On September 8th, the first indication of the opportunity available to him arrived at Bragg's Headquarters. A dispatch from Confederate Cavalry Brigadier William T. Martin described the exposed position of a lone Federal infantry division in MacLemore's cove, on the Confederate side of Lookout Mountain. This was Thomas' lead formation, under Major General James S. Negley. Martin's first message went unnoticed, however, for Bragg was ill again, worn haggard with stress. Several more messages sent on the 8th also went unheeded. Finally, on September 9th, Bragg received a detailed description of Negleys force and location, and at last realized that the moment he had been waiting for arrived. The two commands nearest the exposed Federals were the divisions of Confederate Major Generals Thomas C. Hindman and Patrick R. Cleburne. They were of different corps, but the men themselves were friends from before the war and could be relied upon to co-operate with each other. Unfortunately, they could not also be relied upon to listen to Bragg. Hindman, coming from the north, was ordered to move to Davis crossroads and attack the Union flank. Cleburne, facing the Federals opposite Dug Gap in Pigeon Mountain (the eastern wall of McLemore's Cove) was to attack west when Hindman engaged. Together, two powerful Rebel divisions would converge on a lone Federal one. The orders were sent out at Midnight, September 9th. To his credit, Hindman started within an hour of getting Bragg's message, and by dawn on the 10th was nearly in place, four miles from the crossroads. At that point, he became cautious, having heard nothing from Cleburne. That silence was not Cleburne's fault, however, but that of his immediate superior: Daniel Harvey Hill, who had arrived in August to replace Hardee. Hill's command included Breckinridge's Division as well as Cleburne's; and Breckinridge, still nursing the Murfreesboro grudge, had plenty to say about Bragg. Hill was shocked to see the extent of the resentment and disharmony present in the army, and all his subordinates agreed that the reason was clear: Bragg. Given Hill's own caustic personality (he had been eased out of the Army of Northern Virginia by no less than Robert E. Lee in 1862) and history of outspoken criticism of his superiors, it was no surprise that Hill ended up a Bragg foe. At 4:30 a.m. on September 10th, Hill received Bragg's midnight order. Immediately, Hill was full of reasons why Cleburne could not advance: Cleburne himself was bedridden and ill, Dug Gap had itself been blocked with felled trees by Rebel cavalry and would require time to clear, and one of Cleburne's brigades was detached on picket duty. All of these reasons were immediately dispatched to Bragg and Hindman via messenger, alerting both men that half of the proposed pincer maneuver would not be in place. Receipt of Hill's dispatch reinforced Hindman's caution, and the northern pincer now stopped entirely. Bragg, upon receiving Hill's message, responded by ordering Buckner's Corps of two divisions to move to support Hindman, in place of D.H. Hill. At 1:30, Hill changed his mind, sending a second message to both Bragg and Hindman that Cleburne was advancing and had encountered Federals in strength at Dug Gap; Hill requested that Hindman to attack the Union force in the rear if the Federals attacked Cleburne. This note produced considerable confusion. Hill was supposed to attack, not await attack. Further, the Federals on Hindman's front were quite active, and a second Union division had reinforced Negley, a fact that did nothing to ease Hindman's fears. Both Hindman and Hill thus spent the rest of the day waiting for the other to open the combat, which was not at all what Bragg intended. At dusk, the first of Buckner's two divisions arrived, but Buckner, new to the situation, deferred to Hindman. September 11th proved no better for the Confederates. The opportunity still lingered, as Negley remained near the crossroads. Bragg joined Hill on the night of the 10th, trying to impart some aggressive spirit to the effort. At Hill's HQ a messenger arrived from Hindman expressing that general's fears for his own rear and reiterating his reluctance to attack. Bragg responded by ordering Hindman to attack the next morning "even if he lost his entire command in doing so." In theory, this would seem to eliminate all doubts. Hindman's actions that morning were not that of a man about to plunge into a headlong attack, however. First, Hindman chose to rotate the head of his column, sending forward one of Buckner's divisions in place of his own. That action consumed at least an hour. Next, the march south proceeded slowly, with frequent halts, like a man feeling his way across a dark room. Finally, about midday, Bragg himself muddied the waters: Hindman received two dispatches from the commanding General. The first informed Hindman that if the enemy was too strong to attack, he could retreat to Catlett's Gap hardly a call to arms. The other message estimated the Federals at about 12,000 men, at least two divisions. Not surprisingly, Hindman halted altogether to send back to Bragg and find out what was going on. Finally, at 4:00 p.m., word returned: Bragg demanded an attack. By then, it was too late. The Federals had escaped, and only a light rear- guard action marked the day's combat. McLemore's Cove illustrated the degree of command paralysis that the Army of Tennessee labored under by mid-1863. Both Hindman and Hill treated Bragg's orders as suggestions, not commands. Buckner, who should have assumed command on the 11th as senior officer, allowed Hindman to continue to run the show, for reasons never really explained. Bragg himself reinforced his commanders' skepticism by issuing conflicting orders: After Bragg's orders to Hindman to attack even if it cost him his whole division on the morning of the 11th, Bragg's midday approval of a retreat if the enemy was too strong was a mixed message of the worst sort. A plan that should have brought five Rebel Divisions swarming down on two isolated Federal Divisions fizzled miserably because the senior officers constantly second-guessed their commander, who for his own part gave them plenty of reason to do so. Bragg, true to form, immediately found someone to blame. When he met Hindman in front of Dug Gap on the 11th he excoriated the division commander publicly for the failure. Negley might have gotten away, but Rosecrans' Federals were still badly scattered, and there was still a chance to defeat them in detail. Early on the morning of September 12th, Cavalry pickets brought word that part of two Federal divisions were at Lee and Gordor~s Mill, about 12 miles north of Dug Gap, and at least as far from the nearest support. Bragg's army was closer and more concentrated, with Lt. General Leonidas Polles Corps' the closest. Bragg ordered Polk to take his largest division - Cheatham's - to Rock Spring Church, six miles southeast of the Mill. Hindman was ordered that afternoon to join Polk. Yet another two divisions - the corps of Major General William H. Walker, fresh from Mississippi -- was sent to Polk as well. By the evening of the 12th, Polk should have had four divisions available to hit the Federals. At 6:00 p.m., Bragg sent a dispatch to Polk outlining the extent of the opportunity, and at 8:00 p.m., he sent a second message ordering Polk to attack at dawn, September 13th. True to form for the Army of Tennessee, Polk declined to advance. Hindman was late arriving, not reaching Rock Spring Church until 4:30 a.m. the next morning, and Walker managed to find fault with every one of Polk's intended deployments. In an echo of the kinds of disagreements experienced between Bragg and his corps commanders, Polk found Walker argumentative and critical. There would be no harmony at either the senior or subordinate levels of command for the Confederates. Accordingly, Polk ignored Bragg's attack order, instead sending back a message asking for reinforcements and reporting the Federals ready to attack themselves. Bragg received this dispatch about midnight on the 12th. His replies indicated that he would send Buckner forward, and reiterated the need for Polk to attack at dawn. Polk again ignored the order, instead choosing to await the expected Federal effort. None came. Instead, a reconnaissance revealed the Union forces gone from Polk's front. Bragg himself arrived at Polk's headquarters about mid-morning to find the Yankees gone without any attack by Polk at all. Two spectacular opportunities had been lost in the last three days, and Bragg all but gave up. He regrouped his army, and in doing so gave Rosecrans valuable time to recover his own equilibrium. The thought of additional reinforcements -- more men from Mississippi, and the expected arrival of Longstreet's corps from Virginia -- helped revive Bragg's desire to attack. On September 15th, Bragg decided to shift the army north to try and cut off Rosecrans from Chattanooga. Confederate troops were directed to move towards Lee and Gordon's Mill, while Rebel cavalry seized the fords and bridges over Chickamauga Creek. The reinforcements could detrain at Ringgold and march directly to the army as it came north, protecting that flank. On the 16th and 17th, both armies sidled northwards. By September 18th, Bragg was further along, and Rosecrans was again in danger of being outflanked. Skirmishing erupted that afternoon between Rebel infantry and the Union cavalry screening Reed's and Alexander's Bridges, a mile or two north of Rosecrans' position near Lee and Gordon's Mill. By late afternoon, Bragg had managed to concentrate three corps -- Buckner's, Walker's, and Longstreet's (temporarily led by Major General John Bell Hood) -- on the Union flank. Rosecrans responded by sending Thomas's Corps on a night march to Cloud Church, extending his own line closer to Chattanooga. While this again leapfrogged the Federal flank past Bragg's line, it left a dangerous gap between Thomas and the rest of the Union army coming up on Lee and Gordon's Mill. The stage was set for the bloodiest battle in the West. Bragg's plan was simple: Buckner, Walker, and Hood would pivot southwest and attack to drive Rosecrans back into MacLemore's Cove. Hill and Polk would move up to support that effort. Chickamauga The Army of Tennessee Introduction Union on Offensive Bragg Acts: McLemore's Cove Battle of Chickamauga Chickamauga as Simulation Back to Table of Contents -- Against the Odds vol. 1 no. 2 Back to Against the Odds List of Issues Back to MagWeb Magazine List © Copyright 2003 by LPS. This article appears in MagWeb.com (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other articles from military history and related magazines are available at http://www.magweb.com * Buy this back issue or subscribe to Against the Odds direct from LPS.