The Myth

This particular myth was briefly examined in my recent publication 1815: The Waterloo Campaign: Wellington, his German Allies, and the Battles of Ligny and Quatre Bras, published by Greenhill Books. Limitations of space prevented me from going into the issue in more detail there. This essay elaborates.

There are three accounts of Wellington criticizing Prussian positions at Ligny that I have located. The first, printed in Maxwell's Life of Wellingion, originates from notes left by William, 20th Baron de Ros, of conversations with the Duke between 1836 and 1840. [1]

The second is dated 26 October 1837 and originates from notes left by the fifth Earl of Stanhope. [2]. The third comes from the Earl of Ellesmere's correspondence and is dated 25 September 1851. [3]

It should be pointed out that Wellington seemed unaware that his conversation partners were making notes of their friendly chats. However, as an experienced politician, the Duke was likely to have anticipated that his stories would be repeated. After all, the dates indicate Wellington made his comments on three separate occasions over a period of over 10 years. There can be little doubt he wanted this story to become common knowledge.

De Ros' Account

'On the morning of the 16th I (Wellington) left Brusselss and rode forward about five miles beyond Quatre Bras to see the Prince of Orange's outposts. After that, I went over to the Prussians about seven miles to our left from Quatre-Bras, and found them drawn up on the slope of the ground with their advanced columns close down to the rivulet of Ligny, the banks of which were so marshy that the French could only cross it at the bridges of three or four villages that lie along its course. I told the Prussian officers, in presence of Hardinge (Wellington's liaison officer in Blucher's headquarters), that, according to my judgement, the exposure of the advanced columns and, indeed, of the whole army to cannonade, standing as they did displayed to the aim of enemy's fire, was not prudent. The marshy banks of the stream made it out of their power to cross and attack the French, while the latter, on the other hand, though they could not attack them, had it in their power to cannonade them, and shatter them to pieces, after which they might fall upon them by the bridges at the villages. I said that if I were in Bluchers place with English troops, I should withdraw all the columns I saw scattered about in front, and get more of the troops under shelter of the rising ground. However, they seemed to think they knew best, so I came away very shortly. It all fell out exactly as I had feared, and the French overwhlmed them, as they stood, by a prodigious fire of artillery, and I myself could distinguish with my glass from Quatre Bras a general charge of the French cavalry on their confused columns, in which charge it was that Blucher was ridden over and near killed.'

Stanhope's Account 

Stanhope records a conversation between Hardinge and Wellington that took place in his presence. It reads: 'When you (Wellington) had examined the Prussian position, I remember you much disapproved of it and said to me, "If they fight here they will be damnably mauled."

I (Wellington) told them so myself, but of course in different terms. I said to them, "Everybody knows their army best, but if I should fight with mine, I should expect to be beat."

Turning to me (Stanhope), and marking the back of one hand with fingers of the other, he added: "They were dotted in this way--all their bodies along the slope of the hill, so that no cannon ball missed its effect upon them; they had undertaken to defend two villages that were too far off, only within reach of cannon shot. Now here is a general rule: Never attempt to defend a village that is not within reach of musketry.

It was just that way the French lost the battle of Blenheim. They sent troops into places beyond the reach of musketry, and then couldn't get them back again."'

Ellesmere's Account

'It is true that I (Wellington) went to the Moulin de Bry and saw the Prussian army formed to receive battle. My obervation was, "We each of us know our own army best. I should have not formed mine in this defensive position as yours is, I should have held them further back and would have thus protected them from the effect of the French artillery. Gneisenau made me an angry answer -- I believe, that the Prussians liked to see the enemy! We saw in the evening what passed on the Prussian field of battle -- the failure of the charge of cavalry made by Blucher.'

Damning Charges by Wellington

Wellington's charges are damning. It would seem that at the meeting at the Bussy windmill at Brye, he advised the Prussians against fighting in this position, that he criticised their deployment and that they took no notice of this. However, other than Wellington and Hardinge, apparently no body else at this meeting noted such comments as having been made. FitzRoy Somerset, Wellington's military secretary did not, the Bavarian Thurn und Taxis did not, the Hanoverian Dornberg did not, and nor did Prussian officers present.

Conversely, in the conversations noted by De Ros, Ellesmere, and Stanhope, neither Wellington nor Hardige made any mention whatsoever of the main topic discussed at this meeting, namely when and how Wellington was going to support the Prussians that day at Ligny. Before and during this meeting, Wellington made promises of support he either could not or would not keep. He did not mention that to De Ros, Ellesmere, or Stanhope. My recently published book contains a fuller account of the meeting.

More Were the Prussian Positions at Ligny Exposed

Introduction
The Sombreffe Position
Wellington and the Windmill at Bussy
De Ros
Stanhope
Ellesmere
Conclusions
Large Ligny Map (extremely slow: 472K)
Jumbo Ligny Map (monstously slow: 1.42Mb!)