The Yom Kippur War
October 6-24, 1973

Starting Lineup: Egypt and Syria

by Kent H. Clotfelter


The attached diagram gives the Egyptian and Syrian army organization and composition at the start of the Yom Kippur War as given in the Strategic Balance. Numbers in parentheses are estimates of strength which differ from those of the Institute of Strategic Studies figures, and the numbers in circles refer to the source numbers in the Bibliography from which their differing estimates arise. Both Syria and Egypt are equipped entirely with Soviet equipment, and in the case of the SA-6 Missile and the T-62 Tank. it is equipment which is just now beginning to be issued to the Warsaw Pact forces. The strength of the air forces as compiled by various sources is also given in the table.

The unit organization is essentially Soviet with some differences. The Brigade is thought to be nothing more than the equivalent Soviet Regimental Organization augmented with artillery and support services.

Both Syria and Egypt have had over 2,000 Soviet advisors in their countries since the 1967 war to train their armed forces. Soviet doctrine has been integrated through the armed forces of both countries.

Soviet doctrine calls for multiple assaults all along the front in river (canal) crossing. with the successful crossings being reinforced and expanded until they run together (Ink Blot Tactics). Soviet Tactics emphasize pre-planned attack with careful, and methodical advance planning and arduous training. Advances are to take place across the whole front at a carefully measured pace. After each advance, there is to be a pause for regrouping and meticulous planning fo the next push.

Although many noted Soviet military figures have written rather fanciful papers about rapid advances and blitzkrieg warfare, there bas been no worthwhile change in Soviet tactical doctrine since early 1943. Its reliance is still placed on careful, methodically planned advances across broad fronts. This doctrine was originally derived and is still used to gain results when employed with large material and manpower superiority and an inferiority of small unit leadership and quality of troops and material.

Its major disadvantages are that is is incapable of reacting rapidly to unexpected situations, and is unable to deviate from the plan regardless of the opportunities offered.

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© Copyright 1974 by Donald S. Lowry
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