Even large-scale offensives can be stopped by a defense in place if a number of successive positions are available and the infantry holding the front line has strong artillery, tank, and assault gun support. The reserves must be mobile so they can be shifted from one sector to another in time to prevent or at least contain an en- emy penetration. This can be achieved only if the road net is in good condition and sufficient transportation is available.
A conflict entailing simultaneous fighting in different theaters of war and at different fronts within each theater may easily produce a shortage of combat forces which can be overcome only by improvising reserves. In such a situation, security and supply troops, as well as other service units, may have to be committed along extensive, quiet sectors to release combat forces for the formation of reserves. A correct estimate of the enemy's intentions is essential for the timely withdrawal of units from apparently safe sectors.
In the operations near Orsha during the winter of 1943-44, the Germans employed defense-in-place tactics and denied the Russians the use of the Minsk-Smolensk Rollbahn for several months. In this instance, railroad and highway communications were excellent, and the mobility of the reserves, together with the construction of defensive positions in depth, prevented a Russian breakthrough. Used in other sectors, the same tactic proved ineffective when road nets were bad or when the Russians massed a thousand or more tanks to force a breakthrough, and the Germans had no adequate weapons to oppose them. Had the enemy used such a mass of armor at Orsha, the Germans would have been unable to hold with a defense in place.
Even at Orsha the general situation of Fourth Army was anything but favorable. By the end of September 1943, the army had just completed a strategic withdrawal from positions east of Smolensk under extreme difficulties. In accordance with orders from Army Group Center, the army was to occupy the Panther Position east of the Dnepr in order to deny the Russians access to Orsha, the communication center on the Dnepr, where three railroad lines and the Moscow-Minsk and Leningrad-Kiev highways intersect. The capture of Orsha would have jeopardized the position of Third Panzer Army adjacent to the north and Ninth Army to the south.
The Fourth Army sector was seventy-five miles wide and ran from a point ten miles north of the Rollbahn to the southern outskirts of Chausy. The army had three corps with eleven divisions whose combat efficiency was greatly reduced by the hard fighting and the withdrawal they had recently undergone. With the exception of one reorganized division, the combat strength of the divisions had dropped to that of regiments, and their weapons and equipment were inadequate. At first the Panther position was very thinly held. With the arrival of replacements and the introduction of various expedients, the army gradually succeeded in building up a fairly adequate defense system.
The construction of the Panther position began in August 1943. In some sectors the position consisted of two parallel trenches, in others of only one. A number of trenches had not been completed by the time the line was occupied and in these sectors the defense system was only a cordon of individual strong points. Tactical wire was strung intermittently and dugouts were few. Natural obstacles had been integrated into the defense line wherever possible. From a tactical point of view, some of the sites were not too well selected because they ran along unsuitable forward slopes. Enemy fire soon led to the abandonment of these positions and forced the Germans to dig in on reverse slopes. Observation was adequate and, though the position was far from perfect, it offered the weakened German forces the possibility of making a stand.
The Russians had followed the German withdrawal very closely. They assembled their forces in front of the position and made careful preparations for a breakthrough. They did not attack until 12 October and the German troops made good use of this delay to improve their defense area. The German command expected that the immediate objective of the impending Russian attack would be to take Lenino, cut the Orsha-Gorki highway, link up with strong partisan groups operating in the forests northwest of Gorki, turn toward Orsha, and advance along the Rollbahn to Minsk.
The reserves of the Fourth Army consisted of several assault gun battalions, some motorized antitank units, GHQ artillery, rocket projector regiments, and engineer and construction units. The success of the defense in place depended upon correctly timing the shift of the mobile elements of these reserves to threatened areas or sectors already under attack. No outside assistance was to be counted on, but the army intended to withdraw battalions, regiments, and even divisions from quiet sectors and move them to critical points once the Russian attack was in full swing. In so doing, the army commander was ready to take great risks in stripping quiet sectors of the front.
The task of shifting these forces was greatly facilitated by the availability of excellent routes of communication. From the lateral highway and railroad line connecting Vitebsk with Orsha and Mogilev, routes branched off to each corps sector. Truck transportation, earmarked for supply functions, was diverted to troop movements. All roads and highways were clearly marked, and construc- lion units maintained them in serviceable condition, a task which was especially difficult in spring and required a lot of manpower. Particular care was given to the marking and maintenance of panzer roads. Special bridges had to be constructed or fords provided for heavy tanks and assault guns because the existing bridges could not carry such loads. Railroad operations were conducted up to points immediately behind the front line.
Instead of giving the weak combat forces a well-deserved rest, the army commander was forced to issue strict orders that all frontline troops work without interruption on improving the forward positions. An exacting, at times even petty, control system had to be imposed by the army to find out where the construction work was lagging and how weak points could be reinforced. By this method the defense system gradually gained depth, and one obstacle after another was constructed.
Finally, the Panther position consisted of two continuous trenches and a fortification system protecting the artillery gun positions. As soon as the Panther position was sufficiently strong, several other positions were constructed in the rear. The first two were spaced at six-mile intervals, and the third covered Mogilev, Shklov, Kopys, and Orsha on the Dnepr by the construction of perimeter defenses east of the river. These bridgeheads had a depth of three to five miles and were interconnected by a trench linking their most forward points. Numerous switch positions were built between the individual trenches and fortified lines so that, in case one sector was lost, contact between units would not be disrupted. Contrary to customary German technique, these switch positions connected the successive trenches diagonally and not vertically. Another position extending north beyond Orsha was built along the west bank of the Dnepr. During the winter the Germans also constructed a strong Position farther to the rear along the Beresina.
The antiaircraft artillery, as well as the few available planes, were held in reserve to be committed in sectors under attack. The flexibility of the mobile antiaircraft guns greatly strengthened the defense system. Effective reconnaissance was of great importance. Information obtained from ground reconnaissance, sound ranging, and air observation usually provided the Germans with sufficient intelligence to determine the scope and time of Russian attacks with exactitude. Thus, the army was able to introduce effective countermeasures even before the beginning of an attack.
The Russians launched altogether eight major thrusts against the German defense system. Their last attempt to break through was warded off at the beginning of April 1944. The Dnepr defenses were still intact after six months of bitter struggle. The Russians failed to force a breakthrough in the direction of Orsha and Mogilev despite a series of frontal, flanking, and enveloping attacks. An analysis of this German success shows that the Fourth Army was able to compensate, for a one-to-ten inferiority in manpower and materiel only by exploiting all possibilities for defense and coordinating all its forces.
For this purpose the army had to interfere in details of the command functions of its subordinate corps and divisions, a procedure altogether contrary to German doctrine, but one which proved necessary in this instance. Orders for the formation of reserves, the purpose of which could be understood only from the perspective of the overall situation, frequently did not make sense to lower echelon commanders. The same may be said for some of the orders pertaining to improving positions, constructing roads, transferring stocks of ammunition, and similar demands.
The unusually good communications made it possible to shift reserves freely. When Russian attacks were at their heaviest, the rate of transfer was stepped up to two battalions per day. The withdrawal of an entire division from the front and its subsequent movement to another sector usually required several consecutive nights. During the first night one or two battalions were pulled out, and adjacent sectors extended. During the following night the width of the adjacent sectors was equalized and one or two more battalions were withdrawn in the same manner. This was continued at the same rate until the movement was completed. The transfer of forces would have been accomplished much faster had single battalions been withdrawn from different divisions, but the army avoided this procedure whenever possible since it attempted to maintain the organizational integrity of its divisions.
Before the first Russian thrust, the corps sector where the enemy onslaught was expected was widened by the inclusion of two additional divisional sectors. This was contrary to the established procedure of narrowing that defense sector where an attack was expected. The purpose of this measure was to enable the corps to form strong reserves from its own forces and shift them to the points where they were most needed. In this case, the widening of the defense sector proved effective since all Russian attacks were halted.
In another instance a motorized infantry division, which had but five organic battalions in line at the beginning of the fifth Russian thrust, was subjected to particularly heavy attacks. By the time the fighting abated on the fifth day, fifteen additional battalions had been brought into the divisional sector, and the front was held. At the same time, the German lines in quiet sectors were so overextended that one mile of frontage was occupied by only thirty men. The slightest attack would have penetrated the line in these sectors, but the Russians did not attempt to launch one.
To command and troops alike, the construction of reserve positions gave a sense of security which they ordinarily lacked in the Russian theater. At no time did their existence lower the resistance of the troops or induce them to withdraw before it became absolutely necessary. The infantry felt reassured by the effective tactics the army employed in massing its artillery. The army artillery commander held far-reaching authority over all organic artillery, giving full support to whichever corps was under attack and withdrawing units not needed in quiet sectors. He made all arrangements to provide an adequate supply of ammunition by diverting supplies slated for quiet sectors and using them where they were most needed. Supply movements were facilitated by the availability of the main highway and railroad leading from Minsk which, however, were frequently cut by partisan attacks. During lulls in the fighting, ammunition was saved for impending enemy thrusts.
The mass employment of supporting units such as assault gun, panzer, tactical air support, antiaircraft, and antitank elements was stressed by the army commander. These units were pulled out wherever they were not absolutely essential and shifted to sectors under attack.
The Russian offensive tactics during these operations varied little from those used earlier in the campaign. The infantry fought bravely, launching attack upon attack, often with only a few hours' interval. Manpower was no problem to the Russians. In seemingly never-ending waves, they came out of their trenches, advanced, withdrew, and returned to the attack. During the five thrusts along the Minsk-Smolensk highway, the Russians usually renewed their attacks at the identical spot where they had tried before. They persisted in their efforts to force a breakthrough at a particular point and entirely disregarded the cost. A more flexible command might have considered other solutions.
The Russian was capable of concentrating tremendous fire power and employing artillery effectively. During the first day of an operation, artillery fire was well coordinated, but thereafter its unity of effort gradually disintegrated and its effectiveness decreased. During the second thrust he assembled approximately 800 pieces along a six-mile front and fired a quantity of ammunition which was hitherto unsurpassed in the Russian theater of operations. The number of German guns available for counterfire was approximately 250. On the first day of the thrust the Russians achieved a deep penetration between the Dnepr and the Minsk highway. An attempt to straighten out the salient was unsuccessful. The next day the Russians penetrated the German lines north of the highway and isolated an entire artillery battalion-group. In spite of the commitment of additional reserves, the German line had become so fragile that the army decided to withdraw to the second line of the Panther position. When the Russians renewed their attack, it seemed that their artillery lacked unity of effort and co-ordination. The Germans repelled all further assaults and prevented a breakthrough.
Russian camouflage and concealment were excellent. The enemy moved at night and disappeared from sight during daylight, hiding in villages and wooded areas. Although the Russians often regrouped their forces, their movements could rarely be observed.
The Soviet lower command echelons often lacked initiative. After having succeeded in pushing back the German line for instance, the Russians had difficulty in sustaining the momentum of the attack and in assembling their infantry and artillery forces for an attack on the next objective. On the other hand, the enemy showed extraordinary skill in exploiting even the smallest penetration with amazing speed. Because of these infiltration tactics, the Germans were forced to make every possible effort to immediately seal off penetrations, however small their own counterattack force. Otherwise, it would have been impossible or would have involved heavy casualties to ferret the Russian out of the breakthrough area Once they had sufficient time to organize positions, even planned attacks by fresh units often failed to overcome the stubborn resistance offered by the Russians.
The enemy's zone of attack was usually strictly limited, almost as if it had been cut to measure. The German supporting weapons outside the attack zone proper were not neutralized. For instance, the flanking fire delivered by a German artillery battalion-group from an adjacent sector straight into the Russian attack waves was not interfered with in any way.
The Russian rarely launched diversionary attacks at points outside the main zone of attack. Considering the extent to which the Germans had weakened the quiet sectors of their front, such diversionary attacks would probably have caused some very critical situations.
The Russian proved once again that he was practically immune to unfavorable weather conditions. Snow, rain, cold, and ice affected him but little. His winter clothing was of excellent quality. Except for attacks against German infantry in the front line, the enemy air force was almost inactive, although German antiaircraft defenses were inadequate. Since the Russians never undertook strategic air operations, the Germans were able to move supplies without enemy interference.
German Active Defense Against Russian Breakthroughs Part 2
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Introduction
Defensive Pincers
Defense in Place with Mobile Reserves
Position Defense in Strong Points and Improvised Fortresses
German Active Defense Against Russian Breakthroughs Part 1
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© Copyright 1995 by Mike Vogell and Phoenix Military Simulations.
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