Napoleon Man of War
The Second Coalition
By John Cook, UK
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The Second CoalitionThe principal causes of the Second Coalition were many.
2. The French seizure of Malta. 3. The French seizure of the Ionian Islands. 4. Declaration of the Roman Republic. 5. Declaration of the Helvetic Republic. 6. Imposition of a new government on the Batavian Republic. 7. Expulsion of Pope Pius VI from Rome. The invasion of Egypt in April 1798, the seizure of Malta and the Ionian islands struck a triple blow at the heart of Russian and British interests in the eastern Mediterranean. The seizure of Malta was a particular affront to Tsar Paul 1, who was Grand Master of the Knights of Malta. The imposition of a new government on the Batavian Republic and consequent alliance with France threatened British commercial interests, as ports in the Low Countries were critical conduits for British trade into continental markets. As far as Austria was concerned the Treaty of Campoformio was now seen to be a worthless piece of paper as the French clearly demonstrated that they intended, not only to tighten their hold over occupied territories, but had further designs in Germany, Switzerland and Italy. The expulsion of the Pope Pius VI, who died subsequently in French captivity was, of course, an affront to Roman Catholics generally. In 1799 the puppet Parthenopean Republic was formed from French occupied Naples and Napoleon, still little more than a servant of the French government like any other soldier, deserted his army in Egypt and returned to France. On 9-10 November his coup d’etat overthrew the Directorate. The Consular government which resulted was supposedly a provisional one in which Napoleon, Sieyès and Ducos were appointed provisional consuls. The constitution of 13 December confirmed the appointment of Napoleon as First Consul, with Cambacérès and Lebrun as Second and Third respectively. From the emergence of the Consular period it is possible to judge Napoleon’s motives and actions in the context of this article, for he was now head of the French state. Although it is perfectly true that after his appointment Napoleon made overtures to Britain and Austria which were, indeed, rejected, why on earth should they accept them? Under the circumstances it is quite unreasonable to expect otherwise. The French were bargaining from a position of weakness, they were almost entirely responsible for the war and the allies had every expectation of a favourable military resolution to it. Napoleon was not motivated by peace but by the need to buy time so that he could prepare for the campaigns of 1800. The Consular campaigns of Marengo and Hohenlinden changed the military situation and with the defeat of the Austrians the Treaty of Luneville was concluded the following year. This confirmed the conditions of the Treaty of Campoformio and, in addition, forced the Austrians to surrender all but a few remaining minor possessions in Italy and to recognise the Batavian, Helvetic and Ligurian Republics. Furthermore, Napoleon became the sole arbiter of indemnification for German Princes who had lost possessions on the Rhine. As Germany and northern Italy were in Austria’s sphere of influence this was an ingredient of for future conflict. In the meantime Russia had again withdrawn from her Austrian alliance, and the coalition, leaving Britain alone. Having retaken Malta and expelled the French from Egypt the British concluded the Treaty of Amiens with France on 25 March 1801. The Treaty of AmiensMr. Weider claims that Britain violated the terms of the Treaty of Amiens and was responsible for the rupture. This, to be blunt, is rubbish. The Treaty of Amiens was concluded by the Addington administration under the conditions of which France, amongst other things, conceded to withdraw from Naples and Rome, withdraw her forces from Holland and recognise the independence of the Ionian Islands. Britain reciprocated by returning colonies seized from France and most of those belonging to her Dutch and Spanish allies, and agreed to withdraw from Malta. No mention of was made concerning the resumption of British trade with the continent. This was an issue which the French negotiators, headed by Tallyrand and Joseph Bonaparte, refused to discuss. Addington’s administration expected, nevertheless, and somewhat naively, that having agreed a treaty, trade would resume. France now controlled a significant number of continental ports and all those on the Channel coast. This issue of trade and Napoleon’s refusal to allow British access to continental markets, wherever he could, was to be singularly instrumental in Britain’s involvement in continual war with France until Napoleon’s abdication in 1814. Napoleon had been proclaimed Consul for life on 4 August 1802 and, as head of state, the responsibility for the rupture of the Treaty of Amiens was entirely his. Hardly had the ink dried on the treaty when Napoleon took further actions which the British received with dismay and alarm, and as far as they were concerned justified retention of Malta.
2. Annexation of Piedmont. 3. Declaration of the Swiss Confederation, formed from the Helvetic Republic, which was allied to France and of which Napoleon was Mediator. 4. Evidence of renewed French ambition in the eastern Mediterranean. 5. The retention of French troops in Holland in contravention of the Treaty of Amiens. 6. The build up of French forces on the Channel coast, which were to become the Grande Armée. The revelations in the French government’s official newspaper Le Moniteur that Egypt was once again a target for French expansion was of particular concern. Above all was Napoleon’s continued refusal to allow British trade through continental ports in his control. This was to be an obsession with Napoleon which was ultimately expressed in the so-called Continental System. It was little more than a continuation and hardening of the policy of many predecessor French governments and was ultimately equally unsuccessful. The concentration of troops on the Channel coast which commenced in February 1803 was also sufficient evidence for the British government, if they needed any more, of Napoleon’s aggressive intent. The British ultimatum delivered on 23 April insisted on the retention of Malta for 10 years and the withdrawal of French troops from Holland in accordance with treaty provisions. In return Britain offered to recognise French Italian vassal states provided that France compensate Sardinia and Switzerland, both of which had lost territory. Napoleon made an attempt at a reconciliation by offering to allow Britain to retain Malta in exchange for a French occupation of the Italian port of Taranto. By now the British thoroughly mistrusted Napoleon and Addington rejected the offer. On 16 May 1803 authorisation was given to seize French shipping. More Napoleon Man of War Back to Table of Contents -- First Empire #56 Back to First Empire List of Issues Back to MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 2001 by First Empire. This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com |