Napoleon Man of War
Summary
By John Cook, UK
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There is no evidence of some great Napoleonic vision of a united federation of European nations, as he claimed at Saint Helena, and which is currently propagated in some quarters today. The ‘united’ Europe of Napoleon’s Grand Empire was not one of equal partners, but one in which everything was subordinated to and dominated by the interests of France, at the expense of everybody else. On the whole, however, it seems that his aggressive expansionism was conducted largely on the basis of chance; opportunist gambits rather than part of a strategy with a defined endgame. The Continental System is often seen as the ultimate expression of Napoleon’s policy of commercial exclusion of Britain from continental Europe, but it also reflects his desire for French commercial hegemony in Europe as a whole. In the context of Britain it was not a new device and had been employed previously by the Bourbon monarchy and Revolutionary governments but never to the degree attempted by Napoleon. Napoleon believed that if he excluded British trade her continental markets would automatically become France’s. To this end he gave lesser continental states the option of compliance with the Continental System or war. It was a policy which never had much chance of working, even had compliance been universal, for a number of reasons, not least that of geography - the commercial arteries of Europe were rivers which flowed in the wrong direction and road transport was no substitute. It was also a system which was impossible to enforce uniformly and was not even applied consistently. Smuggling on a massive scale notwithstanding, sometimes with official connivance, the Continental System was broken when it was in Napoleon’s interest to do so. In the latter part of the Imperial period Napoleon instituted a system of licences, which resulted in the bizarre situation where two nations at war with each other freely traded to the extent that British cloth and shoes, destined for the French army, were imported through Hamburg. A Matter of Degree The difference between former French attempts and Napoleon’s application of blockade was a matter of degree. In order to neutralise Britain’s commercial superiority, which he could not achieve by military means, Napoleon turned most of Europe, and with it Britain’s continental markets, into a French colony. The purpose of this was to create a commercial vacuum free of British commerce which he hoped France would fill. There was no reciprocity involved and all the occupied and dependent territories were subordinated to the interests of France with tariff barriers erected to favour French goods. The Rhur area for example, particularly Berg, already highly developed industrially was deprived of its markets in the Low Countries and the Baltic with disastrous results. Similarly, the export of textiles from Italy was forbidden and raw silk was taken from Piedmont and sent directly to Lyon for manufacture, destroying the silk textile industry in Lombardy. In general terms French products were exported without let or hindrance, whilst incoming goods had to pay high tariffs to enter France. It was a commercially moribund policy for France and continental Europe as a whole. It was also a grievous error of judgement for it made an implacable and necessary enemy of Britain, which depended on the export of manufactured goods and, as a result remained, uniquely, at war with France from the failure of the Treaty of Amiens in 1803 to Napoleon’s fall in 1814, some 12 years later. The corollary to this was that Britain helped finance the aims of continental powers, who did not have the wherewithal to do so individually. One should not, however, infer philanthropic British motives and when it was not in her interests subsidies, credits and materiel support was withheld. Architect of the Coalitions It would be quite wrong to ascribe the role of architect to Britain in the increasing union of the continental powers, whose aims were at times disparate and conflicting. The architect of the coalitions was Napoleon himself. By 1805 it was evident to all but the most myopic that his ambition had no limit, and by 1812 it had truly become a matter of national survival for all the major powers. British financial and materiel aid to the powers did not inspire them, it merely enabled them to do what they would have done anyway had they possessed the necessary resources themselves. Napoleon’s appetite for territorial acquisition was a trait he shared with all his continental peers, although his was on a much, much, more extravagant and aggressive scale in comparison. The massive expansion of greater France beyond her 1791 borders, and the establishment of a dominant commercial Grand Empire at the expense of her neighbours was, not unexpectedly, unacceptable to Austria, Prussia and Russia. It was another major error of judgement because none of his European neighbours of any consequence could allow themselves to be dominated by any single hegemonous commercial continental power such as Napoleon established. Napoleon’s actions forced alliances between powers who in the ordinary scheme of things, if the precedence of the 18th Century is anything to go by, were natural rivals. Napoleon’s responsibility for the wars lies principally in the years from 1804 and it is a large responsibility, indeed, the largest if not the only one. Napoleon was the architect of the circumstances which made war inevitable. He created alarm, fear, distrust and the desire for revenge amongst all his continental neighbours, and it is quite irrational to lay the blame, which is rightly his, elsewhere. Napoleon’s peaceful utterances were simulations of peaceful intent, those made in exile through Las Cases, were an attempt at justification for his regime. His actions were consistently provocative to all the European powers such that they saw only a French threat to their very existence. Napoleon’s ‘peace’ was on his terms and dictated on the bayonets of the Grande Armée. He imposed impossible terms which subordinated the vital national interests of other countries to those of France, which could never be acceptable in the long term. The claim that Napoleon was essentially a ‘man of peace’ is not supportable and is based on unhistorical propaganda. 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