The Austrians did successively better in the three engagements, scoring a decisive tactical victory over the Prussians in the last which had some impact on the wider strategic situation. All three actions posed considerable problems for commanders on both sides. The dictates of geography and strategy placed the Prussian entry point at the northern end of the area, facing Austrian forces to the south and east. Though not impassable, the Bober acted as the western boundary on all three occasions, with the fighting taking place on and around the hills east of the river.

Though Landshut was ringed by hills, these were surrounded in turn by more high ground. The long Reich-Hennersdorf ridge was too far from the main position to be held by the Prussians defending the town in 1745 and 1760 and so served as a convenient screen for the Austrian deployment. The heights to the south and north of the town also faced further hills which served as collecting points for the Austrian attacks, notably the high ground by Reich- Hennersdorf itself.

Nonetheless, it was difficult to deploy from these heights as the Austrians discovered in 1745, especially as the Prussians were defending a more compact position centering on Justice Hill closer to the town. When the roles were reversed in 1757 the ground decisively favored the Austrians as the Prussians had to approach Landshut up the cramped Bober valley from the north.

Here, the Austrians could not only deploy on the heights immediately north of the town, but on those flanking the valley to the east, forcing the Prussians to operate on the difficult ground closer to the river. Nonetheless, the Prussian assault up Book Hill came close to success, indicating the relative flexibility of 18th century line troops who were clearly capable of fighting in such difficult terrain.

Footnotes

[1] The topographical information is taken from the description of the area by the British Ambassador Mitchell and from the maps in the Prussian General Staff histories. These are not entirely consistent and identify other hilltops not named in the accounts of the actions. The northern section of the Reich-Hennersdorf ridge is also labeled the Lange Berg (long hill).

[2] Winterfeldt's estimates come from his report cited in the Prussian General Staff history of the Second Silesian War, vol. II 198. The Austrian Staff History (vol. VII 438n1) gives Nadasdy's effective strength as only 4,300 seven days after the battle, but notes it was still drawing supplies for 6,200 men. See the order of battle for a full breakdown and note 4 below.

[3] The event prompted Seydlitz to recommend that the Prussian cavalry always reform facing the enemy - a suggestion that received the king's approval on 27 Sept. 1747.

[4] This unit first saw action in June 1744 and by 1745 had an official strength of 7 infantry companies of 140 men each and two hussar companies of 75 a piece (Austrian Staff history vol. I 396). Prussian accounts mention detachments of Banat and Temesvar hussars which are not listed separately in the Austrian account. It is possible that these were the hussar companies attached to this unit, and possibly the Croat regiment as well. Perhaps the 350 hussars of Franquini's command included these companies instead of comprising men drawn from the three regular Hungarian hussar regiments with Nadasdy. Simbschen's unit was later transformed into the Banat Grenzer Regiment.

[5] Whereas the 1745 action is well-covered by both the Austrian and Prussian staff histories, we only have the Prussian account for 1757. The estimate of Austrian strength comes from Jany's history, vol. II 445. Simbschen's detachment had included two Saxon Ulan pulks which were possibly still with the corps in August.

[6] This unit was composed of the grenadiers of ex-Saxon IRs 53 (Manstein) and 57 (Jung Bevern) and had only been established on 11 February. Its disbandment had been ordered on 13 July but had been delayed, partly by the death of its commander at Striegau on 5 August. It was led by Captain von der Goltz in the action and eventually captured at the fall of Schweidnitz 12 November before the order to dissolve it could be carried out.

[7] The Prussian Staff history of the Seven Years War (vol. XII) and Jany, II 554-5 give a full break down of these forces. Four battalions were withdrawn from Fouque's field force to reinforce the Silesian garrisons before operations began. Including these battalions, the fortress garrisons totaled 4,100 in Schweidnitz, 3,800 in Breslau, 4,000 in Neisse, 3,200 in Glatz, 2,200 in Cosel, 1,200 in Glogau and 800 in Brieg; a total of 19,300.

[8] Not the hussar general, but another Zieten.

[9] In his History of the Seven Years War (p.300) Frederick places Fouque's force at only 8,000 effectives, the number also given by Archenholz (p.211). However, strength returns listed in the Prussian Staff history (vol. XII, see also Jany, II 557) give about 9,500 to 10,000 infantry and around 1,900 cavalry, excluding the crews of 33 battalion pieces and 35 heavy guns and howitzers.

[10] Estimates of the Austrian forces also vary from 28,000 upwards. The returns listed in the Prussian staff history give the following strength for Loudon (including Wolfersdorff and Gaisruck):

regular infantry (25 btns., 6 gren btns.) 24,834
Grenzer (6 btns.) and 2 free battalions 7,008
regular cavalry (50 sqdns. + 11 coy elite) 7,494
hussars (16 sqdns.) 1,095
Total: 40,431