Observations on
Deployments at Salamanca, 1812

A Question of Unrecognized SOPs at Work?

Anglo-Allies

by Howie Muir, Burkina Faso

The SOP

I deduce the guiding principle of battle array for the British army to have been one of alternating seniority to the wings, with priority to the right: the most senior on the right, the next senior on the left, the third most senior on the inside right, the fourth on the inside left, and so forth. The Lead Up.

In fact, it does appear that Wellington moved his army during the days leading up to the engagement in an order of battle that would have been familiar to any soldier of the previous century's wars. An order for the Movement of the Army on the 1st July 1812 (dated 30 June) directs: "The army to move tomorrow, the 1st July, in three columns. The right column, consisting of Major-General Bock's brigade of cavalry, the 1st, 7th, and 4th Divisions, to move by the right from Canizal towards Alaejos. . . The centre column, consisting of Major-General le Marchant's brigade of cavalry, the 5th and 6th Divisions, to move by the right. . ." (Wellington's Supplementary Despatches, vol. 14, pp. 55-56, courtesy of RM). Note that the infantry's battle order is implicit and conforms to the expected SOP, and with the French to the left, north of the Douro, one would expect the British, moving eastward, to march with their right in front. An earlier, undated movement order (ibid., pp. 70-71, from RM) entitled, "Memorandum for the Quartermaster-General," apparently written on 16 June 1812, arranged for Wellington's three approach columns to encircle Salamanca: the first column under Picton (3rd Division, Pack's and then Bradford's Portuguese brigades, followed by de Espana's Spanish Division) led by the left while crossing the Tormes and circling west of Salamanca; the third column under Graham (1st and 7th Divisions) led by the right, circling east of the city; the second column, under Beresford ("5th Division, followed by the 4th Division") marched by its left to the east of the city, presumably covering its sister third column from interference by Marmont to the north. Each column was specifically directed to move in an order compatible with presenting the customary battle array to the flank most likely to be threatened.

Napier's narrative of the days leading up to the July engagement refers constantly to the "lines of battle" in which the British marched, and clearly the order in which Divisions moved, and even in which column they marched, changed frequently owing to a wide variety of circumstances and evolving needs. Oman notes that on 20 July, as a result of changing topography, the two armies moved into increasingly close proximity: "The movements of the two armies tended to converge . . . It seemed likely that the heads of the marching columns must collide, and that a combat, if not a general action, would ensue."

Oman immediately goes on to observe: "Each army was marching as if in an order that could be converted into a battle line by simply facing the men to right or to left respectively. Wellington had his troops in three parallel columns, the first one, that nearest to the French, being composed of the 1st, 4th, 5th and Light Divisions, the second, which would have formed the supporting line if the army had fronted and gone into action, contained the 6th and 7th and Pack's and Bradford's [Portuguese] brigades: the 3rd Division and España's Spaniards formed a reserve, moving farthest from the enemy. The light cavalry were marching ahead of the column, the heavy cavalry and D'Urban's Portuguese brought up the rear." (Oman, p. 411).

At the end of the day this order of march was altered with the 6th Division and the Anglo-German light cavalry (under von Alten, who would turn the brigade over to the KGL Hussars' Arentschildt after being wounded on the morning of the 22nd) placed as a rearguard at Aldea Lengua and its fords (Oman, p. 413). During the early morning hours of 21 July, the allied army occupied the previous month's position at San Cristobal, then later in the afternoon mirrored the French move to cross the Tormes "practically in battle order, in two lines," while the reserve (now the 3rd Division and D'Urban's cavalry) remained north of the river to guard against a French "dash" for Salamanca (Oman, p. 416). Unfortunately, neither Oman nor Napier specify which Divisions comprised which column and thus the disposition of the army when Wellington encamped his forces on 21 July.

The morning of 22 July had seemed to promise an almost immediate combat. The battle order of the army is difficult to deduce, but may have been something akin to the following. While the 3rd Division and D'Urban's cavalry remained north of the Tormes at Cabrerizos, the main British left, the Light Division, seems to have been posted by 22 July somewhere near Carbajosa or Santa Maria, having crossed the Tormes at Cabrerizos the previous evening. Next in line, to the south and east, and behind the stream bed of the Pelagarcia, according to Oman's sources, "the 4th Division camped in the wood just west of Nuestra Señora de la Peña [Vere, p.31], the 5th on high ground in rear of Calvarisa de Ariba [Leith Hay, p. 45], the 7th a little farther south, also in woody ground [diary of Wheeler of the 51st]" (Oman, p. 415).

Le Marchant's heavy cavalry appear to have occupied ground between the 5th and 7th Divisions (based on an account by Green of the 68th Foot of that night's violent thunderstorm) – although Napier's account places this cavalry further north, near Santa Marta). At least elements of British light cavalry were picketing forward of the left flank, as far ahead as Calvarisa de Abaxo. The specific location of the 1st and 6th Divisions or of the independent Portuguese brigades remains open to speculation. Perhaps these formed the second line The whole disposition was apparently masked by both woods at the centre of the line and placement on the reverse slope of the plateau which ran south from Santa Marta to the west of the Pelagarcia and thus shielded most of the British army from French observation.

According to Foy, quoted by Oman, the French could observe the 7th Division, visible in the wood not far from Calvarisa de Ariba (Oman, p.420), as well as a distant column that turned out to be Wellington's baggage train in motion, headed for the Cuidad Roderigo road. The morning skirmishing which developed between the heavy screen that Wellington had the 7th Division deploy against Foy's Division opposite received support from von Alten's light cavalry brigade. At sometime after midday, the Light Division replaced the 7th, and the 95th Regiment took over from the 7th Division skirmishers, as the latter was moved to the centre-rear by Wellington, who had become convinced that no serious French initiative was to be expected on his left.

Yet, by early morning, it appears that the British army was already being rearranged by Wellington, for the race to the Greater Arapile on his right drew upon the 4th Division which was by now the closest formation – indicating that it must have already been shifted south from its camping area. Thus, not long after first light it would appear that Wellington was adjusting for an expected French effort to turn his right and to meet it Wellington was already engaged in leapfrogging his Divisions south and westwards behind the cover of the plateau.

The British Shift to the Right

After Bonnet established French possession of the Greater Arapile, Wellington observed midmorning that Marmont was subsequently engaged in moving five French Divisions leftwards on the hinge that this terrain feature and Bonnet's Division now constituted. Accordingly, the British now accelerated their own, mirroring displacement to the right, hinged for its part on the redeployment of the 4th Division and Pack's Portuguese brigade around the Lesser Arapile.

Oman sketches out the distribution of Wellington's army as of dawn of 22nd July, but it is a bit vague, perhaps owing to a lack of extant primary resource information. He specifies the Light and 1st Divisions as being established on the left of the 4th Division – presumably to the northeast, as the 7th was still lightly engaged with Foy to the left. "At the same time Wellington moved down the troops which had originally formed his left wing (5th and 6th Divisions, España's Spaniards, and Bradford's Portuguese) to a supporting position behind his centre, somewhere near the village of Las Torres, where they could reinforce either his right or his left. . . As a further general reserve G. Anson's and Le Marchant's cavalry brigades, and the greater part of Victor Alten's were brought away from the original left and placed in reserve near the 6th Division" (Oman, p. 425), while Bock and von Alten's/Arentshildt's remaining squadron (apparently only one of the 14th Light Dragoons, in spite of Oman's plural description) stayed on the left. At the same time he ordered the 3rd Division and the remainder of D'Urban's cavalry brigade to cross the Tormes and place themselves between Aldea Tejeda and La Penilla in the far right rear of the army, covering the road to Ciudad Roderigo (Oman, p.425). They started their move about noon and reached their new positions around 2 o'clock.

Fortescue's map, depicting Marmont's morning position as he commenced his initial extension to the left, places the 5th and 6th Division (later joined by the 7th division) waiting south and east of Carbajosa, and the 1st Division appears in close support of the Light Division on the plateau facing east toward Foy at Calvarasa de Ariba.

Sometime around noon, Wellington appears to have considered launching the Light and 1st Divisions against Bonnet's French in an effort to seize the Greater Arapile, from which Beresford dissuaded him. Later in the afternoon (no hour given by either Oman or Napier) the Light Division replaced the 7th on the left and the 7th hastened to join the reserve behind the centre. Thus, it would appear that the Light and 1st Divisions were positioned in that order, left to right.

Although Marmont's redeployments were making themselves visible by 2 o'clock and a substantial cannonade and energetic skirmish erupted in the centre sometime thereafter, it appears that not until about 3 o'clock was Wellington's attention drawn to Marmont's increasingly awry dispositions. Shortly thereafter, Wellington set his offensive in motion.

1st Division

The 1st Division's peregrinations during the battle are not particularly clear. At one point during the morning, it appears to have been posted not far north of the village of Arapiles, and then waited through the afternoon just north of the Lesser Arapile, a position generally corroborated by Ingilby (a lieutenant in Gardener's attached battery, see Dickson, p. 695). On the other hand, Fortescue's map for the morning places the 1st Division, at some point in time, in support of the Light Division on the left after the 7th Division's withdrawal. In any event, the division seems to have confined its only real engagement during the main battle to the work of its light companies in defence of the village of Arapile (where they had been placed early in the morning) in concert with the light companies of the Fusilier brigade (Oman, p. 434). These light companies were hard pressed by Maucune's skirmishers during the apparent development of a French attack in the centre in the early mid-afternoon.

Finally, as the 6th Division advanced across the valley in the late afternoon to succour the defeated 4th, the 1st Division was put in motion toward the Greater Arapile – although it may have moved off tardily (Oman, p. 461, drawing on Napier) and not quite headed for Wellington's intended destination. It's order of march is not established by Oman or Napier, except to say that the 3rd Brigade, the KGL, appears to have led the way, forcing the last regiment of Bonnet's Division to abandon the hill and retire, badly harassed by the KGL light companies. The fact that the 3rd Brigade led seems peculiar in light of the consideration of seniority of placement, for one might have expected it to occupy the middle of the Divisional line as the most junior brigade. Curiously, I note that in Wellesley's General Order of May 1809 the KGL brigade appears to be considered as outside the numbering of British brigades, those of the 1st Division had also occupied the leftmost flank at Talavera in 1809; at Bussaco, in 1810, the KGL brigade acted quite separately from the 1st Division (placed north of the convent, far to the left!); on the first day at Fuentes d'Onoro (although the second day found the KGL in a supporting line), at Vittoria, Bidassoa, and Nivelle, the deployments are not specified in Oman.

If they were customarily the leftmost brigade, that would have meant that the 1st Division had advanced with its left in front, suggesting that it anticipated a deployment to the right in support of Clinton rather than to the left against Foy. Alternatively, the KGL light companies and rifle-armed sharpshooters, which shared the excellent reputation of their colleagues in the centre companies, might well have been advanced as a skirmish screen even if the Division's right flank had led, as the Guard's brigade had left its light companies in the village that morning.

3rd Division

The deployment and evolutions of this Division, on the actions of which arguably hung the fate of Wellington's offensive action and the success of the battle, presents a number of nearly irresolvable questions. Their exploration is nevertheless worthwhile, but requires a degree of detailed consideration that not every reader may enjoy, so please feel free to pass on to the last paragraph of the section and continue! Oman remarks on Pakenham's initial arrangement of his Division for the advance Wellington ordered to open his counteroffensive. D'Urban's Portuguese and Arentschildt's Anglo-German cavalry formed the right two columns, Wallace's British brigade formed the head of the third (from the right) and Campbell's the leftmost column, while Power's Portuguese brigade was placed in the third column following Wallace – and it is this arrangement that drew Oman's comment. "The object of this formation was that the division, when it came into action, should be able to deploy into two lines, without the delay that would have been caused if the third brigade [Power's] had followed in the wake of the other two." (Oman, p.440)

Indeed, when Wallace later deployed against Thomières, his regiments were disposed in the expected order of alternating seniority, left to right: 74th – 88th – 45th. A couple interesting points lurk here, as do some as yet irresolvable mysteries. Oman notes earlier (p. 436) that Pakenham's resting Division had stood to arms only moments before Wellington's arrival to issue the orders that put the Division in motion. Oman quotes Grattan (of the 88th) as indicating that the battle commenced within half an hour of this order being given – a time Oman sets as "quarter to four". (On the other hand, Napier sets the start of the 3rd Division's engagement with the French at five o'clock [Napier, p. 57] ). Given that Pakenham "had some two miles of rough ground to cover" (Oman p. 440), it appears that he didn't spend much time rearranging his forces – which suggests that the disposition of battalions within the brigades possibly remained unaltered.

The deployment for the approach march appears to be a logical extension of what one would have assumed to be the earlier order of march. Commanding the senior British brigade, Wallace would normally have been the leading brigade in the column of march if the Division were marching with the "right in front", and the Portuguese brigade would have occupied the middle of the column of march as the most junior brigade, given Britain's habit of alternating senior postings by flank. Hence, it would appear from Oman's account and his sources that not only had Pakenham prepared to bring the Division rapidly into battle order by a simultaneous left wheel of companies, but that the preparations for the strike at Thomières were made with the tactical choice in view of crossing his front wheeling into line

Nevertheless, the arrangement that brought Campbell to the left of the other two brigades appears peculiar and raises a further and intriguing mystery. If all four columns were evenly abreast, that would have meant that Campbell's brigade would have become the first line when the units wheeled left. This was not what transpired. Campbell in fact became a supporting second or third line (depending on how one reads the account). If Pakenham foresaw engaging first with Wallace's brigade, with the others in support, one would have anticipated the initial deployments of the British brigades to have been reversed. Napier's account seems to confirm that Pakenham's approach to Thomières was indeed a kind of land-bound version of the nautical crossing of the "T".

Napier contemplates Marmont's imagined horror when he "saw Pakenham with the third division shoot like a meteor across Thomières' path" (Napier, p. 56). Napier goes on to observe that, "The British columns formed lines as they marched. . ." Oman is in accord, noting: "Wallace's three battalions formed line from open column without halting, when they had got to within 250 yards of the enemy.…" He goes on to quote Grattan of the 88th: " the different companies, by throwing forward their right shoulders, were in line without the slow manoeuvre of a deployment" (Oman, p.443). It was Wallace that led the Division's attack, not Campbell. This suggests to me that Pakenham may have made his initial preparations quite on the fly and launched the columns forward without waiting for Campbell's brigade to come abreast with Wallace or even Power; or possibly, Campbell was slowed somewhat on the approach.

Alternatively, if Oman's dispositions are correct, perhaps Pakenham was taking the precaution of preparing to deploy ahead from his line of march should the situation have required this on contact with the French: this would make sense of Campbell's placement to the left and Wallace to the right with Power following to provide support. Indeed, D'Urban relates discovering that the leading French battalion of Thomières' Division had already crossed Pakenham's line of march by the time the Portuguese cavalry encountered the enemy. This scenario would have required Pakenham, as the Division closed in on the head of Thomières' column, to have halted Campbell to allow Wallace to advance ahead of Campbell's brigade before executing a left wheel into line to charge the French. Campbell would have then had to continue forward after Wallace's line passed on toward the French, thereafter advancing for perhaps another ten or fifteen minutes to reach a position permitting it to wheel into line and follow behind the first British brigade, with the Portuguese paralleling their action to form a third line. This is very fancy footwork, however, and arguably a risky minuet in the face of the enemy, although it would have provided the maximum flexibility for an assault whose target's exact position was not clearly established until shortly before contact.

On the other hand, if Oman and his sources could be conceived to have mis-constructed the order of Pakenham's columns (in spite of Oman's footnote crediting D'Urban and the regimental history of the 45th, on p. 440), preparations to have Wallace form the leading brigade of an assault to be launched after wheeling companies to the left would have required him to have lead the left not the right column. In correspondence on the matter, Rory Muir hypothesised that the relative positions of the brigades may have been influenced by accidents of their rearguard deployment north of the Tormes and their march to Aldea Tejada.

Presuming that they had been deployed in the normal order of precedence in and around Cabrerizos on the morning of the battle, when the order came to move south, the likely dispositions would have made it logical for Wallace on the right of the line to cross at the Cabrerizos ford. The desire to limit delay would have dictated that Powers' Portuguese, the next brigade to the west, set off southwards to cross at the next ford, Santa Marta. Meanwhile, Campbell, on the left, would have found it most expedient to head southwest to cross the Tormes by the city bridges – and, indeed, there is at least one source that vouches that the 5th Foot of Campbell's brigade passed through Salamanca. This division of routes would have facilitated a prompt fulfilment of Wellington's orders, minimised the inevitable bottlenecks at the available crossings, and avoided the logistical hazards which often accompany large formations attempting to cross each others' paths. With their collective arrival at Aldea Tejada, they would have found themselves not only facing south, but now in the reverse of their normal order of precedence, with Wallace on the left. Powers could have followed either British brigade, but to have been in the third column behind Campbell, would have been most logical in terms of preparing to give battle to the left in a succession of supported brigade lines. (The preceding is based on private information from RM.)

In any case, Wallace's brigade led the final attack, its companies wheeling left into line (and in proper order of seniority) to commence its assault on the head of Thomières' column. Such a deployment would certainly have made for a very rapid attack and offered the British the greatest fire advantage of line over Thomières' columns – an advantage apparently gained in part because Pakenham's troops remained invisible to Thomières until only the final 1,000 yards (Oman, p. 442) owing to the lay of the terrain and the light woods which had screened the British from his view (a point on which both Oman and Napier seem to be in general agreement). It would appear that Campbell's British and Power's Portuguese successively wheeled into line to follow Wallace. Moreover, Oman indicates that owing largely to French artillery and musket fire the centre of Wallace's line lagged (the 88th) while the flank regiments pressed forward, rendering the first line more concave in appearance. I wonder if these two aspects are what Napier refers to when writing: "Pakenham broke the half-formed lines into fragments, and sent the whole in confusion upon" the French.

Thus, it appears that Pakenham's deployment decisions (whatever they may have been precisely) were shaped in concert with an apparent British practice of adhering to alternating regimental seniority within a brigade and the arrangement of brigades within the Division. Moreover, there appears to have been a conscientious consideration of the order of march and approach march with respect to which wing of the formation needed to be in front. Unfortunately, I cannot glean the battalion deployments for Campbell's (except that the 1/5th was on the right, however, as evidenced by its combat with Curto's chasseurs [Oman. P. 444] ) and Power's brigade's – but I'd hazard suggest that Campbell was deployed left-right 2/83rd – 94th – 2/5th – 1/5th and Power as 21st – 9th; the 12th Caçadores were already detached in a skirmishing role, joining the three companies of the 5/60th which were also sent forward to screen the final advance (Oman, p. 443).

D'Urban's & Arentschildt's Cavalry Brigades

The supporting cavalry also appears to have adopted traditional battle order. Among D'Urban's Portuguese cavalry, the 1st led and the 11th followed. In Arentschildt's British cavalry brigade, the 14th Light Dragoons were followed by the 1st KGL Hussars. According to Oman's research, the 14th (with two squadrons) wound up charging with the Portuguese. Thus, both apparently had their "right in front". Curiously, neither Oman nor Napier specifies which brigade formed which column. D'Urban's Portuguese apparently arrived in the lead and opened the engagement with a charge launched just as Wallace's brigade prepared its attack (Oman, pp. 441-2). The rest of Arentschildt's brigade (e.g., the 1st KGL Hussars) does not seem to have come up until after this charge and the subsequent attack mounted by Curto's chasseurs, which the British and German cavalry drove off. Then, as the British assault drove on to pursue Thomières' broken Division, eventually to meet Maucune's, Oman indicates that D'Urban's Portuguese were on Pakenham's immediate right while Arentschildt's cavalry moved still further to the right, observing and periodically engaging Curto's French cavalry.

Although confirmation of the original column distribution is not clear, one might surmise that Arentschildt's British and German troopers formed the first, or outer column on the approach march and D'Urban's Portuguese the inner, second column. The delay of the latter's arrival at the point of contact might be explained by the attack's 90 degree turn to the left (as Pakenham deployed from columns to line); the change of axis would have left Arentschildt's troopers to the rear of D'Urban's column. Alternatively, perhaps Arentschildt's brigade was riding somewhat to the rear of D'Urban's front.

4th Division

Cole's Division appears to have been manoeuvred in the early morning with its brigades in the normal order of seniority, so that when it deployed midmorning westward of the Lesser Arapile and Pack's independent Portuguese brigade, Stubbs' Portuguese formed the left brigade and Ellis' Fusiliers the right. Stubbs' constituent regiments were also traditionally arrayed: 23rd – 11th. Interestingly, the other British brigade of the Division, that of W. Anson, early on had been committed to covering the Lesser (or British) Arapile, with the 3/27th on the hill and the 1/40th in support below.

William Anson, commanding the First Brigade, had been appointed major-general on 4 June 1811 replacing Kemmis, who had departed earlier in the year; Ellis of the 1/27th was temporarily in command of the Second Brigade after Maj.-Gen. Barnard Bowes' reassignment to the 6th Division in May (Wellington's Army, p.362). Customary seniority suggests that Anson's brigade would initially have led the 4th Division's column of march which, having arrived that morning on the army's right flank near the Lesser Arapile, would have made the leading brigade the logical and closest candidate for the task of defending the eminence. Already, because of the Division's proximity, it had fallen to the Division's light troops (7th Caçadores) to race the French for the Greater Arapile at 8 o'clock that morning. When the attempt failed and the 7th Caçadores retired, it was "to behind the Lesser Arapile, which was held by the first British brigade of their division (W. Anson's)" (Oman, p.423). Thus, it would appear that the order of march, dictated by the anticipated need to conduct it in a manner ready to deploy in battle order, shaped the choice of which of the 4th Division's brigades occupied the hill and which were later to be committed to the afternoon's attack. Maintenance of the principle of seniority would also appear to have guided the Division's subsequent redeployment to the right of the Lesser Arapile.

Presumably Ellis' brigade was to the rear of Stubbs' brigade (although I have nothing to establish this) and, being its senior, would have had to march past the rear of Stubbs' deploying brigade to reach its right during the afternoon's disposition for the British attack. If true, this would shed some light on what might be considered a minor deployment snafu that became evident during the Division's advance later that afternoon.

Wellington must have arrived not long after his 4 o'clock visit to the neighbouring 5th Division to deliver orders for the advance in company with the 5th. Possibly at this time additional skirmishers were deployed (the 7th Caçadores and the Brunswick Oels company), if not already forward (it is hard to tell from Oman)., While Napier does not note it, Oman remarks on the need for the Fusilier brigade to pass, during the Division's advance, "through the end of the village of the Arapiles, which it did by files from the right of companies, the companies forming up again on the east side of the place, upon their sergeants regularly sent out as markers.

The defile delayed the advance of the division, which therefore attacked decidedly later than Leith's men, the joint movement being in an échelon, with the right [5th Division] leading and the left [4th Division] considerably refused" (Oman, p.447). While it is possible (some opinion would hold, probable) that Wellington intended an echeloned attack with Divisions striking in succession from right to left, it would appear that a significant period of time separated the attacks of the 4th and 5th Divisions, although the amount of time is difficult to ascertain with any accuracy (perhaps as much as an hour if one follows Oman).

Whatever the delay, a contributory source may ultimately have been the decision to maintain the hierarchy of seniority in the Division's remaining brigades. The initial deployment of Stubbs' brigade first would have made a misjudgement of the ground remaining for Ellis' brigade far more likely. If Ellis had already been in the lead during the Division's arrival on the ground, I suspect that it would have deployed sufficiently further east to have avoided the need for the Fusiliers to pass through the village; the reverse order of deployment engendered far greater awkwardness, as it would have required the four line battalions of Stubbs' brigade to relocate by a flank march to clear enough space for Ellis to avoid overlapping the village. The delay and separation must have been considerable, for Oman sets the time of Leith's contact with Maucune as soon after 5 o'clock (Oman, p.448). Based on the memoirs of Wacholz (in the Brunswick Oels Jägers), the 4th Division's advance after passing the village started at about 5:45 pm (Oman, p. 455) – nearly an hour after the 5th Division had been launched (Oman, p. 437). This lengthy delay seems hard to reconcile with the timing of events on its right, but it might be interesting to speculate on the outcome of the initial British attack in the centre if both Division's had struck together or with tighter timing

Stubbs' Portuguese brigade succeeded in driving off the three battalions of Bonnet's 122e Ligne, posted on an advanced spur some distance to the west of the Greater Arapile and the greater mass of Bonnet's Division. The 7th Caçadores were detailed to follow it, covering the Division's left flank (meanwhile, Pack's brigade was advancing in the hope of occupying the attention of the remainder of Bonnet's Division), while the rest of the 4th Division pressed on against Clausel's position. Unfortunately, nowhere in either Napier or Oman can I deduce solid hints of the order of Ellis' brigade deployment which, on the basis of custom, would have been, left to right: 1/23rd – 1/48th – 1/7th.

The 4th lost to Clausel and was driven back by the combination of his spirited counterattack and the flank attack mounted by most of Bonnet's Division after the latter defeated Pack and steamrollered the 7th Caçadores. The impact of the French attack, further aided by the arrival of Boyer's dragoons on the British left, seems to have knocked the 4th Division rearward and obliquely to its right, northwest toward the village. Stubbs' leftmost Portuguese regiment, the 23rd, is noted as having formed square at one point with elements of the Fusilier brigade! And Boyer's dragoons ranged far afield, threatening even the 2/53rd at the centre of the 6th Division advancing from behind to the support of the 4th.

Ellis' brigade rallied, but one wonders where. Oman's map (after p. 481) suggests that it rallied to the right of the 6th Division's route, near the village, a direction that would accord with the recoil from Boyer's cavalry attack.

On the other hand, there are apparently references to the 6th passing through remnants of the 4th Division (according to private remarks by RM), although Oman does not refer the event. Nevertheless, after the Fusilier brigade rallied, it is later to be found advancing on the left of the 6th Division (Oman, p. 464), meaning that if it had not been passed through by the 6th Division, it had crossed obliquely behind the 6th to arrive in time to support the concluding fire-fight against Ferey's rearguard stand.

5th Division

During the later part of the morning, this Division was drawn from the left to a position to the rear of the centre. Apparently Marmont was able to observe it and the 6th Division from the Greater Arapile in the Anglo-allied rear area, still in motion toward the centre at 11 o'clock (Oman, p.426). The cannonade that opened up in the centre after 2 o'clock led Wellington to anticipate a French assault. He therefore ordered the 5th Division from its sheltered position in the lee of the low ridge north of village of Arapile up to the crest, on line with the 4th Division to its left. There the Division halted just below the crest and lay down to minimise casualties from the bombardment (Rory Muir, p.159).

Wellington arrived to give Leith his orders sometime after the commander-in-chief's 3:45 visit to Pakenham. It is not clear from Oman if Wellington stopped to give Bradford, España, or Cotton their orders during the course of his return, or if orderlies were dispatched with instructions. Oman postulates Wellington's arrival at the 5th Division at sometime around 4 o'clock, upon which he specified the Division's deployment for its attack as well as its timing (according to Leith Hay in Narrative of the Peninsular War, p.157, as given in Rory Muir, p. 146), after which he rode on to Cole (Oman, p.437). Leith deployed skirmishers and advanced his Division to the crest, but was compelled by his orders to wait for Bradford's Portuguese brigade to come up on his right before advancing (Oman, p. 437). Leith's advance finally began at about 4:40 pm (Oman p.437).

Greville's brigade was placed in the first line. It appears that the 1/38th was in the centre (Rory Muir, p. 160) and the 1/9th on the left (private information supplied by Rory Muir), which indicates that the brigade was probably in its customary order of 1/9th – 2/38th – 1/38th – 3/1st. Greville's brigade was some 2,528 strong and supported by Spry's Portuguese with 2,305 (minus one-fifth, or perhaps 450 for the 8th Caçadores, leaving perhaps 1,855 in line) and Pringle's British brigade, placed to the right of Spry in the second line. The latter's brigade was divided on Wellington's express orders so as to equalise the two lines: the 1/4th (457 strong) was moved forward to the right of Greville's brigade, making a front line total of 2,985, while the rest of the brigade (1,254) remained in support, making for a second line total of perhaps as much as 3,109 – in fact, remarkably equal (an equality only slightly lessened if the departure to the Divisional skirmish line of the British light companies is included: roughly one-tenth would suggest ~298 from the front line and ~125 from the second)! If Pringle's brigade was deployed in the customary order (2/30th – 2/44th – 2/4th – 1/4th), it indeed would have made sense to advance the 1/4th to join Greville as it would have come from the right extremity of Pringle's line and required the least adjustment to deployments.

The Division's disposition seems a curious one, especially as it was dictated by the Army commander himself – a decision that would ordinarily be left to a Division commander. By all means, a supported attack was to be preferred, so a second line was quite a sensible choice. Yet, one might also have imagined unity of command would have transcended the geometric pleasures of precisely balanced lines and the consequences of an oddly distributed brigade under Pringle. Why was it not more useful to deploy one or two complete brigades forward with the remainder in support (as both Pakenham and Clinton seem to have eventually done, and the wisdom of which seems to be reflected in the defeat of Cole's unsupported line)?

Victorious against Maucune's Division, with which it engaged shortly after 5 o'clock (Oman, p. 448), Spry's brigade in the supporting line was sometime thereafter redirected by Beresford diagonally to its left to strike the triumphant Clausel's flank in the wake of the 4th Division's defeat. This Portuguese threat did indeed inhibit further French advance, both protecting the 5th Division's open left flank and pinning Clausel in the face of the 6th Division's approach, while Beresford collected a chest wound for his trouble.

6th Division

The Division must have reached its position in the rear of the centre by noon. Wellington then advanced it from its reserve position to the sheltered area behind the 4th Division when the French cannonade began in the early mid-afternoon, and perhaps into the 4th's position when that Division moved forward to attack Clausel. Finally, to support the defeated 4th in its retreat, the 6th was called upon to support the attack in the centre.

Interestingly, Ingilby of Gardner's battery, attached to the 1st Division (Dickson, p. 695), observed the 6th's manoeuvres prior to commitment and offers a slightly different depiction. He places the 6th Division directly behind the Lesser Arapile during the early afternoon with "the 1st Division … not yet in line, but .. on the right of the 6th and rather in reserve." After the cannonade opened up in the centre: "the 1st Division at a brisk pace made a movement in close columns to attack, but that being suddenly counter-ordered, the Division directly occupied the position of the 6th Division, which quitted it ground rapidly in open column, wheeled into line on the spot we had just left and advanced to attack the centre of the French line. . ."

While the respective relationships of the Divisions are difficult to reconcile, the observation of the 6th Division's departure for combat is interesting. It departed in open columns ready for the foreseen left wheel of regiments' companies into a battle line. Such an action implies that Clinton had readied his Division for this, and provides grounds for imagining that the British SOP for deployment might well have been followed.

According to Oman, brevet Colonel Samuel Hinde's Second Brigade was on the left (presumably deployed left-right 1/32nd – 1/36th – 2nd), and Maj.-Gen. Richard Hulse's First on the right, in the prescribed order: 2/53rd – 1/61st – 1/11th (Oman, pp. 459 & 463). I must note, however, that other reputable sources (Fortescue, Lawford & Young, R. Muir) rely on evidence that these two brigades were reversed (which, if such were the case, would place Lewin, of the 1/32nd, one of Oman's frequently cited sources for this part of the battle, neatly in the middle of the line). In any case, Rezende's Portuguese formed the second line (deployment order unknown, but presumably 12th – 8th Line, and I will predict that the 9th Caçadores were placed on the brigade's right). In Oman's words, "the 6th Division, who advancing straight before them [and there is the possibility that perhaps part of Hulse's brigade, too, traversed the village (based on private information supplied by RM)] – over the ground previously traversed by Cole – fell upon, overlapped at both ends, and thoroughly discomfited in close musketry duel the nine battalions of Bonnet's division. . ."

Bonnet's Division subsequently "fell back in disorder towards the hill behind them, and their rout compelled Clausel's division [pinned on the far flank by Spry's Portuguese] to give way also, since it exposed its flank to the oncoming line of Hulse's brigade on Clinton's right" (Oman pp. 461-2). The 6th drove on up the French side of the valley, while leading elements of the 1st Division to the left assured the security of Clinton's left flank (Oman, p. 462). It appears from Oman that as the 5th Division reformed to his right, and the 3rd further on, Clinton pressed on to engage the fresh French rearguard Division under Ferey.

The ensuing musketry duel exacted a terrible toll from both the French troops and the British brigades. Even as Ferey's Division yielded ground, Hinde's and Hulse's brigades were fought to a standstill. Thereupon, Rezende's Portuguese would appear to have managed a passage of lines in textbook order to advance from their position as the supporting line and engage Ferey's Division lining the edge of the woods. Their attack was shattered by French musketry, but at the same moment, Ferey's Division crumpled from the left under pressure from the advance of the 5th Division. The Fusilier brigade from the 4th Division was also in support of the Portuguese, although Oman's description seems to place it on the left of Rezende's brigade while one of his quoted sources implies the Fusiliers were behind it.

Pack's Portuguese Brigade

Deployed in the proximity of the Lesser Arapiles, in the mid-afternoon Pack was given the task of covering the 4th Division's left flank against the potential threat that Bonnet's French might offer from the vicinity of the Greater Arapiles. Choosing to exercise the discretion left him by Wellington, Pack launched a spoiling attack across the valley with the 4th Caçadores skirmishing ahead of the brigade, immediately supported by the grenadier companies of the Portuguese line battalions, which themselves followed in two columns with the 16th on the left and the 1st on the right (Oman, p. 456), once again, the order that British SOP would have suggested. I have left aside consideration of a number of formations which played no active role in the battle, such as the 7th and Light Divisions, Bradford's Portuguese, and d'España's Spaniards, and which therefore have little information available relating to their deployments.

More Observations on Salamanca 1812

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