TACTICS AND DOCTRINE: THE SWORD AND THE SHIELD

The Israelis referred to the Soviet-supplied Arab tactics as Phalagial Tactics, and the situation is probably best understood by using the analogy of an armed swordsman. The Arab-Soviet tactics are like a man armed only with a shield. It provides good protection so long as the enemy's strikes hit it and the arm wielding it is fast enough to interpose it between the wearer and any thrust. When used with overpowering strength it allows the user to shove and possibly crush a much smaller and weaker opponent. When used to block expected thrusts it can be most effective in blunting an enemy sword. Its major disadvantage is that, due to Soviet doctrine, the am holding the shield is unlikely to be swift and able to parry any but the most obvious of these.

The Soviet emphasis on rigid chain of command, lack of individual initiative at the lower levels, and long and careful planning with meticuluous and rigid follow-through does not produce a fighting machine which is capable of making rapid decisions in a fluid situation. The foundation of all Soviet tactics is the sure knowledge that the Soviets will always enjoy an advantage in quantity of manpower, but that they have always had to operate with an inferiority in quality of manpower. As a result, the Soviets have tended to keep decision-making at the highest possible levels of their organization. The result is good planning and implementation of initial attacks, but very long pauses between attacks, and a paralyzing inability to react to rapidly changing situations.

The Israelis chose to forge a Sword. Their doctrine places maximum emphasis on rapid decisions at the lowest possible level, concentrated rapid offensive action, and ruthless exploitation.

The organization, equipment and tactics of an army dictate whether it Is to be a Sword or Shield. The army doctrine dictates whether the body holding the weapon shall be fast-acting or sluggish. For a fast-acting army, the logical choice is a Sword while for the sluggish the best choice is a Shield. Actually. the best choice is an active doctrine and both the Sword and Shield Only one army today has adopted that approach, the West German Arnies.

GUNS, MISSILES, AIRPLANES AND TANKS

During and shortly after the war there was a lot of crap printed in the popular press and on television by many so-called military analysts. Much of this is due to the news media's addiction to sensational headlines whether they exist or not. Any newsman who can't produce new and startling headlines is likely to find himself out of work. I shall attempt to correct some of the false myths created by this propaganda.

MYTH 1. The emergence of Egypt and Syria as Significant Military Powers

Actually Egypt and Syria were major militia powers in 1967, but they were discounted by the press due to the total and decisive way they were beaten by Israel in 1967. The Israelis have always enjoyed an immense tactical advantage over the Arabs. but in 1967 they launched a strategic surprise attack which had been in the planning for over five years, and destroyed the Arab Air Forces on the ground.

In 1973, the Arabs launched a long-planned strategic attack which, although it didn't take Israel by total surprise, still caught her before she could mobilize. Further, in 1973, the Arabs launched two tactical surprises in the form of SA-6 missiles, and the antitank missile ambushes. Despite this, Israel won a clear and decisive military victory, and the Arabs were only saved from much worse damage and disgrace by the loud sword-rattling of the Soviet Union.

Actually the Arab Armies did considerably worse tactically in 1973 then they had done in 1967! In 1967, the Arabs lost 60 aircraft to Israel's 3 in air-to-air combat for an effective ratio of 20:1 in Israel's favor. In 1973, the Arabs lost 375 aircraft and 40 helicopters to Israel's 10 or less (accounts vary but 10 is the maximum number of air-to-air losses attributed to Israel) for an effective ratio of 37.5:1 in Israel's favor.

In 1967, the Arab Navies accomplished nothing. In 1973. the Arab Navies succeeded in losing 30-50% of their strength and being chased into port.

In 1973, the Arabs suffered a net loss of 2000+ tanks to a net Israeli loss of 200 tanks. (Actually this is somewhat deceptive for the Israelis were left in possession off the battle field, and have been seen removing even badly damaged Egyptian tanks from the Africa side of the Canal.)

Given three to six months to repair and rebuild, and the fact that only about one in three tanks hit in battle are actually write-offs. The Israelis may end up with a net gain of from 300- 1000 tanks! In 1967, the Arabs lost about 870 tanks to Israel's estimated loss of less than 100. Further, the majority of Israeli tank losses in 1973 were due to antitank missiles and not Arab tank action.

MYTH 2. The airplane is dead, killed by the surface to air missile.

In 1973 the Israelis lost approximately 100 aircraft (or less) to surface-to-air weapons. The Israelis flew approximately 2,000 sorties per day and the War lasted 18 days. This computes 2.78 aircraft lost per thousand sorties. In 1967, with an air force of approximately 3/5 the size of the 1973 Israeli Air Force, the IAF lost 43 aircraft to surface-to-air weapone in six days of fighting. This works out to a loss rate of approximately 5.32 aircraft per thousand sorties!

Further, shortly after the War, AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY estimated that less than half of the Israeli aircraft losses which were credited to surface-to-air weapons were caused by missiles. More recent estimates tend to confi rm this. This should come as little surprise, for the antiaircraft gun has always been vastly superior to the guided missile in bringing down aircraft. Up to January 1966 the U.S. had lost 179 aircraft over North Vietnam: 168 were shot down by antiaircraft guns and only 11 by missiles.

During the Arab-Israeli War of Attrition (1967-1973) the Israelis brought down 13 Arab aircraft with Hawk missiles and 24 with conventional antiaircraft guns 31 Within their range limitations antiaircraft guns have consistently been vastly superior to guided missiles.

The Egyptians deployed 130 antiaircraft missile battalions of six launchers each. One Pentagon source referred to the Egyptian missile defenses along the Suez Canal as "...equivalent to the entire U.S. antiaircraft defense deployed world wide."

If we assume that only 35 of the Israeli aircraft lost due to surface-to-air action were destroyed by Syria (a low estimate); and that only half the Israeli aircraft lost to surface-to-air fire were brought down by gun fire (a low estimate); we conclude that the Egyptians employed four antiaircraft missile battalions for 18 days (a total of 24 antiaircraft launchers). for each Israeli aircraft brought down by guided missiles.

For the cost of outfitting, training, manning, and supplying two missiles for each launcher the Egyptians could have bought the airplane five times over:

The history of antiaircraft guided missiles so far and into the foreseeable future is that of long-development-time, costly weapons, which are rapidly overtaken by short development time. relatively cheap countermeasures. Antiaircraft guns, in contrast, offer considerably more ability for much less cost. But neither system has shown itself as being able to raise the loss ratio per thousand missions to an acceptable level.

MYTH 3. The tank is dead, killed by the antitank guided missile.

The Arabs lost approximately 2,000 tanks, primarily to Israeli tank-cannon fire. The Israelis lost approximately 200 tanks primarily to Soviet antitank missiles. Draw your own conclusion about which is the better tank killer. As pointed out previously, the Israelis actually lost fewer tanks per day of combat, and fewer tanks per hundred enemy tanks destroyed, than they did in the 1967 War. The major differences of the antitank missile compared to the gun are:

(a) High cost; sophistication, but low versatility.
(b) Superior accuracy only at extreme ranges.
(c) Light weight and easy portability, but a low rate of fire and a long flight time.
(d) Superior penetration, but vastly inferior lethal effect.

Some estimates report as high as 800 Israeli armored vehicles hit, but the majority of them either were able to continue in combat or to be returned to combat after brief repairs.

In short. the times when you can justify the use of an antitank missile system in preference to a gun system are the same as those when an antiaircraft missile system is superior to an antiaircraft gun system:

(a) When weight of the gun system is prohibitive.
(b) When the range is so great as to prevent a gun system from engaging the target.

Although the Arab tank losses might be considered prohibitive there is nothing in the Israeli tank losses to indicate they were even approaching a prohibitive level. The tank is far from dead, and still dominated the battlefield in the Israeli's hands.

MYTH 4. Blitz is dead, for air and armor are dead.

I think I have pretty well covered that already. Further, the above statement is an absurdity for the essence of blitzkrieg is not the weapons used but the concept of using speed and agility as weapons. Blitzkrieg was alive when Alexander led the Companion Cavalry and will continue when man fights in star ships; it is not tied to the popularity of any particular weapon system. For that matter. the idea that any weapon can become obsolete is somewhat curious.

The U.S. suffered casualities in Vietnam from crossbows and sharpened bamboo sticks. The former dates from the 13th century, and the latter from cave men. The instrument is unimportant, the ultimate weapon is man himself. The Arabs, given a vastly superior quantity of material, higher quality material, and almost strategic surprise, achieved only marginal initial gains, and suffered decisive defeat. Their tactical performance was actually poorer than it had been in 1967, despite over five years of intense Soviet training and buildup.

Bibliography

1. WHEN GOD JUDGED AND MEN DIED, "A Battle Report of the Yom Kippur War" by Arnold Sherman, Bantam Books. Inc., Dec. 1973.

2. MILITARY-REVIEW, "Professional Journal of the US Army: US Army command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas:

A. "The Yom Kippur War" March 1974 by Kenneth S. Brower pp. 25-33.
B. "The Middle East War" Feb 1974 by the Staff p. 48.
C. "Israeli Paratroopers" March 1973 by Jac Weller.
D. "Soviet Airborne Troops" April 1973 by Graham H. Tubiville
E. "River Crossing: Key to Soviet Offense" Oct 1971 by Cpt Eugene D. Betit.
F. "Israeli Armor: Lessons from the Six Day War" Nov 1971 by Jac Weller.
G. "A Military Solution to the Suez Canal Impasse" Joy 1971 by Major Edgar O'Ballance.

3. ARMED FORCES JOURNAL INTERNATIONAL

A. "The Middle East War" January 1974 pp. 33-38
B. October 1973: a special issue entirely dedicated to an in-depth look at Israel.
C. November 1973: Bulletins from the War.

4. AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY

A."Israeli Aircraft and Arab SAMS In Key Battles" Oct 22 1974.
B."Soviet Aid Sparks Arab Gains" Oct 15 1973.
C. Miscellaneous articles Dec 3 1973.

5. "The Military Balance 1973-1974" by The International Institute of Strategic Studies, Sep 1973.

6. AIRFORCE MAGAZINE

A."The October War" Dec 1973 by Brigadier Kenneth Hunt.

7. JANES WEAPONS SYSTEMS 1973 McGraw Hill & Co.

8.ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES OF THE WORLD by C.F. Foss, C. 1971 Charles Scribner's Sons

9. BESSY'S ANNUAL 1967

A."The Israel-Arab War - June 1967" by Major General J.L. Moulton

10.SOVIET MILITARY POWER by John Erickson, Royar United Service Institute for Defense Studies 1971

11. AFV-G2

A."The Armor of Israel" March 1974 by J. Asher & J. Stuard

12. AFV NEWS

A. "Our Spy in Israel" March 1974
B. "Rebuilt Centurion Unveiled" June 1973.
C. "The Collection of Historic Armored Vehicles of the Israeli Defense Forces" May 1973.

13. US NAVAL INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS

A."Gun Systems For Air Defense" March 1971, by Lt Cdr William O. O'Neil III.

14. ARMY

A."Learning the Hard Way: Lessons From the October War" March 1974 by Brigadier C.N. Barclay.

15. THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY

A. "Who Lost the Yom Kippur War?" March 1974 by Drew Middleton.

16. RUSSIAN TANKS 1900-1970 by John Milsom C. 1970 Galahad Books

17. THE WEAPONS OF WORLD WAR III: "The Long Road Back From the Bomb" by John S. Tomkins C. 1966 Doubleday & Company

18. TIME, NEWSWEEK, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT. CBS, NBC, and ABC nightly news.

19. AREA HANDBOOK FOR SYRIA, 1971 U.S. Printing Office.

20. AREA HANDBOOK FOR UAR (Egypt) 1970, U.S. Printing Office.

More Yom Kippur War

Prologue
Starting Lineup: Egypt and Syria
Starting Lineup: Israel
Rounds One and Two
Weapons: SA-6 Gainful SAM, Israeli Soltam L-33, MiG 21, Egyptian Hangerette
The Naval Balance
Combat Aircraft
The Cost: The Butcher Bill
Results, Conclusions, and Myths