The Army of Tennessee and its commander should have been elated. They had just won their first - and ultimately only - significant battlefield victory. For troops who had surrendered at Donelson, fought and retreated after Shiloh, Perryville, and Murfreesboro, and abandoned Tullahoma and Chattanooga without a fight at all, Chickamauga was the first time they had seen Federals flee the field in disarray. For the men in the Rebel ranks it was -despite heavy Confederate losses -- a heady experience. Within two months, however, the battle which had electrified the South had become, to quote one Confederate corps commander, just another "Barren Victory," its advantages thrown away by internal dissension that almost destroyed the Army of Tennessee as an effective combat force. Two days after the battle, Braxton Bragg was hard at work plotting another campaign -- but not against the Federals now penned up in Chattanooga. Instead, Bragg outlined his next targets in a letter to his wife, Elise, always his closest confidante: Generals Leonidas Polk and Thomas C. Hindman of his own army had to go. Both had committed serious errors before and during the battle, which Bragg felt robbed him of a larger victory. Both had a long history of opposition to Bragg's tenure in command, now more than a year old. For Bragg, this was a chance to clean house, getting rid of men who he regarded as incompetent to lead a corps or a division as well as removing a hard kernel of resistance to his own command. Polk would be a special problem, as his friendship with the Confederate President, Jefferson Davis, gave him a degree of immunity: Bragg likely hoped that the recent victory would give him the leverage needed to trump Polk's political influence. If Bragg felt that removing these two troublemakers would end the internal dissension that had begun after Perryville he was mistaken instead, it set off a nearrevolt among his commanders, none of whom wanted him in charge any more, and were willing to risk mutiny to do it. What was meant as the parting shot of an old quarrel instead became the birth of a new one, with damaging results for the army and the Confederacy. On September 30th, Bragg formally suspended Polk and Hindman, sending them away from the army. Two months later, the Army of Tennessee suffered a crippling defeat at Missionary Ridge, Bragg himself was relieved of command, and all the fruits of Chickamauga went unpicked. Despite strong military qualifications, including a notable reputation won in Mexico and a good grasp of the larger strategic issues facing the Confederacy, Bragg's personality proved a severe handicap. Quarrelsome and fault-finding, Bragg was cursed with twin failings: a caustic outlook towards everyone, and a willingness to express those opinions in public. The result was predictable: humiliated subordinates and disenchanted troops. The first real problems appeared with the Perryville Campaign. Initially, Bragg's move into Kentucky seemed likely to restore Confederate fortunes after the defeat at Shiloh. In conjunction with a small force under General Kirby Smith, Bragg's move north to Frankfort transferred the seat of war several hundred miles northward, reversing the trend of the spring and summer. By September, almost 40,000 Rebel troops were threatening to cross the Ohio River, inducing panic in the Union states of Indiana and Ohio. Unfortunately, the battle of Perryville itself proved a confused, unsatisfying denouement to the campaign. Bragg, deceived by a Federal feint, failed to concentrate his own and Smiths forces to face the main Union army, and as a result 16,000 Confederates launched a poorly-advised attack on more than 45,000 Federals -- only Union ineffectiveness allowed the much smaller Rebel army to escape after an inconclusive fight. Bragg promptly retreated to Harrodsburg where he and Smith finally joined, evening the odds. Bragg's next choice, however, dissatisfied many of his officers and men. Instead of trying to renew the contest as expected, Bragg, disillusioned with the tepid response he received in Kentucky, decided to abandon the state altogether. In late October, with insufficient provisions, Bragg and Smith's men stumbled back into Tennessee. Most of the combined Rebel force had not even been engaged in battle, and could little understand why they were retreating in defeat without a fight. A half-hearted effort to capture Nashville in November followed, a plan which failed in large part because of the outright refusal of Smith to co-operate any longer with any scheme of Bragg's. (Smith was not subordinate, but instead a separate departmental commander, meaning that one third of the combined Rebel army was not subject to Bragg's orders, a situation that proved no end of confusion.) The army came to rest at Murfreesboro, Tennessee, about thirty miles southeast of Nashville. Next came the battle of Stone's River, fought over New Years, 1863. In late December the Union army advanced on Bragg, who counterattacked as they approached his army. The result was a confused fight on December 31st, and a poorly planned Confederate attack on January 2nd that was mostly a slaughter: a frontal assault into strong artillery positions. Again, Bragg retreated, a move widely interpreted in the army and across the South as admitting defeat. Bragg's Political Troubles After two failed campaigns, it is hardly surprising that Bragg was castigated in print and wherever Southerners gathered. Bragg himself did little to win over potential critics: among his publicly stated excuses for the retreats were the cowardice of the Kentuckians, both in and out of his army; and the ill discipline of the Tennesseans in his command. Bragg was called to Richmond in November, after Perryville, to explain himself Later that month, both Kirby Smith and Leonidas Polk senior corps commander in Bragg's portion of the combined army - traveled to Richmond separately to lobby for Bragg's replacement. Bragg chose to confront the issue openly. Previously Bragg had suggested that if he had lost the confidence of the army he would resign. He renewed that promise again in January, this time in conjunction with a curious document - a circular issued to his corps and division commanders, asking them specifically if they had acquiesced to the need for a retreat at Murfreesboro in a council of war; and more broadly if they had lost confidence in his leadership. Bragg was likely not really aware of how much sentiment there was against him in the army: despite warnings from his staff, Bragg expected the circular to fully vindicate him. It had the opposite effect. The officers of William J. Hardee's Corps were unanimous in telling Bragg it would be best if he resigned. The officers of Polk's Corps were a little more cautious, but in the end, they too, made their views clear - Bragg must go. Two of the division commanders: Major Generals John C. Breckinridge of Hardee's Corps and Benjamin E Cheatham had personal reasons to resent Bragg: Breckinridge for the useless sacrifice of his division on January 2nd, and Cheatham for Bragg's caustic criticism of his performance on the first days fight. Breckinridge, a prominent Kentuckian and national figure before the war, was especially vociferous regarding his dissatisfaction. For President Davis, now fully alarmed by the attacks on Bragg emerging from both within and without the Army of Tennessee, rumors of Bragg's unfortunate poll were disturbing. General Joseph E. Johnston was ordered to the scene to assess the situation and try and resolve it. Fearful of his own reputation, however, Johnston -- afraid that any negative endorsement of Bragg might be viewed as politicking for his job -- sustained Bragg in command. Bragg, for his part, had no intention of resigning. The end result was an unresolved rift between Bragg and most of his generals, one that lay dormant over the next six months of inactivity in Tennessee, but still very much a problem in the command of the army. In June 1863, that inactivity ended. Union Major General Rosecrans, commander of the Federal Army of the Cumberland and Bragg's opposite number in central Tennessee, undertook his much anticipated offensive. With an aggressive use of feint and maneuver, Rosecrans avoided a direct attack down the railroad from Nashville and chose to outflank Bragg to the east, threatening much of the Rebel army with capture. Hurriedly, the Army of Tennessee scrambled across the Duck River to Tullahoma, concentrating there on June 29th. Divided command again left the army rudderless. Chickamauga The Army of Tennessee Introduction Union on Offensive Bragg Acts: McLemore's Cove Battle of Chickamauga Chickamauga as Simulation Back to Table of Contents -- Against the Odds vol. 1 no. 2 Back to Against the Odds List of Issues Back to MagWeb Magazine List © Copyright 2003 by LPS. This article appears in MagWeb.com (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other articles from military history and related magazines are available at http://www.magweb.com * Buy this back issue or subscribe to Against the Odds direct from LPS.