Introduction and Background

Those of you who read Richard Partridge's "The Battle of Alcaniz" in AON No. 16 will be aware that he promised to publish the sequel and has asked me to make good the promise.

At right, Suchet

After the wounded Suchet rallied his demoralised troops, following their unexpected defeat, he retreated to Zaragoza and set about rebuilding discipline. The alarm which caused the earlier panic was, apparently, the fault of a single individual whom Suchet had shot. [1]

Blake, meanwhile, was being feted: he received an estate from the Supreme Junta, the command of Murcia and the promise of substantial reinforcements.

Being extremely deficient in reliable cavalry (a fate which dogged virtually every Spanish army in the War) Blake was disinclined to pursue Suchet, who still had an effective mounted force, into the plains. Instead, the former waited his reinforcement and determined on a period of manoeuvre against Zaragoza. The obvious route to the city, which had withstood one of the bloodiest and most prolonged sieges in history, was by way of the main road close to the Ebro river. The popularly-perceived nature of Spanish general officers of this period would suggest that this would be the route for Blake to take, with all the trumpeted bravura that seemed to accompany Spanish strategic design. It would almost certainly have lead to the inevitable defeat, at the gates of Zaragoza, that usually accompanied such events.

Blake, with commendable, although unusual, circumspection, eschewed the opportunity for fleeting glory and moved his army (now numbering some 25,000 of all arms) by a mountain road to Belchite, where he arrived on June 12.

The French, now with their discipline thoroughly restored, realised Blake's intentions. For Suchet to lose possession of Zaragoza - which had cost so much to seize -- was unthinkable; not least because the new commander was anxious to avoid this humiliation so early in his fledgling career. Indeed, defeat and the loss of Zaragoza might have led to the ignominious departure from Spain of King Joseph himself. [2]

Suchet sent urgent despatches to the King requesting reinforcements (his troops numbered a little over 10,000) and, whilst awaiting a response, concentrated most of his army in and around the city. The exception was a small detachment (two battalions under Gen. Fabre at La Muela) which was intended to prevent insurgents from cutting the road to Tudela.

The reply which Suchet received from King Joseph was far from encouraging. French forces were spread very thinly and only two regiments (six battalions) could be spared. These would be drawn from the 3rd Corps (on "loan" to Gen. Kellermann) and ordered to force march on Zaragoza. These 3,000 men might well not arrive in time to affect the outcome if Blake attacked. Certainly, Suchet was not in a position to take the offensive himself -- he was still not sufficiently confident that his troops would not repeat their Alcaniz performance, particularly in the light of Blake's enhanced numbers.

Blake now seemed to abandon the careful and sound attitude to the campaign that he had shown since Alcaniz. Dividing his army, he sent Areizaga with 6,500 men, including about one-third of the available cavalry, to Bottorita whilst Blake, himself, attempted to cut-off and capture Fabre's detachment. [3]

In this he was unsuccessful but hoped that these two battalions, which retired to Plasencia, would not be immediately available to Suchet. Areizaga, meanwhile, captured a French supply train on its way to Zaragoza. Returning to the main objective (forcing Suchet to quit Zaragoza to meet the threat which the Spanish army posed), Blake pushed on to the village of Maria, about twelve miles from Zaragoza but in the plain between the mountains and the Ebro. In addition to taking up this somewhat exposed position, he had allowed a quarter of his army to remain six or seven miles away, with a river (the Huerba) between the two bodies.

The arrival of the Spanish so close to Zaragoza forced Suchet's hand. The surrounding population were roused and there were rumours of a renewed insurrection within the walls of the city itself. His options were limited: he must go out to meet Blake and either cause that General to retire or to beat him in an action.

On 14 June, Suchet rode out from Zaragoza, leaving one battalion of 400 effectives (121e Ligne) and his sapper companies to guard the city.

He had reports that Colonel Robert with his 3,000 reinforcements had passed Tudela, a day or so's march away, so he would be something over half the enemy's strength once these units arrived. During the day, Musnier's division attacked and forced back the Spanish vanguard brigade under Creagh but, on meeting Blake's main body, Musnier retired.

With about 5,000 sick and detached troops, Blake had a total of something over 20,000 present under arms in his three divisions. After the experience at Alcaniz, it is possible that Blake, wishing directly to threaten Zaragoza, considered Areizaga's location, at Bottorita, of crucial importance in achieving that end. Even without that division, the remaining two mustered about 14,000 and the French had already been defeated with worse odds than that.

Whatever his thoughts, Blake failed to call-in Areizaga. Suchet recognised the threat that the smaller Spanish force posed to the city, if left unattended, and so had to detail part of his own force to watch it. Gen. Laval was given the task, with just 2,000 infantry (44e Ligne and 3e de la Vistule were stationed on the Monte Torrero, about a mile or two outside Zaragoza [4]). These arrangements left Suchet with 8,300 with which to force Blake's 14,000 to give up the campaign.

Some good news reached the French during the morning of the 15th. Robert had made better progress than expected and would arrive at Suchet's HQ by noon. This gave the French commander the final nudge needed to take the offensive. The Spanish position was to the left of the Maria-Zaragoza road which ran beside the Huerba river. They occupied two parallel ridges, one behind the other, comprised of rolling hills opposite the village of Cadrete. Roca's division, with Creagh's Vanguard brigade [5], formed the first line with the Spanish cavalry, under O'Donnell, straddling the road on the far right of the line and off the ridge itself.

The second line was on the rear-most of the two ridges and comprised the division of the Marquis of Lazan. The artillery was placed in the intervals of the first line, except for a half-battery which remained with two battalions acting as a reserve just before Maria. It is impossible to determine, from the details avaiable to me, the identities of these reserve battalions or the divisions from which they were drawn, although it is possible that at least one was from Areizaga's division since Darbishire's map in Oman (Vol. II facing p.426) suggests there was one more battalion in place than the order of battle (Ibid. Appendix IXA p644) lists for the two divisions present in line. (Also, the map suggests there were artillery pieces in the second line as well as the first).

The position was a poor one. The ravines in front of and behind each Spanish line were deep and steep, making manoeuvre problematic, especially in the case of defeat; such an eventuality would also give Blake a problem reuniting with Areizaga, there being only the single bridge in front of Cadrete on his extreme right. [6] Obviously the Spanish commander would have been thinking, positively, of a victory but, had proper military prudence of the type he showed earlier prevailed, he would surely have brought Areizaga in and sought ground with less risk attached.

On the far side of the ravine immediately in front of Roca's position, was yet another of the series of ridges (in reality, spurs of the Sierra de la Muela) and it was this ridge that was occupied by Musnier's division, to form the French right and centre. Habert's (substituting for the detached Laval) infantry formed the extreme left. This single line represented the entire French force -- the artillery being in the intervals except for the cavalry and two battalions of infantry (5e Leger & 64e Ligne, detached from 5 Corps, the latter being Suchet's personal escort).

Of the cavalry, one squadron of Lanciers de la Vistule [7] covered the Army's extreme right flank, whilst the rest, commanded by Wathier, formed-up behind Habert. The two infantry battalions acted as a small reserve and were stationed about a half-mile in the rear of the French centre.

In general, the French position was on a lower elevation than that of the Spanish. Suchet's HQ was in the Abbey of Santa Fe on the left bank of the Huerba and about a mile in the rear.

Since he had inferior numbers and awaited the arrival of Robert, Suchet was not particularly keen to attack Blake and, in his turn, Blake preferred the tactical defensive r6le even whilst adopting the strategic offensive. There is not inconsiderable evidence from his record that Blake had a reasonably thorough appreciation of the nature of the Spanish army of the early 19th Century and more than a passing grasp of military practice. His approach, therefore, was an eminently sensible one. Thus, in the morning, very little happened.

Towards noon, however, the Spanish decided to attempt provoking the French into an attack. What Oman describes as a "...cloud of skirmishers..." was "...sent against Habert's front..." [8]

In theory, these probably comprised one battalion of 2o Cazadores de Valencia, being the only unit in Creagh's Vanguard trained to light infantry tactics, although it is possible that the two line battalions contributed their "sharpshooters" (eight men per battalion [9] under the pre-1809 regulations) which would not have had a significant effect on numbers! Oman goes on to say that the cloud "...grew so thick and pushed so far forward, that at last the whole (of Habert's 2000 strong) brigade was seriously engaged..." which suggests that the entire battalion was involved -- perhaps even the second battalion from Lazan's division joined in. Eventually, Habert was forced to open with artillery case shot on the skirmishers to force their retirement.

Since Blake had failed to nudge Suchet into aggressive action in this area, he decided to force a conclusion himself by launching his left wing in a flanking attack on Musnier's extreme right.

The time was between one and two p.m. and a result was required if Blake's designs were not to be tharted. On sighting the Spanish battalions making their way down the sides of their ridge, into the ravine, Suchet issued orders for the lancers to prepare to charge into their flank and for Musnier's infantry to make a frontal attack. Part of the 114e Ligne together with some detached voltigeurs made the attack and this combined-arms assault was enough to turn the Spanish and force their retreat whence they came.

Whilst this retrograde movement was occuring, Suchet received news that Robert was expected by four p.m., having already reached and passed Zaragoza. Additionally, Fabre's two battalions had rejoined. [10]

This so encouraged the French commander that he immediately went over to the offensive, launching the eight battalions of the 2nd Division in a storming attack at about three in the afternoon. Roca had no time fully to reorganise his line and was in danger of being caught disordered. However, his troops, together with some battalions from Lazan's division, managed to hold the French at many places along the line and, in some, to beat them back with losses. Oman reports that the 115e Ligne got into severe difficulties and Suchet had to call forward the 64e Ligne from his reserve and one of Habert's regiments (2e de la Vistule) to support them.

At this point, what might be termed a "British experience" occurred. There was a violent hail storm (cf. The Battle of Albuera 23 May, 1811 et al.) and the two contesting sides were unable even to see each other for about half an hour. During the storm, a courier arrived with a message that Robert had reported his arrival at the Abbey of Santa Fe.

Immediately, Suchet sent instructions for Habert's so-far unengaged battalions (three, in all) to attack Blake's right, in the fields near the Huerba river, and for the cavalry to support them.

The effect of the French musketry (and probably artillery fire) was sufficient to unsettle the Spanish cavalry and the right-most infantry battalions to the point where, when the French cuirassiers and hussars charged, the Spanish horse did not even wait to contest matters. This was not the first and would not be the last time that Spanish cavalry precipitated disaster by failing to maintain support for their infantry.

Off they rode, leaving Roca's infantry battalions plus one or two of Lazan's more advanced units, open to the horrors of a flanking cavalry charge -- once again a similarity to Albuera, with a cavalry flank charge following a storm.

It is doubtful that many units would have had time to form squares and the slaughter and rout was complete near the river. As a result, the road and river-crossing to Ariezaga's division was compromised, there only remained open country for a retreat - and that cut up by ravines -- presenting a daunting prospect and one impossible for artillery to contemplate.

Blake, however, was not finished. He ordered Roca to refuse what remained of his right flank and brought up the remains of Lazan's battalions to mount a fighting retreat which lasted in good order until darkness prevented the French from pursuit. Blake crossed the Huerba under cover of darkness and rejoined Areizaga. All but two of his artillery pieces were left behind and the half battery left with his reserve infantry were captured by the French cavalry whilst in pursuit of their opposite numbers.

Only three Spanish standards were taken by Suchet's victorious army a tribute to the Spaniards' steadiness in retiring. Von Brandt, an officer serving with the Vistular Legion, remarked that they left the field "in perfect order and with a good military bearing".

So ended the "return match". Not a total disaster -- that was to follow at Belchite on 18 June 1809, when Blake inexplicably turned again to face Suchet and was totally routed. Indeed, the Spanish army (with the notable exception of one arm) and Blake himself had cause to hold their heads high and, had the commander observed one or two classic military axioms, the outcome could well have returned Zaragoza to Spanish control with all the attendant humiliation to France.

Most of his errors are, with hindsight and the benefit of an academic standpoint, easy to identify and counter. Had he called Areizaga across the Huerba as soon as he had decided to give battle (or, better still, not split his army in the first place), 6,500 reinforcements -- according to Oman "the best troops in his Army" would have marched across the Huerba to the total discomfiture of Suchet's counter attack. Had he chosen the much stronger ground that he later took at Belchite and inveigled the French to attack him, he should have prevailed.

Had he strengthened the area between the river and the hills with earthworks, containing artillery and protected infantry - cf Talavera de la Reina 28 July 1809 -- (there was probably sufficient time on the 14th), Wathier could not have delivered his fateful charge. The two infantry battalions and half-battery held in reserve would probably have been better utilised at the front, in this region. There was little or no prospect, given the strength of Suchet's force, of the Spanish rear being unthreatened and we have already commented on the futility of the single road for a retreat - the reserve would have given it better security prospects if located forward in prepared positions.

Battle of Maria 15 June, 1809

Introduction and Background
Orders of Battle and Large Map (61K)
Wargaming the Battle of Maria and Footnotes