THE BRITISH EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
The poor condition of the Army at the outbreak of war has already been mentioned. However, it is necessary to examine more closely the British element of the force which the Duke of York had under his command in 1793-4, in order to ascertain the means at his disposal for the prosecution of the war.
At the commencement of the war against Revolutionary France, the regular troops of the British Army numbered approximately 45,000. It was consequently extremely difficult to find an adequate number of men to send to Flanders and to keep up the steady flow of reinforcements necessary to replace men who were sick or casualties.
As a result, the British infantry under the
immediate command of the Duke comprised
only two brigades during the whole of 1793, a
situation that was to last until mid 1794 when
more substantial numbers of men were
forthcoming. (4)
The first consignment of troops,
comprising the Guards Brigade, did not suffer
very greatly from the sudden influx of raw and
inexperienced recruits raised in an attempt to
increase the Army establishment after war was
declared. This could not be said of the brigade of
the line which, under the command of
MajorGeneral Abercromby, was despatched to
the Duke in early March. Captain Harry
Calvert, an Aide-de-Camp to the Duke of York,
observed the arrival of Abercromby's brigade,
and subsequently wrote in his diary "on the
junction of the brigade of the line, we remarked
with concern that the recruits they had lately
received were in general totally unfit for
service, and inadequate to the fatigues of a
campaign, being mostly old men, or quite boys,
extremely weak and short."
Although this brigade was composed of only
three battalions, the condition of these men was
so bad that the Duke was forced to leave the
37th and 53rd Foot in the rear, as they were too
great a liability to Lake into the field. Cornet
Robert Wilson of the 15th Light Dragoons
probably reflected the feelings of the Army in
general when he wrote that "the most part of
the men were recruits from the gaols, sent out
in such a state of equipment as to excite shame
and derision." (5)
It is clear that the despatch of
Abercromby's brigade, comprising half of the
Duke of York's infantry force, caused some
embarrassment at home. The Adjutant-General,
General Sir William Fawcett, wrote to the Duke
at the end of March
"I much fear your R[oyal] H[ighness] will
not be able to reap the advantages you might
have expected from the Brigade of the Line,
just sent over to you, as so considerable a
portion of it is composed of nothing but Raw
undisciplined Recruits, and how they are to be
disposed of, untill they can be taught their
business, I am at a loss to imagine."
Abercromby's brigade was not exceptional
in this respect, as the reinforcements
despatched to the Duke throughout the entire
Flanders campaign appear to have been of
extremely dubious quality. In early April 1794,
Calvert observed that one batch of reinforcements "much resembled
Falstaff's men, and were as lightly clad as any
Carmagnole battalion." Sir James Craig, York's
Adjutant-General, wrote four months later that
the army had received "many Recruits who do
not know one end of their firelocks from the
other, & many who will never know it." (6)
Some regiments of cavalry were in an
equally parlous state. For instance, at the end of
March 1793 Fawcett described three quarters of
the 11th and 16th Light Dragoons as "raw
recruits ... totally unfit for active service."
Both units were duly sent to the Duke less than
two months later, but had to be stiffened by the
addition of the 15th Light Dragoons, which was
apparently in better order. He was more
fortunate regarding several regiments of
Dragoon Guards, which must have been in an
even worse condition, as these were not sent
out until the army was in winter quarters after
the close of the 1793 campaign. (7)
If the quality of many other ranks was
poor, the condition of the officer corps was
equally worrying. This may largely be ascribed
to the system of recruiting, popularly known as
"crimping", by which any man could obtain
rank in the army in relation to the number of
recruits he brought to the colours. This had
been introduced by the Government as a means
of saving money, since the expense was borne
by the potential officers, and not by the state.
However, the system resulted in men of no
military experience whatever becoming
subalterns and captains of line regiments. The
men they recruited were likewise not selected
for their good qualities, as numbers were more
important than fitness.
In 1794, the system of crimping was
changed so that men could achieve field rank if
they raised enough recruits, whereas previously
the highest rank open was that of captain.
The second method by which men could
achieve high rank was by purchase. If an
individual, or his relations, possessed enough
money or influence, all ranks up to and
including Lieutenant-Colonel were open to him.
This had unfortunate consequences for the
Duke's army in Flanders, for, as Calvert
observed, "the field officers are many of the
boys" and some were so young that Lord
Cathcart felt that they were "not fit to find
their way home from school." Although many
youthful field officers commanded regiments in
the Duke's army, there was a notable lack of
subalterns. Those able to purchase rank were
often not willing to accompany their regiments
on active service, when they could obtain easy
promotion at home without being subjected to
the hardships of a campaign. This had serious
consequences regarding the discipline of the
army, especially during the long retreat from
the borders of France to Holland and Germany in 1794-5. (8)
Discipline was also seriously affected by the
marked shortage of general officers to
command the huge influx of reinforcements
despatched to the Duke in 1794. By the middle
of that year he had seven brigades of British
infantry at his disposal, and for several months
had only three MajorGenerals to command
them, one of whom (Henry Fox) was acting as
QuartermasterGeneral to the army and had little
time for his brigade.
The situation had not been helped by the
forced departure in late July of Major-Generals
Moira and Crosbie, who had brought out the
reinforcements. Their presence with such large
numbers of men was thought inappropriate
when their seniors in the Army list,
Abercromby and David Dundas, held smaller commands.
In early August Craig had warned the Under-
Secretary of War, Evan Nepean, of the
inevitable consequences on the discipline of the
troops, but it was not until late September that
the situation was rectified. In the meantime, as
Calvert noted, "the command of the brigades
devolved on young men newly come into the
service, whose years and inexperience totally
disqualified them for the situation. I could
mention lads of one-and-twenty who had never
been on service before." (9)
Difficulties with personnel also gravely
affected the Duke of York's staff. Apart from
an inadequate number of senior officers
available to hold staff posts, the duke suffered
from the fact that officers in the British Army
were not trained for any higher command than
that of an infantry battalion or cavalry
regiment.
As Captain Craufurd, one of the Duke's
Aides-de-Camp, wrote "we are so destitute of
officers qualified to form the Quartermaster-
General's department and an efficient corps of
aides-de-camp, and our officers in general have
so little knowledge of the most essential parts
of their profession that we are obliged to have
recourse to foreigners for assistance or our
operations are constantly liable to failure in
their execution." (10)
As well as being deficient in training, the
Duke of York's army was also short of
equipment. This particularly affected the
artillery, who were almost permanently lacking
in sufficient numbers of officers and gunners.
Many had to be supplied from the infantry
regiments, and some units were forced to lend
the equivalent of an entire company for this
service.
However, the army was in greatest need of
artillery drivers, especially after the arrival of a
large number of guns sent out to the Duke in
July 1794. In April 1793 the Secretary of War,
Henry Dundas, had refused to send any drivers
or horses, informing Craig's predecessor Sir
James Murray, that the cost of transporting
them from England was too great, and that he
would have to find his own in Holland. In the
middle of August the following year, Craig
requested 600 horses and 200 drivers, remarking
"where to get the latter I declare to you I have
not an idea ... they would be of more use to us
than twice that number of Recruits to the
Regiments." (11)
As the 1793 campaign was drawing to a
close, the army was facing a further serious
problem, that of finding clothing for the troops.
So great was this need, that several patriotic
societies were formed in England in the autumn
of 1793 specifically to furnish the Duke's army
with clothing for the winter. One of these,
named the "General United Society for
Supplying the British Troops upon the
Continent with Extra Cloathing", provided over
20,000 waistcoats, and 19,000 pairs of
stockings, amongst other supplies, between
December 1793 and January 1794. A further
example, though on a lesser scale, were the
"Gentlemen of Sunderland" who forwarded
nearly 400 waistcoats and 900 pairs of
stockings over the same period. (12)
The problem of clothing was not solved in
1794, and had principally arisen from the
British Army's practice of sending new issues of
garments in pieces, meaning that the regimental
tailors had to make up the uniforms on their
arrival. This would require several weeks under
normal circumstances, but with an army on
active service was near impossible. By the end
of August 1794 Craig's despair at the situation
of the army was very great. I am confident," he
wrote to Nepean, "this is the worst provided
British Army with respect to Cloathing that
ever was in the Field." By early November he
was desperate, and was writing "we are naked &
bare footed. I don't suppose there are ten good
pair of shoes in any Company in the Army. I
wish to God you would send us, but it must be
immediately, 20,000 pair of good shoes. We
will pay for them, but let us have them over
without a moment's delay." (13)
The standard of the troops' clothing was
directly related to the number of sick in the
army, especially during the severe winter of
1794-5 when all the great rivers of Holland
froze solid. However, the medical care provided
by the General Hospital accompanying the
army was almost nonexistent. Much of the
trouble was due to the absence of sufficiently
qualified doctors, but little appears to have been
done to remedy the looting and neglect of
patients by those who were supposed to care for
them.
As Craig had written in August 1794, "the
dreadful mismanagement of it is beyond
description & the remedy is beyond my ability."
The situation remained the same until the end
of the campaign, as Lieutenant-General
Harcourt was writing to the Duke in mid-
December 1794 "if something is not decided
upon, and very speedily too, the sending of the
sick to the General Hospital under the present
administration of it is doing little better than
devolving them to destruction." At least one
brigade commander, Lord Cathcart, provided a
solution to the problem by establishing a
hospital for the use of his own troops so as to
avoid sending them to the General Hospital. His
own opinion, that "all the physicians in the
Army ought to be hanged," undoubtedly
reflected the views of many. (14)
More Duke of York 1793-4
The Grand Old Duke of York Part II: 1793-4 by Robin Thomas
THE OFFICER CORPS
CLOTHING
The Retreat from Dunkirk
Battle of Tourcoing and Recall
Battle of Linselles: 18 August 1793
Footnotes
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