Observations on
Deployments at Salamanca, 1812

A Question of Unrecognized SOPs at Work?

A Standard Battle Array?

by Howie Muir, Burkina Faso

If a standard operating procedure existed for deployment on the field of battle, or the approach march to it, it would have provided merely a point of departure for a commander, not an iron rule. In other words, in the absence of other overriding imperatives, it would have served a basis on which the units were placed with respect to one another. One can find a number of instances in which the commander departed from the SOP for reasons which were either self-evident or might be readily imagined: Abercrombie's right wing brigade at Alexandria was obviously deployed in such a way as to best accommodate the ruins that dominated that flank; at Coruņa, it made sense for the British Reserve Division to have the 95th initially deployed forward on the right – that was the kind of job it was trained for; Ross' (Anstruther's brigade) subsequent deployment in reverse order at Coruņa would have been quite sensible under the circumstances; equally, Davidovich's final deployment of his command at Castiglione on 3 August 1796, out of order, also made sense as a response to circumstances.

Thus, the thesis proposed is not an inescapable rule to which a commander was obliged to adhere at all times; rather it is to suggest that each nation, as a legacy of its development from a relatively codified form of earlier warfare, had retained a customary basis for executing deployments, absent other more pressing considerations or directives.

Having a standard basis would have helped officers to keep their bearings amidst the usual confusion and frequently poor visibility to be found on the battlefield. I have often scratched my head in wonderment as to how on earth couriers, orderlies, and ADCs managed to find the unit that was due to receive their missive. If it was possible for a messenger to anticipate that unit "X" was normally to be found to the right of unit "Y", the odds of his rapidly locating the unit were improved. The argument might be similarly extended up the chain, with caution, to various steps in the command hierarchy. Perhaps it is also worth noting that such a SOP would more likely have applied in a set-piece battle than a meeting engagement, where commanders had time to deploy as thought fit rather than when they found themselves feverishly trying to establish a front line and grabbed anything at hand to do it. Not least, manoeuvring a battalion with known entities of established habit or predictability to the flanks would have made the activity easier and perhaps more efficient.

Finally, the steady repetition of the seeming use of a hierarchy of seniority in the British army seems inescapable. Circumstantial, and based largely on secondary sources, admittedly, I present this only as a thesis worthy of further consideration. I confess myself quite surprised at the consistency in Wellington's deployment at Talavera. Equally, I was surprised to find that with the thesis I could make sense of Davidovich's arrival and initial deployment at Castiglione. I regret that I haven't more sources at hand, and that what I have is largely British-oriented. Nevertheless, as illustrated by the Battle of Salamanca, there do seem to be grounds for suggesting that there were SOPs of some sort that provided a point of departure for commanders, however different those may have been developed in each army.

If, indeed, there were SOPs, the anticipation of their application or the decision by a commander to deploy differently would have contributed to developing a battle in a particular way, could partly explain errors committed on the field, and might provide some pieces to the never-ending puzzle of how and why commanders arrived at the decisions taken. I don't mean to suggest that it explains all or even most of the crucial bits, but if there were SOPs (and it is hard to believe there weren't), I am surprised how little the literature explores them.

Would adherence to an SOP, or lack of it, translate for a tabletop wargame? Would upper-echelon orders become easier or harder to transmit or implement? Would battalion commanders suffer fewer or more frequent fits of hesitation as they tried to determine on whom they were to align, which battalion they were to support, or with which to co-ordinate? With the smoke, noise, terror, and general horrific abandon, one could imagine that consistency of neighbours had a role to play in keeping the howling oblivion of total chaos at bay ... certainly most important would be the neighbouring company (how else could the battalion manoeuvre smoothly), but perhaps the neighbouring battalion would be influential (not to say critical) as well? Modern units, under far more dispersed battlefield conditions, might not value that neighbourliness as much as our forefathers – but I would hasten to defer to those who have the relevant military experience to judge such matters. Yet such dispersal could dim modern appreciation for well-established neighbours in a close order line of battle.

In the course of your next detailed exploration of a battle, it might be worth pausing to consider if a "Standard Deployment Procedure" might have influenced the development of the engagement when examining the command decisions made and the dynamics of the constituent combats. It may be surprising to what degree the customs of seniority in deployment shaped the battle.

Sources:

Maj.-Gen. Sir Alexander Dickson, The Dickson Manuscripts, vol. 4, edited by Maj. John H. Leslie, republished by Ken Trotman, Ltd, Cambridge, 1990.
General Foy, History of the War in the Peninsula, Under Napoleon; to which is Prefaced a View of the Political and Military State of the Four Belligerent Powers, English translation, published by Treuttel and Würtz, Treuttel, Jun. and Richter, London, 1829.
Rory Muir, Tactics and the Experience of Battle in the Age of Napoleon, Yale University Press, New Haven & London, 1998. A series of private e-mail exchanges with Rory Muir (indicated above as RM; he bears neither responsibility for my errors of interpretation nor the burden of any known kinship to me beyond the happy accident of family names); he is presently researching a full-length, detailed study of the battle of Salamanca.
Maj.-Gen. Sir W.F.P. Napier, A History of the War in the Peninsula, vol. 4, W.J. Widdleton, New York, 1862.
Sir Charles Oman, A History of the Peninsular War, vol. 5, republished by Greenhill Books, London, 1996.
Sir Charles Oman, Wellington's Army, 1809-1814, reprinted Greenhill Books., London, 1993.
McGuigan, who doggedly helped me to sort out the nuanced seniority of British officers (errors of comprehension and interpretation are my own). I must note the remarkable utility of the internet; it permitted communication that allowed an American, living in West Africa, to turn to individuals in Australia, Canada, and the U.S. for research assistance with exploring a battle in Spain, as well as facilitated the submission of the result to a British publication!

A Postscript

Naturally, it is only after having submitted the article that I happened across this passage in Carl von Clauswitz's "Principles of War" (trans. & ed. by Hans W. Gatzke, The Stackpole Company, Harisburg, PA,1960; p.30):

    "We should establish one battle-order (the arrangement of troops before and during combat) for the whole campaign or the whole war. This order will serve in all cases when there is not time for a special disposition of troops. It should, therefore, be calculated primarily for the defensive. This battle-array will introduce a certain uniformity into the fighting-method of the army, which will be useful and advantageous.

    For it is inevitable that a large part of the lower generals and other officers at the head of small contingents have no special knowledge of tactics and perhaps no outstanding aptitude for the conduct of war.

    "Thus there arises a certain methodism in warfare to take the place of art, wherever the latter is absent. In my opinion this it to the highest degree the case in the French armies."

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