112th US Cavalry
1944 Covering Force
in New Guinea

US Counterattack at Afua

Dr. Edward Drea

As for the cavalrymen of the 112th, they knew only from the heavy sustained volume of fire to their north that a large battle was in progress. The XI Corps commander, Major General Hall, knew about as much. Hall contacted General Gill for an assessment of the fighting. American Tech. Sgt. Serph Smigiel, who was monitoring the communications equipment to insure circuits were not in use during a cutover procedure, overheard Gill say that although the "Jape" had broken through, the overall situation was all right. Gill's flanks were holding, and his reserves were intact. Hall told Gill to carry on and that he, Hall, was going back to sleep. The men fighting and dying on the line did not quite share Gill's sanguine appreciation of the battle.

The sergeant then contacted regimental signalmen closer to the covering force, because many of the infantrymen were from his home town, and he was anxious to learn their fate. He heard that the Japanese indeed had smashed through the covering force, even using their weapons as clubs against the American defenders. No one knew exactly what was happening, but ominous reports were filtering back that Company E had been overrun and annihilated.

Meanwhile, on the periphery of this confusion, the 112th Cavalry had its forces divided. Half its units were east of the Driniumor and completely out of contact with the regiment at this critical time. The 1st Squadron along the Driniumor was not under attack, but it did receive scattered artillery and small arms fire, possibly some of the latter from its own understandably nervous sentries. Sometime between midnight and 0300 on 11 July, the 112th Headquarters command post learned that the Japanese had broken through the 3d Battalion's sector, when the neighboring battalion commander called for artillery fire through the 112th command post to cover his withdrawals. Later a preliminary report reached the 112th that about fifty Japanese had broken through the 2d Battalion's sector. That grim news meant that the Japanese were in the 112th's rear and that the unit might already be cut off.

At higher headquarters as well, the progress of the battle was still unclear. The "G-2 Estimate of the Enemy Situation" of 11-12 July reported that "At 0430 hours, 11 July an estimated battalion (but possibly a regiment) penetrated our covering position." It recounted that the first two Japanese attacks had been repulsed, but that Allied units, after suffering heavy casualties, were ordered to withdraw. Ultra added nothing substantial to clarify the situation. Based on their own preconceptions reinforced by a patrol report from the 112th Cavalry, G-2 estimated that the 78th Infantry Regiment might have crossed the Driniumor south of Afua In other words, G-2 concluded that the long-awaited, two-pronged Japanese attack was underway and planned its operations accordingly.

Patrolling

The morning of 11 July the 112th had to discover whether any Japanese troops were nearby and reestablish contact with the 2d Squadron. At first light, 1st Squadron dispatched patrols from Troop A south and southeast to search for enemy formations on the 112th's flank. Lieutenant Boyce and twenty men were about 2,700 meters southeast of Afua when they heard an enemy column approaching them. The Japanese were marching in columns of two's, closed up, laughing, and talking loudly. Boyce quickly deployed his men in ambush and waited until the Japanese were within twenty-five meters before springing it He saw eight Japanese troops topple as his patrol's submachine gun and light machine guns fired into their column. More Japanese fell screaming as they ran for cover. Boyce and his men then took advantage of the enemy's confusion to withdraw and beat a hurried retreat to Afua, where they arrived at 1300.

Earlier that morning, another 112th patrol, this time from Troop C, under Lieutenant Smith, was resting at a waterfall about 1,800 meters south of Afua, when the men spotted an eleven-man Japanese patrol marching up the river straight toward them. Smith also set a hasty ambush and waited until the first six Japanese were within three meters of him before firing. He personally killed two Japanese with point-blank rifle fire, two more Japanese died in the explosion of a white phosphorus grenade, and two others were wounded. The survivors fled into the jungle. Smith continued his patrol and about 500 meters west of the river discovered what he thought was a large Japanese bivouac. He reported his news back to Headquarters, 112th Cavalry, shortly after noon.

Another patrol to the northwest, this one from Troop B, reached Niumen Creek, where the men discovered fresh boot tracks and heard Japanese talking. At one point, the men in the patrol had the chilling experience of feeling sure that Japanese were trailing them, but they managed to return around noon without incident. All these patrol contacts indicated to General Cunningham that large numbers of Japanese were attempting to outflank his exposed position from the south. Later that afternoon, reports of large numbers of Japanese crossing the Driniumor south of Afua seemed to confirm it. His perception, in turn, colored SWPA G-2's estimate that the 78th Infantry was conducting a flanking operation southeast of Afua.

In the meantime, telephone communication with 1st Squadron Headquarters failed because of a fault in the line, thus delaying until 0730 orders for the immediate return of 2d Squadron from east of the Driniumor. About two and one-half hours later, as 1st Squadron waited the arrival of 2d Squadron, General Hall contacted the 112th's command post and ordered the unit to destroy supplies and equipment that the men would be unable to carry in their withdrawal to River X (Similar orders were issued to the 2d/ 128th and the 3d/ 127th).

Supply sergeants ordered the men to bury all supplies in foxholes before moving out, and the men destroyed what could be neither buried nor carried. Everyone worked in haste, fearful that each passing moment gave the Japanese time to tighten their grip on the unit. To this point, except for scattered small arms fire during the night of 10-11 July, the 112th had not been engaged in the fighting. Nevertheless, their perception of that battle rested on the fragmentary reports they had received, and the so-called fog of war had produced extreme apprehension. Thus, while General Martin approved General Cunningham's request to withdraw at 1100 instead of the scheduled 1500, he did so only after emphasizing that the mission of the covering force was to delay the enemy, not to give up ground without resisting.

General Martin faced a series of decisions he had to make on the basis of incomplete information. He had no forces left to plug the breakthrough because the reconnaissance in force operations along either of his flanks required all his reserves. He judged, correctly, that the Japanese were across the Driniumor in force and were threatening his rear. General Krueger did not agree with Martin's estimate of the seriousness of the situation. As limited as his information was, Martin did realize that there were no U.S. forces between the Japanese and the American main line of resistance near Aitape, and consequently he ordered a general withdrawal to River X, where he would reorganize his forces to combat future Japanese attacks. A signal from the Japanese 80th Infantry put it more bluntly, "Under our eyes the enemy is retreating in boats and along the trails."

As General Cunningham led the first echelon of the 112th in retreat to River X, 2d Squadron finally appeared at Afua. Fear propelled the Americans as they covered in an hour the same distance that had taken them most of the previous day. Everyone pushed himself at an exhausting pace or risked being left alone in the jungle again that night. By 1200, 2d Squadron had replaced the 1st at Afua, and the 2d, in turn, withdrew three hours later. Native bearers helped carry the squadron's baggage, particularly by dismantling and portaging the 5th Portable Hospital, then assigned to the 112th. The 2d Squadron's luck again failed as a torrential downpour punished them all afternoon. The heavy trail and slippery going slowed the native bearers, who, in turn, retarded the column's progress. So, near midnight the 2d Squadron, less Troop F, wearily reached River X. It had been a physically exhausting and mentally terrifying ordeal. Troop F, whose men brought up the rear, did not close with the main column and, fearful of crossing the River X in darkness, spent the night alone. The night march over a narrow jungle trail was later described in the unit history as "a great hardship." Litter bearers got lost in the black maze, requiring the column to halt until they could be found.

After that, men caught hold of the belt or shoulder of the trooper in front of them and led each other in a procession of darkness. The men stumbled along, and when they tripped and fell over slippery roots or bush on the trail, it caused a chain reaction as several beltholders crashed down together in the mud. Weapons were consequently covered with mud and not in firing condition. The 2d Squadron was no longer a fighting unit, and the men were too exhausted to care. They were too fatigued even to eat. Only a day's rest and refitting would reconstitute the unit.

Both combatants needed time to regroup and reorganize. The 112th's troopers were drained not from fighting, but from the physical demands of making a hasty withdrawal during a tropical deluge, as well as from the mental strain from a night and day of unrelieved tension. The 3d Battalion, 127th Infantry, had not participated in the fighting either, but it too was scattered in retreat. Farther north, Companies E and G were in disarray somewhere in the heavy jungle between the Driniumor and River X. Nearer the coast, small groups of men from Company F were fighting Japanese soldiers from the 237th Infantry.

The Japanese 78th and 80th Infantry regiments had swung southwest after their breakthrough, but both had suffered dreadful personnel losses. Their turn south was too late to cut off the retreat of the 112th. In short, despite the initial Japanese breakthrough and severe losses on both sides, the fighting so far had been inconclusive. Once again the respective commanders had to make the operational decisions that would set in motion another desperate melee in the New Guinea wilds.

Drive the Japanese Back

General Krueger at 6th Army still refused to believe that Martin's retreat from the Driniumor had been necessary. On 12 July, he ordered General Hall to drive the Japanese back eastward across the Driniumor. General Hall, in turn, ordered General Martin to retreat no further, except before overwhelming odds, and he forbade the withdrawal of any unit not in actual contact with superior enemy forces. To emphasize the point, later the same day General Martin was relieved of command of the covering force and assigned command of Eastern Sector. Major General Gill assumed command of Persecution Covering Force. Gill's Field Order Number One, Persecution Covering Force, directed a counterattack on 13 July to restore the Driniumor line. For operational purposes, two clusters of units, designated North Force and South Force, would attack east to the west bank of the Driniumor, where they would turn south and north respectively in order to join forces, thereby sealing the Japanese penetration.

At 18th Army, General Adachi believed that the battle was developing favorably. According to the preliminary reports he had received on 12 and 13 July, the 20th Division was southwest of Afua, and the Americans were in full retreat. Regimental staff officers reported that the Americans had suffered "many casualties," but darkness prevented a detailed account of enemy dead or captured equipment. Japanese losses were given as twenty-five dead and fifty-nine wounded. Adachi concluded that his initial attack had succeeded and that his next attack towards the airfields at Aitape could continue according to plan.

On 12 July the 112th Cavalry was sorting itself out in anticipation of imminent fighting. Patrols had no success in locating the Japanese, but everyone dug in, expecting yet another Japanese attack that night. About twenty men laid out an escape trail, and others reestablished communications between the 112th and the 3d Battalion, 127th Infantry, also regrouping after being scattered during its retreat. Then at 1750, in accordance with 6th Army's orders, General Martin ordered the 112th Cavalry to reoccupy its former positions on the Driniumor the following morning. Commanders' meetings and coordination conferences with the 3d Battalion, which would advance on the 112th's left flank, occupied the early daylight hours. During this time, General Cunningham also coordinated air and artillery support for the 112th Cavalry, should it encounter Japanese resistance. Similar preparations were repeated to the north, where the 1st Battalion, 128th Infantry, would simultaneously attack towards the Driniumor. Rested and refitted, the 112th was ready to be committed to battle again. At 0800 an advance guard platoon moved from River X eastward to the Driniumor.

In three hours during intermittent showers the advance guard platoon from Troop B had covered about 2,000 meters, making very good time over the jungle trails. Then the point men bumped into perhaps seventy-five Japanese soldiers from the 20th Division near a stream crossing. As one American veteran recalled, "We just walked up on what looks like about fifteen Japs out in the river. They were great big Japs, looked like he was six feet tall and with one of our ponchos on his back." Both sides recovered from their initial shock and surprise and sprinted for cover. A sharp fire fight flared, punctuated by bursts of light machine gun fire, thunks of Japanese grenade dischargers, and rifle shots. The Americans wisely waited for the main body of the 112th Cavalry and its additional fire support.

For the next three hours, 1st Squadron cautiously deployed forward, with Troop B in the center, A on the right, and C on the left, until all had reached the creek. Most of their firing was unaimed, because the thick vegetation precluded seeing much farther than a few meters, and men were reluctant to expose themselves for aimed fire. Another pause occurred as requests were made for artillery fire against the Japanese. Finally at 1400, after artillery fire had fallen on the suspected Japanese positions, the entire 1st Squadron made a rush across the stream. Their spectacular charge went for naught, however, because the Japanese had realized early in the engagement that they were outnumbered and outgunned and had fled deeper into the jungle. So the 112th Cavalry crossed the nameless stream, and by 1530 lead elements had reached Afua without opposition. The 112th was back on the Driniumor.

Squadron defensive deployments were textbook: two up, one back. The 1st Squadron deployed Troop B on the river's west bank as the squadron's south flank with Troop C to its north and Troop A in reserve. The 2d Squadron moved downriver from Afua and took up positions north of 1st Squadron with Troop F's lines tied to C, Troop G holding the north flank, and E in reserve. The impression that the defenses were laid out in neat and orderly "lines" was misleading. Afua had already been hit with an air strike, and the American soldiers had to dig in amidst the rubble. It was too late in the afternoon to prepare elaborate entrenchments, so they used bomb craters and artillery shellholes that pitted the area as foxholes or outposts for minimal protection against potential enemy fire and the elements. The heretofore constantly booming artillery fire slackened by early evening after General Hall had warned artillery officers to conserve ammunition or risk exhausting their stocks. For the next ten days, harassing fire was limited to not more than ten rounds per gun per night.

Troop G's sector was the most active that night. Throughout the night, sentries heard and occasionally, when the clouds parted, caught fleeting glimpses in the moonlight of Japanese soldiers crossing the Driniumor and moving southeast, away from the American lines. These Japanese probably were scouts or guides sent to find the exact whereabouts of the 20th Division, at present somewhere southeast of the river and Afua, but two of whose regiments were now northwest of Afua

Pvt. William Garbo had arrived at Troop G that day as a replacement and promptly became an ammunition bearer. After dark he found himself in a machine gun pit, about the size of a dining room table, covered with ponchos and logs. Although he had listened to everything the veterans had said, nothing had prepared him for a night in a pit so black that he could not see his hand in front of his face. It was so still that he could hear the Driniumor flowing past, but more menacing sounds of five Japanese infiltrators soon followed. A Japanese soldier climbed onto the logs covering Garbo's dugout and hurled a bundle of dynamite onto the startled machine gun crew. Only the detonator caps exploded, deafening the Americans and covering them with sulphur powder.

Grenades, followed by American small arms fire, killed two of the infiltrators, and the surviving Japanese escaped into the jungle darkness. While the rest of the night passed quietly in the 112th's area, once again came the sounds of small arms and heavy artillery fire to the north. Although the men of the 112th could not know it, what they heard was fighting among the American 1st and 3d battalions, 124th Infantry, and the Japanese 1st and 2d battalions, 237th Infantry. They had the vaguest idea that someone besides themselves had the misfortune to find Japanese troops. It was probably fortunate that the 112th troopers did not know that the 78th and 80th Infantry regiments at that moment were about 2,500 meters northwest of Afua, in the rear of the 112th's defenses, and preparing to attack. All the cavalrymen knew for certain was that in the morning it would be their turn to attack.

On a situation map everything was clear. The Japanese had broken through the center of the American lines. The U.S. forces even now had launched a counterattack to seal off the gap. On 14 July South Force (the 112th Cavalry and the 3d Battalion, 127th Infantry) would attack north as the 124th Infantry Regiment, minus one battalion, would attack south. The axes of attack were parallel and west of the Driniumor. The objective was for the Americans to join forces, thereby destroying the Japanese units operating west of the Driniumor. The more one was removed from the actual fighting and terrain, the clearer the situation seemed. No one at any echelon realized that two Japanese regiments were readying an attack from northwest of Afua.

Tense and Nervous

In the 112th Cavalry, everyone was tense and nervous, checking their weapons before their attack on the morning of 14 July. No one knew exactly where the Japanese were silently waiting for the American approach, but everyone knew that Japanese ambushes from the thick, lush, green vegetation could erupt at any moment and spray them with deadly small arms fire. Leading the advance patrols was nerve racking and potentially lethal. But without patrols, the squadrons were blind.

Shortly before 0800, a squad-size patrol from Troop F crossed to the Driniumor's east bank in front of its troop sector. Almost immediately, Japanese machine gun fire struck the patrol, wounding one man. The squad was temporarily pinned down, but covering fire from Troop F's machine guns and mortars kept the Japanese gunners' heads down and gave the patrol time to escape back across the river. Then tragedy struck. As the artillery liaison officer tried to adjust the 120th Field Artillery Battalion's 105-mm fire on the Japanese ambush site, four shells landed short, exploding just in front of the south flank in Troop F's sector. Friendly fire killed one American and wounded three others. It was a portent for the 112th Cavalry that day.

The 1st Squadron pushed north, parallel to the Driniumor's west bank, preceded by squad-size patrols. Screening patrols, one squad from each troop sector, took up positions about 600 meters east of the river and remained there during the day to protect 1st Squadron's flank. The mission of 1st Squadron was to link up with the 124th Infantry, operating somewhere-no one seemed to know where-to the north. Cavalry patrols, however, advanced 1,500 meters downriver without finding any trace of either American or Japanese units. Moreover, the commander of the 124th Infantry, who was supposed to be clearing Japanese troops along the Driniumor by a southern advance, reported that his troops had reached the Anamo-Afua trail junction.

The 2d Squadron, however, was occupying these positions at present, which meant that the 124th Infantry was lost (Gray, "Aitape," maintains that there were two Afuas--an old Afua and a new, the latter 1,500 meters upstream--so both commanders were correct. The terrain map of Aitape issued to the troops shows only the one village).

As if to exacerbate the already muddled situation, Australian fighter aircraft mistakenly strafed the 2d Squadron's sector, wounding one cavalryman. Close air support was a continual problem, because the Americans and Australians operated on different radio frequencies, which meant that the ground troops could not contact the pilots and identify themselves. In addition, in the midst of preplanned American artillery concentrations, Japanese artillerymen would sometimes also fire a round or two near the area. This led to confusion among the Americans over whether or not friendly artillery was falling on their heads. Also that afternoon, Companies G and H, 128th Battalion, after wandering and fighting for two days in the jungle, arrived at the 112th's rear echelon at River X, where they helped to man the perimeter that night on Persecution Task Force's orders.

The picture for 14 July, then, was one of American regiments and battalions segregated by the jungle terrain into squad- and platoon-size formations which, relying on inaccurate maps, were milling around thick jungle on either side of a spur of the Torricelli chain, which stretched irregularly about 3,600 meters north of Afua between the Driniumor and Koronal Creek. The Japanese, simultaneously, had two understrength infantry regiments consolidating positions on that very spur near Kwamagnirk Village. Conceivably, squads of Americans and Japanese passed within a few meters of each other, but enclosed and muffled by the great trees and expansive vegetation, they passed unaware of the presence of the other. Had they even glimpsed another patrol several meters away, the jungle had reduced all their uniforms and national identities to a sameness.

The Japanese infantrymen had picked up numerous pieces of American clothing and equipment, probably after overrunning Company E and forcing G to withdraw. A 2d Squadron security patrol, for instance, saw four Japanese near River X wearing American packs and clothing. As early as 29 June the Persecution Task Force S-2 warned all units that the Japanese were wearing U.S. uniforms and equipment and to be careful "not to identify the enemy by clothing alone. Members of the 112th were reduced to the fatigues they wore on their backs. Clothes and boots rotted away, because in the harsh priorities of combat, they were less essential to survival than ammunition and food. The 112th would spend the next three weeks fighting along the Driniumor. The only relief was for the seriously ill or the wounded. The living and the dead stayed on the line."

That night, General Hall declared a full alert because a Japanese prisoner had claimed that a major attack was imminent. The 112th had special cause for concern because a few hours earlier Persecution Task Force Headquarters had informed them by message that approximately two Japanese regiments were about 3,600 meters northwest of the 112th's right rear. The anticipated attack never materialized, and only light small arms fire was audible to the north.

Another reason that American patrols encountered so few Japanese on 14 July was that the Japanese were still regrouping. The 78th and 80th Infantry regiments, which had suffered such terrible casualties on the night of 10-11 July, amalgamated themselves under the command of Maj. Gen. Miyake Sadahiko and henceforth were known as Miyake Force. Also on 14 July, 18th Army Headquarters apparently realized the serious losses incurred to date. General Adachi then recognized that the Americans had reoccupied the original Japanese crossing point on the Driniumor, that strong enemy units were advancing along the coast against his 237th Infantry, and that for the first time to his knowledge, Americans were appearing in strength on the Afua front.

He responded to the new situation by ordering the 41st Division to destroy the Americans near the Driniumor crossing and along the coast. Meanwhile, he directed the 20th Division to annihilate the enemy near Afua.

The 112th Cavalry was in the midst of its counterattack, but the men could account for little but frustration, confusion, and needless death from `friendly fire." Persecution Task Force was dissatisfied with the 112th Cavalry's seemingly slow and overly cautious advance. General Hall wanted the gap in the U.S. lines closed. At 2300 on 14 July, he ordered General Cunningham to move Troop E north to fill the opening, although he did agree to a request that the move be delayed until first light. At dawn on 15 July, the men of Troop E started north to find the 124th Infantry.

About one hour later they passed Company L, 127th Infantry's left (north) flank, which rested on the exposed gap. Afterwards, they used the Anamo Trail and had proceeded north perhaps 2,700 meters when the lead scout, Pfc. Carlos A. Provencio, heard a Japanese dragging a weapon along the trail. Provencio waited for the man to appear on the trail and, when he did, shot at him. The startled Japanese turned and fled. The point man moved after him, and as he turned another twist on the jungle path, he almost ran into another Japanese soldier, whom he promptly shot and killed. The troop reacted quickly, moved forward firing in support, and killed six Japanese soldiers.

Private First Class Provencio then caught sight of a Japanese machine gun emplacement, so instead of going straight along the trail towards the gun, he led the troop on a detour around its right flank. The Americans then resumed their march and reached the 124th Infantry's command post by noon. Shortly thereafter, Troop E sent a message to General Cunningham reporting this linkup, but it never arrived, leaving the general to wonder what had happened to his men. The cavalrymen spent the rest of the afternoon exchanging stories and food with 3d Battalion, 124th Infantry. At 1700, that battalion received orders to attack South to close the gap, but with darkness fast approaching, a request to postpone the attack until morning was granted.

While Troop E made its way north, patrols from the 112th Cavalry reported numerous sightings of small parties of Japanese south and west of the regiment's positions near Afua. General Cunningham, in some distemper, readjusted his lines northward to cover the void created by Troop E's departure. Other cavalrymen improved defenses around Afua, sweating under the tropical sun. Three C-47s flew over and dropped rations and ammunition, for Japanese ambushes had made ration trains too dangerous or too prohibitive in terms of the men needed to guard the trains, which of necessity moved slowly along the easily ambushed jungle trails. Usually the airmen dropped ten-in-one rations, but for one three-day period, the cavalrymen on the ground had to subsist on K rations alone.

Members of the 112th's Service Company like T-5 Albert Earl Gossett volunteered to ride in the C-47 ration planes and to kick supplies out the doorless side of the aircraft. It was the kind of effort that could easily be overlooked, but without resupply the combat troops would be unable to function. An idea of the magnitude of the airdrop may be gained from the statistics that 5.1 tons of supplies were air-dropped on 22 July to the 112th at Afua, and just two days later, another 3.1 tons were parachuted to them. Kicking out supply pallets was dangerous work, because in the excitement of the few seconds one had to kick the supplies out, it was deceptively simple to get tangled in the parachute static lines and pulled from the aircraft.

On the ground, after eating, 112th personnel settled in for the night. It passed quietly with only desultory firing heard to the north. But there was always potential danger. A friendly artillery battery firing a routine night interdiction mission had one stray shell explode in the riverbed about fifty meters in front of Troop G's sector, killing a trooper who had decided to sleep above ground that night.

Mopping Up

On 15 July the Japanese 20th Division reported that in its sector "almost all" the enemy had retreated and that its troops were "pursuing and mopping up" the Americans. Evidently, the 78th and 80th Infantry regiments of the 20th Division had as little notion of the whereabouts of the 112th Cavalry, 127th Infantry, and 124th Infantry as the Americans had of Japanese locations. That day, General Adachi decided to send the previously uncommitted 66th Infantry, 51st Division, to expand the 20th Division's gains.

Concurrently, he ordered the 41st Division's 239th and 237th Infantry regiments to attack west and east, respectively, in order to hold the original Japanese breakthrough corridor on the Driniumor. While Troop E and the 124th Infantry would be attacking south and the 112th Cavalry and 127th Infantry pushing north, the convergence of Americans and Japanese units from all points of the compass would create a unique tactical situation and make a collision unavoidable. It happened the morning of 16 July.

Troop E spent the night of 15 July with Company I, 124th Infantry. Supply Sgt. Frank Salas recalled that the 124th's men were `very happy" to see fellow Americans. The 124th Infantry had had no combat experience, and the sight of the 112th Cavalry men, veterans of New Britain, calmed the understandably nervous green troops. The Company I commander distributed E troopers throughout his unit, which occupied the right (south), or exposed, flank of the battalion. He acknowledged the "steadying influence" of the cavalrymen the next morning, when he told Lieutenant Campbell, then commanding Troop E, that it was the first time Company I's soldiers had not opened fire at shadows and noises during the night.

In the still cool morning, some of the cavalrymen and infantrymen were sitting around cleaning their weapons for the upcoming attack. An advanced detachment from Troop E began moving across a clearing. In the jungle vegetation on the south side of the clearing, about fifty Japanese troops from Major Harada's 1st Battalion, 239th Infantry, lay in ambush. As the Americans approached, a nervous Japanese machine gunner tripped the ambush too soon. Machine gun fire raked a knoll just below the feet of the surprised E troopers. No Japanese could be seen, but puffs of smoke and rifles were visible in the jungle foliage. The new men stood frozen in amazement that live Japanese could be only twenty meters away, but the 112th veterans ran back into the perimeter and opened fire.

Manning weapons belonging to the 124th Infantry, Cpl. T. D. Clark and Pvt. Jasper Fortney fired into the thicket. Clark used a machine gun, and Fortney fired a 60-mm mortar without a site. About ten meters closer to the Japanese, another E trooper adjusted the mortar fire because he could see movement in the trees. The mortar shells seemed to go straight up to apogee and then plunge back to earth. The firing continued for about thirty minutes, and then the surviving Japanese rushed the Americans, who promptly shot them down.

Troop E searched the bushes for any Japanese survivors. Discovering none, they spearheaded the 3d Battalion's push south. Meantime, the Japanese 3d Battalion, 237th Infantry, attacked the rear of the 3d Battalion, 124th Infantry, temporarily separating it from Troop E. Nevertheless, the cavalrymen pushed slowly south against only occasional sniper fire and contacted Company K, 127th Infantry, at 1245 and then proceeded on to the troop bivouac near Headquarters, 2d Squadron. During their battle, forty-five Japanese infantrymen were killed, including Major Harada. The 112th Cavalry miraculously suffered no casualties. This action of 16 July forced General Adachi to reconsider the forces arrayed against him.

112th US Cavalry 1944 Covering Force in New Guinea

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