We will now examine Wellington's comments and compare them with the observations of the Prussian positions and topography made above. According to De Ros, Wellington told him that he found the Prussians 'drawn up on the slope of the ground with their advanced columns close down to the rivulet of Ligny.' From the examination of the Prussian positions above, we have seen that only about 8,500 men were in such a position. One might think that Wellington was referring only to those men, but his conversation with De Ros continued with the statement, 'the exposure of the advanced columns and, indeed, of the whole army (my emphasis) to cannonade, standing as they did displayed to the aim of the enemy's fire, was not prudent.'

Thus, Wellington would appear to be claiming that all of the 60,000 men he could observe were exposed to artillery fire. We have established that this was certainly not the case. Pirch I's Corps was not, the troops in Brye were not, parts of Pirch II's Brigade was not. We have also established that Wellington knew this not to be the case.

The Duke's apparent criticism continued, 'I said that if I were in Blucher's place with English troops, I should withdraw all the columns I saw scattered about in front, and get more of the troops under shelter of the rising ground.'

Now if Wellington had have given that advice and Blacher had have taken it, what would have been the result? Blficher would have withdrawn those battalions of Steinmetz's Brigade deployed to support the occupiers of St. Amand to somewhere further to the rear of the Prussian positions. How could St. Amand then have been reinforced in sufficient time and how could any French breakout from that village have been contained rapidly? The same applies to those troops drawn up in support of the occupiers of Ligny. Moving them further to the rear would reduce the chances of successful local counter-attacks and allow the French to establish themselves in that vital village. Take Ligny and the battle would have been won. If Wellington had indeed given the advice to the Prussians, that he claimed he did, would it have been good advice?

Tall Tale and Clues

It is evident that Wellington was telling De Ros a tall story here. Note in his second sentence, Wellington states that the Prussians were 'seven miles to our left from Quatre-Bras.' Note at the end of his statement he said, 'I myself could distinguish with my glass from Quatre Bras a general charge of the French cavalry on their confused columns, in which charge it was that Blucher was ridden over and near killed.'

The clues are there. There is no way Wellington could see a distance of seven miles with his glass. That was simply not possible. Moreover, there were several lines of hills between Quatre Bras and Ligny. How could Wellington have seen through these hills? As he certainly could not observe events at Ligny with his glass, he was clearly telling De Ros a tall story on this point at least.

How much of his account can thus be relied upon? Wellington was known for his sarcasm and ironic sense of humour. [6] Was he was pulling De Ros' leg here?

It is interesting to note that Wellington's claim to have witnessed the moment of the Prussian defeat at Ligny. This conflicts with the accounts of FitzRoy Somerset, Muffling and indeed the Duke's own records. Until around 7 p.m., the Prussians had been sending reports of the situation at Ligny to Wellington hourly. [7] The final despatch arrived at Quatre Bras at 8.30 p.m. [8] This report indicated that the Prussians were holding their positions, and believed they would do so for the remainder of that day. [9] After having retired to Genappe for the night, small parties of Prussian soldiers were seen crossing nearby fields, but this was not taken as indicating a defeat. [10] Wellington then issued orders for the 2nd Division and Reserve Artillery to move to Quatre Bras that day. [11] Would he have done so if he really had observed the Prussians at the moment of their defeat? Wellington's own records show that he favoured an offensive for the morning of 17 June 1815. [12] Indeed, he was reportedly shocked when the news of the Prussian defeat finally arrived in his headquarters. [13] As Wellington clearly did not observe the Prussian defeat at Ligny as he claimed, then how reliable is any part of the story that Wellington told De Ros?

It is interesting to note that Wellington mentioned Hardinge as a witness to the conversation noted by Stanhope and examined above. Hardinge did indeed claim to have heard such comments from Wellington. However, Hardinge was not the only Englishman present at the meeting at Brye being discussed here. FitzRoy Somerset was as well. As we have seen, his account of the meeting does not correspond with that given by Wellington to De Ros. [14] The Duke did not mention his participation in the meeting.

More Were the Prussian Positions at Ligny Exposed

Introduction
The Sombreffe Position
Wellington and the Windmill at Bussy
De Ros
Stanhope
Ellesmere
Conclusions
Large Ligny Map (extremely slow: 472K)
Jumbo Ligny Map (monstously slow: 1.42Mb!)