Hohenzollern's lead hussar patrols found Hausen to be occupied by French infantry, with small detachments in the woods above. The Austrian was cautious, fearing that he was facing a large enemy force in unknown terrain. He halted on the ridge between Thann and Hausen to the east of Buch. hearing cannonfire in the direction of Schneidhart, Hohenzollern's chief of staff advised that they should leave the Abbach route and march to the assistance of 4th Korps. Hohenzollern resolved that the best way to ease any pressure on Rosenberg was to continue on the assumption that Davout would keep to the Abensberg road if attacked by two separate columns.

Hohenzollern ordered FML Lusignan to take Hausen while Vukassovich led the 2nd battalion of the Peterwardeiner Grenzers into the Ammerholz towards Roith. The I st battalion of the Archduke Charles Legion would follow later. At 10.30 a.m., Kayser's brigade pushed the enemy skirmishers from Hausen up the slope past Saaldorf to the woods, and Lusignan took a squadron of the 3rd Archduke Ferdinand Hussars scouting u the road. Meanwhile, Vukassovich pushed some French patrols back through the Ammerholz.

Lusignan moved the skirmishing platoons from Kayser's brigade up the road and through the woods on either side. meeting no resistance he continued to the Buchberg. Gudin's division, following Morand, had already passed through Teugen, and his rear units detached a few companies of skirmishers. A fierce firefight developed on the Teugen slopes as the Peterwardeiners came through the Ammerholz in support of the line skirmishers. Troops from the third rank of Kayser's line battalions had been extracted and formed into platoons - each of around 27 men in two ranks - in support of the actual skirmishers drawn from the flank company platoons.

Each battalion's 60 to 80 skirmishers were at six-pace intervals in two lines, supported by three formed platoons at a hundred paces to their rear. Six formed platoons were formed a further hundred paces back. The French skirmishers succeeded in driving their less flexible Austrian opponents to the southern slopes of the Buchberg before the supports arrived.

At 11 a.m., Saint Hilaire arrived at Teugen and prepared for action. The 10 Legere at the head had only just passed through Teugen when strong Austrian detachments came down from the south and forced Davout to throw the next unit, the 3 Ligne, up the road to the Buchberg slopes straight from a column of march and in considerable disorder. The French, exhausted by their sudden climb, were sent back down the slopes by the Austrian platoons brought up on to the Buchberg, and by the skirmishers in the woods on the flank. Saint Hilaire formed his remaining forces on the slopes north of Teugen and rallied the 3rd halfway down the Buchberg.

The 'Terrible' 57 Ligne was next to arrive. These magnificent veterans marched coolly up the road with their right on the end of the tongue of wood on the Buchberg and deployed on the crest. During this manoeuvre they were enfilacled by Austrian fire from further up the hill to their right, and taken in front by Kayser's brigade battery based on the Hausnerberg. Kayser led some squadrons of hussars forward but the terrain was not to their liking and they were repulsed as the 57e advanced. Schr^der's and Collereclo's regiments, supported by eight guns, forced the 57e back from the Hausnerberg and counterattacked.

Davout had meanwhile ridden to Post Saal with the intention of moving Morand and Gudin. They had been redirected along the Fecking stream towards Hohenzollern's vulnerable left flank at Hausen when the fighting began with Rosenberg's advance guard at 9 a.m. Saint Hilaire interrupted with a message that he was under heavy pressure and, leaving matters to Morand, Davout returned to Teugen. He arrived and halted Petit's brigade as it marched from Saalhaupt after falling back on Friant, ordering him to support Saint Hilaire by an attack on Kayser's right.

French General Advance

The French began a general advance. The 10 Legere tackled the main body of the Peterwardeiners in the northern Ammerholz. At the same time a battalion of the 3 Ligne moved towards Roith and then turned into the tongue of wood on the Buchlberg, capturing some detachments of grenzers. The 57e, with the other two battalions of the 3e on their right, again advanced towards the Hausnerberg with the 72 and 105 Ligne in support. Petit weakly supported the advance by attacking Kayser's right with elements of the 12 and 21 Ligne and the skirmishers of the 33 Ligne. As Kayser fell back, unobserved elements of the 10 Legere came through the Ammerholz towards the left of the Hausnerberg and surprised the brigade battery, capturing a gun as it withdrew.

Friant's division began to close up and prevented any possibility that Rosenberg's advance guard commander GM Stutterheim would move by Saalhaupt to aid Hohenzollern. Stutterheim had a battalion of grenzers, three squadrons of the Vincent Chevauxlegers and a 3 pounder battery. He had been ordered towards Abbach but his tired and detachment weakened grenzers had encountered impenetrable French skirmishing. The cavalry and artillery had failed to negotiate the appalling tracks in the forest. At 9 a.m. he had engaged Gudin's advance guard under Petit in the wood east of Schneichart. This he had beaten back with his DeutschBanat Grenz, supported by the light guns, but the voltigeurs eventually forced him back and he was ordered to halt. Stutterheim was able to hold up some of Friant's troops, delaying the French attack on Hohenzollern's right.

He was also able to pursue Petit back on Friant who in turn was forced to leave the first two battalions of the 15 Legere, three voltigeur companies and the 1st Battalion and four companies of the 108 Ligne before he continued to the south from Saalhaupt. A battalion of the 111 Ligne was also left behind to defend he divisional park at Saalhaupt. The 33 Ligne and six guns went into battle order to the east of Teugen and voltigeurs were sent into the woods towards the road. Following a brief firefight, Petit reformed his battalions at Saalhaupt and marched to Teugen, being stopped by Davout as previously noted The rest of the 108e and 111 e were placed in reserve under Grandeau to the east of Teugen.

Rosenberg, on Hohenzollern's right, had been ordered to attack the woods north of Hellring while Charles halted on the Grub Heights with the grenadiers. With around 15,000 men against Montbrun's 2,900 cavalry and 2,000 infantry, he had deployed to the south-west of Dinzling at 10.30 a.m. Scouts reported a large enemy force and thus he detached six battalions. Montbrun, fearing he would be cut off from Friant, stormed the wooded heights. Artillery forced the French back to the woods but they continued to threaten Rosenberg's left flank. This fighting would last until evening when Montbrun retired relatively unmolested. In this way an entire Korps, the main attack column, was wasted against a mere flank guard, unable to help Hohenzollern by occupying Friant.

Hohenzollern still wished to march through Teugen but had had to remain with the main body at Hausen. He was thus unable to follow up Lusignan's initial success. When a request for help arrived from Lusignan, the regiments slowly formed up and marched forward on Hausen, one battalion after another. the flexible French were able to maintain local superiority and inflict heavy losses on Kayser's brigade, In confused fighting the Austrians retired into the woods lining the road. Friant placed the 1 08e in skirmish order with the 48 Ligne in front of Barbanegre, and pushed on towards Kayser's right. Five squadrons of hussars with a cavalry battery were shifted to the heights by Buch in order to meet any potential move by the French from Saal. The bulk of Hohenzollern's force remained in reserve between Thann and Hausen.

GM Alois Lichtenstein, with the Manfredini Regiment in three battalion columns in front and the Wurzburg Regiment behind, moved up too late to help as Kayser's regiments were pulling out of the woods. The thinly stretched Austrian line took position on the flatter part of the Hausen slopes and was thus vulnerable to an attack from either flank. At around I p.m. the French succeeded in bringing up their artillery which had been left near Ralisbon in error. They fired as the Manfredini Regiment approached. The 72 Ligne pushed into the woods and, from the western edge of the Emeranholz, enfiladed the columns as they came up the road and attempted to deploy. They repulsed them as they fought for the woods, Lichtenstein then held high a flag of the Wurzburg Infantry and led them to the right of the road in support. He was badly wounded as these troops went in with the bayonet against the southwest edge of the Emeranholz, and the Austrian columns fell back.

By 2 p.m. the French had about 20,000 men in the line with 5,000 more in reserve. A battery of artillery had succeeded in finding a passable track through the Emeranholz and had come up on the Austrian right flank, firing on Hohenzollern's gun line of several batteries - the bulk of his artillery - deployed in front of Hausen.

GM Moritz Lichtenstein now led the Kaunitz Regiment up the slope as the Peterwardeiners and Archduke Charles Legion came routing out down the slope to Hausen. The last intact regiment, the W,rtemburg Infantry, was then led forward to the Emeranholz by Saint Julien and GM Bieber with some success. Both Bieber and Moritz Lichtenstein were wounded in their respective attacks.

Towards 3 p.m., Hohenzollern wrote to Charles that he needed reinforcements. He then led his staff with some hussars and the columns forward again several times, but heavy enemy fire forced a withdrawal on Hausen. this was covered by the artillery on the slopes. The French were exhausted and badly mauled, and simply duelled with the Austrian artillery which retired beyond the Hausen valley near Buch. The infantry seemed content to remain in the woods. Throughout, Charles had remained at Grub with the grenadiers awaiting clarification of the fighting that he believed to be going on along the entire front. He received Hohenzollern's message and marched to Hausen with his grenadiers at 4 p.m. At 5 p.m. the Leiningen Grenadier battalion marched to the right of Hausen, but a severe storm soon brought the battle to a close as everyone sought shelter.

Towards evening, Morand's 17 Ligne moved up the Fecking on Hohenzollern's left as a diversion fro Saint Hilaire, but the guns at Buch soon had them seeking shelter in the woods, Charles issued orders for the 20 April from Hausen and then established his headquarters at Paring. French communications with Lefebvre had been fully restored via the Abensberg road, and he reported to Napoleon that at 10 p.m. he could see Davout's campfires on the Teugen-Hausen ridge. Only 2,000 men of the 65 Ligne under Baron de Coutard remained to be captured at Ratisbon, having repulsed Kollowrat's 2nd Korps early on the 19. Davout had escaped, and the Austrian army was scattered on a 50 km front with no idea of what to do next.

CONCLUSION

Why had the Austrians missed a golden opportunity to smash Davout? I would list the following reasons,:

• The march north was too slow and methodical.
• The terrain encouraged too much detaching and also created a massive 'fog of war'.
• The commanders were too cautious and insufficiently trained in the role of independent actors.
• Reconnaissance was poor to the extent that the locations of Davout's divisions were practically unknown, and many troops were misdirected due to this.
• The Korps were outside mutual supporting distance of each other. Communications were poor, resulting in Charles waiting with a decisive reserve force all day while the situation was clarified.
• The worst error was probably that the French were encouraged towards Saal without there being anything to stop them linking with the Bavarians.

The importance of the 19 April is often passed over by authors of the period in favour of the drama of Napoleon's advance and of the climactic battle of Eckmuhl in the following days. Usually, it merits a few words to the effect that Davout and his brilliant generals simply brushed the Austrians aside and linked up easily with the main French forces. There is a great deal more to it than that.

As an example, in his latest book on this campaign Robert Epstein defines the onset of 'modern warfare' as having more to do with a change in the intellectual approach to the conduct of campaign. This includes armies splitting from single entities into corps and divisions, and fighting a series of battles within the context of the plan of operations rather than one single combat deciding all.

He recognises this as a process of 'distributed manoeuvre' where decision- making is decentralised on sides, French and Austrian. He devotes a mere half- page to the battle, which is more a classic example of what he is proposing than the later battles where Charles had recentralised control,

I hope that I have clarified the possible confusions that may have arisen from reading Arnold and Petre. What I do want to emphasise is that the fighting on the Teugen-Hausen ridge occurred over the whole area, rather than just around the Hausnerberg. Arnold appears to have muddled his account and is not aided by his maps, although many of the details are in essence correct.

Even 'Krieg' requires some interpretation. Unfortunately, we will probably never have perfect knowledge of this battle due to the nature of the terrain.

More Battle of Teugen-Hausen 19 April 1809

Introduction and Background
Preparation for Battle
The Battle of Teugen-Hausen
Order of Battle
The Wargame