Observations on
Deployments at Salamanca, 1812

A Question of Unrecognized SOPs at Work?

Case for a "SOP"?

by Howie Muir, Burkina Faso

It would seem that in the vast majority of cases in which the internal positions of regiments within brigades, and brigades within Divisions, can be determined, that both the French and Anglo-allied armies were greatly influenced by a standard operating procedure of deploying with adherence to some sort of seniority. The ancient paramount honour of the position on the right flank was maintained, though in different ways. Numerical order formed one aspect of regimental and brigade seniority (the British alternating between right and left postings, the French numbering from the right), and it would appear that seniority of commanders also played a role in determining brigade order. Customs of seniority then shaped the deployment choices and practices of both sides, as each seems carefully to have given consistent attention to which flank was in advance on the march so as to facilitate the rapid assumption of battle order.

Regimental Precedence:

By the long way around, such concern would suggest that contemporary commanders at all levels recognised a value in consistent neighbours among regiments and brigades amidst the confusion of battle, a logical extension of the religiously fixed internal arrangements of companies within a battalion. The rigidity of the relationship naturally weakened up the chain, as brigades were more fluidly rearranged with respect to each other and Divisions bore almost no consistency in their respective placements. A cursory survey of British practices at the battles of Alexandria (1801), Maida (1806), Vimiero (1808), Coruña and Talavera (1809) – as well as some French deployments, and even a glance at Austrian deployments at Castiglione (1796 – Bernhard Voykowitsch's Castiglione 1796 is illuminating) as a cross-check, suggests that the underlying influence of various seniority systems shaped different but very real national SOPs for deployment.

At Alexandria, the cavalry brigade and five of the seven British infantry brigades conformed to the traditional deployments; it is hard to decipher the seniority of the sixth (Stuart's brigade of foreign regiments in British service) and the disposition of the seventh, rightmost brigade was broken up by its deployment amidst a large ruin (see Piers Mackesy's excellent British Victory in Egypt, 1801). Of the four "divisions" at Maida, both Cole's brigade and the combined flank companies of Kempt's provisional battalion conformed to the custom of alternating seniority to the wings, while Acland deployed in reverse order; I cannot discern the order for Oswald. Oman and Napier provide little detailed information of the eight British brigades present at Vimiero; yet one can deduce that both Anstruther and Nightingall deployed in ways that honoured the customary imperative, while it seems Ferguson did not – for the others, there is not sufficient information to make deductions.

Again, for Coruña, Oman and Napier provide few details about brigade deployments: Anstruther's brigade of the Paget's Reserve Division engaged in the opposite of the customary order as the possible result of having marched off from its original position be the left and subsequently deployed to its left, thereby reversing its order; Manningham and Leith, based on conjectural evidence, may also have deployed using customary practice, but there is not enough detail to draw deductions about the other deployments. Yet, at Talavera, it appears that the British army deployed in textbook custom: of the nine Anglo-German brigades, six conformed, two the deployments are not specified, and the last, Stewart's may have had practical reasons for reversing its order; both Anglo-German cavalry brigades also conformed.

The utility of a SOP springs from the notion that any repeated operation of an organisation is executed more efficiently if there is a standardisation to it, a regularity or outline that involved multiple parties can comprehend, anticipate, and co-operate with. How much more efficient to be able to issue what would constitute a modern "fragmentary" order to regulate an order of march – "Left in front" or "Right in front", for example – rather than having to issue a full description of the order of march every time to each of the regimental commanders who then would have to harmonise the places of their individual battalions. That is not to say that seniority (a commander's, or regiment's, or that of the proprietary colonel, the Russian chef, or Austrian inhaber) dictated order in all marches or deployments, but it quite probably influenced the approach march to an anticipated field of battle.

Naturally no one wants a steady diet of dust at the end of the column, and it was probably normal to rotate this unpleasant post. And, doubtlessly, a brigade or even a Division might well have retained deployment practices based on initial orders of precedence when first formed and even to have continued old habits in spite of later reassignments until some demand or circumstance prompted an update of practice.

Brigade Precedence & A Study of Officer Seniority:

A glance at C.T. Atkinson's brigade and Divisional listing in the appendix of Oman's Wellington's Army, 1809-1814, reveals a general outline of the link between a commander's seniority and the precedence of the brigade. The outlines become clearer when individual officer's dates of commission and promotion are considered in detail. In the mere half-year preceding the battle at Salamanca, the British army experienced a bewildering – but not uncommon –rotation of commanders of the various formations.

From January 1812, four of the five Divisions considered above had changed commanding officers at least once and of the fifteen respective brigades, only two had not suffered changes of command. Consider the 3rd Division, for example, which by late 1810 was largely composed of the regiments it would have at Salamanca and the constituent British brigades of which were commanded by the men with whose names they were still associated at the start of 1812. Throughout, there seems to have been a studious attention to assignment of senior officers to senior Divisions and brigades, and junior officers to junior formations.

First, a brief explanation of an aspect of the seniority and rank of British officers, and the relationship to the formation commanded may be in order. The French general, Maximilian Foy (commanding officer of the 1st French Division at Salamanca), offered an artful (although not complete, and perhaps a somewhat biased) sketch of the system in his History of the War in the Peninsula:

Every English officer, from the commander-in-chief to the lowliest drummer, is included in the regimental rolls; all are paid according the rank which they fill in them. Those who are not, are placed on half-pay, and are not considered liable to serve.

The employments form the basis of the British army. The ranks then come as extraneous, and beyond the lieutenant's commission they do not always accompany the employment. Thus there are nominal captains who are majors, majors who are lieutenant-colonels, and lieutenant-colonels who are colonels. The ranks have been multiplied when on foreign service, in order that the English might always be above, or at least on an equality with the officers of other nations, with whom they might be called upon to act in the field. This is called brevet-rank in opposition to commission-rank. In the interior of the regiment, the officer ranks according to his commission; in the general service of the army, and wherever detachments from different corps are marching together, he commands in right of his brevet-rank.

The acting commander of a regiment is its eldest lieutenant-colonel. By a most inexplicable singularity the rank of colonel, which in every other army is so important, has no corresponding employment in either the English infantry or cavalry. The general officers in the army are colonels of regiments. …This empty title, which has no duty attached to it, enables them to derive a handsome income from their regiments. Previously to 1810, brevet-colonels, who commanded brigades abroad, or even within the three kingdoms, were called brigadier-generals. This was not considered as a rank. At present the colonel who commands a brigade neither changes his title nor uniform. In the regular order, brigades are commanded by major-generals, divisions by lieutenant-generals, and armies by generals or field-marshals. . .

The Government, when it has bestowed special commands on, or entrusted important missions to superior officers or generals, has sometimes given them a rank above that of which they have the brevet: this is called local or temporary rank, because the privileges of the rank are limited to a certain time and space. Although the King has been pleased to give a momentary illustration to the officer invested with his confidence, the classification of this officer remains the same in the army; and during his accidental elevation, the Government takes care to place no officers senior to himself in permanent rank under his command. (Foy, pp. 172-6)

One can see here the kernel of the difficulties faced by London in finding sufficient numbers of experienced senior officers to serve under the relatively junior Arthur Wellesley (and future Wellington). More to the point, the parallel system of ranks necessitated quite a minuet of precedence when senior officer needed to be replaced.

From the British Army's arrival in the Peninsula in 1808, the order in which brigades were numbered almost invariably paralleled the seniority of the commander assigned to the formation. I note with interest that in a General Order of 7th August 1808, Wellesley formed his army and numbered the brigades by the seniority of the commanding officer and, most tellingly, listed them from the right as follows: 1st (Hill), 3rd (Nightingall), 5th (Craufurd), 4th (Bowes), 2nd (Ferguson), 6th (Fane) – the pattern of alternating seniority is clear, with the exception of Fane, whose light brigade Wellesley considered to be outside the normal order (and seniority) of the line brigades (private communication from McGuigan). Anstruther and Acland subsequently received the 7th and 8th Brigades in that order apparently due to the dates of their arrival and the lack of time available to reorganise before engaging in active operations (General Orders of 20th and 21st August 1808, private communication from McGuigan).

When I reread Oman's description of the British approach march to Rolica with this General Order in mind, it appears that the SOP for battle array was key to shaping the role of each brigade: "On the left, General Ferguson, with his own brigade and that of Bowes … struck over the hills to get around the eastern flank of the French. In the centre. . . Hill's brigade formed the right, Fane's the left, Nigthengale's [sic] the centre, while Catlin Crawfurd's [sic] two battalions and the Cazadores acted as the reserve" (Oman, vol. 1, p.237): the commanding officer's seniority directly influenced placement, which shaped assignment.

Also worth noting, is that in his General Order of 4th May 1809 (private communication from McGuigan), Wellesley again listed the constituent brigades by seniority of commanding officer and in the order of their battle array right to left: Guards, 1st, 3rd, 5th, 7th, 6th, 4th, 2nd, and then the KGL – which was considered to be (along with the Guards) outside the system of arranging the British brigades, as was to be evident in their Division at Talavera.

Throughout the war it was common for the senior brigade commander to assume command of the Division, whether to compensate for the lack of lieutenant-generals or to fill in for an absent or fallen superior. Seniority of assignment was also the norm among the commanders of Divisions, an echelon of organisation already employed by Wellesley in 1807 during the expedition against Copenhagen and by Moore in 1808. Again Wellesley employed virtual Divisional groupings of brigades for his advance on Oporto in 1809.

With the Divisional organisation of June 1809, the British Peninsular army began to take on the outlines of its final shape, which would further be filled in with the attachment of Portuguese brigades beginning in early 1810. Created in 1809, the 3rd Division took on its long-term character with the general reorganisation of the British army in early 1810, when it was one of the first to receive a Portuguese brigade. The assignment of its commanders is not atypical of the British Divisions, although the pattern does present some anomalies.

The First Brigade (1/45th, 74th, 1/88th) started the year of 1812, still under Maj.-Gen. MacKinnon. As a brevet-colonel from the Coldstream Foot Guards, Henry MacKinnon had obtained command of Donkin's Second Brigade upon Donkin's departure from the Division in October 1809. This brigade had been born of the Division's heavy losses suffered at Talavera and the death there of the First Brigade's commander, Maj.-Gen. Mackenzie. The Division's two brigades were amalgamated under the Second Brigade's commander, brevet-Colonel Donkin. A new First Brigade arrived immediately after the battle under brevet-Colonel Robert Craufurd, whose army rank of colonel was senior to Donkin's. Moreover, on 26 July, Craufurd had received the local rank of brigadier-general. Craufurd, as senior brigade commander had then also assumed command of the Division. On 22 February 1810, Wellington launched Craufurd's brigade on it famous career as the nucleus of the newly-founded Light Division, at which point MacKinnon's brigade again became the 3rd Division's First. Later, MacKinnon was to be appointed a brigadier-general on 6 August 1811, elevated to local major-general on 26 October 1811 and appointed a major-general on 1 January 1812.

Curiously, however, Stafford Lightburne, commander of the brigade which was transferred from the 4th Division to become the 3rd Division's Second Brigade on 22 February 1810, was already a major-general and thus senior to MacKinnon – apparently upsetting of the thesis of seniority. A closer study of the Wellington's General Orders, and an appreciation for the nuance of military language, reveals a delicate but crucial distinction between temporary and permanent assignment. Not only was Thomas Picton appointed to command of the Division in the General Orders of 22 February 1810, but because this was only "until further orders," he simultaneously received command of the Division's First Brigade. In the same orders, Maj.-Gen. Lightburne, to whom Picton was just barely senior, was given the Second.

MacKinnon, meanwhile, simply remained, until his death, in active charge of the First Brigade, assigned by these General Orders to be a Colonel on the Staff to Picton's brigade; Picton's Divisional duties immediately occupied his attentions and he never assumed charge of his new brigade, although the First Brigade technically remained his until Kempt's appointment in the winter of 1812 (private communication with McGuigan).

In any event, the recently arrived Lightburne had spent less than two months with the 4th Division and would depart for home just over seven months later. When Maj.-Gen. MacKinnon was killed at Ciudad Roderigo in January 1812, the newly promoted Maj.-Gen. James Kempt was appointed to fill his post on 8 February only to be wounded on 8 April at Badajoz, leaving Lt.-Col. Wallace of the brigade's 88th Foot to take over ad interim (Wallace had already substituted for four months during

The Second Brigade (2/5th, 77th, 2/83rd, 94th Foot) had been borne of the amalgamation of the remaining units after Talavera and had been Maj.-Gen. Colville's since he'd replaced Maj.-Gen. Lightburne in October 1810. It was still known as "Colville's brigade" even after his December 1811 transfer to the temporary command of the 4th Division during the ill Cole's absence (a post at which he remained until wounded at Badajoz); the transfer left Lt.-Col. James Campbell of the 94th Foot in temporary command. On 28 June, J. Campbell was superseded by Maj.-Gen. Pakenham's assignment from the Adjutant-General's Department to acting command of "Colville's brigade in the 3rd Division;" Campbell was again in charge before Salamanca when Pakenham temporarily took over the Division for the absent Picton.

The Portuguese 8th Brigade (12th Caçadores, 9th & 21st Line) had originally been Harvey's brigade (absent the 12th Caçadores, which arrived in April of 1812) when married to the 3rd Division in February 1810. It had begun 1812 under Palmeirim who turned it over in March to Col. Champalimaud (for spelling, RM cites S.P. Ward's The Portuguese Infantry Brigades, 1809-1814, vice Atkinson's version of "Champlemond") of the Portuguese 21st Line – who had commanded it at Bussaco in 1810, where he had been wounded. Wounded again at Badajoz, Champalimaud yielded temporary command to Lt.-Col Charles Sutton of the 9th Line. Brig-Gen. Power (of the 32nd Foot) took over from Champalimaud probably in July; he was no stranger to the brigade, as he had commanded it at Fuentes d'Onoro the previous year.

Thus, in just the first half of 1812, the 3rd Division experienced three changes of Divisional leadership, the First Brigade four changes, the Second Brigade two changes, and the Portuguese brigade three changes of command. To scan to the end of the war, Wallace departed for home in late 1812, an invalid of the Burgos retreat (Wellington's Army, p. 361), leaving the temporary command of the brigade to Lt.-Col. Robert Trench of the 74th Foot. Kempt, the last permanent appointment seems not to have been permanently replaced until local Brig-Gen. Brisbane's assignment in January 1813 (promoted to major-general in June that year), a year after the former's wounding at Badajoz (Wellington's Army, p. 368) and mere two-month command in the wake of MacKinnon's death. Brisbane retained command until the war's end.

The Second brigade was subject to some four further changes of commander. J. Campbell remained in temporary command until Colville's resumption of command in May 1813 (save for a brief space after Salamanca when Lt.-Col. Henry King, 2/5th commanded). Col. Keane of the 5/60th Foot guided the brigade from mid-August 1813 and retained command of the brigade until the end of the war. Pakenham, having performed so well as the commander of the 3rd Division at Salamanca, continued his usefulness as an interim commander, being transferred to temporary command of the 6th Division in January of the 1813 (in Clinton's absence), after which Colville acted in command the 3rd Division until Picton's return in May 1813, thereafter reverting to his brigade. Another bout of ill health for Picton put Maj.-Gen. Manley Power in command in September and October 1813, followed by Colville again in November-December, until Picton's final return on Christmas day 1813. Interestingly, while offering a commentary on the difficulty of keeping sufficiently senior officers in place, none of these post-Salamanca changes of command upset the precedence of the brigades.

A corroborative glance at another of the heavily engaged British Divisions, the 4th under Cole, reveals an even greater consistency of adherence to the principle of seniority of brigades within the Division. From its creation in 1809, the officer permanently assigned to the command of the First Brigade was always senior to the permanent commander of the Second, in spite of the rotation of officers. There even appears to be evidence of a curious manipulation of brigade and command precedence during the major army reorganisation in February 1810 to maintain the principle: the First and Second Brigades were switched, or rather the units composing them were, while Maj.-Gen. Cole, who was also the commander of the First Brigade, remained chief of the new First Brigade and Col. Kemmis, 40th Foot, attached by the General Orders "as a Colonel on the Staff to the brigade of Major General Cole" (as MacKinnon was for Picton's brigade), remained in active command of it (private communication with McGuigan).

The former First Brigade, which had been temporarily under Col. Myers, 7th Foot, after Maj.-Gen. A. Campbell's wounding at Talavera, again came under A. Campbell's command at the time of the switch. One might presume that the switch of brigades was related to Campbell's return to duty. As the junior major-general taking up command of the units that had previously been his, the question of precedence presented itself, and it seems to have been the occasion of considerable manipulation of the order of battle to keep the "First" Brigade under the senior brigade commander. Similar tales are revealed for the other British Division command structures.

It is interesting, although perhaps not surprising, to note that throughout the British army the brigades often continued to be known by their commander's name, especially if no permanent replacement had been named: witness the lingering attachment of Colville's name to his brigade which endured through 1812, until Pakenham's arrival in June. Clearly, a temporary replacement such as Wallace or Forbes for the 3rd Division's First Brigade or J. Campbell for the Second Brigade did not effect brigade precedence.

More Observations on Salamanca 1812

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