most of the fighting. The 112th Cavalry was at about 85% of its strength. The 128th infantry Regiment had 77% of its officers and 85% of its men. The 127th had 77% of its officers and 92% of its men. With these numbers as a basis, Dr. Drea extrapolates that the units were at approximately 90% strength. Using the 1943 U.S. Infantry battalion authorized strength of 871 officers and men as a guide, he calculates that "a rifle battalion could muster 784 men.

Assuming an above authorized strength in headquarters units, one might expect about 175 men in a rifle company (525 per battalion) and another 145 men in a weapons company, or 670 total." This means that of the 55,000 troops present, not many more than 8,000 actually fought and not all at the same time. Dr. Drea again assumes that most of the 3,010 battlefield casualties came from the fighting ranks, which means that front line units took 37% casualties. To again quote Dr. Drea, "The figure may seem high, but on the average in fifty-seven U.S. infantry divisions, infantrymen suffered 94.7% of division causalities, while they had only 68.5% of the authorized strength."

These calculations illustrate two key points. First, a small number of fighting men took most of the casualties. Second, without even considering losses from other causes, it is clear that most units operated with far fewer men than their authorized TO&Es.

112th US Cavalry 1944 Covering Force in New Guinea

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