Spanish Translation by Juan L. Sanchez Martin in Dragona Magazine, April 1993 issue.
English Translation (using Micro Tak Spanish Assistant) by Paul R. Petri

The Armies Deploy for Battle

In order to adjust to the intention of Marshal Traun of attacking the right wing of the Spanish, the Army should displace from the Grassland of Livelli to the zone that meets to the east of the highway of Camposanto to San Felice. Certainly much time was necessary in order to execute the movement in a terrain rolling and uneven; nevertheless, it is strange that keeping in mind the brevity of the days in the month of February if you have not begun before 10 in the morning, you will be losing two or three hours of daylight.

It was due to the distribution of the bread and, fundamenlally, by the fact that Traun awaited the heavy artillery from Mirandola, which seems not to have been sent by San Felice but by the direction of the deployment position, in the first moment, towards the direction of the camp, probably for reasons of safely.

Departing at 6:30 AM in the morning from Mirandola it could not arrive beforc 9:30 in the morning since in order to arrive they had to cover 12kms., partly by good highway, 3 hours were specified; this explains the late time of the departure.

Before putting this in progress, Marshal Traun gathered together the generals and superior officers in front of the Piccolomini Regiment and stated to them his plan of attack. He would pass the time by keeping the attention of the enemy by means of a diversion before the left wing of the Spanish, while the principal attack would then ensue against the right wing. The Army should separate by the left in order to permit the progress of the cavalry until the Panaro; that is to say, upon the flank and the back of the enemy.

The diversion detachment was formed by the Partisan and 100 hussars, which advanced immediately against the left wing of the Spanish. Received fire from artillery, they reached a position of waiting on the Panaro, outside of the range of the enemy pieces [15].

Meantime, the Army was started toward the left, by two columns with the cavalry at the head, skirting the creek. The march proceeded slowly. Numerous pits and some forest made obstacles to the advance, also further complicated by having to be attentive to combat at any moment and in a closed formation.

The cavalry, which marched at the head, didn't arrive at the two bridges near Gorzano until noon: the bridges were used in order to cross the Dogaro, which receives its name from the course of the creek from Gorzano at the head. Once joined on the other side, revolving again by the left once the infantry appeared along the creek. Marshal Traun ordered the deployment of the Army, which was found not more than 1,700 meters from the enemy.

The Army spread the cavalry between the highway from San Felice to Camposanto, so that the right wing arrived almost on the highway from San Felice to Solara. The first line advanced to the right in order to permit enough space for the second line in order to spread parallel to the river [16].

The Army formed into two lines. On the right was the infantry and on the left the principal body of the cavalry; in each case the Austrians occupied the position of honor, to the right of the Sardinians.

The first line of the infantry was formed by 10 battalions of Austrians and 4 battalions of Sardinians [17]. Those on the front of the first line had been distributed 16 pieces of artillery and two howitzers, in 5 batteries [18]. Four mixed squadrons formed a third line within the wing right [19].

The 4 pieces of 12 pounders were upon the highway of Camposanto. The flanks of the second lines were covered each by one battalion of Eslavones and 200 Eslavones horse (Note: also called Maroses upon coming from the region of Maros, in Hungary); the left flank was reinforced also by 200 soldiers' from the heavy cavalry contingent.

On the left the Cavalry was distributed in two lines, one by the Austrian regiments and the other by the Sardinians [20]. The force of this cavalry, in total, 12 Austrian squadrons and 4 Sardinian, [21] no horses had been deployed on the right wing and they were united by 300 hussars de Havor with the infantry, distributed between the flanks opposite the left wing.

Being necessary more than an hour and a half for the Army to complete this deployment [22] and even this still didn't meet the conditions which Marshal Traun wished to get opposite the enemy. In order to arrive appropriately opposite the right wing of the Spanish and envelope it with the Cavalry, it was necessary to stray while in progress bending to the left, a quite complicated movement because of the rigidity of the formation and the difficulties of the ground traversed by numerous ditches.

In the night of the 7 to 8, the Spanish had provided an abatis before their left wing, which closed the embankment and the distance realized between that and the village occupied by the "Parma" Brigade, who took the positions from the Grenadier Brigade. Also the two French companies which met on the bank of the Panaro occupied some houses from which it was possible to take in either flank any enemy which would attack against the abatis.

In the morning, Lieutenant General Gages scarcely knew of the imminence of the attack, he gathered the pieces of artillery in three balteries, each one of two pieces of 8 pounders: one was located opposite the Spanish Guard, on the wing right; another on the highway from San Felice and the third, of a lesser size (? Translator) was placed before the Guard Valona (Walloon Trans.).

The Spanish did not quickly realize that against the lcft wing there proceeded only a weak force, while the principal nucleus was stalioned, as well, to the left. As a caution, Lieutenanl General Gages did not deduce precisely that the attack would ensue against his right wing. Yet he did not take any measure and only toward noon, having lost sight of the enemy Army which was not on level ground, but was repeatedly furrowed with ditches and dikes, he sent a group to explore toward San Felice, probably the French company of hussars. The detachment discovered the Austro-Sardinians at the moment in which they began the deployment, a report that induced Lieutenant General Gages to introduce an alteration on the disposition of his threatened right wing.

The Regiment of Dragoons de La Reina passed the first line, between the two regiments of Cavalry and the line of Cavalry was fallen behind in order to form a barrier on the right, by the rearguard. However, this as such didn't cover the zone to the river entirely, the Infantry Regiment de La Reina passed the second line on the extreme right of the Cavalry. The grenadiers of the Regiment occupied an abatis of a great extension in front of the river.

The battalions of the second line were displaced right, behind the cavalry, in order to pass by the position in case of necessity. The second battalion of Guadalajara received the order of incorporating with the right wing of the Spanish Guard, where it filled the line between the squadron of Cuirassiers de La Reina, probably in order to close a short interval between the infantry and the cavalry. It is of noting that the report says that this battalion being transferred to the left wing of the cavalry and not to the right of the infantry, circumstance owed to the precedence of the Spanish Guard; that is to say, to the duty of occupying the right wing. In order to observe this exactly, the Guadalajara battalion remained some paces behind the first line.

Toward 2 in the afternoon, relying on the pointed alterations, the Spanish deployment formed an arch around the location of Camposanto, with the two wings supported by the river and an extension to the front, approximately, 2,500 meters. Formed in the first line, including the Parma Brigade, 26 battalions and 12 squadrons; behind the right wing, in reserve, forming the second line, were 4 battalions of the Ireland Brigade and 3 battalions of the Reina Brigade: in total, 7 battalions and the French company of hussars.

Outside of the right wing, the Migueletes had been dispersed among some houses by the edge of the Panaro. The French, Italian and Albanian Companies were on the right edge of the river.

With a glance at the plan, you've seen that the situation of the Spanish was quite precarious. If the enemy succeeded in penetrating at any point, a catastrophe would inevitable result. In such a case, in the short space of land behind the Spanish position there could not be formed a second line of resistance, it could be foreseen that only a minimal portion of the troops would succeed in crossing the bridges. With a little luck, the Austro-Sardinians Army could secure a total success because, although inferior numerically, all their force could be converged in only one point.

Footnotes

[15] The plan of Stockel, seconded in this by Browne and Schels, it says that the demonstrative group was formed by the Partisans, the Croats, 4 pieces of artillery, 100 hussars and 4 mixed squadrons of cavalry, and that they were sent against the Spanish lefl wing after joining the Army in the battle. As soon as it concerns to the composition of the detachment, it calls attention quickly that in that time there were no Croats in the Army; apart from this, it seems probable that the heavy pieces of artillery could follow the advance of the troops on that land as it was a little swampy. In all the rest of the plans of battle, this encounter is close or, on the highway from San Felice to Camposanto; according to some, guarded by a picket of Eslavones (erroneously of Croats, according to Stockel). Like the allotment of the heavy artillery it seems probable enough, since the movements were easier on the highway and, from there, it could fire efficiently against the left wing of the Spanish. As for the advance of the Partisans, he would have responded very little to the intention of the opponent, having taken place after the ultimate deployment of the Army. Given the scarce conformity of the plan with the land, Stockel could not represent another to form the advance group of the diversion; also, he was quite incorrectly informed on the movements of the Army. The "Austrian Sketch from a report withoul addressee and without date" it puts the one which cannot win the situation without the group of diversion to relieve the right wing of Traun engaged on the Panaro. The Italian report says that, to the right, the land was very bad and that is why there was only sent 4 squadrons, from the reserve, and 300 horses. The letter of Anonimo, belonging to the Staff of Traun, to his uncle is expressed in the clearest manner: "our light cavalry (a part of the same, like it is inferred of the one which follows) it separated from us and it executed, with the partisans, a false attack against the enemy left: the intent produced good effect, and it would have been greater if it employed a stronger detachment to deal with them." It is of noting that the order of battle sent by Marshal Traun to the Gran Duque, like another order of battle that is in the "Kriegsarchiv" it marks all the troops that formed the line, excluding only the Partisans and the picket of hussars, confirming that these had already been sent ahead. Finally, the Spanish declaration that their artillery opened fire against the left at 8 o'clock in thc morning supports the statement that the demonstrative group indeed advances in the morning and doesn't participate in the useless march before the enemy front, incompatible with the mission that had been given them.
[16] It is not easy to indicate the localization of the deployment with base plans available of the battle. Stockel makes progression of the Army further on the Reggiana and it deployed to the right of the appropriate highway from Finale to Modena. Like it has been demonstrated previously, this highway coincides with the one from Vallicella, distant some 3,500 meters trom the Panero; that is to say, some 3 km. from the Spanish posilions. Given the course of the events, it result to first view improbable that the deployment is executed so far from the enemy, given that a little later the advance against him was begun and was opened with fire from cannon, whose reach does not overcome the 1,000 to 1,200 melers from the heavy pieces which were minor in the campaign. The Austro-Sardinians, therefore, should not have deployed more than 1,200 meters trom the enemy. According to Sure, the Austro-Sardinians would have marched almost 3/4 of an Italian mile and they would have deployed some 1,400 meters from the Spanish; according to a second plan that is in the "Kriegsarchiv," the distance would have been 1,800 paces or 1,350 meters. Lieutenant General Gages relates that the Austro-Sardinian deployed from the Spanish (1,544 meters), the same figure that is in the Italian report without addressee and without date. All these elements seems to indicate the course of the Dogaro, that meets at 1,700 meters before the Spanish lines. Calculating 300 meters for the necessary space between two 200 meter lines, the deployment of the first there would be a distance of 1,400 to 1,500 meters from the enemy. Stockel says that they had crossed a course of water, called the pit or canal of Reggiana, and they remember that it flows parallel to a highway from Finale, that would correspond to the highway from Gorzano because the highway that comes from San Felice is indeed the great provincial highway that goes from Modena to Finale by Bomporto and Soles. In the remainder of the plan there does not exist a canal or course of water between the Austro-Sardinians and the Spanish; also, it could be deduce that the referred bridges were that of Gorzano. Stockel represents something to the Army deploying at a greater distance which separated it from the Spanish. With 250 men per battalion in the Austrian half of the force and 450 in the Sardinian, with 100 horses per squadron, with a formation of 3 lines for the infantry and two in the cavalry, the first line (10 Austrian battalions, 4 Sardinian and 9 squadrons) could not extend more than 1,700 meters. If Stockel has reproduced exactly the distances of the true field of battle, the deployment should effect to not more than 1,700 meters from the enemy.
[17] Anonimo in the letter to his uncle reports the deployment of the infantry in a different form to the order of battle that is found in the "Kriegsarchiv," that it is the following: first line, 9 Austrian battalions and 5 Sardinian; second line, 6 Austrian and 3 Sardinian. None of the plans and orders of battle coincide with this data.
[18] Stockel and the French Captain are adrnitting that the Austro-Sardinians provided 18 pieces of Artillery and 4 siege guns. A second plan published in Milan by Marcantonio dal Re, the pieces of artillery were divide into 3 Austrian and 2 Sardinian. Although in the order of battle sent to the Gran Duque 5 batteries are marked, Anonimo's letter says that they had 6 pieces of artillery, 2 howitzers and 4 of siege pieces, and the 10 Sardinians: total in all, 22 pieces.
[19] These squadrons had been formed with elements taken out of all the regiments of cavalry; to the scene with the company of Austrian Carabinier, a 100 men with the commandant, and with a squadron taken out of each of the Sardinian regiments. Stockel marks these 4 squadrons which integrated with the demonstrative group. In the rest of the plans and enclosed orders of battle sent to the Gran Duque and of the "Kriegsarchiv," these squadrons are include within the right wing, generally indicated as "reserves."
[20] The Cuirassiers de Miglio in the first and Berlichingin in the second. Reference of the Sardinian regiments, the available references agree. Stockel and one of the orders of battle of the "Kriegsarchiv" they put the Dragoons de la Reina in the first line; on the other hand, Sure and the order of battle sent to the Gran Duque has them located in the second line, incorporating the Cuirassiers de Savoya in the first. According to their precedent, this last should have the position of honor: therefore, in the first line.
[21] Sure marks one of the Sardinian regiments with 2 squadrons and the other with 3. In other orders of battle they appear with 2 squadrons, sometimes with 3. Indeed each regiment had 4 squadrons, one of which was sent behind the right wing in a cavalry reserve. It also is probable that Traun had designated one, and probably two Sardinian squadrons (200 soldiers of heavy cavalry) towards the Sardinian infantry on the left wing. The Spanish ascend the force of the left wing of cavalry to 19 squadrons, a figure that should be exact. It serves each other merely of knowing if the 300 hussars de Havor formed one, two or three squadrons; the purpose of which, they would return the Sardinian 4,5, or 6 squadrons.
[22] In the correspondence attributed to Marshal Traun, published in Arvers, the deployment would have finished at 2. According to the majority of the information at this hour the artillery fire would have begun, that according to Colonel Sure was at 1:30P.M. in the afternoon. Included Gages affirms in his story that he advanced on the enemy at 1:30. From the beginning we could conclude that the deployment terminated at 1:30P.M.

The Battle of Camposanto

Author's Note
The Battle of Camposanto: Passage of the Panaro
The Battle of Camposanto: Spanish Operations at the Panaro
The Battle of Camposanto: The Armies Deploy for Battle
Petri: Some Observations on What Happened So Far
Order of Battle
Additional Notes