Spanish Translation by Juan L. Sanchez Martin in Dragona Magazine, April 1993 issue.
English Translation (using Micro Tak Spanish Assistant) by Paul R. Petri

The Operations of the Spanish on the Left Bank of the Panaro

The morning of February 4, Gages sends in the companies of hussars and Migueletes toward Finale and Bondeno; the cavalry, which went ahead toward San Felice, under the orders of Lieutenant Generals Macdonald and Atrisco, who were sent to Solara. This vanguard, formed by the Cuirassiers de Reina, had an encounter with some hussars and Croats which had become concentrated in some houses in Solara. There followed a brief battle in the which thc Austrians were evicted, suffering 20 dead and 12 prisoners.

Through the interrogation of these prisoners, Lieutenant General Atrisco discovered that a strong enemy cotingent was in Bompono. Atrisco communicated this information quickly to the commander of the Army because, at noon of February 4, Lieutenant General Gages withdrew the army from the camp of Camposanto and made itis march along the Panaro, after leaving nearly 600 men to guard thc bridges.

Past Solares, Gages gives the order to occupy a close camp by San Michele, where they will rest until the morning of February 5, after a march of 5 kilometers.

On the morning of the 5, Gages sends Lieutenant General Beaufort and the Marshals of Field Jauche and Torre, with all the grenadiers and pickets of cavalry: nearly 3,000 men in total towards Bomporto. Beaufort found the position of the Austro-Sardinians very strong; one subgroup from the cuirassiers of Miglio, who had deserted from the positions of the vanguard, informed him that the whole Austro-Sardinian Army had gathered (less two regiments of Sardinian cavalry) and awaited the attack of the enemy. The Spanish vanguard interchanged fire of musketry with the forward positions, the school of the Jesuitas, which is located 500 meters from the position on the Panaro, this exchange of fire continues until well in the advance of the afternoon, but the prospect of an attack by Traun never took place.

Gages, in view of the concentration effected by the enemy, gives up the undertaking and on the morning of February 6 returns with his force to Camposanto, now with the intention of beginning the retreat to Bolania [8].

Marshal Traun sent after the Spanish some hussars and 150 Eslavones, which stayed at a good distance froni the enemy. The Austrian light troops, only when a portion of the Spanish force moved back against them, lost a captain, three men, and 13 wounded.

The Spanish detachment sent to the valley rejoined with the Army at Camposanto. This detachment had succeeded in carrying off some boats, carts of provisions, baggage and complete uniforms for one regiment of infantry, probably destined for the troops quartered in Finale. The new uniforms and the 2,000 sacks of flour were received with great happiness; the remainder were burnt.

The Spanish officers were a little surprised when the retreat was begun to Solara; but their surprise grew great when, in the afternoon they received the order to return to the Panaro. The baggage should reach the right bank that same night: in the morning the artillery and troops should pass, each one by one of the bridges. They didn't succeed in understanding the reason for this operation, very painful because of the cold, which would have the same result as a small march towards the left bank of the river.

Although the baggage was not indispensable, it had been sent on to Bolonia and Imola, but still many vehicles followed the Army; also, it had been necessary to requisition other carts in order to transport the spoils obtained in Finale, which greatly augmented the baggage park and whose drivers fulfilled the duty that had been imposed on them, even though it was quite wrong that they earned this task.

Faulty dispositions, the falling darkness, the precipitation that accompanies every movement of withdrawing, especially in the baggage, this departure caused a general disorder. Each one wanted to pass through the first bridge; the road became saturated with disabled carts. In the morning of February 7 only a minimal portion of the vehicles had reached the right bank; the two bridges were completely obstruct by a myriad of carts which had collided or had broken down. The majority of the carriages were still on the left bank.

Meantime, Lieutenant General Gages was aware that the AustroSardinians werc advancing. This report, comes from some informants, and was confirmed by 6 Sardinians of the infantry Regiment of Saboya, which had been captured around midnight of the 6. These soldiers formcd part of the enemy vanguard and admitted thal all their Army camped near Solara.

At 3 AM, Lieutenant General Gages ordered the Army to form into order of battle and reinforce the position, since it could not avoid by a rapid march the enemy attack, due to the enormous disorder caused by the baggage. The left wing, the most exposed to the enemy attacking from Bomporto, leaned on a great village, near the river embankment or cut on the Panaro. This village is organized lor thc defense and occupied by 5 weak battalions from the "Parma" brigade. It leaned on the first line, whose field was protected by trenches and abatis.

The front of this line broke into an obtuse angle because the troops of the left wing, the Dragoon Regiment of Sagunto and the Guard Valona (or Wallons: Translator) were aligned perpendicular to the river embankment, which at that point bends to the northeast and later, in a strong arc toward the southeast, it returns to its discourse toward the east next to the principal center of Camposanto.

The right wing of the first line is formed by the "Castilla" Brigade and the Spanish Guard as well as the two regiments of cavalry became in consequence opposite the north, along the highway from Camposanto to San Felice, distanced from the houses, so that the second line can camp at a short distance from the first. Before the right wing there were some small ponds and also some houses; between these and the river, remained an open space of nearly 500 meters which they were going to defend with the Migeletes and the French Company of hussars, dispersed among the houses, near the river.

Given that it waited for the enemy from that part of Solara, and lacking in support, the left wing appeared without importance. Also, the land in that stretch was favorable to the Cavalry, most of the -9 squadrons- moved from the right wing in order to respond easily to the eventual attacks from the light troops who's intentions are to penetrate through the embankment. The French, Italian and Albanian Companies, and one company which incorporated the armed men from Cardinal Alberoni and the Constables of Bolonia, remained on the right of the Panaro at the riverbank, in order to protect the baggage.

February 7, while the Spanish attempt to repair thc disorder on the bridges, the enemy vanguard appears opposite the left wing, they then deploy into order of battle. Forming at nearly 1,000 meters distance, they remained in observation and then retire upon darkness [9].

During the night Lieutenant General De Gages kept the troops under arms. Since the Austro-Sardinians remained inactive in Solara all the morning of the 8th, Gages ordered the artillery to join the baggage at last. This orders was already followed when, toward 10 in the morning, an enemy column was sighted in progress; according to every appearance, with the intention of attacking the right wing of the Spanish. At that moment, De Gages could not anempt to pass the river with all of his Army; that is why he was compelled to remain on the field, in order to pass the river in favor of the coming darkness.

The artillery received the orders of returning back and laking their positions. A little later they have the opportunity of opening fire on the light troops as they advanced toward the Spanish positions on the left [10].

The Austro-Sardinian Offensive

Marshal Traun, who desired to force a decisive battle was already fueled from the desires of the Queen and because of the political situation created by the failures in Saboya, there remained enough disappointment when the Spanish gave up the attack toward Bomporto and they began their retreat upon Camposanto, by the evening of the 6th.

Several authors attribute the Marshal with the intention of attacking the Spanish when they passed the river, foreseeing their withdrawal across the Panaro. But on the basis of Traun's own declarations, it could be inferred that, in fact, he was thinking of two possibilities: that the Spanish, their surprise frustrated, continue the retreat or that Lieutenant General Gages makes his Modena territory permanent, reinforcing his position of Camposanto in order to await a good opportunity of attacking, maybe with the reinforcements from the auxiliary body of Neapolitans.

In this last case, Traun had decided to attack at any cost in order to refuse the Spanish further on the Panaro; on the other hand, if the enemy retired voluntarily on Bolonia, Traun would have been satistied with the success of having made a failure of the plans of the enemy and the invasion of Modena thanks to the sudden concentration of his forces. [11]

Aftcr having concluded a Council of War, toward noon of February 6, Marshal Traun decided to advance a distance in the direction of Camposanto [12], with the object of meeting the enemy as quickly as possible and taking away any forethoughts from the enemy and compel them, by this action, to make a decision.

After having sent a vanguard with part of the cavalry and all the grenadiers along the great dike which follows the highway toward Solara, the Army was started in two columns, west of the great dike.

The vanguard discovered the abandoned field that morning from the Spanish in San Michele and the advance continued until the grasslands of Livalli, where it regrouped between 5 and 6 in the afternoon. Without making it into order of battle, the troops formed opposite Camposanto, behind the creek, that flowed from this point between quite high riversides, to almost 3 kms. from the opponent. Marshal Traun established his General Quarters in Campagnola and Solara.[13]

On February 7, the Marshal formed the Army into order of battle and he ordered a reconnaissance on Camposanto by a large detachment having been formed by the pickets of the regiments of Cavalry, certain number from hussars, 100 Partisans, and the two battalions of Eslavones under the command of Colonel von Hohenau.

Hohenau found the Spanish arranged for the battle and their positions quite strong, especially to the left. It appeared to him that the enemy intended to stand firm upon the left bank of the Panaro. [14]

Receiving the report from Hohenau, Marshal Traun went in person to the position, he found the information accurate and he didn't have any doubt now that Lieutenant General Gages was not thinking of retiring on Bolonia. They had not made use of the 24 hour advantage in order to verify the dangerous crossroads from one bank to the other. Immediately, he decides to force the Spanish to fall back.

Recognizing the enemy position, he found that an attack to the nearest Spanish on the left introduced little likelihood of success, as much by the strength of the position as by the nature of the terrain that shielded it, partly swampy and furrowed by numerous ditches. On the other hand, he determined that the conditions were quite favorable on the right wing of the Spanish, which lacked extension, making possible its envelopment. Also, the land permitted the employment of his cavalry, largely superior to the enemy, the one point which made his plan almost certainly successful and it would allow an open route to the infantry, which his was weaker than the enemies.

Traun then returned to his General Quarters toward noon. Calls to Council all the generals of the Army, he questioned them whether he should attempt the attack in spite of the numerical superiority of the enemy and of the strong position in the one which was found. The Council, which owed their conviction in a courtesy toward the allied commandant essentially, declared perfectly in accordance with Traun. The Lieutenant General Aspremont welcomed the proposal from the marshal and the rest of the generals declared highly the same view. The attack being settled for the following day, the 8 of February. This postponement was necessary because the morning already was very advanced and because Marshal Traun considered imperative the cooperation from the heavy artillery in order to attack the strong Spanish position. Immediately he besought to the commander in Mirandola and he sends for use in the field of battle 4 cannons of 12 pounds and two howitzers.

The Army remained all the night under arms. Marshal Traun wrote an order for the following day overflowing with enthusiasm for the troops; everyone was encouraged of the fine spirit and they awaited the moment with impatience of dealing finally, and seriously, with the Spanish. Marshal Traun passed the night at a dance which lasted until the dawn, when the Army was started.

Footnotes

[8]The Spanish confirm this, being based on the declarations of Gages, that the arrival of the detachment from Beautort and the deployment on Camposanto did not have the purpose of drawing the Austro-Sardinians out from their positions. Pezzay rollows this version and Saluces is unable to decide if this version is true or not, or if Gages had solidified his intentions of marching on Bolonia. However, it is not doubtful that this last hypothesis is the righl guess. The Army was provided with provisions until February 9 inclusive. It was necessary to use two days to move from the Panaro to Bolonia, the march was to begin precisely at 8 in the morning, but if Gages is unable to make up his mind, as he himself admits, to retire which he evidently wanted to effect on the 7, but because of the delay on the 6, we could infer that the return to Camposanto was due, probable because it could provide food. In consequence, Gages didn't await completely in order to determine if his movements had attracted the enemy to leave their position, Gages also did not take any reconiscence measures to provide himself with information, because Gages was uncertain of Traun's whereabouts until the morning of the 6. It was only natural that Gages attempted to cover up his retirement to the Spanish Court, which were waiting for a decisive event, Gages also does not want to declare that his Army is too weak; on the other hand, he wanted to gain an apparent success in order to please the King. When the rapid concentration of the enemy deprived him of this possibility, he gave up on their idea and he only thought about gaining the sure position of Bolonia.
[9]According to the "Account from the Court of Spain" this vanguard would have retired around 2 in the afternoon. According to the "Account of Lieutenant General Gages", the enemy remained steadfast to its ground during all the morning opposite the left wing, only a rifle shot and a half away; only on the morning of the 8 was there noted a slight retreat.
[10]In the rectification to the " Account from the Court of Spain "and also in Anonimo, it was confirmed with certainty that the artillery opened fire in the early morning. Anonimo has white marks with a crack of an explosion; the "Rectification", on the other hand, has an enemy column in progress towards the left. Being that the Austro-Sardinian troops were very far out of reach from the guns, they must be only light troops that attracted the enemy fire: the Austrian detachment sent in a diversionary maneuver against the left wing.
[11] In their report of February 12, Traun does not explain clearly this reference. He would decide to attack only when the test showed that the Spanish to have intention of establishing only in Camposanto, because he wanted to obligate the enemy to cross the Panero, assuming then he didn't know the intentions of Lieutenanl General Gages of retreating to Bolonia. However, in an end repon to the Counier Council Of War, edited not before February 23, Traun didn't say a word of his intention of surrendering the pass of the river to the enemy, explaining his plans in a different manner. Thc retiring of the Spanish to Solara would not have been for him enough of a success, he for one wished to follow them until Camposanto, attack them on the 8 day and beat them. But in reality he could not have spoken of persecution since without the delays caused by the wagons, Gages would have passed the river on the morning of February 7 without being molested.
[12]In the manuscript of Browne, in the exposition to this work in Schels, finally, in the account attributed to Marshall Traun, published by Arvers, he indicated the date of the advance as February 7. But they initially oppose each other on the precise date from the "Account of Traun of February 12", the Austrian report without either address or date on the explanation of the map of the battle by Sure, according to him the army would have begun their march on the 6 day. The act becomes confirmed by the letters of Schumacher and from the lager Furriel, also in the "Account of Gages".
[13]The most numerous data on the advance is in the letter from the lager Furriel, that this reterence says the following: "Toward the 5 (it should be the 6, it will be inferred immediately in the text) we pursued the enemy Army, with 1000 horses and all the grenadiers, and we found their field, that they had abandoned with much confusion, near San Michelle. The same day continued the march toward the great grassland close to San Felice, where we arrived in thc afternoon. The remainder of the Army, that marched on the internal pan of the river embankment, met here two hours laler, al night. On the 7 remained in the same grassland."
[14] The manuscript of Browne uncovers the error of believing that the advance had been produced on February 7 and that Hohenau had made the reconnaissance at 8 in the morning. His declaration explicitly confirms the account of Anonimo, that at 8 in the morning a Austrian reconnaissance party was effected, that provoked the cannonade from the enemy artillery. Browne doesn't say anything and, in fact, the fact of Annimo doesn't offer any trust: he could have suffered a confusion between the reconnaissance at 7 and from the demonstration of the light troops, on the morning of the 8, during the flank march; so much more considering that he met the right wing of the Spanish and he was not, therefore an immediate witness. They are in opposition with their statement from the "Account of Lieutenant General Gages" and of the Court of Spain, that they speak clearly of the appearance of a strong Austrian detachment on the 7, and the plan of battle of Colonel Sure, that marks the march of these troops in front visibly and on the left nank of the Spanish, marking a note that the demonstration took place February 7. Also, the Austrian report without addressee and date reveal that February 7 a demonstration took place. All these reports say nothing of an advance of Austrian troops toward the left wing, on the morning of the 8. We admit the possibility that all Austrian Army was discovered on that day in progress towards the flank, although any information from Traun does not contain any reference: it would be necessarily confirmed that Marshal Traun allowed pass all day the 7 without doing anything and that he waited for to the morning of the 8 in order to effect the reconnaissance to support their ultimate decisions.

The Battle of Camposanto

Author's Note
The Battle of Camposanto: Passage of the Panaro
The Battle of Camposanto: Spanish Operations at the Panaro
The Battle of Camposanto: The Armies Deploy for Battle
Petri: Some Observations on What Happened So Far
Order of Battle
Additional Notes