Editor's Note: the following account of the battle of Gross Jagersdorf is a translation from the original German text found in the book Die Schlachten Friedrichs des Grossen by Joachim Engelmann, with illustrations by Gunter Dorn.(Podzun-Pallas 1991).

Introduction

Since the spring of 1756, the Russian state, under the leadership of Tsarina Elizabeth, daughter of Peter the Great, had prepared for war with Prussia. Even though the Russian army had been trained from 1730 to 1740 by a number of Prussian officers, including Treskow, Finck, Manstein, Wartenberg, Grant and Keith, Elizabeth was prepared to fulfill her obligations to her allies, Austria and France. Field Marshal v. Lehwaldt was instructed to defend East Prussia with his corps of 24,700 men.

'Although your corps is weak, if you only attack on one wing and hold the other back my hope is that you will be able to handle them,' the King wrote him. If successful, he was instructed to call for peace talks immediately. Should he fail, then he was to retreat only step by step. It was not until the end of June 1757 that the Russians appeared and crossed the border of East Prussia on August 1st, whereupon Lehwaldt retreated to Wehlau.

When the Russians crossed the Pregel River between August 25th and 27th, taking positions southwest of Norkitten between the Prege1 and Auxinne rivers, Lehwaldt also crossed the river. After making a reconnaissance on August 29th, he decided to attack the Russians on the following day, from the southwest at Gross lagersdorf, spearheaded by 40 squadrons commanded by the Prussian general Schorlemer.

Lehwaldt was unable, however, to observe the left wing of the enemy at Sittenfeld. Meanwhile, the Prussians commanded by Dohna had marched into battle positions. Despite a warning from a deserter, Apraxin believed the maneuvers of the Prussians to be a feint and he planned to march on Allenburg on August 30th.

Terrain

The battlefield was a rolling plain that was bounded by the Pregel river to the north, the Auxinne river to the east, the Astrawischkener and the Roser woods to the south, and the Almenhauser and Puschdorfer forests to the west. The rivers were obstacles for all troops and weaponry. The middle portion of the battlefield was comprised of the Norkittner forest [or Norkittner Wald], a flat section running from east to west.

Some 1,500 meters to the south of this feature lay the Sittengraben [Editor: this was small creek] with swampy edges. The forest stretched 2,000 meters from the southwest to the northeast and it was 700 to 1,000 meters wide at its deepest.

In 1757, this terrain feature was very dense, had much undergrowth, and was swampy. From the height 30.2 on the southwest corner there was a good field of fire. Dams, ditches and wetlands between this field and the Kutkehemer woods made every move difficult. A1l houses in the area were made of wood with roofs of straw. Gross Jagersdorf had burned to the ground.

Lehwaldt's Prussian army had 24,700 men comprised of 22 infantry battalions, 50 squadrons of cavalry, 35 battalion guns and 20 pieces of heavy artillery. The Russian general Apraxin had 54,800 men configured in 89 battalions of infantry, 40 grenadier companies, 46 squadrons of cavalry, 119 Sotnien [squadrons?] irregulars, 154 regimental guns, 30 secret howitzers and 79 field artillery pieces. Thus Lewaldt was half as strong in infantry and cavalry and only had a fifth as much artillery as his Russian counterpart.The actual fighting strength of the Russians was still unknown to Lewaldt. Their leadership was not highly regarded by the Prussians.

Assuming that the enemy would expect his attack from the positions of August 29th, Lehwaldt set out in three columns at one o'clock in the morning on August 30th through the Puschdorfer forest. The Black Hussar Regiment (HR 5) was at the head, one of the infantry columns made up the right flank, the other infantry column the left, both with grenadiers and second groups [lines of battle?], followed from behind by the heavy artillery and the cavalry of the left flank under Schorlemer as the third column.

After passing through the forest, they marched into battle positions from 3:30 am. on, with 10 battalions in the first line of battle. The second line had 8 garrison battalions, each with two grenadier battalions covering its flanks. Three heavy artillery batteries of 6 guns each stood ahead of the front line. Holstein's cavalry on the right wing was reinforced by the Dragoon Regiment Schorlemer (DR 6).

[Editor: it appears that 5 squadrons of the 10 squadron regiment were posted on each wing.]

The enemy, from which only signals and drum rolls could be heard, was hidden by ground fog and was marching southwest towards Eschenbruch. The Russian vanguard under Sybilsky gathered at Sittenfeldt in the dsep right flank, when at 4 o'clock am. word came of the Prussian advance.

Lehwaldt had ordered, 'The left wing should be attacked, so that the army will pull right and hold right When the enemy's cavalry is beaten, cost what it may, they must charge into the enemy infantry.' It was clear what was meant! The corps started off quietly at 4:30, then with a fast pace and drums beating, marched towards the burning villages of Uderballen and Daupelken. At the same time, the cavalry attacked on both flanks.

[Editor: Schorlemer's 30 sqds on the left wing attacked the Third Division to the north of the Norkitten Wald, while Holstein's 20 sqds on the nght wing attacked Sybilsky's advance guard to the south of the Norkitten Wald ].

Attack

When Apraxin received word at 5 o'clock a.m. of the Prussian attack, he had the vanguard stopped in order to take position in the west, the First Division (Fermor) ordered to occupy the southern rim of the Norkittner Wald, and the Second Division (Lopuchin) ordered to take position on the northern rim of the Wald. The cavalry of the other divisions reinforced the vanguard.

[Editor: both Duffy and the Prussian General Staff map indicate that the order of Russian column of march was, from north to south, Browne's 3rd Division covering the open ground from the Pregel River to the northern edge of the Norkittner Wald; Fermor's 1st Division deployed in the middle of the ward.

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Lopuchin's 2nd Division deployed from the southern edge of the wald to the open plain around the town of Uszbundzen; and finally, Sybilsky's advance guard on the road leading south to Allenburg. Thus Browne faced off against Schorlemer's attack, Fermor opposed the Prussian infantry of the left wing, Lopuchin faced the right wing of the Prussian infantry, and Sybilsky tangled with Holstein's cavalry on the Prussian right.]

The Prussian cavalry of the right wing (Holstein) had moved to the southeast corner of the woods, but came into a crossfire, so that it had to retreat to the south, where it remained north of the Sittengraben. Schorlemer's 30 squadrons had defeated the Russian cavalry on the left wing, had broken through the edge of the woods, and caught the infantry from behind at Weynothen. Then they ran into a fresh Russian brigade commanded by Ivan [or Johan] Manteuffel and the two artillery brigades [commanded by Major Tyuttchev] of the Third Division (Browne), which, with their heavy fire, forced the Prussians into the ditches and dams. Schorlemer assembled his troops at the Kutkehmer woods. Casualties were less than feared.

[Duffy adds that Fermor now ordered Tyutchev to withdraw from his position on the height for some unexlained reason, leaving the columns of Russian infantry to themselves as they attempted to form a coherent battle line. The process was further confused by the troops' entanglement with the divisional baggage trains.]

At six o'clock a.m. the infantry of the Prussian right wing attacked. Because of its threatened right flank, the Prussian troops stretched so far to the right in the meadows south of Gross Jagersdorf and Daupelken that their connection to the troops of the Prussian left wing was lost.

Smoke and powder fumes caused coherence in the first line to be lost, since wing commander von Goltz had extended the front line by moving in the third line [comprised of the Garnson Regiment 2 - Sydow which had 4 battalions] and the grenadier battalions [Gohr and Lossow]. When the line reached the ridge north of Daupelken [this is the unmarked village depicted or, our map, due north of Uderballen], it opened volley fire on Russian brigade Villebois of the 2nd Division, behind which the 1st Division appeared.

The Prussian infantry regiments IR2 (Kanitz) and IR4 (Kalnien) managed to flank the right wing of the 2nd Division and despite heavy casualties, pushed the Russian brigade Saltykov with four regiments back into the woods. The Villebois brigade (with its Narva regiments and Grenadier Regiment 2) had to retreat also after losing half of its strength. Many Russian field guns were captured. At seven o'clock a breach in the front line was accomplished, however, the Russians bravely held their ground between the woods and the road.

[Duffy's account notes that the 2nd Division did not have its field artillery, having only its regimental guns and a battery of secret howitzers. The divisional artillery had been deployed with the advance guard and the 1st Division. Thus we might surmise that the Prussians had a local advantage in field artillery, a factor which may have contributed to the initial Prussian success in this sector.]

In order to cover the right flank of the infantry during its heavy fight, Holstein once again threw his 20 squadrons against the Russian vanguard. At Sittenfeldt [shown on the map as an unmarked village in the midst of Sybilsky's advance guard], he broke through the Apscheron and Butyrski regiments and captured some field guns, before being chased back to the Roser Wald across the Sittengraben by the three horse grenadier regiments of the second group and the cuirassier regiments Kiev and Nowotroizk from the reserve of the 2nd Division.

Casualties were light. At least his threatening presence prevented a flank attack by the Russian vanguard which would have been a total catastrophe for the Prussian infantry. The heavy battery that had advanced to a position southeast of Uderballen also intervened effectively in the fight.

During the fierce fighting that lasted for hours in the southeastern part of the woods, Lehwaldt had the left wing of the infantry push through the unoccupied northwestern part, up to the edge. Browne, commander of the 3rd Division, drove the regiments Neva, Siberia, and the 1st Grenadiers up against the edge of the woods and had the regrouped Saltykov brigade attack from the east. Count Dohna [commander of the Prussian left wing infantry] was severely wounded during this phase of the fighting. Attacked from three sides. the Prussians had to abandon the woods and retreat.

Events on the right wing also turned. The fresh Russian bngade of Manteuffel entered the fierce fight of bayonets and rifle butts in the woods, while the Rumianzow [or Rumyantsev] reserve brigade, with drawn bayonets, attacked the left flank of the 8 Prussian battalions fighting deep in the Norkittner Wald. Some of these battalions accidentally came under friendly fire from the Prussian Garrison Regiment II, due to the excitement of the fight and the obstruction of sight caused by the smoke, and they had to give up the position they had fought so hard for and after losing forty percent of their strength, retreated in confusion. Schorlermer covered the orderly retreat on the left with a renewed attack that prevented further pursuit by the enemy. Dragoon Regiment Platen (DR8) was the last unit to leave the battle field.

At this point in the battle, the Russian infantry emerged from the Norkittner Wald and Sybilski's vanguard also crossed the wet meadows to the south and advanced to Gross Jagersdorf. The Russians plundered the dead and wounded.

Lehwaldt pulled back via Puschdorf to the camp at Wilkendorf, pursued (by Sybilski) by three horse grenadier regiments (and some assorted cossacks) as far as Puschdorf. The Prussians lost 123 officers, 159 non-commissioned officers, and 4,238 soldiers. They also lost 17 regimental guns and 11 heavy field artillery guns. The infantry regiments Kanitz (IR2), Kalnien (IR4), Garrison Regt. IX (La Motte), Lehwaldt (IR14), grenadier battalion Gohr (11/14) and Garrison Regt. II (Sydow) suffered the most losses. [Editor: most of these units were in the right wing of the Prussian infantry attack on the southern part of the Norkittner Wald]

The Russians lost 278 officers and 5,711 men, among them 11 generals and 1,487 dead. [Officer casualties were unusually high and included generals Weymarn, Lieven and Villebois - all wounded, and General Lopuchin died after being hit by three musket balls] The Russians advanced to Allenburg, but then retreated from East Prussia by the end of October, with the exception of Memel. They took up winter quarters in Kurland and Samogitia. Apraxin was demoted on October 28th, brought in front of a military tribunal and died during the investigation [from an apoplectic seizure according to Duffy]. Lehwaldt was called back to Marienwerder by the King on October 6, 1757 and instructed to turn his army against the Swedes.

Despite their victory, which was attributed to their higher numbers, bravery and strong artillery, the Russian campaign ended after three months as if it were a defeat. The inner structure of the army was not yet intact [Editor: I am not sure what this statement refers to.]

They had hoped to conquer East Prussia, or at least gain it as a pawn. Apraxin wanted to cut off Lehwaldt's retreat to the west, engage and destroy him. The best direction of attack would have been from the southeast, but the area was unsuited for gathering the troops and was obstructed by the lake district. The march from the north had its own obstacle - the wide Memel River (or Nieman River).

Thus the main body of the Russian army was left with the choice of approaching from the northeast, from the area of Kowno-Grodno towards Koenigsberg. Fermor therefore proceeded against Meme1 with a weaker column, while a cavalry corps attempted to push forward from the southeast, which it failed to do. Nevertheless, Apraxin succeeded in the difficult task of uniting his marching columns. The Russians proved themselves to be tough in defense, unshakable in their defiance of death, capable of using the field well and effective with their artillery fire, which caused the Prussians trouble in later battles.

Lehwaldt's army was too weak and securing East Prussia was too much of a task for it to accomplish. By holding the Russian vanguard in its right flank, it ultimately saved the Prussians from destruction. Lehwaldt would have been inferior to the Russians even in their original position, for the superiority of their artillery would have broken through even more, although this did not come into play. He began the retreat only then, when nothing else was possible. No flags were lost. On the whole, the Prussians were able to withstand the defeat.

More Gross Jagersdorf

Introduction
Battle Description
Order of Battle

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