STRATEGY
The British Government was not only responsible for the nature and composition of the Duke of York's army, but it also played a major role in deciding his campaign strategy, leaving little room for initiative on the part of the commander in the field. Strategic decisions were made by a triumvirate of senior politicians composed of the Prime Minister, William Pitt, the Secretary for War, Henry Dundas, and the Foreign Secretary, Lord Grenville, none of whom had military experience, and rarely saw fit to consult those who had.
As Burne has argued, this situation was not as unusual as it might appear, since the British Army possessed no General Staff, and there was no Commander-in-Chief until the appointment of the aged Lord Amherst in February 1793. There was consequently no obvious body of informed opinion to which the politicians could turn when deciding the overall strategy to be adopted.
The troops sent to Holland in 1793 were initially intended for the protection of that country only, and co-operation with the large Austrian army under the Prince of Coburg- Saalfeld was not envisaged. As the Government wished to have the option of recalling the Duke's army for future operations elsewhere, Lake had been instructed not to move his troops further away than twenty-four hours march from the port of Helvoet.
As Burne has stated, "to be tied down to an
area within a day's march of a given spot is to
be as effective in defence of a country as a dog
chained to its kennel is for the defence of its
master's property." As Coburg's army marched
south after the retreating French, and defeated
them at Neerwinden (18 March 1793), the
British force remained powerless to move from the
banks of the Scheldt until this curious directive
was rescinded on 19 March. (15)
As has already been mentioned, the British
Government was concerned about the security
of the Channel ports, and much of their
campaign strategy was directed towards this end.
Undoubtedly the best example of the appalling
consequences of the Government's insistence in
dictating strategy was the abortive siege of
Dunkirk, undertaken by the Duke in the late
summer of 1793. The idea appears to have
originated from the King, and was, in theory at
least, a good one.
The town was weakly fortified, and a quick
operation, conducted with the assistance of the
Royal Navy, would probably have led to its
capture at little cost. Once taken, the French
might weaken their centre in order to retake it,
thus allowing the main army under Coburg to
break through and march on Paris. Dunkirk was
also regarded as Britain's share in the
indemnities being agreed upon by all the allied
governments in early 1793.
However, the British Government had
seized upon the King's idea of taking Dunkirk,
though not for the same reasons. As Dundas
informed Murray in the middle of April, "you
are well aware that there exist in this Country
many strong prejudices against Continental
Wars ... It is extremely essential to meet those
prejudices on as strong grounds as possible. The
early capture of Dunkirk would operate most
essentially in that point of view, and the
Expedition, successfully conducted under the
command of a Prince of the Blood, would give
much eclat to the commencement of the War."
Although advantageous to the Government at
home for political reasons, the operation met
with little favour from the army or the
Austrians, who had agreed to provide the Duke
with 10,000 men, thus depleting the allied
centre. (16)
Preparations for assembling a siege train
had commenced in early July, but some
difficulties were experienced by the Board of
Ordnance in obtaining the requisite number of
guns and artillery men. Meanwhile, Dundas had
assured that all would be ready and delivered to
Nieuport by 20 August, and the Duke had
planned his approach march accordingly. York's
covering force, commanded by the Hanoverian
Marshal Freytag, was in position to the south of
Dunkirk on 20 August, whilst the Duke himself
arrived with the remainder of his army four days
later. His march had been conducted with speed
and efficiency, the French not realising which
part of their line he was destined to attack, and
so were unable to gather reinforcements in the
threatened area. (17)
A few guns from the siege train had left
England in the first week of August, but half the
requisite number were only ready to sail on the
16th, and the remainder a week later.
Meanwhile, the Duke was powerless to act
without his heavy artillery, and was being
considerably inconvenienced by a force of
French gunboats who were able to enfilade the
siege works with impunity, as the Royal Naval
squadron had also not arrived.
Informed of this circumstance by Murray,
Dundas blustered "why did you not earlier
suggest to me the wish of a Naval Co-operation
with respect to Dunkirk. I had always a conceit
in my own mind that it might be of use, but I
had no authority to quote for that opinion." As
Fortescue has rightly pointed out, Dundas "had
indeed a good many conceits in his own mind,
the most fatal of which was that he understood
how to conduct a campaign." In fact, Admiral
Macbride's squadron had been put under Dundas' orders specifically to
cooperate with the Duke's army, and as York
later wrote to the King, Pitt had promised a
naval force for the Dunkirk operation as early
as the preceding May. (18)
The Duke's position was far from pleasant,
as the French controlled the sluices of the
Nieuport canal, and were able to flood the only
road linking the investing with the covering
force. By the time the gunners were eventually
landed, on 27 August, to be followed by the
remainder of their guns on the 31st, the French
had been provided with an opportunity to
reinforce the Dunkirk garrison with a further 1000 men.
In the first days of September, whilst the
Duke's army was working hard to bring up the
artillery and supplies for the siege, Freytag's
covering force was being severely pressured by
30,000 men under the command of General
Houchard. The 82 year old Hanoverian had
been forced to abandon his position on 6
September and retire to Hondschoote where he
successfully managed to repulse another attack
the following day. However, French pressure
increased on 8 September, and, with his
communications threatened, the Duke was
forced to retreat from before Dunkirk. (19)
(1) British Museum Additional Manuscripts (here after,
BM Add Mss) 40,391 p288-298, Peel Papers, Memorandum [on the Duke ofYork]; Bunbury, H.E.
(1854) NARRATIVES OF SOME PASSAGES IN THE GREAT WAR WITH FRANCE. Reprinted 1927
by Peter Davies, London. p xv; Glover, R. (1963) PENINSULAR PREPARATION. THE REFORM OF
THE BRITISH ARMY 17951809. Reprinted 1988 by Ken Trotman, Cambridge. p2-6, 40; Fortescue,J.W.
(1899-1930) A HISTORY OF THE BRITISH ARMY. 13 Vols. Macmillan. London. Vol. 4 p95-6.
More Duke of York 1793-4
The Grand Old Duke of York Part II: 1793-4 by Robin Thomas
SIEGE OF DUNKIRK
NOTES
(2) Anon (1796) AN ACCURATE AND IMPARTIAL
NARRATIVE OF THE WAR BY AN OFFICER OF THE GUARDS. London. p3; Brown, R (1795) AN
IMPARTIAL JOURNAL OF A DETACHMENT FROM THE BRIGADE OF FOOT GUARDS. John
Stockdale. London. p2-3; Burne, A.H. (1949) THE NOBLE DUKE OF YORK. THE MILITARY LIFE
OF FREDERICK DUKE OF YORK AND ALBANY. Staples. London. p37-8; Fortescue,J.W., op clit, Vol.4
p54-61, 65, 74; Verney,H. (ed.) (1853) THE JOURNALS AND CORRESPONDENCE OF GENERAL SIR HARRY CALVERT. Hurst & Blackett. London. p20-1.
(3) Burne, A.H., op cit, p36; Auckland to Grenville, 15
February 1793, in Historical Manuscripts Commission (1894) THE MANUSCRIPTS OF J.B.
FORTESCUE ESQ PRESERVED AT DROP MORE. HMSO. London. Vol.2 p379. (Hereafter, Dropmore
Mss); Duncaujones, C.M. (1957) TRUSTY AND WELL-BELOVED. THE LETTERS HOME OF
WILLIAM HARNESS, AN OFFICER OF GEORGE III. SPCK. London. p55; Fortescue J.W., op cit, Vol.4
p96-7; Frederick, Duke of York and Albany, in DICTIONARY OF NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY (1885-
1900), 63 Vols. Smith, Elder, & Co. Vol.20 p233-5.
(4) Dundas to Murray, 14june 1793, War Office Records, 6/7 p72-5, Public Record Office, London (hereafter WO); Murray to Dunclas, 6 October 1793, WO 1/167 p231; Adjutant-General to York, 31 October 1793, WO 3/11 p204.
(5) Randolph, H. (1862) LIFE OF GENERAL SIR ROBERT WILSON. 2 vols. John Murray. London. Vol. 1 p94; Verney, H., op cit, p52-3, 67.
(6) Adjutant-General to the Duke of York, 27 March
1793, WO 3/11 p77-8; (see also Adjutant-General to the Duke of York, 12 April 1793, WO 3/11 p87; Adjutant-General to the Duke of York, 31 October 1793, WO 3/11 p204); Craig to Nepean, 5 August 1794, WO 1/170 pl4l; Verney, H., op cit, p187.
(7) Adjutant-General to the Duke of'York, 27 March
1793, WO 3/11 p77; Adjutant-General to the Duke of York, 31 October 1793, WO 3/11 p205.
(8) Observations of His Royal Highness the Duke of York (hereafter, York's Observations), 23 December 1794, WO 1/171 p606-7; Atkinson, C.T. (1951) Gleanings from the Cathcart MSS. In JOURNAL OF THE SOCIETY FOR ARMY HISTORICAL RESEARCH 29 p144-157. p153; Verney, H., op cit, p385-6;
(9) Craig to Nepean, 5 August 1794, WO 1/170 p1412;
York's Observations, 23 December 1794, WO 1/171 p605-6; Burne, A.H., op cit, p211; Fortescue, J.W., op cit, Vol. 4 p296-7; Verney, H., op cit, p359, 384-5.
(10) Bunbury, H.E., op cit, p xxi; Burne, A.H., op cit,
p220; Glover, R., op cit, p196-7; Le Marchant, D. (1841) MEMOIRS OF THE LATE MAJOR-
GENERAL LE MARCHANT. London. p83-5; Ward, S.G.P. (1957) WELLINGTON'S HEADQUARTERS. OUP. Oxford. p20-1.
(11) Dundas to Murray, 23 April 1793, WO 6/7 p20-3;
Dundas to Murray, 26 April 1793, WO 6/7 p33-4; Craig to Nepean, 12 August 1794, WO 1/ 170 p177-8; York's Observations, 23 December 1794, WO 1/171 p609-10.
(12) James Graham to the officer commanding British troops
at Ostend, 28 November 1793, 6 December 1793, 17 December 1793, BM Add Mss 40,633, Stewart of
Afton Papers, p88, 98, 114; Lucas, C. (1977) Gifts of clothing to the troops in 1793-5. In JOURNAL OF THE SOCIETY FOR ARMY HISTORICAL RESEARCH 55 p2-7.
(13) Craig to Nepean, 12 August 1794, WO 1/170 p 177;
Craig to Nepean, 31 August 1794, WO 1/170 p285-6; Craig to Nepean, 3 November 1794, WO 1/171 p11; York's Observations, 23 December 1794, WO 1/171 p610; Observations of MajorGeneral Craig on the subject of clothing, WO 1/171 p615-9.
(14) Craig to Nepean, 12 August 1794, WO 1/ 170
p177; Harcourt to York, 15 December 1794, WO 1/171 p482, 484; Atkinson, C.T., op cit, p148.
(15) Instructions for Our most dearly beloved Son His
Royal Highness Frederick Duke of York, 23 February 1793, WO 6/7 pl; Separate Instructions for
the Duke of York, 23 February 1793, WO 6/7 p2; Instructions for Our Trusty and well beloved Gerard Lake Esquire, 23 February 1793, WO 6/7 p3; Lake's secret instructions, 23 February 1793, WO 6/7 p4-5; Dundas to Murray, 19 March 1793, WO 6/7 p8-10; Burne, A.H., op cit, p42-3,103.
(16) Dundas to Murray, 16 April 1793, WO 6/7 p18-19;
Dundas to Murray, 1 August 1793, WO 6/7 p 139-141; Burne, A.H., op cit, p44, 71-2.
(17) Richmond to Nepean, 14july 1793, WO 6/7 p8691;
Richmond to Nepean, 18 July 1793, WO 6/7 p92-7; Dundas to Murray, 19 July 1793, WO 6/7 p82-5;
Dundas to Murray, 30 July 1793, WO 6/7, 98-102, 109-128; Dunclas to Murray, 2 August 1793, WO 6/7 p144-5; Murray to Dundas, 24 August 1793, WO 1/166 p781-5; York to the King, 21 August 1793, in Aspinall, A. (1962-70) THE LATER CORRESPONDENCE OF GEORGE III. 5 Vols. CUP. Cambridge. Vol.2 (1963) p76-7; Burne, A.H., op cit, p69.
(18) Dundas to Murray, 6 August 1793, WO 6/7 p1768;
Dundas to Murray, 16 August 1793, WO 6/7 p183-6; Dundas to Murray, 23 August 1793, WO 6/7
p191-2; Dundas to Murray, 29 August 1793 (public despatch), WO 6/ 7 p 199-200; Dundas to Murray, 29 August 1793 (private despatch), WO 6/7 p202-3; York to the King, 26 August, 18 September 1793, in Aspinall, A., Correspondence of George III, Vol.2 p79-80, 97-101; Fortescue, JW., op cit, Vol.4 p 125.
(19) Murray to Dundas, 25 August 1793, WO 1/ 166
p811-2; Murray to Dundas, 26 August 1793, WO 1/166 p803-6; Murray to Dundas, 28 August 1793,
p815-8; Murray to Dundas, 31 August 1793 WO 1/166 (public despatch), WO 1/166 p823-6; York to
the King, 31 August, 3, 7, 9 September 1793, in Aspinall, A., op cit, Vol.2 82-4, 86-9; Fortescue, JW. op cit, Vol.4 p127-132.
The Retreat from Dunkirk
Battle of Tourcoing and Recall
Battle of Linselles: 18 August 1793
Footnotes
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