Reception, Equipment, and Training
by Major A. W. Field
RECEPTION AND EQUIPMENTWhether they were enthusiastic volunteers or reluctant conscripts, for those that arrived at the depots there is no doubt that a nightmare was about to begin. Their reception took place in even worse conditions than those called up in 1813. Like the latter, assembled by an NCO at the principle town of the department, they were taken to a regimental depot, and from there by forced marches to the towns and villages near the front. They were most likely dressed as they left home; in
peasant blouses, round hat and sabots, as many of the
depots had no uniforms and in some cases not even arms for
them. Sometimes they got second hand uniforms from
various sources just behind the front: if they were lucky they
may get a greatcoat (capote), a shako and an ammunition
pouch, but many went into action with just a forage cap, belt
and cartridge box. Many contemporary accounts verify this
situation: DeSegur reports that the 113th Line at
Champaubert 'was composed of new recruits, their uniform
consisted of a grey greatcoat and a bonnet de police.'
[7]
On 27 Jan, La Hamelinaye's division of the Paris Reserve
was sent to defend Troyes even though it was still awaiting
ammunition and 'the rest of its arms'.
[8]
General Freval who commanded the cavalry depot at
Versailles reported, "There has just arrived here a squadron
of light cavalry who are deficient of everything except
waistcoats and breeches". [9]
Even the Guard did not escape these shortages; on the
6th Feb, Napoleon wrote to General Ornano who commanded
the Depot of the Guard: "There should be plenty of muskets
and cartridge pouches. There are enough shakos in Faris.
You will have to scratch for the rest... under present
conditions you can dress a soldier with a shako, greatcoat
and pouch". [10]
Napoleon ordered the National Guard to be dressed in the
greatcoats and shakos of allied prisoners but it transpired
that these were unwearable due to the vermin!
[11]
But if only two out of three had any uniform the most
critical deficiency was in arms. The poorly maintained
muskets of the National Guard had already been called in and
after the need to reequip a huge army in 1813, the production
of muskets could not Keep pace with demand. In the depot
of the I st Military District there were 9,135 men and only
6,350 muskets, in the 16th, 15,789 men and only 9,470
muskets. In some of the formed regiments the shortages were
even worse; the 153rd Line Regiment boasted 1,088 men and
only 142 muskets and the 115th Line, 2,344 men and 289
muskets. [12]
To what extent these deficiencies were made good
during the war it is impossible to say but after French
victories special attention was given to collecting the
muskets from the battlefield and prisoners.
The cavalry too suffered severe shortages. The
dragoons had been stripped of their muskets to supply the
infantry and all were short of sabres; the 17th Dragoons had
349 men with only 187 sabres and the 8th Cuirassiers 92 sabres for
154 men. [13] Not surprisingly the cavalry were also
desperately short of horses; General Freval's
report quoted above goes on to say that he
has 6,284 horses for 9,786 men. [14]
This shortage also meant that cavalrymen at the front
were unable to find remounts when their horses were lost for
any reason: the Regimental History of the Carabiniers tells of
80 dismounted troopers who were sent back to Liege to find
horses. Finding none there they were sent first to Namour,
where they met the rest of the regiment. They followed them
to Rhiems from where they were sent back to the Verseilles
depot before finally being remounted. [15] What a waste of trained
manpower.
A veteran grenadier recalled from Spain breifs two Marie-Louises.
These two conscripts are comparatively well equipped compared to many of
their contemporaries.
Proficiency at drill was immensely important on the
Napoleonic battlefield. It gave the troops the confidence and
tactical flexibility which distinguished good troops and
allowed them to manoeuvre quickly, a telling advantage
during a battle. However, to acquire this skill required one
vital commodity which was not available to Napoleon in
1814; time. Napier estimated that it took three years to make
infantry completely disciplined - as opposed to just fit to
take the field which may take only a few weeks, [16] and Napoleon considered a soldier
trained after two months campaigning.
The Emperor's greatest victories were won after a
concentrated period of training in Boulogne whilst awaiting
the invasion of England. He was never again to have such a
long period of peace in which to train his troops.
Consequently, from the time that La Grande Armee
marched off towards Ulm and its subsequent run of victories,
them in close order, guided by veteran NCOs. [17]
This situation is amply illustrated in this passage from Houssaye, describing a moment in
the battle of Craorme: "The conscripts were already much shaken and would have broken on
the slightest provocation. The general did not even dare to deploy his division, but kept his battalions in mass under the close fire of the Russian guns. The young soldiers behaved better than could be expected but they lost terribly; the 14th Voltigeurs lost 30 of their 33 officers and the regiment was mown down like a field of corn." [18]
As if the inability of the conscripts to maneuvre in formation was not bad enough, it seems that in some cases even the most rudimentary aspects of training had been ignored: seeing a conscript standing inactive under Russian musketry at Champaubert on the 10th Feb 1814, Marshal Marmont asked him why he did not fire back; the young man replied that he did not know how to load his musket! [19]
Another conscript approached his lieutenant and said, "sir, you have been at this a long
time. Take my musket and fire it and I will pass you the cartridges. [20] Given such episodes it is no surprise that the tactical employment of such troops was limited.
In the absence of a good proportion of veterans in a unit to help to guide and educate the conscripts there was a vital need for an experienced and professional cadre of officers and NCOs. Inevitably however, just as the previous years had seen the destruction of the veterans so they had seen the decimation of the existing cadres, Napoleon had struggled with a desperate shortage of these invaluable men as he raised his new army in 1813, and as he had been forced to scrape the barrel then, so the cupboard was now virtually bare. The more inexperienced and poorly trained the troops, so it is even more important to have strong cadres. Therefore the burden of training and leading green troops fell even harder on those available and demanded even more sacrifices, particularly in battle. Napoleon was therefore forced to depend on older men, reservists or volunteers and even mutilated veterans who controlled the drafting of the
troops, and one armed pensioners from Les Invalides.
To replace losses retired officers had to be recalled,
and many old NCOs, most of them illiterate, were promoted
to sub-lieutenant. Napoleon wrote to Clarke (the Minister for
War): "I am told that there are between 700 and 800
individuals in Les Invalides whose disabilities are slight and
would serve again with good grace. If this is true they would
form an admirable source of junior officers." [21]
Bouvier-Destouches, ex-lieutenant of the mounted
Guard Grenadiers had lost most of his fingers in Russia but
had the stump of one hand fitted with a hook to hold his
reins, the other with a strap to hold his sabre and was
wounded twice more at Craonne! [22]
To graphically illustrate the state the army was in we
need only return to the gallant 113th Line at Champaubert.
De Segur tells us that they had hardly any commanders or
cadre and when Marmont inspected them, seeing most of
their platoons without officers, he demanded of one of the
conscripts where was their lieutenant, "our lieutenant?"
replied a weak voice, "but we never had one", "and your
sergeant?" replied the Marshal, once more the sergeant?" replied the Marshal, once more the same voice, "but it is the same, we fear nothing, we are finel" [23] Although this story may have been somewhat romanticised the point is well made.
The large number of conscripts incorporated into the
cavalry presented even more of a problem than in the
infantry. Cavalry troopers required far more training than the
infantry before they were fit to take the field. One French
expert, admittedly overstating his case, declared in 1793 that
cavalry needed three or four years of drill before they could
be risked in action, whereas infantry recruits could take their
place after only six weeks providing they were mixed with
veterans. [24]
There were several reasons for this; a cavalry trooper
had to learn not only how to look after himself and perform
the intricacies of mounted drill amid the noise and confusion
of the battlefield but also how to ride and care for his mount.
By this time in the wars around 80% of recruits had never
ridden a horse and complicating the situation was the acute
shortage of trained horses. Most had previously come from
Germany but now of course this source had dried up. So
although there were many tough old cavalrymen to meet the
invasion - the Guard cavalry, the now veteran survivors of
the campaign in Germany and the magnificent dragoon
regiments recalled from Spain, there were also raw base
mounted on whatever horses could be found, and these
were gathered up into provisional regiments as their
depots got them more, or less uniformed and equipped. In
August 1813, General Lauriston describing this type of
cavalry, wrote to Berthier; "These young men are well
intentioned but so inexperienced that they are always
defeated because they fall off their horses." [25] In 1814 the situation
would have been no better.
Pajol's command at Montereau consisted of such
troops; "many men and horses had not been with the army
more than 15 days, Not only were the riders incapable of
handling the horses and weapons properly, but even with
reins in one hand and their sabres in the other, some needed
both hands to turn their horses left or right. [26]
General Delort who commanded one of Pajol's
brigades commented that "only a madman would order me to
charge with such troops." [27] However, At Montereau, the order was given and
ironically it was Pajol' charge which turned the Wurttemberg
defeat into a rout despite charging "like a herd of stampeding
cattle." [28] after the
battle Pajol's ADC admitted that "veteran cavalry on well
trained horses could never have done so well."
[29]
Given the poor quality of the infantry the importance
of a strong artillery was well understood by Napoleon. He
was careful to build up a strong Guard artillery and they were
to play a pivotal role in most of his victories. At least in this
area there were less problems; there remained a large pool of
trained officers and there were a number of sources from
which the army could draw trained artillerists. Technical
training was only required by a small number of each crew,
the majority of whom were mere labourers to manhandle the
gun and carry ammunition.
Generally there was not a shortage of guns but a full
divisional compliment was rarely achieved and there was
often a logistical nightmare of supplying a number of
different calibres in a single battery. Lack of trained
horseflesh to draw the guns and supporting caissons and
wagons was more of a problem and this was exacerbated by
the poor weather, the terrible mud through which the guns
had to be drawn on this campaign and the shortage of
trained drivers who really knew how to care for the horses.
'Ces Pauvres Enfants': Napoleon's Marie-Louises Of 1814 by Major A. W. Field
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