America's Forlorn Hope

IJN Invasion Repulsed

by Mike Joslyn

Kajioka's fleet arrived within sight of Wake sometime around 3 A.M. on the morning of December 11th. By now, even the weather was working against it. High winds and rough waves swamped or capsized landing boats, extending the debarkation of the landing force into an ordeal which lasted until nearly dawn.

Meanwhile, the Marines had gone to general quarters, taking with them the order not to fire until they got the word from headquarters. Devereaux knew that the Japanese cruisers with their 5.5" guns outranged his 5 inch pieces by about 7,000 yards, so he gambled that the silence of his batteries might lure Kajioka's ships into range. He further ordered the four remaining Wildcats to stay on the ground until the Marines opened up. They would then seek out any Japanese carriers or aircraft in the area and attack.

With dawn breaking in the east, the Yubari moved to a point four and half miles south of Battery A, turned west and began its first pass at Wake island. joined by the Tatsuta and the Tenryu, the three cruisers barraged camp 1, setting the oil tanks on fire. As Yubari turned east for another crack at Wake island, the two older cruisers, their three destroyer escorts, and the patrol craft split off and began to steam north towards Wilkes, firing as they went.

By 6 A.M. the Yubari was about to start its third firing run some three miles south of Battery A. The Tatsuta, Tenryu and their accompanying train of destroyers were sailing down the throat of Battery L on Wilkes. Five and half miles to the west of the atoll, within sight of Battery B on Peale, was the destroyer Yayoi leading two others. The sun had risen, the targets were illuminated, and the Marines commenced firing.

Battery B was the first to respond to the Japanese bombardment by firing on the Yayoi. After a spirited fifteen minute exchange, the Yayoi scored hits on Battery B, putting one of the 5 inchers out of action. The Yayoi, however was hit and set on fire. It retired behind a smoke screen laid by the second destroyer, and the trio turned about.

A few minutes later, Battery A engaged the Yubari and put two shells into the cruiser amidships, just above the waterline. Smoke and steam began to pour from the gaping holes. As the Yubari tried to hide in its own steam, one of the patrol craft rushed to interpose itself between the cruiser and the shore. It took a shell in its forecastle meant for the Yubari, and turned to run.

At least one shell silenced Yubari's forward turret, and the cruiser started to zig-zag away with a discernible list to port. After several lurching halts, it managed to get out of range. The damage to Battery B in this encounter was one barely wounded Marine.

With all its ranging and sighting gear blown away in the dynamite blast of the 9th, Battery L was a little hesitant to fire. The Battery waited until 6:52 A.M. when, at two and a quarter miles from the beach, the destroyer Hayate presented a target which was too much of a temptation. On the third shot, Hayate exploded taking its entire crew with it.

The Marines of Battery L, stunned by their unexpected success, stood there gawking until Sergeant Bedell roused them with his acid "encouragement." In swift succession, the Battery then engaged the destroyer Oite, a transport and one of the older cruisers, damaging all three. In the space of eight minutes, Battery L had sunk or damaged a third of the Japanese invasion fleet, all for the cost of two slightly wounded Marines.

With his force growing smaller by the minute, Kajioka ordered a general retreat at 7 A.M. Ten minutes later, not a single Japanese ship could be seen from the atoll. If the Admiral believed his force to be out of danger at that point, he was sadly mistaken.

The Wildcats, having assured themselves that there were no Japanese carriers or bombers in the area, swooped down on the invasion fleet, pouring 2,000 pounds of bombs and ample machine-gun fire into the fleeing ships. The strafing further damaged the Tenryu, the Tatsuta and the Kongo Maru, but the most spectacular achievement remained ahead.

At 7:31, a load of armed depth charges on the deck of the destroyer Kisaragi was touched off by a 100 lb. bomb. It disappeared in an explosion rivaling the Hayate's. For the Japanese, the first attempt on Wake had now come to its disastrous conclusion.

"I am prepared for any punishment you deem suitable..."

    --Admiral Kajioka, radio message to 4th fleet HQ December 13, 1941

Perhaps on account of his past service, or maybe because the hopelessness of this first foray was recognized, ritual suicide was not demanded of Admiral Kajioka. Instead, he was allowed to retain command of the landing forces, in order to redeem himself at a later date.

The fleet limped back to its anchorage in Kwajalein on December 13th, carrying 160 wounded below decks. To this had to be added the 300 dead on the two sunken destroyers, along with another 80 struck down on other ships. Every one of the cruisers involved had been damaged, as well as five other ships. Kajioka characterized the expedition as "a disgrace to the Emperor," and it was the only reverse that the U.S. inflicted on the Japanese in that first week of Pacific war.

As 4th Fleet had achieved all of its other objectives, however, it could now concentrate fully on Wake. The Hayate and the Kisaragi were replaced with two similar ships, along with a newer destroyer, the Oboro. Four heavy cruisers were sent from Truk to shield the landing force from any naval threat. More importantly, the 2d Maizuru Special Naval Landing Force was dispatched fresh from its victory at Guam, and the carriers Hiryu and Soryu were split off from the Pearl Harbor strike force to add another 100 planes to the air forces attacking Wake.

The new plan was essentially the old plan with more weight. The combined 2d Maizuru and 4th Fleet SNLF would storm ashore on the south side of Wake, only this time, there would be no bombardment to warn the Marines. Instead, the carrier planes would hammer the Marine positions starting two days before the invasion. If the issue was still in doubt after the 2d Maizuru landed, Kajioka was ordered to run his destroyers aground on the coral reef and use their crews as infantry. Japanese shipwrights raced to repair Kajioka's damaged ships in time for the next attempt, scheduled for the early morning hours of December 23.

Meanwhile, the bombing continued.

"...a man would forget an order as soon he turned away. He would have to come back and ask what you wanted him to do, and sometimes it was hard for you to remember."

    --Major Devereaux describing the toll of fatigue on the Marines, December 12-22, 1941

For the next eleven days, life for the Marines fell into an unpleasant monotony of digging, diving for cover, and pushing heavy guns around. With two exceptions, the 24th Air Flotilla bombed them everyday and, in a week and a half, managed to destroy half the vehicles and virtually every building above ground on Wake. On the other hand, they killed only 4 Marines and destroyed a single Wildcat. In exchange for this, the 24th Air Flotilla suffered the loss of seven bombers and damage to eleven more.

The anti-aircraft batteries really owed their survival to the efforts of Marines and civilian volunteers in moving them when the bombing got too close. Both Batteries D and E were moved twice during the battle, and replaced each time with dummy positions to mislead the bombers. Outfoxing the enemy exacted its own price in fatigue, however. Moving the eight ton anti-aircraft guns was an all night proposition.

At the same time, larger bunkers were being bulldozed for the naval guns, although, with the exception of Battery L, they endured the bombing in better shape then the anti- aircraft guns. Perhaps this was because of the excellent camouflage. Even from a small boat floating 150 yards offshore, it was almost impossible to see them. The vegetation used in this camouflage (and in all the other camouflaged positions on the island) had to be replaced every day, because dead and dry vegetation would highlight the position in aerial photos, and so another task was added to the Marines' lengthening list of details.

As the siege wore on, the work multiplied. Communication wires were torn up after every bombing and had to be re-laid. The bombing killed birds by the thousands, and to keep disease at bay, they all had to be collected and buried; (this was not entirely successful; most of the garrison came down with severe diarrhea, anyway, most likely spread by the millions of flies now feasting on the garbage made by civilians cowering in the bush). And Marines were constantly engaged in repairing blast-damaged and shrapnel-pierced equipment. The round-the-clock work and the debilitating effects of disease, more than the bombing, was wearing down the Marines.

The one bright spot in all this was the arrival, on December 20th, of a Navy PBY which managed to get through the rain that was keeping the Japanese bombers grounded. With it came something that the Marines at Wake had been waiting for: news of the force that was sailing, at that moment, to their rescue.

"Wake is a liability, not an asset."

    --Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox, aide to Admiral William S. Pye, Pearl Harbor, December 12, 1941

Two days after the attack on Pearl Harbor, Kimmel transformed his original ideas on Wake into action. While Kajioka's fleet was being repulsed in its first attempt, Kimmel's staff issued orders for a three part plan to reinforce the atoll, which, given the resources and the lack of time, was necessarily a simple one. Task force eleven, built around the carrier Saratoga, would deliver new planes and part of 4th Defense Battalion to Wake by December 24.

Meanwhile, Lexington would make a strike on what was assumed to be the main Japanese air base in the Marshalls -- Jaluit, about 800 miles south of Wake -- on or before December 23. Hopefully, this would distract the Japanese from Wake while the relief force slipped in. Covering Hawaii would be the carrier Enterprise and Task force 8. With its goals established, the relief plan now began to attract obstacles the way a ship's hull draws barnacles.

Problem number one was choosing who would command the newly-formed Task Force 11. Kimmel had a choice between Rear Admiral Aubrey Fitch -- commander of the Saratoga and either a naval aviator or carrier commander for the past eleven years -- and Rear Admiral Frank Fletcher -- whose whole career experience had been aboard battleships and cruisers. Though they were equal in seniority, Fletcher was popular, came from a navy family, and had finished notably higher then Fitch in the same class at Annapolis. Kimmel chose Fletcher, even though nothing in Navy regulations obligated him to do so. Task Force 11 would sorely miss Fitch's superior carrier experience.

The next problem was assembling the forces involved. On December 8th, the Lexington was 400 miles southeast of Midway while the Enterprise was 200 miles from Pearl; both had just finished delivering Marine aircraft to Midway and Wake, respectively. Saratoga, on the other hand, was still in San Diego, over 3,000 miles from the action. Both Lexington and Enterprise spent the next week chasing phantom Japanese fleets around Hawaii, while Saratoga steamed at high speed towards Oahu.

The result was that everyone arrived at Pearl at the same time needing to be refueled. The Lexington got away on December 15, the same day Saratoga might have made it in. Unfortunately, the carrier was held outside of Pearl for the entire night because it was feared that Japanese midget submarines might take the opportunity to dash in if the anti-submarine nets were opened. Consequently, Saratoga wasn't fully refueled until December 17th.

While Saratoga drank fuel into its nearly empty tanks, the seaplane tender Tangier and the fleet oiler Neches turned lazy circles in the sea beyond Pearl Harbor. Aboard the Tangier were 200 volunteers from the 4th Defense Battalion, thousands of rounds of three and five inch gun ammo, and the desperately needed early warning radar.

The Tangier was Wake's good news. The bad news was the aging tanker Neches. At a time when speed was essential, the Neches chugged along at 15 miles an hour, top speed ... but only if the wind was right.

Back on the Lexington, the Japanese seemed to swarm just over the horizon. On both the 16th and 17th, planes from the Lexington attacked "Japanese carriers." In the first instance, scout planes actually did drop bombs on something -- in retrospect, obviously not a Japanese aircraft carrier. They missed.

The next day, twenty-nine of Lexington's bombers took off to ravage what turned out to be a drifting American barge. Meanwhile, reports began to reach Fitch about the Japanese conquest of the Gilbert Islands (south of the Marshalls, and near Fitch's route of attack). Navy Intelligence calculated that up to 200 Japanese floatplane fighters and bombers were waiting there to ambush the Lexington.

As for Jaluit, a large submarine force was supposedly gathering in its lagoon. The crowning portent was the anti-aircraft drill held two days after leaving Pearl Harbor -- not one of the anti-aircraft shells fired by the Lex's escorting cruisers worked.

Kimmel returned to the States on December 18th to face the public inquisition over Pearl Harbor. With its chief architect gone, the plan was gasping its last. Stepping in as interim commander-in-chief of the Pacific Fleet was Admiral William S. Pye, a battleship admiral who was merely warming the chair for the incoming Chester Nimitz.

Not wanting to be remembered as the man who had lost the rest of the Pacific fleet, Pye canceled the Lexington's raid and sent it north to support the Saratoga -- still 650 miles away from its goal. It was probably just as well. Had the attack gone forward, the Lexington's blow would have fallen on a half-completed seaplane base, with no airplanes. The hundreds of submarines and floatplanes conjured up by Naval intelligence did not exist.

At 8:00 AM on Monday, December 22d, the Saratoga and Task force 14 were a little under 600 miles northeast of Wake. The reinforced Japanese fleet had already been at sea for a day. With the oiler Neches in tow, there was no way that the Task force could physically beat the Japanese fleet to Wake, but even with the drag of the Neches, the Saratoga's aircraft could have been within range of Wake by eight o'clock the next morning. Instead, Admiral Fletcher was ordered to begin refueling his destroyers, and headed west and north -- away from Wake -- to do so. For the next twelve hours, he made barely 70 miles, all of it negative progress.

Fletcher cannot be entirely faulted for the change of course. Refueling at sea is a tricky process, made more so by the rough waves which the Task force encountered as it began. There's some doubt, however, that the destroyers really needed it. Even the emptiest of Fletcher's destroyers still had nearly 75% of its fuel left. It's more likely that Task 14 was held back so that the Lexington could catch up to it. In any event, Fletcher did not manage to link up with the Lexington. Instead, he turned west again on Monday night (still refueling destroyers), and got to within 490 miles of Wake before it surrendered.

What no one knew on the American side was that sixty miles east of Wake, patrolling far beyond any Japanese aircraft and separated from each other by many miles, was the covering force of four Japanese heavy cruisers. Even if this inviting target had been ignored, the extremely vulnerable Japanese transports were still available.

For three weeks after the departure of the Japanese carriers (and their sheltering umbrella of aircraft) the transports hovered around Wake as though the U.S. Navy had ceased to exist. As far as Wake was concerned, it had. Task force 14 retired on Midway, unaware of the compensatory revenge being offered up on a silver sea.

America's Forlorn Hope US Marines Defend Wake Island: Dec 8-23, 1941

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