Napoleon Man of War
War of 1809
By John Cook, UK
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The expansion of the French Grand Empire, comprising vassal or dependent states in Germany, Italy, Poland, the Low Countries and Spain, together with occupied territories absorbed directly into France was a constant source of tension with all his continental neighbours. In May 1809, Napoleon proposed the absorption of the remaining Papal States. Naturally enough Pope Pius VII resisted the ‘man of peace’ and was promptly arrested and taken prisoner to Savona, via a deliberately tortuous route which broke his health. The entire Papal apparatus was moved to France. This final act against the Pope, a repetition of 1799 in which the exiled Pius VI had died in French custody, ensured that Napoleon earned the personal enmity of most Roman Catholics. The Austrians saw the embroilment of French forces in Spain as a golden opportunity for revenge and to regain her lost territory, and in 1809 she attacked.This, again, was no coalition of European powers as had been seen up to 1805 and it did not last long enough for Britain to provide significant militarily support. The abortive Walcheren campaign was mounted too late to have any effect on the main theatres of war in Germany and Italy. It can be claimed that Austria was the aggressor, but Napoleon himself had given Austria all the reasons it needed during the previous four years and it is simply unreasonable to have expected her to meekly accept Napoleon’s status quo if she had any hope of retaining any political or commercial influence in a Europe increasingly dominated by France. The outcome of the war is well enough known. It included Napoleon’s first defeat but the war was ultimately decided in France’s favour. The Treaty of Schönbrunn resulted in further Austrian territorial concessions. Part went to Bavaria, part to the Grand Duchy of Warsaw. The Ionian Islands, evacuated by Russia under the terms of the Treaty of Tilsit, were combined with other former Austrian territories to form the French province of Illyria. Finally, Austria was required to enforce the Continental System and sever all ties with Britain. Austria was now a de facto French ally with all which that implied. By 1810 the Napoleon’s Grand Empire controlled all of Germany, save Austria and what was left of Prussia, the Low Countries, the Italian peninsula, Switzerland, Poland and parts of the Adriatic and Balkans. This was a catalogue of conquest, annexation and creation of dependent vassal states. Punitive levies on defeated nations now amounted to a full third of France’s income; war was not only made to pay for war, it was a necessity. Combined with this was the ruthless exploitation of satellite states and over the period industries and commerce in Italy, Germany, Holland and the Hanseatic towns were systematically ruined in order to destroy competition thus protecting French commercial interests and to enforce the Continental System. The 4th CoalitionThe origins of the 4th Coalition can be traced initially to events of 1810 and Russian withdrawal from the Continental System. It ultimately involved all the principal European powers who exasperated by experiences of the preceding 10 years, at last, subordinated their own foreign and domestic policy agendas to a single unified aim which was to return France to her 1791 borders and, for the first time, included the removal of Napoleon. The result was his military defeat, abdication and first exile. By 1810 the Continental System was having a disastrous effect on the Russian economy and, indeed, the whole of Europe including France was in the grip of an increasingly severe economic depression. As already mentioned Russia depended on exports of raw materials, for which Britain had been a major customer. Imperial France and her Grand Empire of vassal states, which was an utterly unbalanced bloc dominated by French commerce, could not replace this market and Russia could no longer sell her produce as before. In addition to concerns about the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, Alexander was also aware by 1810 that Napoleon had no intention of honouring his agreement made at Tilsit in the context of Ottoman possessions in Europe and although Alexander had declared war on Britain, as required by the treaty, he did not prosecute it energetically. The effects of the Continental System have already been noted and Alexander, therefore, re-opened his ports to neutral shipping in the hope of restoring the Russian economy and to quell domestic discontent. The Russians placed tariffs on French imports, as France had always done to protect French commerce. Napoleon’s response was a demand that Russia confiscate all neutral ships in Russian ports on the grounds that they were carrying British goods. Alexander’s not unreasonable response was to withdraw from the Continental System in December 1810. In the same year, shortly after Bernadotte arrived in Sweden whose Diet had elected him Prince Royal, Napoleon sent the Swedes the by now familiar ultimatum in which he demanded that Sweden adopt the Continental System and declare war on Britain. The ‘man of peace’ informed the Swedes that failure to do so would result in a French declaration of war on Sweden. Sweden complied as she had little choice, thus the Baltic was surrounded by de facto French allies all of whom were officially at war with Britain but, importantly, it also ultimately made allies of two very unlikely partners, Sweden and Russia, who formed the embryo of the 4th Coalition of 1812-14. This was a singularly massive error of Napoleonic judgement on a par with his invasion of Spain and ultimately provided the other principal contribution to his fall. One of Napoleon’s most insensitive acts was his annexation of Oldenburg in December 1810, which strengthened his hold on the Baltic but to which Alexander had personal ties as his sister was married to the heir to the Duchy. This was coupled with the of French occupation of Danzig in contravention of the Treaty of Tilsit and movement forces into the Grand Duchy of Warsaw. Although it is perfectly true that both Napoleon and Alexander viewed another war as virtually inevitable, this was entirely the result of Napoleon’s provocations. Experience had shown that defensive postures were not, and never had been, in Napoleon’s nature. The extraordinary claim by Mr. Weider that Napoleon did not attack Russia in 1812 simply avoids a matter of historical fact. It was Napoleon who attacked Russia. He assembled an army of approximately half a million men and crossed the Niemen in June 1812 into the territory of a country which was still officially an ally. Whilst it is certainly true that Alexander made preparations for the coming war, to suggest that he was responsible for it is nonsense. Napoleon did not have to invade Russia at all and the reason he did was because Alexander had already come “to his senses” and left the Continental System, a commercially bankrupt arrangement which was causing him severe economic difficulties, leading to domestic unrest. It is simply unreasonable to expect Russia, or any other country for that matter, to subordinate her commercial and domestic well being to the interests of a foreign country. The campaigns of 1813 and 1814 were a continuation of the war which was initiated by Napoleon in 1812 and a natural consequence of his defeat in Russia, which gave Prussia and Austria the opportunity to throw off the Continental System, and with it Napoleonic commercial, political and military domination. More Napoleon Man of War Back to Table of Contents -- First Empire #56 Back to First Empire List of Issues Back to MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 2001 by First Empire. This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com |