by Peter Hofschröer, Austria
During the course of my research into the Waterloo Campaign, I had cause to examine numerous regimental histories,
particularly those of the German units involved. One that particularly caught my eye was that of the 25th Regiment, formerly the infantry of Lützow’s Freikorps.
Members of Luetzow’s Freikorps in their famous black uniforms. The red facings and yellow buttons completed their portrayal of Germany’s national colours. As with artists’ impressions, these paintings have been highly sanitised. Pretty pictures sell, but the reality described in this article paints a different picture (pun intended!). Regimental History, Hofschröer Collection.
This was not merely because of the rather exotic history of this regiment, but mainly because of the graphic account of its uniforms and equipment. The regimental history includes two colour plates (reproduced here) of the theoretical uniforms of the regiment. As we shall see below, reality was a long way away from the theory. The following quotes from the Regimental History (see Stawitzky, pp 42-48), along with my annotations, give an idea of the condition of all the regiments, both infantry and cavalry, of Blücher’s “Army of the Lower Rhine”. It is a very sorry picture indeed. The quotations are given in italics, my comments in normal typeface. The 25th Infantry Regiment was part of Generalmajor von Tippelskirch’s 5th Brigade in the II Army Corps under Generalmajor von Pirch I. The other infantry in this brigade were the 2nd Infantry Regiment (1st Pomeranians) and the 5th Westphalian Landwehr. As well as its old cadre of Lützowers, the 25th received replacement manpower from the Rhine Province, a substantial part of which had been under French rule for the past two decades. This mixture of former irregulars and unwilling recruits must have caused problems with discipline. However, as the quotations below elucidate, the mixture of men of different origins was not the only problem faced by this regiment.
The same considerable lack of uniformity could be found in most items of clothing and equipment. As headwear, part of the men wore caps, the rest shakoes, the latter consisting in part of English supplies [as well as Prussian], making for a colourful mixture. English backpacks were supplied to the first and third ranks.
General von Tippelskirch’s order of 20 May stipulated that each company should swap with the others to achieve uniformity of headwear, all of a company wearing either caps or shakoes. Belts, cartridge-boxes and backpacks came in all shapes and sizes and as there was no norm, each individual improvised something with the greatest latitude. Reconstructing the uniforms of the 3rd and 10th Replacement Battalions is not easy. The 3rd Replacement Battalion was designated for the 3rd Reserve Infantry Regiment. On 25th March 1815, the 3rd Reserves became the 15th Line. Being East Prussians, they had brick red facings. The 10th Replacement Battalion was designated for the 1st Silesian Infantry Regiment and the 10th Reserve Infantry Regiment (in 1815, the 22nd Infantry Regiment), both Silesians. That would give the 10th Replacement Battalion yellow facings. As the Reserve Regiments often wore interim uniforms rather than the regular uniforms, it is difficult to be certain exactly with what their replacement manpower was issued.
The History of the 22nd Infantry Regiment describes their uniforms as follows:
As the new uniform regulations were only issued on 25th March 1815, it is highly unlikely they could have been put into practice before the Waterloo Campaign.
Was it the case that the men of the 10th Replacement Battalion wore a similar jacket, or did they wear the regular coatee as issued to the 1st Silesians? The Regimental History of the 1st Silesians provides no guidance on this.
The History of the 25th Infantry Regiment continues,
A report on the state of the regiment’s accoutrements written in Dinant on 22 April 1815 mentions the sorry state of the small cartridge-boxes and the inadequate backpacks, saying: ‘Many different types of cartridge-box, backpacks and muskets are in use.’
The regiment’s commanders were certainly well aware of the problems caused by this mixture and applied for the introduction of the new uniform and the associated equipment early on. In a letter dated 16 May 1815, the ‘Oberkriegskommissariat’ [War Commissary] rejected this application. It stated: “Regarding the clothing of the former Lützow Infantry Regiment, now the 25th, I have tried to obtain the supply of 1,428 infantry coatees oder 1,301
“Lithewkas” [coats] by negotiation with the IV Department [of the War Ministry, i.e. the ‘Oberkriegskommissariat’]. However, I received the answer that the regiment is to refer to the monthly contingent supplies, details to be published, regarding bad, worn-out uniforms. Referring to the regiment’s uniforms, these are to be replaced bit by bit by the [new, regulation] blue uniform with the contingent supplies.”
This decision delayed the implementation of this application indefinitely. The differences in uniforms must have impeded the tactical cohesion of the troops and diminished the necessary bond, with which a body of men appeared as a whole. This must have been particularly true in the street fighting of Ligny on 16th June 1815, where distinguishing friend from foe was already very difficult.
At this time, a Prussian infantry regiment consisted of three battalions, two of musketeers (line infantry) and one of fusiliers (light infantry). The fusiliers were
selected men who had an aptitude for light duties, particularly skirmishing and as such received the batter armament. That they were supplied with French rather than
British muskets shows where the preference lay. The Charleville was a more modern weapon. The Brown Besses with their worn out barrels were not suited for the more accurate fire a skirmisher was required to give.
The difference in calibre, a disturbing situation, made it necessary for time to be wasted spent remaking the existing supplies of ammunition. There was a complete lack of accoutrements, with only 100 musket slings being available. Each battalion had a number of rifles, listed as “short firearms”. They were in good condition. The 1st Battalion had 56, the 2nd 58 and the Fusiliers 60. Furthermore, the 1st Battalion had 407 muskets, the 2nd 415 and the Fusiliers 425. As each battalion had a
minimum requirement of 728 muskets, then the 1st had a shortage of 321, the 2nd 313 and the Fusiliers 303.
This shortage of side arms was typical of the Prussian army of this period. It is interesting to note that the scabbards of the infantry short swords were normally made of brown leather in the Prussian army and black in the French. [2]
At right: Members of the 25th Infantry Regiment in the new uniform theoretically issued in 1815. Again, this shows how far artists’ impressions and reality are apart. There are those who take such impressions as gospel, but the more realistic impressions given by our house artist show uniforms that are much closer to what was actually worn by member of this regiment in the Waterloo Campaign. Regimental History, Hofschröer Collection
Black the Norm
However, from 1818, after returning from the occupation of France, black became the norm in the Prussian army. This indicates that the Prussian army resupplied itself from French stocks during the occupation of France.
There was also a shortage of the necessary supplies of accoutrements. For instance, instead of the 2,413 sets of cross-belts needed, only 1,192 were
available. Of these, 278 sets of black belts and 119 sets of white belts [the musketeers were supposed to have white belts, the fusiliers black] were listed as unusable, while of 795 white sets were listed as usable..In addition to the sorry state of the equipment, it is also useful to outline the amount of time that was available to train the regiment for battle. The three battalions reached Dinant [their point of concentration in the Netherlands] on 23rd May. If all the time from 24th May until the battle of 16th June had been available, it might have been possible to achieve a satisfactory standard of training in linear evolutions. However, this period of three weeks intended for the training of the regiment was disrupted and reduced by several events....
A further disruption to its training occurred on 13th June, three days before the Battle of Ligny, when 330 replacements arrived. They were deployed in the companies immediately. Raised in the Kleve area [on the Lower Rhine] and all former French soldiers, these replacements used to make up the strength of the regiment were unwelcome. Their training to the Prussian regulations was far from complete and they needed another four weeks. Furthermore, the mentality of these men, being against military service and obviously not patriotic, made matters worse. Their opposition to military service was made clear on their march from Kleve under Major von Gayl, when 117 men deserted....
The men from Kleve brought along a further disadvantage. They were issued with the old uniforms of the 2nd Regiment (1st Pomeranians) on which madder red [the regimental facing colour] collars had been hurriedly sewn. The regiment now wore four different uniforms. Little could be done about the discipline and spirit of these replacements as they were only allocated to their companies on the day of the Battle of Ligny. This disrupted the cohesion of the units. An anonymous veteran of the Campaign of 1815 described the uniforms and equipment of the freiwilligen Jäger, a detachment of volunteers that provided its
own uniforms and equipment, as follows,equipment, as follows,
Not only were they a unusual mixture of education and customs, but also of uniforms and equipment. Next to a man with the most expensive equipment and the finest Liège rifle stood a man in rags with an unusual type of firearm. Most of them wore the black uniform. Even in Berlin, when the first detachment marched off, they knew nothing about the new [regulation] uniform. Only part of the second detachment were clothed in the regulation
green uniforms. [The volunteers did not were the blue tunics of the line, but the green of the Jäger]. The costumes worn by the foreigners [i.e. non-Prussians] were often rather strange, as tailors in different parts of Germany had amended the already ridiculed Lithewka [coat] in their own way...
This is how matters were when the order arrived early on 15th June for the regiment to march to Namur, the Brigade HQ. The Detachment, drilling and making cartridges, was, of course, the first to depart... The organisation had not progressed so far for NCOs to be chosen... Moreover, there was a shortage of everything, particularly ammunition. Some were supplied only with half-filled cartridges, others just had empty cartridges, as there was insufficient powder available.
There were no patches, just lose balls. Nobody had provisions. Many marched off that morning with enthusiasm, but no breakfast... Shirts and towels had to be cut up to make patches for the balls, the powder was distributed as fairly as possible and we were told to take the ammunition from fallen comrades and the enemy. The Regimental History gives further details on the volunteers,
The Jäger Detachment enjoyed a significant advantage in terms of its equipment. A report from Franc-Waret dated 14th June 1815 lists 80 excellent rifles, 40 usable muskets, 85 sword bayonets, 60 powder horns, 197 knapsacks, etc., as well as an adequate ammunition supply.
Surprising though it may seem, the 25th Infantry Regiment acquitted itself well at Ligny. Like most of the Prussian forces deployed in the Netherlands, the 25th also suffered from a lack of food and water, exacerbating its already considerable problems. In such circumstances, it was a great achievement for this regiment to fight at all, let alone recover so quickly from the defeat on 16th June and stage a forced march before arriving on the field of Waterloo two days later. The leadership provided by Blücher and Gneisenau can only be fully appreciated when the condition and quality of the forces at their disposal is taken into consideration. The armchair generals that criticise their tactical handling of certain situations appear to be quite unaware of the quality of manpower at their disposal. Furthermore, the impression given by the sanitised paintings of romantic artists of the late 19th century, so often regarded as reliable sources, needs to be considered in the context of the above.
Acknowledgements
My thanks go to John Cook for reconstructing the uniforms worn by the 25th from the notes given and to Oliver Schmidt for providing information and sources.
Sources
anon, “Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des Königl. Preußischen 25sten Infanterie-Regiments, den Feldzug von 1815 betreffend” in “Zeitschrift für Kunst, Wissenschaft und Geschichte des Krieges”, Vol I, (Berlin, 1858).
Footnotes
[1] Menges, p 25.
More Prussian 25th Uniforms Uniforms of the Waterloo Campaign
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