Apart from the criticism he received at the time, the Duke of York has also been badly treated by subsequent historians, as mentioned earlier. This is notably the case with Sir John Fortescue, whose volume four of `A HISTORY OF THE BRITISH ARMY' remains the most widely read account of the Flanders campaign. It is worth examining one of the actions in which Fortescue's criticism of the Duke is especially heavy, in order to observe how the historian has left to posterity an account which may only be described as a distortion of the truth.

The engagement in question was fought at Linselles on 18 August 1793, during the Duke's march to Dunkirk. The Hereditary Prince of Orange, whose troops held the area through which the Duke was proceeding, had decided to attack several French posts at Linselles in order to distract attention from the flank march of his ally's column. Although the Dutch had initially been successful, a strong French counterattack had dislodged them and they had appealed to the Duke for assistance. According to Fortescue, the Duke's troops had already undergone "a severe march" that day, the implication being that they were not in a condition to meet the enemy.

In fact, the Duke had travelled only six miles on the 18th, from Tourcoing to Menin; his men having been halted the previous day. Being the nearest troops available, the Brigade of Guards under General Lake were despatched and arrived at about 6pm, after a march of a further six miles. On arrival far from finding "not a Dutchman there," as claimed by Fortescue, the Dutch were in fact attempting to rally, though unsuccessfully as it turned out. Lake immediately determined to assault the French position, consisting of a steep climb up to the village of Linselles which was protected by two redoubts and several barricades. Although numbering only about 1100 men, the Guards successfully forced five times their number of Frenchmen to retreat in disorder, and captured twelve guns.

Fortescue's principle criticism of the Duke was that he then failed to reinforce the Guards. "It is a grave reflection upon the Duke of York" he wrote "that he should so thoughtlessly have exposed some of his best troops to needless danger, leaving them isolated and unsupported for several hours." The record of an eyewitness, Corporal Robert Brown of the Coldstream Regiment, states that the attack and subsequent pursuit of the French took four hours, by which time the reinforcements sent by the Duke had arrived. As the Duke later informed the King, "Upon the first intelligence of what had happened, I sent six Battalions to General Lake's support, and went there myself, but before we arrived everything was over and the enemy was compleatly gone." Fortescue's criticism, that the Duke had sent his best brigade on a mission of questionable importance, and had subsequently done nothing to find out what had happened to it, is simply untrue.

The Guards had defeated a significantly larger force of the enemy and the victorious British were in no threat of being counter-attacked, as events subsequently proved. The relieving force, far from being "a detachment of Hessians," as Fortescue states, was in fact composed of the 14th and 53rd Foot and two battalions of Hessians, accompanied by the Duke in person.

The entire force, now numbering seven battalions, waited to see if the French would counter-attack to recover their lost position. This not being the case, the Duke sent the Guards back to Menin, followed by the more recently arrived troops early the following morning. Fortescue's final judgement on the Duke's conduct, that "because the Prince of Orange was guilty of one act of signal foolishness, there was no occasion to outdo him by another" is hardly fair after an examination of the true facts relating to the action. (35)

In this examination of the substantial and varied difficulties faced by the Duke of York during his first campaign, it should have become obvious that the allies lack of success in the field could not be ascribed to any deficiency on his part. Indeed, I have been unable to find any incidents of faulty generalship by the Duke which led to the failure of British or allied operations. Considering the nature of the army at his disposal, it is all the more surprising that his troops were never defeated in battle, with the exception of Dunkirk, and instead were able to win a series of notable victories in both 1793 and 1794. (36)

It is also clear that many of the Duke's contemporaries, and subsequent historians, have not recognised the extent of the problems he faced. As Burne has stated, "the wonder is that he did not throw up the sponge long before the end of his second campaign. Only a high sense of duty deterred him from this course."

The maligned reputation of the Duke as a commander in the field may not be substantiated on examination of the sources relating to the Flanders campaign. It is doubtful whether the Duke's subsequent reform of the British Army during his long tenure at the Horse Guards would have been nearly so successful had he not experienced its many serious shortcomings during active service. It may also be stated with truth that the Duke was in a large measure responsible for the ultimate success of Wellington's Peninsular army some twenty years later.

As one contemporary wrote "HRH when employed in the Field may therefore fairly be said to have suffered from the absence of those advantages in the Composition,

the Discipline of the Troops & the Instruction of Officers & Men which he so strenuously laboured to secure to others & which enabled to establish & to maintain the character & Representation of His Majesty's Arms abroad." (37)

The Grand Old Duke of York Part II: 1793-4

The Retreat from Dunkirk
Battle of Tourcoing and Recall
Battle of Linselles: 18 August 1793
Footnotes

More Duke of York British Involvement in the Low Countries, 1793-4 (NN # 4)

Introduction
British Expeditionary Force
Strategy and Siege of Dunkirk