Battle of Isandlwana: Introduction

Battle of Isandlwana

Introduction

by Paul Darnell
Photos courtesy of National Army Museum

"At Isandlwana I myself only killed one man. Dum! Dum! went his revolver as he was firing from right to left, and I came beside him and stuck my assegai under his right arm, pushing It through his body until It came out between his ribs on the left side. As soon as he fell I pulled the assegai out and slit his stomach, so I knew he shoult not shoot any more of my people."

--Kumbeka, Warrior from the umCijo Regiment

INTRODUCTION

Isandlwana has been and no doubt will remain a battle full of unanswered questions, questions that successive authors and historians have tried to answer giving their own reasons as to why the Zulus were victorious, or if you prefer why the British were not.

As stated in the Foreword, the use of the senior officers' report on engagements is to be used where possible as the main reference for articles, unfortunately this is not possible for Isandlwana as both Pulleine and Durnford died with their commands. However, we do have accounts from various survivors with several detailed, Zulu ones giving us a real insight into this fascinating action. For the battle, time scales have been used as guidelines listing all the main events.

FORCES ENGAGED

British: Commander Lt. Col. Durnford R.E.

Unit Officers NCOs/Men

Staff 3 9

R.A. 2-7 Pdrs. 2 70

R.E. 1 4

1st Batt. 24th Regt.
5 Companies 16 403

2nd Batt. 24th Regt.
1 Company 5 178

Army Service Corps - 3

Army Hospital Corps 1 10

Mounted Infantry - 30

Natal Mounted Police - 33

Natal Carbineers 2 27

Newcastie Mounted Rifles 2 15

Buffalo Border Guard 1 8

1st Batt. 3rd Regt. N.N.C.
2 Companies 10 200

2nd Batt. 3rd Regt. N.N.C.
2 Companies 10 200

No.1 Company N.N.
Pioneer Corps 1 10

Durnford's No.2 Column
R.A. Rocket Tubes 1 9

Sikali's Native Horse
5 troops 5 257

1st Batt. 1st Regt. N.N.C.
2 Companies 6 240

TOTAL 67 1707

Zulu Induna Ntshingwayo and Mavumingwana

Right Horn: Nogwengu Corps

Centre Chest:

Left Horn:

Reserve: Undi Corps

(No hard evidence is available for the strengths of each regiment. Zulu statements give some numbers but not all regts are mentioned. Some figures could be mixed.

TOTAL: Up to 20,000 warriors

EVENTS LEADING UP TO ENGAGEMENT

January 11th (Saturday) The central column crosses the Buffalo river and establishes a camp on the Zulu side of the river.

January 12th (Sunday) Several Companies of the 24th and N.N.C. with mounted support engaged a small force of Zulus guarding livestock around a kraal (Sirayo's) some 5 miles from the camp. The Zulus are dispersed with some 1000 cattle, horses, goats and sheep captured.

January 15th (Wednesday) Patrol sent to reconoitre isiPezi Hill some 22 miles into Zululand. This is to be the first fortified camp on the road to Ulundi. No reports of any Zulus.

January 17th (Friday) Lord Chelmsford chooses sight for next campsite, Isandhlwana (The Little Hand), 8 miles distance. Wood and water available at site.

January 20th (Monday) Central column moves off, the bulk reaching the new camp by midday, the remainder delayed by a conga 1 mile from Isandhlwana coming in on the moming of the 21st. The delay of the column to advance since the 11th was caused by the total lack of anything approaching a road.

Late evening Durnford and his detachment of No.2 Column arrives at Rorke's Drift. Sends word to Chelmsford, crosses the Buffalo river, occupies the deserted campsite of the 24th.

Afternoon The remainder of the 20th was spent establishing camp with infantry outposts and cavalry vedettas thrown out some 2-3 miles. The infantry outposts were brought in to within 500 yards at night.

January 21st (4.30am, Tueaday) Majors Dartnell and Lonsdale leave camp with 150 mounted Colonials and 16 Companies of N.N.C. to further scout the areas around the Malakata Hilis 8-10 miles south east of the camp. Chelmsford had himself already scouted the area on the 20th, no Zulus were seen but due to the rocky nature of the terrain he was still concerned about the area concealing a large Zulu force.

Midday Patrol of Mounted Infantry reports Zulu scouts around the Isipezi hill. Patrol had skirmished with a small body of 40 warriors. (This was probably the rear elements of the impi moving up onto the Nqutu plateau).

3pm-4pm Chelmsford whilst on patrol himself on the Nqutu plateau sights party of 14 mounted Zulus who rode away. Chelmsford then receives report from Dartnell. Large Zulu force discovered and requests reinforcements and the authority to attack in the morning. (Zulu force seven hundred). The N.N.C. were in a bad way, no food or camp facilities to spend the night outside, many of their officers protested about the order to camp out, stating they were purely a reconnaissance force and in no fit state to engage a Zulu force. Chelmsford sent word giving Dartnell permission to engage the Zulus but no reinforcements were to be sent.

January 22nd (Wednesday, 1.30am) Second Report from Dartnell. He did not consider his force strong enough to attack the Zulus and requested several Companies of the 24th as support. (Zulu force now grown to 2000 strong). (A Zulu induna with his retainers were thought to be in the area around his kraal stronghold, but with no more than 700 warriors, the 2000-strong force opposing Dartnell indicated a much larger gathering possibly the main impi's advance group.

4am Col. Glyn accompanied by Chelmsford with relief force leaves to support Dartnell. (Chelmsford was in a bad position. He had to support Dartneli and Longsdaie as it appeared they had found the main impi and they were in no fit state to oppose it. Also it was Cheirnsford's plan at the outset to seek out and engage the main Zulu impi and the location of it appeared to have been achieved.) Before Chelmsford left he sent orders to Col. Durnford to bring up his column from Rorke's Drift to Isandlwana. Chelmsford had ordered his column No.2, split up on the 16th, 2 Battallons of N.N.C. to remain at the Middle Drift and one to move on to Umsinga with Durnford and his detachment brought up to Rorke's Drift aniving on the 20th.

Chelmsford's relationship with Durnford was strained. He had already had to pen an order. Rebuking him for acting independently and informing Chelmsford of intelligence he had received and his intention to act upon it, the order for Durnford to bring his column up to Isandlwana brought him under the command of Col. Glyn and eased the problem of further possible conflict as well as supporting the garrison left in the camp. Below is the order written by Chelmsford's Military Secretary Brevet Lt. Col. J.W. Crealock, which Durnford wrote down upon receiving it. The order was found written in his notebook at the camp after the disaster. It does not state Chelmsford's supposed wish that he was to assume command of the camp but as senior offlcer to Pulleine, he would theoretically do so.

2am 'You are to march to this camp at once with ali the force you have with you of No.2 Column. Major Bengough's Battalion to move to Rorke's Drift as ordered yesterday.'

2/24th Artillery and mounted men with the General and Colonel Glyn move off at once to attack a Zulu force about ten miles distant. He also gave orders to Pulleine which again Crealock passed, this time orally. The Cavalry vedettes were to be kept advanced, the infantry outposts were to be drawn in closer, Pulleine was to remain in the camp and defend it if attacked.

6-9am The morning of the 22nd found Dartneli with his N.N.C. and Mounted units moving off to advance against the Zulus who had occupied a ridge dose by but in very poor terrain. Chelmsford had arrived around 6am ordering up Col. Glyn's Mounted units to assist in the attack. The N.N.C. were less than enthusiastic about any movement towards the Zulus with the whole force having spent a virtual sleepless night with the N.N.C. panicking several times, the officers and NCOs having to beat back the natives to stop a total rout. The advance was unsuccessful with the main Zulu body retiring to the NE, making use of the ridges and rocky nature of the terrain. Some Zulu units were caught in the open by flanking Mounted units with 30 warriors being slain.

9.30am With the main Zulu force now out of sight, Chelmsford orders a halt to the advance and for the force to take breakfast and establish a new camp for the whole column close to where Dartnell had spent last night. A report comes in from Isandlwana:

Report just came in that the Zulus are advancing in force from left front of the camp.
8.05am Signed: H.B. Pulleine Lt.-Colonel.
'Received 9.30 - 22/1/79 (signed) H.P.' (H.P. - Captain Haliam Parr, Staff Officer who received report).

The report indicated Zulus on the Nqutu plateau but gave no sign of concern by Pulleine at being unable to meet this force or that it was indeed the main impi. Chelmsford sent Lt. B. Milne, a naval officer to observe Isandiwana from a nearby knoll, where he climbed a tree for a better view. Lt. Miine had a naval telescope which was more powerful than the army binoculars. Nothing unusual was observed except that the oxen appeared to have been drawn close into the camp, although the view was obscured by the heat haze.

10am 1st/3rd N.N.C. ordered by Chelmsford to return back to Isandlwana to assist Col. Pulleine in bringing up his force to the new campsite. They were to scout all the conga's on route back.

Isandlwana Camp

8am Report to Pulleine from Nqutu plateau, one received by Chelmsford at 9. 30am: Zulu force in sight approaching from the north east. Camp stand too, infantry outposts fall in, except one Company of N.N.C. and a small vedette at the head of the spur.

9am 2nd report to Pulleine this time from outpost on the spur (1500 yards from camp). 'Observed Zulus on the edge of the plateau observing camp. Zulus had been In three columns, two of whkh had retired to the NE and disappeared In the roliheg ground and a third is moving to the NW.'

10am Col. Durnford arrives at camp with his force following on. Discusses situation of camp strengths and alert. Camp stands down - infantry keeping their accoutrements on (ammunition, pouches etc.).

10.30-11am Unclear report from head of spur vedette regarding Zulus on plateau. Officer of N.N.C. sent up to clarify position. Report clarified. Zulus retiring along plateau to the east and would have to be followed up.

11am Durnford forms plan based on reports received on Zulu movements. He assumed that Chelmsford was engaged with the main impi, or a strong part of it. (Gunfire could be heard in the distance). The need to stop the Zulu force retiring east along the plateau to regain the main impi and threaten Chelmsford. He sent one of his basuto troop (one of the troops that appeared at Rorkes Drift) back along the track to escort his waggons which were still coming up from the drift. Two troops were sent up the spur to drive the Zulus along the plateau and over it. Durnford took his remaining two Troops and the Rocket Battery and a Company of the 1st/1st N.N.C. as escort to engage the Zulus coming over the plateau and destroy it. He asked Pulleine for two Companies of the 24th to strengthen his plan. Pulleine refused due to Chelmsford's order of defending the camp. He further discussed with Pulleine the need to strengthen the N.N.C. at the head of the spur suggesting a Company of the 24th. A Company under Captain C.N. Caveye was sent up the spur.

11-11.30am A section of one of the Troops sent up the plateau spotted some Zulus herding some cattle (some 34 miles from the head of the spur). They rode towards the herd which was now climbing some rising ground. The herders dispersed over the edge of the rise, the cattle halting on it. Following up, the Basuto's Troopers reined in at the edge of the rise and looked down into a large ravine. They had discovered the main Zulu impi.

The Zulu Impi

It had left Uiundi on the 17th, Chetshwayo having given it some basic instructions.

The impi adhered to the march slowly command, arriving in the area of Isandlwana on the 20th, spending the night in a hollow close to the north of the Isipezi hill, some 10 miles from the camp. It had been decided to attack on the 21st, but due to the openness of the valley they would have to advance along, it was further decided to move the impi up onto the Nqutu plateau which would give it better cover for an attack. This was carried out successfully on the 21st, bringing the impi to within 4 miles of the head of the spur. Owing to a new moon (eclipse) due on the 22nd 'Day of the Dead', it being a bad omen for any fighting, the impi was prepared to wait till the morning of the 23rd to attack. The troopers had sprung the trap prematurely and for the Zulu Izinduna this was a real emergency with all the regiments rising as one and advancing over the ridge following up the retreating horsemen. The regiments adopted the traditional bulls horn formation as they positioned themselves around the umCijo regt. which was the first over the ridge. Central command was effectively lost, with Mavumengwana and Ntshingwayo only able to halt the Undi corps and the Udhioko regiments which had been camped in a ravine 1 mile behind the main force. These they used as the reserve.

12 o'clock Firing heard from the camp. Lt. Cavaye's Company at the lip of the spur engaged with right horn. Report comes from spur. 'Zulus advancing along plateau'. This report coincides with Chelmsford's order being received by Pulleine for him to strike camp and follow on linking up with his. Pulleine sent back this report:

'Staff Officer - Heavy firing to the left of camp. Cannot move camp at present.' (No mention of larger numbers of Zulus). Stand to ordered.

'F Company under Capt. W.E. Mostyn was ordered up the spur to support 'A' Company. At this time another report was penned to Chelmsford unbeknown to Pulleine by Captain Alan Gardner who was one of the officers who had brought the order to strike camp, who must have been unsatisfied with Pulleine. Heavy flring to the left of camp. Shepatone has come in for reinforcements and report. that the Zulus are falling back. The whole of the camp turned and fighting about one mile to the left flank (again no mention of large Zulu numbers) and it is very unclear as to why he stated Zulus falling back.

12.20pm Unable to stem the advance, the two Companies of the 24th on the lip of the spur start to withdraw, with the two troops of Basuto horse covering the withdrawal. The N.N.C. Company had started their own less dignified withdrawal just ahead of them.

12.45pm 'C' Company under Capt. R. Younghusband was ordered to support the two retiring Companies of 24th, all three forming an extended line some 600 yards long at the base of the spur, 20 yards from the camp. The Basuto horse and the N.N.C. Company formed up on the right of the Companies. Durnford withdraws towards camp after seeing impi coming over plateau and into valley. He uses retreat by altemative troops maintaining fire on the Zulus. He withdraws back along the track he came, looking for the Rocket battery to warn thern. The umCijo and umXhapo regiments cutting his retreat on the left with the inGobamakhosi, umBonambi and the uVe racing out far to the right. Durnford finds Rocket Battery which had been overrun. One rocket was fired at the Zulus coming over the ridge. Zulu force had fired a ragged volley from 100 yards away scaring the mules with two jumping on a nearby mound. N.N.C. Company routs back to camp, Battery then overrun.

1.00pm Durnford takes up position in the large conga further supported by the Mounted Infantry and Newcastle Mounted Rifles, 30 in total, from camp. Firing against Zulu left horn - inGobamakhois' regt. Zulu left horn advance halted with warriors taking cover - heavy fire opened up by Zulus; due to cover afforded by conga and Zulus firing high, the fire was inaccurate. Companies C, E, F 24th withdraw closer to the camp (300 yards) leaving two Companies of N.N.C. who had been on their right flank somewhat advanced and exposed, their position now linking the two British Companies' lines north and east, to their rear firing east were the two artillery guns. The N.N.C. adopted a curved line. (The N.N.C. tended to be ignored by line officers, it is not clear as to where the remaining Companies were during the action).

The three line companies facing the valley, E, G and H, as yet were not under the pressure of the other companies. They had to cover a frontage or virtually 1 mile, east, company having a frontage of 200 yards and gaps of 200 yards between each company, the distance from the camp around 6-800 yards for companies. No orders had been given to condense the line frontage, the companies being in the positions they fall in, the large gaps caused by C, E, F Companies' absence on the left flank. Zulu regts. suffering badly from British volley fire. Advance generally halted some 2-300 yards from line, the right and left horns taking heavy casualties.

1:10pm The N.N.C. Companies at the link rout. Out of 200 plus men only around 30 had rifles, faced with the umCijo of possibly 2000 warriors, their actions can be sympathised with. A gap of some 300 yards is now left in the line which the umCijo regt. pours through. 'A' and 'F' Companies are cut down unable to fix their bayonets, suddenly taken from the rear. 'C' Company on the far right manages to fix bayonets and withdraws back to the camp and makes a stand on the slopes of Isandlwana. The Artillery fired a few rounds of case then limbers up and withdraws. Of the three Companies facing down the valley 'E' Company was caught in the left flank by the Zulus coming through the gap and frontally by possibly the uVe regt. 'H' Company smashed frontally by uVe regt. 'G' Company had already swung right to counter Zulu left horn. Began to withdraw, caught by full force of the inGobamakhosi regt. and caught in the flank and rear by other regt. warriors. It made a stand in font of the saddle. Durnford and his mounted troops retired back to the camp when the Zulus had just broken through the gap at the link, his position in the conga being outflanked and his men running low on ammunition, he uses his troopers to try to hold the saddle, this gave the only chance of retreat for the camp. He made a stand with around 70 men gathered from his troopers and other survivors.

2pm The camp was in the hands of the Zulus with the Ududu, Isanqu and Mbubi regts. sweeping round Isandlwana and taking the camp in the rear and the unBonambi regt. crossing the gap on the left. It had taken just 20 minutes for the line to be destroyed, a further 30 for the camp to fall. Some 400 or so men had managed to reach the saddle and take the wart. The fugitives rout, mainly N.N.C. The 2-7 Pprs. which had withdrawn earlier, came to grief, both guns being lost to the Zulus along the track.

More Isandlwana

Isandlwana Introduction

Large Maps of Zulu and British Movements (slow: 184K)

Isandlwana Eyewitness Accounts

Isandlwana Battle Profile

Colour Diorama Photos (small: 59K)

Colour Diorama Photos (Large: extremely slow: 412K)

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