Spanish Translation by Juan L. Sanchez Martin in Dragona Magazine, April 1993 issue.
English Translation (using Micro Tak Spanish Assistant) by Paul R. Petri

The Passage of the Panaro By the Spanish

The capture of Saboya (Savoy), the first important success for the Spanish, induced the Court in Madrid to attempt a similar undertaking in the eastern theater of operations. If they succeeded in having reinforcements arrive by maritime route from Spain to the Army of Lieutenant General Gages, in the assumption that they succeed in deceiving the British surveillance, they would rely on the support of King Carlos (Charles) of Naples which, once he broke his declaration of neutrality, he would render his kingdom into a state of defense and he would always bring support to the army of his father, although he was not very confident against the incursions from the British flotilla.

In the Austrian army circulated the rumor of the imminent coalition of a body of Neapolitan auxiliaries with the Spanish and there was talk of an agreement with the Pope in order to establish a line of march, one which the 12,000 Neapolitans would pass through. How they wished to fuse, the forces of Lieutenant General Gages having obtained the 15,000 men, [1] from the Court of Madrid, in the month of January, after the rest of several months, he judged that the Army should be swiftly reorganized in order to face these ambitious operations, in spite of the unfavorable season, given that a short time before the Army of the Infant (Prince, i.e. Don Philip, the son of Philip V of Spain) had behaved victoriously in a campaign in worse conditions.

Contrarily, he believed that the situation of the Austro-Sardinians in Modena was still bad, and he was relying on an easy victory that with one blow would end all the difficulties before the arrival from Austria of reinforcements, already on the road, and that they probably had been delayed and had desertions, always very elevated in the army. In the Bourbon Court it was known that, after the capture of Saboya, the existing tensions between the Courts of Vienna and Turin (the capital of the Kingdom of Piedmont-Sardinia) had increased considerably from autumn; Maria Teresa distrusted the intentions of Carlos Manuel III (Charles Emmanual III of Piedmont-Sardinia) and this, crestfallen over the heavy losses suffered by her army, the reward was sufficiently distant from her suffering and sacrifices which relentlessly pursued the Queen, she did not wish to have any knowledge of territorial concessions which included embracing some compensation trom Sicily.

The Minister D'Ormea pointed out himself that contradictory to everything even though Lieutenant General Senneterre took it upon himself to start negotiation talks in the name of Louis XV, knowing that one attack was merely enough to induce upon Carlos Manuel III to denounce the Treaty of Turin, this would constitute the more intense desire of the Court of Versalles, just as hopeful were the class leaders. One event of decisive arms in upper Italy would signify to France that preferable means to give a complete ovenurn to the situation, even then so unfavorable as much from the military point of view as from the political stand point.

In the first half of January of 1743, King Felipe V (Philip V of Spain) sent Lieutenant General Gages the general order of searching for the opponent, of beating him if it was possible in the open field and, in any event, to oblige them to move back from their strong position. This order arrived at General Quarters on January 31.

Lieutenant General Gages, given the report of the military forces, the bad weather and the lack of siege artillery, what he will encounter in the garrisons, considers that his mission does not hold by any means any possibility of success, judging it impossible the holding of the Duchy of Modena and retaking the offensive at the same time. Also, given his position as a foreigner, who had obtained his command from the government instead of Montemar only through an unusual preference, he didn't dare refuse the responsibility and he was provided to put it into execution [2]. Liberated from most of the responsibility, as the result from the explicit directions in thc orders, he should exert by abiding formally to them in spite of which, from the outset, they exclude any possibility of success, which would show in the later events.

Assembling the Lieutenant Generals, he stated their orders and made it clear that he was not deterred and did not determine whether the offensive was or was not opponune, but of exhorting them to sustain the inevitable fight with honor. There the decision was made of passing the Panaro River in the vicinity of Camposanto and of surprising the Austrians who were spread in their quarters.

In order to avoid this Traun pieced together reports through his friends in Bolonia (Bologna), that Gages, under the pretext of having to contain all of the robberies, obtained the permission of the municipal authorities for the occupation of the gates by Spanish troops, to prohibit the comings and goings into and out of Bolonia. At the same time, the light troops were sent in advance, departing on the highway from Modena, marching toward San Giovanni, in order to mask the movements of the army, while the baggage not indispensable was sent with the sick towards Imola. All the troops received provisions for 4 days, while loaded carts would arrive which were supposed to follow the army.

By midnight on the first of February, after a dance given by Gages, the officers went to their units, which met at dawn by the highway from San Felice, undercover on the west of Bolonia. The Army crossed the Reno River by the bridge and arrived at Crevalcore on February 2, it was delayed after a long march of 30 kilometers. During the march, near San Giovanni, there was an encounter with some Austrian hussars which fell on the carts, which followed the Army, which were guarded by pickets from the Guards' of Valonas (also Walloon:Translator), which retired after a lively combat.

In spite of the intense cold, which made necessary the distribution of an abundant ration of liquor, upon the falling of the night of February 3 a vanguard [3] under the orders of Lieutenant General MacDonald arrived at the Panaro. Field Marshal Count De Jauche, who with the grenadiers from the two regiments of the Guard formed the point, scouted the ford and sustained a long period of fire from a detachment of soldiers from the "Berlichingen-Kurassiere" under the orders of General Feldwachtmeister Count de SaintPierre. The Spanish lost 7 men. Meanwhile while this was going on two small boats were prepared for Jauche and 30 grenadiers who succeeded in reaching the opposite bank, given that the ford at that time was impassable as it was being covered by the cavalry. The cuirassiers retired and regroup at a hundred paces trom the position, where they remained in observation.

The Count de lauche continued the transport of men in front of the important position and near the side of the establishing point in order to construct a bridge. This came to be constructed and over this pass of the river went the grenadiers and carabiniers. Next to this a bridge another was thrown over constructed from small boats and requisitioned canoes.

While the vanguard passed the river, probably by the first hours of the afternoon, a strong column was discovered in progress from Finale to Modena, the Cuirassiers of Saint Pierre then retired. Lieutenant General Duke de Atrisco advanced toward the column with the Royal Carabiniers and two battalions of the Guard, but he was too weak to attack it. Although Lieutenant General MacDonald later came to reinforce it with the Cuirassiers de Reina and the pickets of the Cavalry, the Austrians, had already spread within San Felice. The Spanish generals opted then to establishing their camp since it was not possible to reach the column, that had proceeded without halting its march toward Mirandola.

Around this very time the bulk of the Spanish army, whose vanguard had reached the Panaro at 8 o'clock in the morning, began the passage of the river and camped in the vicinity of Camposanto. Even by the dawn the baggage had not reached the opposite bank.

The Concentration of the Austro-Sardinians

The friends of Marshal Traun in Bolonia had f'ound the manner of the arriving news enough to put the Austrians in the ficld. Toward February I it was brought to their knowledge thal the Spanish were swift in their order to march and whom had made sure they had subsistence for eight days. It was added that Lieutenant General Gages would march probably toward Ferrara and Bondeno. But this was incredibly precise and Traun was too smart to believe that the Spanish retired on Imola, he took the continuing necessary measures of wisdom in order that he could assemble his troops according to cach case quickly.

First he ordered that the regiments of cuirassiers from far away, who were quartered along the Po; Miglio Cuirassier Regiment would arrive by the route from Carpi and the Berlichingen Cuirassier Regiment from Finale. Later he designated a point of meeting for all the groups, in case of alarm, between the distance from Bomporto to Bastiglia. This land introduced a strong line of defense, with the left flank and the front on the Naviglio, formerly referred to as the Canal of Modena, while the right was supported upon the Panaro.

February 3 was to demonstrate the advantages gained from this caution, because Traun was not aware of the departure of the Spanish from Bolonia until the first hours of that day; that is to say, at the moment when he encountered the Spanish in the vicinity of the Panaro. It only sufficed one mere warning so that all the troops could begin the march in order to concentrate.

Marshal Traun then warns Lieutenant General Aspremont of the march of the Spanish, he then sends couriers with urgency to the groups quartered at great distance and he advances upon Bomporto with the closest troops [4]. The Diesbach regiment joined the column on the highway [5]. Traun and his Staff recognized the zone of meeting at 9 o'clock in the morning of February 3, after a march of nearly 24 kilometers, encountered there by the Eslavones, most of the Regiment of hussars de Havor and by the Frontier Guard de Horse.

The march of the other groups suffered the natural delay due to the time lapse until the orders arrived to them. General Feldwachtmeister Neuhaus did not receive orders in Finale until noon of February 3; for the Sardinians a great delay was yet produced, not having been possible to communicate the orders directly to the groups by means of Aspremont, whose General Quarters were located in Parma.

Aspremont set off with the two battalions of infantry and 4 companies of the Cuirassiers de Saboya which met in Parma, hurrying to the aid of Traun, but only after Traun called for the 6 battalions of infantry which were by Modena and Reggio, they arrived on the field on the 4th and 5th of February, as well as the Austrian regiment of Roth. He also sent an officer to Parma in order to reclaim the other 4 companies (squadrons? trans.) of the Cuirassiers de Saboya, which left the city February 5; that is to say, when the bulk of the Austro-Sardinian troops had gathered at its meeting place. These companies, coming by Reggio, joined with the army together with the regiment of Dragoons de Reina in Casalmaggiore, on February 6. It doesn't seem that he provided a reminder call for the Sardinian troops in Plasencia and Pavia.

The evening of February 5 General Feldwachtmeister Neuhaus also arrived with the troops from Finale, consisting of the infantry regiments of Deutschmeister and Traun, the Cuirassiers Regiment of Berlichingen and some one hundred hussars. These troops were unable to continued their march by the shortest route toward Bompono, due to the presence of the Spanish troops, and they had to bend away towards Mirandola until they reached Concordia, a short distance, in order to cross the Secchia River at that point and go from there, by Modena, toward the concentration point.

The march being nearly 70 kms. You are understood that the column, after having marched for 48 hours, reaches the army completely exhausted. So then, Marshall Traun had succeeded in assembling an excellent force in a strong position: 16 Austrian battalions, 8 battalions of Sardinian infantry with their 20 companies of grenadiers, two regiments of Austrian Cavalry, nearly 800 hussars and borders guards of horse, two battalions of Eslavones or Slavonier and 800 Partisans. Also, he could rely on the arrival of two Sardinian regiments at any minute [6].

This force included therefore nearly 7,300 infantry, 1,900 cuirassiers and dragoons, 800 hussars and 1,800 Eslavones and Partisans, 11,800 men total, while the Spanish had 13,000 infantry, around 1,200 cavalry and little fewer than 800 men of light troops, Migueletes (mountain fusiliers) and a body of French. In consequence, the Austro-Sardinians had more than double the cavalry; but the recount of the troops of the era favor the Spanish. Adding the light troops, we could say that the proportion was advantageous in these by nearly 3 to 2 [7].

Footnotes

[1]By the first of January the effectives scarcely numbered 10,000 men. The first dates are the recount from the 19 of February of 1743, according to this the Army, without counting the officers, contained 9,306 infantry, 560 Fusiliers of the mountain, 1178 Cavalry and 128 men from the French companies. Since in the battle the Spanish had 700 dead and 624 missing, the first conclusion is that they should be fewer than 13,817 men; adding the numerous officers, the deserters until February 19 and the dead due to illness or wounds, this arrives at a total fewer than 15,000 men. In consequence, an important reinforcement should have arrived to the Army toward the middle of January, although the Spanish records do not indicate this; probable the Spanish National Provincial battalions promised in time to reinforce the Lieutenant General Gages (6).
[2]Most of the historians, among them Arneth and Arvers, affirm that Gages had made ultimately two counter proposals. A confusion by the orders of the offensive of the autumn of 1742 has been about. This order letter was undoubtedly in connection with the events of Saboya, which the Court could have been informed about by the 13rst half of lanuary. In half discurrieron almost three weeks, very fair but enough time so that the mail arrived from Madrid to Bolonia (the letter from Campillo of January 22 did not arrive until February 19); A strong protest there would have been, consequently, if the offensive had been delayed 10 to 12 weeks.
[3]Royal Carabinier, Cuirassiers de Reina, pickets from two other cavalry regiments, all the companies of grenadiers and two banalions from the Spanish Guard.
[4]The Regiment of Infantry Alt Wallis and Piccolomini, one battalion from the Traun Infantry Regiment and the Cuirassiers de Miglio.
[5]According to the manuscript from Browne, 1743, and Schels, Marshal Traun left for Bomporto with 7 battalions. Traun in his letter of February 20, admits to having arrived with 10 battalions. Both unite and collect to the rear of the Diesbach Regiment.
[6]Because they were short on effectives the Roth and Deutschmeister Regiments formed a second battalion formation, this is solely from the plan of Colonel Stockel. According to the order of battle which Marshal Traun ordered and sent to the Gran Duque (Grand Duke), the Regiment of Traun would also have formed into two battalions; but this document introduces many evident errors.
[7]The Austrians did not receive reinforcements during the month of January, so that this strength could not be higher from the beginning of the month. The Sardinians hardly had 500 men per baltalion and little more than 100 horses per squadron. This information is confirmed by a report from Turin, that declares the total of the Austro-Sardinian troops at 11,800 men, of which 4,300 are Sardinian.

The Battle of Camposanto

Author's Note
The Battle of Camposanto: Passage of the Panaro
The Battle of Camposanto: Spanish Operations at the Panaro
The Battle of Camposanto: The Armies Deploy for Battle
Petri: Some Observations on What Happened So Far
Order of Battle
Additional Notes