Isandlwana was the worst defeat ever inflicted on the Bitish Army by a native force. This series of events that led up to that defeat unfold like a book, each one adding odds in favour of a Zulu victory--this takig nothing away from the Zulu warriors in bravery and determination which was finally to win the day.

Chelmsford was well aware that a Zulu Impi was in the area and was keen to locate it and defeat it. The force at his disposal was nore than adequate for the plan. Leaving the camp with Col. Glyn's force to follow up possible contact with the Impi and to reinforce his N.N.C. force which was under pressure from it, was in no way irresponsible. He left a sufficient number of troops at Isandlwana to defend it which was to be further reinforced by Durnford's No.2 column.

Where everything starts to go wrong ts the way in which the various reports are written, none of which alert Pulleine, Durnford or Chelmsford to the whereabouts of the main Zulu impi and the threat to the camp.

Reports to Pulleine and Durnford:

1. To Durnford from Chelmsford

You are to march to this camp at once with all the force you have with you of No.2 Column (no orders to defend camp as Pulleine had received).

2. Large body of Zulus was advancing from the north-east across the Nqutu plateau. (Pulleine orders fall-in).

3. Zulus had been in three columns, two had retired to the north-east and disappeared in the rolling ground and the third was moving north-west.

4. Zulus retiring along plateau to the east and would have to be followed up. (Durnford takes force out of camp and the spur on the Nqutu plateau is picked by one line company. The spur becomes unnecessarily important, taking troops out of the camp).

5. Order by Chelmsford to strike camp received by Pulleine.

6. At same time as this, an officer of Colonial Horse reports advancing Zulus on plateau. (This officer was in an excited state having seen the impi himself so he may have not given a clear report, as the report written by Pulleine to Chelmsford reflects no emergency. Troops fall in again.

7. Capt. Gardner, officer who delivered order from Chelmsford to British camp writes further report: 'Zulus falling back.'

Reports received by Chelmsford/Staff Officers

1. Report just come in that Zulus are advancing in force from left front of the camp. (Naval officer sent up hill to observe camp).

2. Shellfire first heard from camp by Chelmsford. Zulu prisoners indicated presence of main impi.

3. Verbal report from N.N.C. Commander who was returning to Isandlwana. Hamilton-Browne: 'For God's sake, come back with all your men, the camp is surrounded and must be taken unless helped.' (Delivered by several officers so report may have got watered down, not clear if Chelmsford received it or that staff officers did, no action taken.)

4. Second report written by Hamilton-Browne indicating from a Zulu prisoner that he had caught the presence of Zulu impi 20,000 strong in area.

5. Third report written by Hamilton-Browne indicating shelling from camp.

6. Staff officer: Heavy firing to the left of our camp cannot move camp at present.' (This report was written by Pulleine in response to Chelmsford's order to move up to new site. The 2nd and 3rd reports of H.B. (4 & 5) were received by Chelmsford around this time and seemed to indicate nothing new.

7. Heavy firing near left of camp. (George) Shepstone has come in for reinforcements and reports that Zulus are falling back. The whole force at camp turned out and fighting about one mile to left flank. (Report written by Capt. Gardner - Staff Officer read it, nothing new to report to Chelmsford so it was not given to him.)

Ten reports in all sent and received, not one fully indicating the emergency of the situation, the threat to the camp appears to have been perceived by Pulleine and Durnford as coming from the spur, which caused companies to be sent up there which in turn left too few to deploy in good order in camp. Once the three companies came down from the spur and were engaged, the remaining three along the front of the camp were left to defend 1 mile of frontage, trying to fill the gaps left by those on their left flank. Much has been talked about ammunition running low, this cannot be discounted and must surely be a contribution to the defeat, the companies especially those at the front of the camp including Durnford's force were so far from the camp that the flow of ammunition must have been poor. For me, the Zulu victory was caused as previously stated by a combination of events: no laager, poor deployment, unclear reports, ammunition shortage, and some others. How do you see it?

Wargaming - Isandlwana: Some Ideas

If I was the British player I would line up my companies and simply blast away at the impi until it is cut to pieces--not much of a game. To really replay the battle certain events need to be recreated.

1. When to start the game - Start with 3 companies of line up the spur engaging the Zulus. This can be off table initially, this gives the Zulu player at least some time to get forward down the valley without being cut to pieces. It leaves the British player with the problem of deployment and pulling back his companies from the spur.

2. Width of table - Depth of table is not crucial for this game as casualties to Zulu regiments can be calculated off table as they advance. Width is, the Zulu player must be able to flank the British on his left and the action on the spur is important.

3. Holding back a regiment - Durnford held up the Zulu left horn regiments for some time, and it appears that the other regiments were held back by the British firing, so your rules should allow for this. For most Zulu sets of rules they do not test for morale that often but by rolling for say each quarter losses to a regt. Using a D6 - 1,2,3,4 advance 5,6 do not advance. This should reflect the effect of losses to each regiment, after all they were all independent units. You may want to give the young unmarried regts. an advantage here.

4. Ammunition - If desired, ammunition restrictions can be imposed on the British by gradually reducing the amount of casualties inflicted depending on your rules, the line companies started with around 50 rounds per man.

5. Durnford's mounted force roll a dice to see if it makes a stand outside the camp. The temptation is to bring it back into the camp.

Terrain and Figs

Terrain for this action is simple. The main feature being the conga in front of the camp. The spur and Isandhuana can be made if required by polystyrene and tetrlon wash or the book and cloth vintage methods. Figs are covered in Rorke's Drift. For the Zulu regiments try basing them the Peter Gilder way - use a base for 10 figs but only use 7-8 allowing for saving on figs as well as scenery on bases.

More Isandlwana

Isandlwana Introduction
Large Maps of Zulu and British Movements (slow: 184K)
Isandlwana Eyewitness Accounts
Isandlwana Battle Profile
Colour Diorama Photos (small: 59K)
Colour Diorama Photos (Large: extremely slow: 412K)

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