INTRODUCTION
In the two years prior to 1814, in the terrible retreat from
Russia and the debacle of the Campaign in Germany, the
Grande Armee had suffered catastrophic losses. The energy
and singlemindedness that Napoleon had shown in raising a
new Grande Armee after Russia had been nothing short of
miraculous. For the Campaign in Germany he fielded an army
of well over 400,000 men, which despite its losses in the
battles that led up to the Armistice in June 1813, numbered
over 437,000 men by mid August.
Despite their impressive numbers however, a large
proportion of these troops were hastily trained and often
poorly led conscripts, many called up before their due date.
The cataclysmic defeat at Leipzig and the subsequent retreat
to France saw this army reduced to just 74,800 effectives - a
loss of 83% in only 90 days.
[2]
As 1814 approached, Napoleon once again faced the
prospect of raising a new army to face the 250,000 largely
veteran allied troops which were massing on France's
Northern borders. These had another 150,000
echelonedbehind them! Napoleon had already gone some
way to exhausting France's manpower pool the previous
year, including the call-up of 90,000 men who would not
have been eligible until 1814: he had therefore already
started mortgaging France's future resources.
The thousands of immature teenagers who were hastily
called to the Eagles were to be known as Marie-
Louises and by their courage and fortitude were to earn
themselves a glorious chapter in France's military history.
The aim of this article is to examine the raising,
training and performance of these young men and also
perhaps to expose a few myths which have grown up around
them.
The Revolution had seen France become the first
modern army to introduce universal military service; the
famous Levee en Masse. This was enshrined in
Jourdan's Conscription Laws of 1798 on which were based
the Imperial Legislation of following years. Under these laws
all men between the ages of 18 and 40 were expected to
register, and those between 18 and 25 (subsequently 30)
were liable for call-up by the drawing of lots until sufficient
men were found. Conscription was to be limited to unmarried
men and childless widowers. The total manpower available
each year was known as a 'class' of that particular year. In
1805 Napoleon secured for himself the power to fix the
proportion of each class that was to be called to the Eagles.
This allowed him to call-up men not only from the due
class, but also those before their due date and to draw
repeatedly on those classes who had already contributed to
the army. It is no surprise that after Napoleon's great
victories of 1805-7, military service became increasingly
unpopular and the numbers of 'refractaires' (those
deliberately avoiding service) rose steeply.
It must be pointed out however, that even during the
punishing drafts of 1813 and 1814 the number of men
actually serving did not exceed 41 % of the eligible male
population. [2]
The. conditions governing the drawing of lots, which
took place in each commune, was strictly laid down in
legislation. It must have been an atmospheric event filled
with tension and a certain amount of nervous excitement.
Families would accompany the prospective conscripts, all no
doubt praying to avoid the call-up. The draw would be
administered by local officials and supervised by gendarmes
and military recruiting officers. A numbered ballot for each
eligible man was placed into an urn and each potential recruit
drew one. If the man was not present then the Mayor drew for
him. The drawn number was announced by the subprefect
and the higher the number the better the conscript's chance
of not being included in the number of recruits that the
commune was required to furnish.
Those who were unlucky enough to draw a low
number were then given a rudimentary medical. If they
passed this and were over 1.54m they were fit to serve. A
conscript declared fit to serve could only escape officially by
paying a substitute. This could be a very costly affair, the
price varying between regions and the military situation from
year to year. A formal contract was drawn up between the
parties and the cost, generally between 1,500 and 4,000
Francs, was often paid in installments. if the substitute was
killed then the conscript had only 14 days in which to find
another. In the later years of the wars it is no surprise to find
that the pool of potential substitutes was ever diminishing
and the price beyond the means of many peasants.
There were of course a number of illegal ways of
avoiding service; the two most common were desertion and
self-mutilation. Unsurprisingly, absconding became more
prevalent as the wars went on; sometimes individuals were
hidden by family or friends from the gendarmes whose
responsibility it was to round them up. However, as the
number of 'refractaires' grew, so they formed bands who
lived in the forests or mountains, turned to robbery to
survive and encouraged others to join them rather than
serve. Selfmutilation included the amputation of fingers or
thumbs so individuals were unable to hold a musket or the
breaking of the front teeth so they were unable to tear open
a cartridge.
In order to concentrate wholly on military operations
whilst he was on campaign in Germany in 1813, Napoleon
entrusted the government of France to his wife, the young
Marie-Louise, assisted by a Council of Regency directed by
Cambaceres. The Decree calling the new conscripts to the
Eagles was therefore signed by her and it is for this reason
that these young soldiers were known as Marie-Louises.
From early in October 1813 (even before Leipzig)
Napoleon issued a series of Senatus Consulte calling for the
raising of new conscripts. If these had all been reallsed they
would have produced 936,000 men under arms. However,
there would prove to be only sufficient time, political will and
equipment to deploy between 120 and 175,000 men to the
various armies before the war ended in April the following
year.
The first levy in Autumn 1813 called for 160,000 men
from the classes of 1808-14: ironically 184,000 reported! The
second levy called for 150,000 from the class of 1815 (ie 18
year olds). This levy also met little resistance except in the
more Royalist departments where it was not pushed too
hard. Anyway, by this time the administrative services,
recruiting stations, clothing factories and arsenals were
unable to cope with the influx of such numbers. Even this
levy did not all find its way to the front before the fighting
was over.
However, Napoleon then called for a third levy of
300,000 men, these were to come from the classes of 1800-07
for the second time, 1808, 1813 and 1814 for the third time
and 1809-12 for the fourth time! It is hardly surprising that
this final levy met substantial resistance from all parts of the
country as it forced some areas to conscript supporters of
families and even some married men. It is reported that only
some 63,000, of the 300,000 called for, actually reported and it
is doubtful if any of these had been processed before
Napoleon's abdication. As if this was not enough, married
and older men were still liable for service with the National
Guard, although this organisation experienced even more
problems in equipping and training the few men that answered the call.
The Allied invasion of France in 1814 struck terror
into the hearts of the French, but initially at least there
seemed little public will to resist. The nation was clearly
weary of war and wished for peace. However, this apathy,
particularly, in the districts which were occupied or directly
threatened by the invasion, was quick to be dispelled as
stories of the behaviour of the Allied armies began to circulate.
The poor discipline of the allied troops, however
understandable, motivated the populace into action.
Regrettably for Napoleon, this spontaneous reaction of the
occupied areas came too late: the damage done by the initial
apathy, particularly the reaction to the punishing levies,
could not be repaired in time.
After the general compliance of the early drafts,
public feeling against those that followed became
increasingly aggressive. Many officials put off as long as
possible the enforcement of the conscription and when put
under pressure carried it out without energy. In some
departments the drawing of lots was the signal for a riot and
in Toulouse a notice appeared threatening to hang the first
man who came forward to draw his number.
No one seemed willing to serve and the later
conscriptions made slow progress. The registers proved
faulty and out of date and despite the gendarmes, bailiffs and
mobile columns, the numbers of defaulters and deserters
rapidly increased. The forests filled with those avoiding the
draft and bands of up to a thousand young men formed in
various departments. These were able to arm themselves and
there were skirmishes with the local troops and gendarmes. A
detachment of conscripts from the Lower Seine started from
there 177 strong but arrived at the training depot with only
35. [4]
It seemed that the only ones who stayed with the later
drafts were those who had either not dared or been able to
follow the deserters. Substitutes became beyond the means
of all but the well-off and almost impossible to find even if the money was available.
Stories began to circulate; a detachment of infantry
crossing the bridge over the Gironde at Bordeaux had
thrown their arms into the river, others said "at the first shot
we shall go over to the enemy"
[5]
But most of these type of stories are unsubstantiated
and were probably spread by Royalists who became more
overt in their opposition to Napoleon. Not everyone was
against the Emperor; whilst the upper classes blamed him for
not making peace, many of the working classes still
supported him and did not necessarily blame him for the war.
To many of them he still seemed invincible, despite his
defeats.
In his book The Campaigns of Napoleon
David Chandler claims that "mere boys of 15 or 16 found
themselves carrying muskets". Records show that no one
from the classes of 1816 or 17 were called up so it is unlikely
that anyone of this age was serving against his will.
However, it is possible that boys of that age volunteered for
service, particularly from those departments that had been
ravaged and occupied, or threatened by the allies. Napoleon
also called up for service some of the Pupilles; made
up from the orphans of soldiers killed on campaign these
were brought up in a military environment, well trained and
probably had more combat value, than many of the older
conscripts. Only the depot battalion with the youngest
Pupilles--13 to 16 years--was in Paris when the Allies
attacked the capital, Marshal Moncey found these
youngsters reluctant to stop fighting and even when
ordered to withdraw they cried "just one more shot."
[6]
However unwilling the conscripts were when they drew
their number or left their family behind, there can be little
doubt from the reports on their performance that for many
their, attitude changed as time went by. Many were from
small,, forgotten, dirty villages and bleak city slums, Illiterate
and completely ignorant of the world. They had been
poor, ill-fed on little but bread and potatoes, and
overworked at monotonous, sometimes dangerous work. So,
despite the lack of equipment, food and training, the
appalling weather and the rigours of campaign, each step
away from their previous life and closer to the nervous
excitement of action, the need to protect La Patrie,
the comradeship of a shared, adventure land the magic of
the Emperor, combined to generate a courage and motivation
that no one, except perhaps Napoleon, could have
reasonably expected.
From all this evidence it is clear that the levies made
for the campaign in France were extremely unpopular and
widely evaded, particularly later on. But we must be wary of
tarring all the conscripts with the same brush, for many of
them fought with outstanding fortitude and courage in the
most trying of conditions.
'Ces Pauvres Enfants': Napoleon's Marie-Louises Of 1814 by Major A. W. Field
CONSCRIPTION IN THE FRENCH ARMY
THE CONSCRIPTION OF LATE 1813 AND 1814
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