'Ces Pauvres Enfants'

Napoleon's Marie-Louises Of 1814

Reception, Equipment, and Training

by Major A. W. Field


RECEPTION AND EQUIPMENT

Whether they were enthusiastic volunteers or reluctant conscripts, for those that arrived at the depots there is no doubt that a nightmare was about to begin. Their reception took place in even worse conditions than those called up in 1813. Like the latter, assembled by an NCO at the principle town of the department, they were taken to a regimental depot, and from there by forced marches to the towns and villages near the front.

They were most likely dressed as they left home; in peasant blouses, round hat and sabots, as many of the depots had no uniforms and in some cases not even arms for them. Sometimes they got second hand uniforms from various sources just behind the front: if they were lucky they may get a greatcoat (capote), a shako and an ammunition pouch, but many went into action with just a forage cap, belt and cartridge box. Many contemporary accounts verify this situation: DeSegur reports that the 113th Line at Champaubert 'was composed of new recruits, their uniform consisted of a grey greatcoat and a bonnet de police.' [7]

On 27 Jan, La Hamelinaye's division of the Paris Reserve was sent to defend Troyes even though it was still awaiting ammunition and 'the rest of its arms'. [8]

General Freval who commanded the cavalry depot at Versailles reported, "There has just arrived here a squadron of light cavalry who are deficient of everything except waistcoats and breeches". [9]

Even the Guard did not escape these shortages; on the 6th Feb, Napoleon wrote to General Ornano who commanded the Depot of the Guard: "There should be plenty of muskets and cartridge pouches. There are enough shakos in Faris. You will have to scratch for the rest... under present conditions you can dress a soldier with a shako, greatcoat and pouch". [10] Napoleon ordered the National Guard to be dressed in the greatcoats and shakos of allied prisoners but it transpired that these were unwearable due to the vermin! [11]

But if only two out of three had any uniform the most critical deficiency was in arms. The poorly maintained muskets of the National Guard had already been called in and after the need to reequip a huge army in 1813, the production of muskets could not Keep pace with demand. In the depot of the I st Military District there were 9,135 men and only 6,350 muskets, in the 16th, 15,789 men and only 9,470 muskets. In some of the formed regiments the shortages were even worse; the 153rd Line Regiment boasted 1,088 men and only 142 muskets and the 115th Line, 2,344 men and 289 muskets. [12]

To what extent these deficiencies were made good during the war it is impossible to say but after French victories special attention was given to collecting the muskets from the battlefield and prisoners.

The cavalry too suffered severe shortages. The dragoons had been stripped of their muskets to supply the infantry and all were short of sabres; the 17th Dragoons had 349 men with only 187 sabres and the 8th Cuirassiers 92 sabres for 154 men. [13] Not surprisingly the cavalry were also desperately short of horses; General Freval's report quoted above goes on to say that he has 6,284 horses for 9,786 men. [14]

This shortage also meant that cavalrymen at the front were unable to find remounts when their horses were lost for any reason: the Regimental History of the Carabiniers tells of 80 dismounted troopers who were sent back to Liege to find horses. Finding none there they were sent first to Namour, where they met the rest of the regiment. They followed them to Rhiems from where they were sent back to the Verseilles depot before finally being remounted. [15] What a waste of trained manpower.

TRAINING

A veteran grenadier recalled from Spain breifs two Marie-Louises. These two conscripts are comparatively well equipped compared to many of their contemporaries.

Proficiency at drill was immensely important on the Napoleonic battlefield. It gave the troops the confidence and tactical flexibility which distinguished good troops and allowed them to manoeuvre quickly, a telling advantage during a battle. However, to acquire this skill required one vital commodity which was not available to Napoleon in 1814; time. Napier estimated that it took three years to make infantry completely disciplined - as opposed to just fit to take the field which may take only a few weeks, [16] and Napoleon considered a soldier trained after two months campaigning.

The Emperor's greatest victories were won after a concentrated period of training in Boulogne whilst awaiting the invasion of England. He was never again to have such a long period of peace in which to train his troops.

Consequently, from the time that La Grande Armee marched off towards Ulm and its subsequent run of victories, them in close order, guided by veteran NCOs. [17]

This situation is amply illustrated in this passage from Houssaye, describing a moment in the battle of Craorme: "The conscripts were already much shaken and would have broken on the slightest provocation. The general did not even dare to deploy his division, but kept his battalions in mass under the close fire of the Russian guns. The young soldiers behaved better than could be expected but they lost terribly; the 14th Voltigeurs lost 30 of their 33 officers and the regiment was mown down like a field of corn." [18]

As if the inability of the conscripts to maneuvre in formation was not bad enough, it seems that in some cases even the most rudimentary aspects of training had been ignored: seeing a conscript standing inactive under Russian musketry at Champaubert on the 10th Feb 1814, Marshal Marmont asked him why he did not fire back; the young man replied that he did not know how to load his musket! [19]

Another conscript approached his lieutenant and said, "sir, you have been at this a long time. Take my musket and fire it and I will pass you the cartridges. [20] Given such episodes it is no surprise that the tactical employment of such troops was limited.

In the absence of a good proportion of veterans in a unit to help to guide and educate the conscripts there was a vital need for an experienced and professional cadre of officers and NCOs. Inevitably however, just as the previous years had seen the destruction of the veterans so they had seen the decimation of the existing cadres, Napoleon had struggled with a desperate shortage of these invaluable men as he raised his new army in 1813, and as he had been forced to scrape the barrel then, so the cupboard was now virtually bare. The more inexperienced and poorly trained the troops, so it is even more important to have strong cadres. Therefore the burden of training and leading green troops fell even harder on those available and demanded even more sacrifices, particularly in battle. Napoleon was therefore forced to depend on older men, reservists or volunteers and even mutilated veterans who controlled the drafting of the troops, and one armed pensioners from Les Invalides.

To replace losses retired officers had to be recalled, and many old NCOs, most of them illiterate, were promoted to sub-lieutenant. Napoleon wrote to Clarke (the Minister for War): "I am told that there are between 700 and 800 individuals in Les Invalides whose disabilities are slight and would serve again with good grace. If this is true they would form an admirable source of junior officers." [21]

Bouvier-Destouches, ex-lieutenant of the mounted Guard Grenadiers had lost most of his fingers in Russia but had the stump of one hand fitted with a hook to hold his reins, the other with a strap to hold his sabre and was wounded twice more at Craonne! [22]

To graphically illustrate the state the army was in we need only return to the gallant 113th Line at Champaubert. De Segur tells us that they had hardly any commanders or cadre and when Marmont inspected them, seeing most of their platoons without officers, he demanded of one of the conscripts where was their lieutenant, "our lieutenant?" replied a weak voice, "but we never had one", "and your sergeant?" replied the Marshal, once more the sergeant?" replied the Marshal, once more the same voice, "but it is the same, we fear nothing, we are finel" [23] Although this story may have been somewhat romanticised the point is well made.

The large number of conscripts incorporated into the cavalry presented even more of a problem than in the infantry. Cavalry troopers required far more training than the infantry before they were fit to take the field. One French expert, admittedly overstating his case, declared in 1793 that cavalry needed three or four years of drill before they could be risked in action, whereas infantry recruits could take their place after only six weeks providing they were mixed with veterans. [24]

There were several reasons for this; a cavalry trooper had to learn not only how to look after himself and perform the intricacies of mounted drill amid the noise and confusion of the battlefield but also how to ride and care for his mount. By this time in the wars around 80% of recruits had never ridden a horse and complicating the situation was the acute shortage of trained horses. Most had previously come from Germany but now of course this source had dried up. So although there were many tough old cavalrymen to meet the invasion - the Guard cavalry, the now veteran survivors of the campaign in Germany and the magnificent dragoon regiments recalled from Spain, there were also raw base mounted on whatever horses could be found, and these were gathered up into provisional regiments as their depots got them more, or less uniformed and equipped. In August 1813, General Lauriston describing this type of cavalry, wrote to Berthier; "These young men are well intentioned but so inexperienced that they are always defeated because they fall off their horses." [25] In 1814 the situation would have been no better.

Pajol's command at Montereau consisted of such troops; "many men and horses had not been with the army more than 15 days, Not only were the riders incapable of handling the horses and weapons properly, but even with reins in one hand and their sabres in the other, some needed both hands to turn their horses left or right. [26]

General Delort who commanded one of Pajol's brigades commented that "only a madman would order me to charge with such troops." [27] However, At Montereau, the order was given and ironically it was Pajol' charge which turned the Wurttemberg defeat into a rout despite charging "like a herd of stampeding cattle." [28] after the battle Pajol's ADC admitted that "veteran cavalry on well trained horses could never have done so well." [29]

Given the poor quality of the infantry the importance of a strong artillery was well understood by Napoleon. He was careful to build up a strong Guard artillery and they were to play a pivotal role in most of his victories. At least in this area there were less problems; there remained a large pool of trained officers and there were a number of sources from which the army could draw trained artillerists. Technical training was only required by a small number of each crew, the majority of whom were mere labourers to manhandle the gun and carry ammunition.

Generally there was not a shortage of guns but a full divisional compliment was rarely achieved and there was often a logistical nightmare of supplying a number of different calibres in a single battery. Lack of trained horseflesh to draw the guns and supporting caissons and wagons was more of a problem and this was exacerbated by the poor weather, the terrible mud through which the guns had to be drawn on this campaign and the shortage of trained drivers who really knew how to care for the horses.

'Ces Pauvres Enfants': Napoleon's Marie-Louises Of 1814 by Major A. W. Field


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